SUDAN AND THE ARABS: POSSIBLY STEP-SISTERS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 KHARTOUM 03477

DEPT PASS TO OAU COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON MASS KPRP SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN AND THE ARABS: POSSIBLY STEP-SISTERS;
CERTAINLY NOT BROTHERS


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS HAVE UNDERGONE A
METAMORPHOSIS SINCE THE MILITARY COUP OF JUNE 1989. MOST
ARAB STATES REACTED WARMLY TO THE OUSTER OF SADIQ AL-
MAHDI. SINCE THEN, THIS WARMTH HAS DISSIPATED AS AN
UNENLIGHTENED GOS HAS DRIFTED TOWARD LIBYA FOR SUSTENANCE.
THE GOS HAS TRIED TO GLOSS OVER ITS PECULIAR INTEGRATION
PLAN WITH LIBYA BY DEPICTING IT AS A STEP TOWARD ARAB
UNITY. WHILE SOUTHERN SUDANESE BLAME ARAB INFLUENCE FOR
THEIR TROUBLES, SUDAN'S ARAB IMPULSES REFLECT EXPEDIENCY
MORE THAN CONVICTION. OTHER THAN HISTORICAL, MULTIFACETED
LINKAGES WITH EGYPT, SUDAN'S ARAB TIES ARE LARGELY DRIVEN
BY PROSPECTS OF JOBS AND AID, ESPECIALLY DONATION OF KEY
COMMODITIES (WHEAT AND OIL) AND MILITARY MATERIAL. THE
RELATIONSHIPS TEND TO BE ONE-SIDED--SUDAN IS A WILLING
RECIPIENT WITH LITTLE, EXCEPT RHETORIC AND ITS
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CASE OF LIBYA, TO OFFER. AMONG ARABS,
EGYPT IS MOST MINDFUL OF SUDAN WITH CONCERNS FOR WATER
RESOURCES AND STABILITY. SUDANESE ARE DRAWN TO EGYPT--AS
MANY AS A MILLION MAY LIVE THERE--AND RELY ON ITS
BENEFICIENCE BUT ARE QUICK TO BRIDLE AT PERCEIVED
MEDDLING. PRIME TARGETS FOR GOS SOLICITATIONS ARE LIBYA
(RECEPTIVE),IRAQ (ONCE RECEPTIVE) AND SAUDI ARABIA
(DISENCHANTED). MEANWHILE LARGE SUDANESE COMMUNITIES IN
SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE REMAIN KEY SOURCES FOR
PRIVATE INCOME AND BADLY NEEDED BUT DECLINING
INVESTMENT. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW


3. SUDAN, WITH ITS ETHNIC AMALGAM STRETCHING SOUTH OF
THE SAHARA, DOES NOT FIT COMFORTABLY INTO THE ARAB
WORLD. TO BE SURE, ARAB CULTURE--LANGUAGE, MEDIA, THE
ARTS, HISTORY, MANNERS--PERMEATES NORTHERN SUDANESE
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR, AND ITS INFLUENCE IS EVIDENT EVEN
AMONG SOUTHERNERS PRONE TO RESIST IT. MOREOVER, SUDAN'S
POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS ARE DOMINATED BY
MEMBERS OF RIVERINE, EASTERN AND WESTERN TRIBES
CONVENTIONALLY CLASSIFIED AS ARAB. AS POLITICS GO,
HOWEVER, THIS ARABIST LINK, INTRODUCED BY THE EGYPTIANS,
IS IN MANY WAYS AN ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION. SUDANESE,
EMBROILED IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL AND PERSONAL PROBLEMS,
ARE NOT EMOTIONALLY DRIVEN BY "ARAB ISSUES" LIKE THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND THE IRANIAN THREAT,
EXCEPT AS THEY BEAR A MORE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP, E.G.
ISRAEL'S ETHIOPIAN TIES AND ITS ALLEGED LINKS WITH THE
SPLA. RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FACTORS--THE HISTORIC STAIN
OF THE ARAB SLAVE TRADE, INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINATION, AND
PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC NONCONFORMITY--ALSO DISTANCE
SUDANESE SOMEWHAT FROM THE ARAB MAINSTREAM.


4. NOTWITHSTANDING AMBIVALENT EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO
THE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, PARTICIPATES IN THE
INNUMERABLE ARAB GATHERINGS AND HIGHLIGHTS ITS ARAB
CREDENTIALS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO THE EXTENT OF
UNDERTAKING AIRY UNITY PROJECTS. THE REASON IS PLAINLY
SELF-INTEREST. SUDAN EMBRACES ARABISM BECAUSE IT
LITERALLY PAYS TO DO SO. SUFFERING FROM AN INTERMINABLE
WAR AND ECONOMIC DEVASTATION, SUDAN NEEDS THE JOB AND AID
OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARAB COUNTRIES CAN AND SOMETIMES DO
PROVIDE.


5. WHILE NORTHERN SUDANESE TEND TO ACCEPT THEIR ARAB
STATUS AS USEFUL, SOUTHERNERS PERCEIVE ARABS AS THE
PROBLEM. TO SOUTHERNERS, "ARAB" HAS BECOME A PEJORATIVE
TERM REPRESENTING UNJUST AND OPPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR.
PASSING OVER SUDAN'S ETHNIC DIVERSITY, TRADITIONAL
RIVALRIES AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS, THEY ARE FOND OF
BLAMING THE ARABS FOR MISRULE AND INEQUITY. A FREQUENT
SOUTHERN REFRAIN IS THAT ARABS CONSTITUTE ONLY A
MINORITY, THOUGH A PLURALITY, IN SUDAN, WHICH IS PROBABLY
TRUE. BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION, SOUTHERNERS ARGUE THAT
THEIR UNITING WITH NONARAB NORTHERNERS--SUCH AS THE NUBA,
THE FUR, AND THE NUBIANS--COULD RESOLVE SUDAN'S DIVISIVE
PROBLEMS. THE IMPROBABILITY OF THIS THESIS ONLY
UNDERSCORES ITS FALLACY. RELIGIOUS, IDEOLOGICAL AND
TRADITIONAL TRIBAL DIVISIONS OUTWEIGH THE ISSUE OF ARAB
TIES. THE FUR OF DARFUR, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE MORE AT EASE
WITH ARAB MUSLIMS, EXCEPTING PERHAPS THEIR RIZEIGAT
ADVERSARIES, THAN WITH SOUTHERN CHRISTIANS.


6. THE ARAB WORLD, FOR THE MOST PART, LOOKS ON SUDAN AS
CHRONICALLY WAYWARD WITH SELF-INDUCED PROBLEMS. SUDANESE
ARE VIEWED AS PERSONABLE, RESPECTFUL OF AUTHORITY, AND
DEPENDABLE WORKERS ABROAD BUT, AT HOME, HOPELESSLY
INCAPABLE OF MANAGING THEMSELVES. EXASPERATION AND
PATERNALISM ARE STANDARD ARAB RESPONSES. BROODING ABOUT
BURDENSOME AND UNSAFE (THE UAE AMBASSADOR WAS NEARLY
ASSASSINATED IN 1988) LIVING CONDITIONS, ARAB DIPLOMATS
IN KHARTOUM UNIFORMLY CRAVE EARLY REASSIGNMENTS. THEIR
AVOIDANCE OF THE WESTERN DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT (EXCEPTING
EGYPT ABD MOROCCO) IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF THEIR
INDUSTRY, THOUGH SOME ARE NOTICEABLY UNINFORMED AND
UNPRODUCTIVE THE EGYPTIANS ARE THE MOST NUMBEROUS,
ACTIVE, VISIBLE AND BEST INFORMED OF ARAB DIPLOMATS.
DIPLOMATS FROM WEALTHIER ARAB STATES ALSO SOCIALIZE
REGULARLY WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE
USUALLY ASKED FOR MORE ASSISTANCE THAN ADVICE.


7. TWO AXIOMS WELL DEFINE THE STATE OF SUDAN'S ARAB
RELATIONS TODAY. FIRST, A SENSE OF DEJA VU PREVAILS.
IRRESOLUTE DECISIONMAKING AND ZIGZAGING POLICIES
CHARACTERIZING SADIQ AL-MAHDI'S GOVERNMENTS HAS ALSO
PLAGUED THEIR MILITARY SUCCESSOR PUSHING SUDAN TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND IRRELEVANCE. SADIQ'S OUSTER
IN JUNE 1989 WAS WELCOMED HEARTILY BY MOST ARABS. THE
FORMER PRIME MINISTER'S INCOMPETENT RULE, TACTLESS
CONDUCT AND FLIRTATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT
(NIF) AND IRAN MANAGED TO ANTAGONIZE PRACTICALLY ALL
ARABS SAVE LIBYA. THESE EARLY CHEERS SOURED HOWEVER AS
THE RCC RAPIDLY REVEALED THEIR OWN BRAND OF ECONOMIC
MISMANAGEMENT, INABILITY TO COMPROMISE FOR PEACE AND A
POLITICAL AGENDA WHICH IS ATTRACTIVE TO ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISTS. THE REGIME WHICH BEGAN BY COLD
SHOULDERING THE LIBYANS AND MAKING OVERTURES TO MODERATE
ARABS GRADUALLY REVERTED, BECAUSE OF NECESSITY, TO WHERE
SUDAN'S WARMEST PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP IS AGAIN THAT WITH
LIBYA.


8. SECOND, SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS, LARGELY
UNILATERAL IN TERMS OF TANGIBLE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
BENEFITS, CLEARLY ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO SUDAN THAN TO ITS
PARTNERS. A HIERARCHY EXISTS AMONG THESE RELATIONSHIPS.
ON THE PERIPHERY, WITH MINIMAL TIES TO SUDAN, ARE THE
MAHGREB STATES (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA),PEOPLES OF
THE LEVANT (LEBANESE, SYRIANS, PALESTINIANS, JORDANIANS)
AND OTHER NONDONOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES (SOMALIA, DJIBOUTI,
MAURITANIA). OF GREATER IMPORTANCE ARE THE SMALL ARABIAN
PENINSULAR STATES WHERE MANY SUDANESE WORK. MORE VITAL
ARE SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH ARE PRIME TARGETS
FOR AID AND EMPLOYMENT. FINALLY, EGYPT IS IN A CATEGORY
OF ITS OWN. A BRIEF SURVEY OF SOME OF THESE
RELATIONSHIPS FOLLOWS.

EGYPT


9. SUDAN HAS LONG MAINTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL (THOUGH
OCCASIONALLY PRICKLY) RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT THAT IS
FIRMLY FOUNDED ON HISTORY AND THE NILE. COMBINED WITHIN
OTTOMAN EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM (AND
EVEN EARLIER DATING BACK TO CUSHITE PHARAOHS),SUDANESE
AND EGYPTIANS REFER TO THEMSELVES AS BROTHERS. BY ITS
VERY FAMILIARITY AND OBVIOUS ASYMMETRY, THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP UNDERGOES PERIODIC STRAINS. MUTUAL
INTERESTS AND PERSONAL CONTACTS SO TIGHTLY INTERTWINE
THIS LINK, HOWEVER, THAT A RUPTURE IS ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE
TO IMAGINE.


10. THE EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE RELATIONSHIP IS FAR DEEPER AND
MORE MULTI-FACETED THAN MANY REALIZE. EGYPT'S PRIMARY
CONCERN IS STABILITY ON ITS SOUTHERN BORDER AND ENSURING
ITS WATER SUPPLY. MEASUREMENT OF NILE WATERS IS AN
IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS. SUDAN,
EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA FREQUENTLY DEBATE WATER ALLOCATIONS IN
BILATERAL SESSIONS AND IN FORMAL MEETINGS OF A NILE WATER
COMMISSION. (SUDAN REPORTEDLY USES ONLY ONE QUARTER OF
ITS ALLOCATION WHILE EGYPT USES TWICE ITS ALLOCATED
AMOUNT.) ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SUCCESSES IN SUDAN THAT
COULD STIMULATE EGYPT'S RELIGIOUS RIGHT WORRY THE
EGYPTIANS ABOVE OTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THERE IS
NOT, HOWEVER, A STRONG LINK BETWEEN THE NIF AND EGYPT'S
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ASSORTED ISLAMIC GAMAA GROUPINGS.
EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE TIES IN GENERAL ARE SUSTAINED THROUGH A
VARIETY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS. AMONG THEM: A
STEADY STREAM OF SUDANESE SHOPPERS, VACATIONERS AND
JOB-SEEKERS TRAVELLING TO EGYPT (UP TO A MILLION ARE
BELIEVED TO LIVE THERE); AN OPTIONAL EGYPTIAN SCHOOL
SYSTEM, ELEMENTARY THROUGH UNIVERSITY, IN SUDAN FUNDED BY
THE GOE; THE PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OF EGYPTIAN MEDIA AND
POPULAR CULTURE IN SUDAN; AN ESTIMATED 20,000 SUDANESE
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN EGYPT (INCLUDING 1000 SOUTHERNERS
ON EGYPTIAN SCHOLARSHIPS); STRONG COMMERCIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE; EGYPTIAN TRAINING
FOR POLICE, MILITARY OFFICERS AND TRADE UNIONISTS; AND A
HERITAGE OF EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE MARRIAGES (SADAT'S MOTHER
WAS SUDANESE; AHMAD AL-MIRGHANI AND MUBARAK AL-MAHDI'S
MOTHERS ARE EGYPTIAN).


11. DESPITE THEIR CLOSE RELATIONS, EGYPTIANS ADMIT TO
BEING CONSTANTLY CONFOUNDED BY THEIR UNPREDICTABLE
SOUTHERN BROTHERS. SHOCKED IN THE 1950'S WHEN SUDAN ON
SHORT NOTICE AND IN A REVERSAL OF POLICY OPTED FOR
INDEPENDENCE RATHER THAN UNION, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE SINCE
TRIED, OFTEN UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO GUIDE SUDANESE POLICIES
WITHOUT SEEMING OVERBEARING. MANY EGYPTIANS PRIVATELY
ADMIT TO VIEWING SUDANESE AS INTELLECTUALLY INFERIOR.
BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO DEAL CAREFULLY WITH
SUDANESE WHO ARE HYPERSENSITIVE TO PERCEIVED EGYPTIAN
INSULTS TO THEIR DIGNITY.


12. BY CONTRAST, MOST SUDANESE ARE CYNICAL AND DUBIOUS
ABOUT EGYPTIAN MOTIVES. MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT DISCARDED PLANS TO UNITE WITH AND
CONTROL SUDAN. (ONLY A FEW SUDANESE DINOSAURS BELONGING
TO THE OLD NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY STILL SUPPORT THIS
ONCE POPULAR DREAM.) THE BUILDING OF THE ASWAN DAM,
WHICH FORCED THE RELOCATION OF NORTHERN SUDANESE
RESIDENTS OF WADI HALFA, AND THE UNCOMPLETED JONGOLAI
CANAL, BELIEVED BY SOUTHERNERS TO BE AN EGYPTIAN PLOT TO
DIVERT NILE WATERS FOR ITS BENEFIT, STILL AROUSES
RESENTMENT. THEY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE UBIQUITOUS EGYPTIAN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. IN EXPLAINING THEIR ATTITUDES,
SUDANESE WILL OFTEN DRAW DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUDANESE
AND EGYPTIAN PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER TRAITS. EGYPTIANS
COMMONLY ARE SAID TO BE CAREFREE, HUMOROUS, DECEPTIVE AND
MACHIEVILLIAN, AND COMFORTABLE WITH AUTHORITARIAN RULE
WHILE THE SUDANESE DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS SERIOUS,
INTROVERTED, HONEST, DIRECT AND POLITICALLY LIBERTARIAN.


13. SUDANESE WILL USUALLY SAY THAT EGYPTIANS EVOKE
BITTERSWEET FEELINGS. MOST SUDANESE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
THEY FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH EGYPTIANS AND THAT EGYPT IS
THEIR MOST INTIMATE AND IMPORTANT NEIGHBOR. ON
PRACTICALLY ANY POLITICAL ISSUE--E.G. AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SHARIA, LIBYAN INTEGRATION, HANGING OF CURRENCY
VIOLATORS--THE FIRST SUDANESE REACTION IS TO WONDER ABOUT
EGYPT'S REACTION. DEEP DOWN, SUDANESE, EVEN MOST UMMA
PARTY ADHERENTS, ADMIT TO THE EXPECTATION, IF NOT
APPRECIATION, OF EGYPTIAN GUIDANCE AND PROTECTION. AT
THE SAME TIME, REFLECTING THE CLASSIC LOVE/HATE EMOTIONS
OF A SUBORDINATE TOWARD HIS MORE POWERFUL GUARDIAN,
SUDANESE ENJOY NOTHING BETTER THAN TO BAIT EGYPTIANS AND
WATCH THEM PUBLICLY HUMILIATED. A DISPUTED FOUL IN A
FOOTBALL MATCH IN KHARTOUM BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT ALMOST
STARTED A RIOT IN EARLY 1989. MOST SUDANESE
ENTHUSIASTICALLY CHEERED FOR ALGERIA (AS THEY WILL FOR
ANY OPPONENT OF EGYPT) IN ALGERIA'S RECENT WORLD CUP
MATCHES WITH EGYPT.


14. THE RESULT OF THE JUNE 30 COUP WAS A SURPRISE TO THE
EGYPTIANS THOUGH, AT THE TIME, THE GOE CERTAINLY WELCOMED
AND ENCOURAGED CHANGE MORE THAN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, AS
A RESULT OF ITS ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH SADIQ AL-MAHDI
AND HIS EGYPTOPHOBIC UMMA COLLEAGUES. GENERAL OMAR
HIGHLIGHTED THE SHIFT IN POLICY BY INVITING EGYPTIAN
AMBASSADOR SHERBINI FOR DISCUSSIONS SOON AFTER THE COUP
AND MAKING CAIRO HIS FIRST FOREIGN CALL (IN CONTRAST TO
SADIQ WHO DELIBERATELY SNUBBED EGYPT AND TRAVELLED WIDELY
BEFORE VISITING EGYPT.) WITH UNAPOLOGETIC DECLARATIONS
OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOE, THE RCC SOLICITED ADVICE OF
PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND AMBASSADOR SHERBINI. THE
BLANDISHMENTS AND THE POLITICAL TURNAROUND IN THE GOS
POSTURE TOWARD EGYPT HAD THEIR DESIRED EFFECT, WITH THE
GOE SENDING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGING
DONATIONS FROM ITS WEALTHIER MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS.
MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(TRADITIONAL LEADING PLAYERS INVOLVING SUDAN) CLEARLY
WANTED TO BELIEVE IN GENERAL OMAR. MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF
FUNDAMENTALIST LEANINGS, UNPOPULARITY, AND INCOMPETENCY
WERE DISCOUNTED, EVENTUALLY LEADING IN LATE 1989 TO AN
EGYPTIAN SPLIT IN PERCEPTIONS OF SUDAN BETWEEN SENIOR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS AND A LESS SANGUINE FOREIGN
MINISTRY. THIS SPLIT QUICKLY BECAME A HOT TOPIC OF
SUDANESE POLITICAL CONVERSATION. WHILE BIFURCATED GOE
VIEWS OF SUDAN APPARENTLY REMAIN, SUDANESE ARGUE THAT GOE
DISCONTENT WITH EVENTS IN SUDAN HAVE WIDENED AND DEEPENED
AS THE GOS HAS WARMED TO LIBYA AND FAILED TO MAKE PEACE
WITH THE SPLA. MOST BELIEVE THAT THE GOE HAS RETREATED
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ITS EARLY SUPPORT OF THE RCC AND THAT
FROSTIER BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND EVEN COUP PLOTTING,
REMINISCENT OF A YEAR AGO ARE IN THE OFFING.


15. ALTHOUGH SUDANESE SHOP FOR CONSUMER GOODS IN CAIRO
AND MOST LOCAL MERCHANTS (INCLUDING MANY COPTS) MAINTAIN
TIES TO EGYPTIAN COMPANIES, EGYPT IS NOT SUDAN'S TOP
TRADING PARTNER. OFFICIAL TRADE HAS BEEN GOVERNED BY
SPECIAL TRADE PROTOCOLS THAT PROVIDES BARTER AND SPECIAL
ACCOUNTING MECHANISMS TO DEAL WITH THE NONCONVERTIBLE
CURRENCIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THESE PROTOCOLS,
LARGELY ILLUSORY (TRADE GOES ON REGARDLESS) WITH FANCIFUL
PROJECTED AMOUNTS--USDOLS 360 MILLION IN THE 1989
PROTOCOL--AND AN OVERVALUED SUDANESE POUND IN RELATION TO
THE EGYPTIAN POUND, HAVE BROKEN DOWN REGULARLY WITH
MUTUAL CHARGES OF AN UNFAIR SURPLUS AND FAILURE TO LIVE
UP TO THE ACCORD. IN 1989, THE GOVERNMENT OF SADIQ
AL-MAHDI ABROGATED THE PROTOCOL AND RESORTED BRIEFLY TO
TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND BORDER TRAFFIC (NUBIANS
IN NORTHERN SUDAN TRADITIONALLY HAVE FLOATED BETWEEN
BORDERS). WITH FRIENDLIER BILATERAL TIES AFTER THE COUP,
ANOTHER LUCRATIVE PROTOCOL WAS NEGOTIATED. KEY PROBLEMS
WITH THE PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN SMUGGLING, ESPECIALLY OF
SUDANESE CAMELS BYPASSING EGYPTIAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS, AND
A COMPLICATED MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME THAT DIFFERS
ACCORDING TO VARIOUS COMMODITIES. ACCORDING TO THE
LATEST STATISTICS, SUDAN EXPORTED 26,607,000 SUDANESE
POUNDS (USDOLS 2,216,000 BASED ON CURRENT COMMERCIAL
EXCHANGE RATE) WORTH OF GOODS TO EGYPT IN THE FIRST HALF
OF 1989--PRIMARILY SESAME, WATERMELON SEEDS AND CAMELS.
CAMELS CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF EXPORTS. (THE 1989
PROTOCOL ASSIGNED A VALUE OF USDOLS 120 MILLION FOR CAMEL
EXPORTS; LITTLE OF THE CAMEL TRADE FLOWS THROUGH OFFICIAL
CHANNELS.) DURING THE SAME PERIOD, IMPORTS FROM EGYPT
TOTALED 113,081,000 SUDANESE POUNDS (USDOLS 9,423,000),
CONCENTRATED IN TEXTILES AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS.
THE TEMPORARY RUPTURE IN THE PROTOCOL FAILED TO PUT A
DENT INTO TRADE PATTERNS. TOTAL OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN TRADE
(IMPORTS AND EXPORTS) FOR ALL OF 1988 AMOUNTED TO 161
MILLION POUNDS.


16. PLEADING POVERTY AND A NEED TO APPEAR EVENHANDED IN
SUDAN'S CIVIL WAR, EGYPT HAS PROVIDED LITTLE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, MUCH TO THE SUDANESE ARMY'S CHAGRIN. A
MILITARY AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT. A
DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED BY NIMEIRI WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A
WEAK "BROTHERHOOD CHARTER" UNDER SADIQ AL-MAHDI. EVEN
THIS WAS REPEALED IN 1989 AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE SPLA.
AFTER THE COUP HOWEVER, THE GOS ANNOUNCED THAT THE
MILITARY DEFENSE TREATY HAD NEVER BEEN ABROGATED AND THUS
REMAINED IN EFFECT. THE GOE, INDIFFERENT TO WHETHER A
TREATY EXISTS OR NOT, HAS SHOWN RELATIVELY LITTLE
INTEREST IN THE WHOLE AFFAIR. EGYPT'S BIGGEST INFLUENCE
WITH THE SUDANESE MILITARY HAS BEEN THROUGH ITS TRAINING
PROGRAMS, RANGING FROM BASIC LEVELS TO NASSER HIGHER WAR
COLLEGE. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND
COUNCIL (RCC) RECEIVED TRAINING IN EGYPT, WHICH REMAINS
SUDAN'S CENTER OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING. MOST
SUDANESE OFFICERS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO EGYPTIANS, THOUGH
THEY CHAFE AT THE LACK OF MATERIAL HELP. SMALL AMOUNTS
OF MILITARY AID RECENTLY PROVIDED HAVE BEEN NONLETHAL
SUCH AS UNIFORMS AND PARACHUTES. SUDANESE ARE QUICK TO
REMIND THE EGYPTIANS THAT SUDANESE BRIGADES FOUGHT SIDE
BY SIDE WITH THE EGYPTIANS DURING ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI
WARS.

LIBYA


17. AN INTEGRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUDAN AND LIBYA
ABRUPTLY ANNOUNCED IN EARLY MARCH 1990 PROPOSING TO
COMBINE THE TWO COUNTRIES' POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY,
AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITHIN FOUR YEARS CULMINATED A STEADY
WARMING TREND IN THE RCC'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TRIPOLI. A
RECURRING PHENOMENON TO LURE COLONEL QADHAFI'S FAVOR, THE
UNITY PACKAGE LARGELY REGURGITATED OLD IDEAS INCORPORATED
MOST RECENTLY IN AN ABORTED UNITY PLAN MOOTED IN 1988.
DESPITE ORNATE RHETORIC, MULTIPLE OFFICIAL VISITS, AND A
CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO PROMOTING UNITY, FEW SUDANESE
SERIOUSLY BELIEVE IT WILL SUCCEED. THUS, CONFIDENT THAT
UNITY WILL UNGLUE BEFORE IT MATERIALIZES, PUBLIC
OPPOSITION TO INTEGRATION IS LIMITED, THOUGH SENIOR ARMY
OFFICERS REPORTEDLY HAVE VOICED DISSATISFACTION.
RIDICULE IS THE MORE COMMON REACTION. AWARE OF THE
DERISION, THE GOS HAS TRIED TO PORTRAY THE ACCORD AS A
STEP TOWARD PAN-ARAB UNITY, A MORE PALATABLE IF EQUALLY
UNLIKELY NOTION. THE UNITY SCHEME, SO LONG AS IT IS
UNREALIZED ALSO HAS ITS SUPPORTERS. MANY SUDANESE
ACCEPT LIBYAN AID AS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY AND WELL WORTH
HOLLOW RHETORIC AND QUIXOTIC UNITY SCHEMES. SUDANESE
MOSTLY LOOK UPON LIBYANS AS DUNDERHEADS AND QADHAFI AS
ECCENTRIC BUT NOT A REAL THREAT TO SUDAN. "MILK THEM
WHILE YOU CAN" IS A POPULAR SENTIMENT.


18. TO BE SURE, SUDANESE SECURITY AUTHORITIES, MINDFUL
OF LIBYAN MISCHIEF, HAVE GENERALLY TRIED TO KEEP CLOSE
TABS ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS IN AND NEAR
KHARTOUM. THE RECENT ABOLITION OF VISAS FOR LIBYANS (AND
SUBSEQUENTLY ALL ARABS) COMPLICATES THEIR JOB, THOUGH
SECURITY OFFICERS AT THE AIRPORT REPORTEDLY ARE PAYING
SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LIBYAN VISITORS WHEN THEY PASS
THROUGH NORMAL IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS PROCEDURES.
CYNICS RECKON THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO SABOTAGE IN SUDAN.
LACKLUSTER LIBYAN-BACKED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN
SUDAN, RECOGNIZED AS A "POLITICAL PARTY" BEFORE THE COUP,
DISBANDED WITH THE ABOLITION OF PARTIES, AND, ACCORDING
TO SEVERAL SUDANESE, HAVE REMAINED INACTIVE. LIBYANS
APPEAR TO BE FOCUSING INSTEAD ON LINKING THEIR POPULAR
ORGANIZATIONS WITH SUDAN'S LOCALLY-BASED, AND
INCREASINGLY ACTIVE PEOPLES' COMMITTEES AND POPULAR
DEFENSE FORCES. AS FOR LIBYAN TRANSGRESSIONS IN DARFUR,
WHILE SOME SUDANESE PROFESS TO BE TROUBLED BY THE AFFRONT
TO SUDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY, THE MAJORITY SEEM CONTENT TO TURN
A BLIND EYE TO EVENTS IN A REMOTE AREA.


19. LIBYA'S MAIN ECONOMIC ATTRACTION IS CHEAP OIL BUT
SUDAN HAS LITTLE OF VALUE TO OFFER IN RETURN. DEPRIVED
OF REGULAR SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA, DUE TO
NONPAYMENT AND RCC POLITICS, SUDAN RECENTLY HAS HAD TO
RELY ALMOST COMPLETELY ON LIBYAN OIL. THE CURRENT DEAL
FOR LIBYAN OIL REQUIRES SUDAN TO PAY ONLY FOR INTEREST ON
THE PURCHASE WITH THE PRINCIPAL TO BE PAID IN KIND WITH
FUTURE SUDANESE OIL PRODUCTION. DESPITE WELL-PUBLICIZED
AGREEMENTS WITH LIBYA, SHIPMENTS OF LIBYAN OIL HAVE BEEN
ERRATIC. LIBYA'S PROMISED 50,000 METRIC TONS OF OIL PER
MONTH TO SADIQ'S GOVERNMENT AND THE RCC HAS NOT ALWAYS
ARRIVED. FOLLOWING THE MARCH 1990 INTEGRATION ACCORD,
LIBYA PLEDGED TO DOUBLE ITS SUDANESE OIL SHIPMENTS TO
100,000 METRIC TONS FOR BOTH APRIL AND MAY.


20. SUDAN'S BALANCE OF TRADE WITH LIBYA HAS BEEN
ENTIRELY NEGATIVE ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. FOR
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, LIBYA RECEIVED NO SUDANESE
EXPORTS WHILE SUDAN IMPORTED 269,712,000 POUNDS (USDOLS
22,500,000) OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM LIBYA. LIBYA HAS
FOCUSED INSTEAD ON OBTAINING POLITICAL DIVIDENDS FROM
TRADE. THIS WAS DRAMATICALLY REFLECTED IN THE 1989
KHARTOUM TRADE FAIR WHEN LIBYA'S BOOTH WAS CONFINED TO
ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLEGED
CASUALTIES FROM U.S. BOMBING OF TRIPOLI. (THE U.S.
PULLED OUT WHEN THE GOS FAILED TO ACT ON AMERICAN
PROTESTS.) IN DECEMBER 1989, SUDAN AND LIBYA APPROVED A
USDOLS 50 MILLION COMMERCIAL PROTOCOL PLEDGING THE EXPORT
OF SUDANESE GOATS, OIL SEEDS, PERFUME AND TEXTILES IN
RETURN FOR OIL, FERTILIZERS AND CEMENT. AS WITH THE
EGYPTIAN PROTOCOL, THE ACCORD IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ITS
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS RATHER THAN AS A GUIDE TO ACTUAL
TRADE. A BILATERAL PROTOCOL IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
WAS SIGNED IN FEBRUARY 1990 AIMED AT LIBYAN BANKROLLING
CEREAL AND MEAT PRODUCTION FACILITIES. LIBYAN
AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE ALSO HAS MORE POLITICAL THAN
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE; A LIBYAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
SCHEME IN DARFUR IS WIDELY VIEWED AS A FRONT FOR ARMS
SMUGGLING AND OTHER NONAGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES.


21. SUDAN AND LIBYA RECENTLY RESURRECTED THE IDEA OF A
JOINT INVESTMENT BANK CAPITALIZED AT USDOLS 50 MILLION
AND HAVE DISCUSSED IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND
TRANSPORT SERVICES BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES. AS IN THE
CASE OF OIL SHIPMENTS HOWEVER, LIBYAN PROMISES OF
ECONOMIC HELP FOR ECONOMIC PROJECTS HAVE HAD A HABIT OF
NOT MATERIALIZING. LIBYA PROVIDES A MODEST NUMBER OF
JOBS FOR SUDANESE--ABOUT 2000 SUDANESE RESIDE IN LIBYA
BESIDES SEASONAL MIGRATION OF SUDANESE TRIBES FROM DARFUR
INTO KUFRA. A SUDANESE ESTIMATED THAT 2000-3000 DARFUR
TRIBESMEN WORK WITHOUT PERMITS IN KUFRA.


22. LIBYA, ONCE A BACKER OF THE SPLA, IS NOW SUDAN'S
MOST DEPENDABLE MILITARY SUPPLIER. THE SUBSTANTIAL
SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EITHER BASED ON SECRET PACTS
AS ALLEGED BY THE SPLA OR, MORE LIKELY, BASED ON INFORMAL
ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED BY SADIQ AL-MAHDI'S MINIONS AND
SUBSEQUENTLY RENEWED BY THE RCC. A FORMAL MILITARY
PROTOCOL SIGNED BY THE GOS SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT
NIMEIRI'S OUSTER WAS NOT OPEN-ENDED AND REFERRED ONLY TO
A SPECIFIC LIST OF ITEMS. BY WHATEVER RATIONALE, THE
LIBYANS HAVE LOANED OR DONATED IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF MILITARY PROVISIONS RANGING FROM
AMMUNITION TO MIG-23 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. DOLLAR FIGURES
ARE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THIS
AID HAS BEEN A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN PROPPING UP THE SUDANESE
ARMY IN ITS CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA. SINCE THE COUP,
LIBYA HAS DISPATCHED TWICE WEEKLY TO SUDAN AN IL-76
TRANSPORT PLANE LADEN WITH SUPPLIES, BELIEVED EXCLUSIVELY
FOR MILITARY USE. IN ADDITION, LIBYA HAS PROVIDED
TRAINING, ADVISORS AND PILOTS, THOUGH LIBYA'S DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY IN SUDAN HAS BEEN DENIED BY
THE GOS. LIBYAN MILITARY, HOWEVER, ARE PERIODICALLY SEEN
AT KHARTOUM HOTELS AND MILITARY FACILITIES. LIBYA'S
INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBING RAIDS WAS PROVEN WHEN THE SPLA
PRODUCED A LIBYAN PILOT AFTER DOWNING A MIG AIRCRAFT IN

1989. THE GOS STILL DENIED IT. LIBYAN PILOTS SEEM TO
OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY, WITH THE TACIT BACKING OF THE
SUDANESE MILITARY BRASS.

SAUDI ARABIA


23. WHILE SHUNNING THE SPOTLIGHT, SAUDI ARABIA, MORE
THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, PLAYS A CRITICAL ECONOMIC ROLE IN
BOLSTERING SUDAN THROUGH LARGE-SCALE REMITTANCE-PRODUCING
EMPLOYMENT, DIRECT GOVERNMENT AID, TRADE AND PRIVATE
INVESTMENT. WITH AN ESTIMATED 350,000 SUDANESE
DOCUMENTED EXPATRIATE WORKERS (PLUS ANOTHER 150,000 OR SO
WHO NEVER RETURNED FROM HAJ),SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDES THE
LARGEST SHARE OF REMITTANCES. BECAUSE THE BULK OF
REMITTANCES HAVE COME TO SUDAN THROUGH UNOFFICIAL
CHANNELS, THEY HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE.
ACCORDING TO ONE STUDY IN 1985, TOTAL REMITTANCES
AMOUNTED TO USDOLS 2.9 BILLION, ONE-THIRD OF SUDAN'S
GNP. OFFICIAL EXPATRIATE REMITTANCES IN 1988 TOTALED
USDOLS 445 MILLION WHICH CONSTITUTED 78 PERCENT OF
SUDAN'S HARD CURRENCY BUDGET. SINCE THE COUP HOWEVER,
NOT ONLY HAS OFFICIAL REMITTANCES DECLINED TO AN ANNUAL
0ARGET OF USDOLS 300 MILLION (AND PROBABLY MUCH LESS),
BUT UNOFFICIAL REMITTANCES, PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED PRIVATE
INVESTMENT, ALSO HAVE DRIED UP IN THE FACE OF THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION ZEAL OF THE RCC. EXPATRIATES HAVE
PREFERRED TO KEEP THEIR SAVINGS IN FOREIGN ACCOUNTS WHICH
THEIR FAMILIES USE WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE
OF SUDAN.


24. WITH ITS RELATIVELY HIGH SALARIES, SAUDI ARABIA IS
THE FAVORED DESTINATION FOR AMBITIOUS AND ENTERPRISING
SUDANESE. THRONGS OF VISA APPLICANTS CAN ALWAYS BE SEEN
OUTSIDE THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM DURING WORKING
HOURS. SUDANESE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA RANGE FROM
PROFESSIONALS (TWO-THIRDS OF SUDANESE DOCTORS ARE
OVERSEAS) TO MANUAL LABORERS. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS
PROVIDED IRREGULAR DOSES OF AID, MOST RECENTLY RELEASING
207 MILLION RIYALS (USDOLS 55.2 MILLION) TO REBUILD THE
ROAD FROM KHARTOUM TO PORT SUDAN. THE SAUDIS HAVE
GENERALLY AVOIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY RECENTLY
TURNED DOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, GOS REQUESTS FOR SMALL NAVAL
CRAFT FOR ANTISMUGGLING PATROLS ON THE RED SEA. THEY
REPORTEDLY FINANCED, HOWEVER, THE SUDANESE PURCHASE FROM
CHINA IN 1989 OF 40 TANKS AND 40 ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS (APC'S),ALONG WITH FIELD AND ANTIAIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS. THE SAUDI MONETARY FUND AND
SAUDI FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT HAVE FUNDED NUMEROUS ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INCLUDING ABOUT FIFTY THAT ARE
ONGOING. REHABILITATION OF THE GEZIRA AGRICULTURAL
SCHEME AND A NEW AIRPORT IN PORT SUDAN ARE EXAMPLES OF
MAJOR PROJECTS UNDERWAY. ACCORDING TO 1988 FIGURES,
SAUDI AGENCIES HAD OVER USDOLS 1.2 BILLION IN OUTSTANDING
LOANS TO SUDAN, BY FAR THE LARGEST LOAN COMMITMENT OF ANY
NATION. REPORTEDLY, SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE AID HAS
LANGUISHED RECENTLY BECAUSE OF SAUDI DISMAY WITH RCC
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT.


25. OFFICIAL TRADE FIGURES CONFIRM THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS
SUDAN'S LARGEST TRADE PARTNER. FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
OF 1989, SUDANESE EXPORTS--LARGELY LIVESTOCK (CAMELS AND
GOATS),SESAME SEEDS AND SORGHUM--TOTALED 276,624,000
POUNDS (USDOLS 22,674,000) AND IMPORTS--PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT--CAME TO
316,627,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 25,953,000). SAUDIS HAVE ALSO
BEEN IMPORTANT PRIVATE INVESTORS IN SUDAN, INCLUDING
PRINCE MOHAMMAD AL FAISAL (FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK),SHEIKH
MAHFOUZ SALEM BIN MAHFOUZ (SAUDI-SUDANESE BANK),SHEIKH
ABDEL LATIF GHORAB (DALLAH AL-BARAKA GROUP),SHEIKH OMER
BIN LADEN (BIN LADEN COMPANIES) AND IBRAHIM AL-AFFANDI.
ALTHOUGH SAUDI INVESTORS HAVE BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY COURTED BY
THE RCC PRIVATELY AND AT THE RECENT INVESTMENT
CONFERENCE, BUSINESSMEN REPORT THAT SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB
INVESTORS HAVE EXHIBITED A MARKED RELUCTANCE TO RISK
THEIR FUNDS IN SUDAN. SAUDI PRIVATE INVESTMENT SEEMS TO
BE SHRINKING RATHER THAN EXPANDING.


26. SUDAN'S LINKS TO SAUDI ARABIA ARE BOTH STRENGTHENED
AND WEAKENED BY ISLAMIC CONNECTIONS. ALL BUT THE MOST
SECULAR OF SUDANESE MUSLIMS PARTICIPATE AT LEAST ONCE IN
THE HAJ, THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA. SAUDI ARABIA ALSO
CONTRIBUTES SUBSTANTIALLY TO ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN
SUDAN INCLUDING AN ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN KHARTOUM.
PARADOXICALLY, SUDAN'S RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES ARE AMONG THE
ELEMENTS THAT MOST DISCONCERT THE SAUDIS. RELIGIOUS
LEADERS OF THE PURIST WAHABI SECT IN SAUDI ARABIA FROWN
ON MYSTICAL MUSLIM PRACTICES COMMON IN SUDAN INCLUDING
VENERATION OF SAINTLY FOREFATHERS, CONSULTATIONS WITH
LIVING FAKIS (HOLY MEN) AND MAGICAL (FORTUNE TELLING,
HEALING) FORMS OF FOLK RELIGION. POLITICALLY, THE SAUDIS
DISDAIN ISLAMIC COMPETITION ARISING FROM SUFI SECTS AND
THE INDIGENOUS NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT. BECAUSE ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM HAS OFTEN INCLUDED AN ANTI-SAUDI STRAIN,
THEY REPORTEDLY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MILITANT
PROCLIVITIES, INCLUDING IRANIAN SYMPATHIES, APPARENT IN
SOME SUDANESE OFFICIALS. THIS ALSO REFLECTS LACK OF
SAUDI ENTHUSIASM FOR SUPPORTING ANY ARAB COUNTRY WHICH
ATTEMPTS TO FOLLOW A STRICTER FORM OF ISLAM THAN THAT OF
THE KEEPER OF THE HOLY CITIES. SAUDIS ARE ALSO SAID TO
BE DISTRESSED AT THE FUROR IN SUDAN OVER THE HUDUD, WHICH
DRAWS UNWANTED ATTENTION TO SAUDI APPLICATION OF SHARIA
LAW. SAUDIS, DISTINGUISHING THEIR HOMOGENOUS MUSLIM
NATION FROM A MIXED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY LIKE SUDAN, WOULD
PREFER THAT SUDAN COMPROMISE ON SHARIA TO PRODUCE PEACE,
RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND STABILITY. SUDAN'S ASSOCIATIONS
WITH RADICAL LIBYA ONLY AGGRAVATE SAUDI DISCOMFORT WITH
SUDAN, A DISCOMFORT THAT HAS ALREADY DIMINISHED SAUDI
ASSISTANCE FOR SUDAN.

IRAQ


27. THE EARLY LOVEFEST BETWEEN THE RCC AND SADDAM
HUSSEIN, MUCH OF IT COUCHED IN SECRECY, SEEMS SOMETHING
OF AN ANAMOLY, WHICH MAY EXPLAIN WHY IT HAS NOW COOLED
SOMEWHAT. SADDAM, AFTER ALL, RULES A SECULAR STATE WARY
OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS (AN IRAQI DISSIDENT BELONGING
TO AL-DAWA WAS MURDERED IN 1988 BY THE IRAQIS IN THE
LOBBY OF KHARTOUM'S HILTON HOTEL),WHILE THE RCC, BACKED
BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, HAS PURGED AND ARRESTED
HUNDREDS OF SUDANESE SECULARISTS. VISITS BY RCC MEMBERS
OMAR AL-BASHIR AND MOHAMMAD AL-KHALIFA, HOWEVER, WERE
WARMLY RECEIVED BY SADDAM AND GOS APPEALS FOR MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE SPLA TOOK KURMUK, WERE
GENEROUSLY REWARDED WITH TWO SOVIET AN-12 AIRCRAFT, AND
SHIPMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND SMALL ARMS. A NUMBER OF
THEORIES HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY SUDANESE TO EXPLAIN
SADDAM'S FRIENDLINESS. CERTAINLY SADDAM, LIKE MUBARAK,
DESPISED SADIQ AL-MAHDI, WHO FLIRTED WITH THE IRANIANS,
AND THUS HAD REASON TO WELCOME HIS REPLACEMENT. SADDAM
ALSO MAY HAVE FELT AN AFFINITY TO A GOVERNMENT OF
SOLDIERS, CERTAINLY MORE SO THAN TO THE FREEWHEELING
DEMOCRACY THAT PRECEDED IT. FURTHERMORE, SADDAM, WITH
VISIONS OF GRANDEUR AS A PAN-ARAB LEADER AND REELING FROM
CRITICISM FOR HIS POLICIES IN LEBANON, MAY HAVE BEEN
SUSCEPTIBLE TO GOS BLANDISHMENTS. FINALLY, SADDAM,
PERHAPS GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP OF SUDANESE "VOLUNTEERS"
(TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MANUAL LABORERS IN IRAQ ENLISTED OR
WERE COERCED IN THE WAR EFFORT) IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND,
BECAUSE OF HIS OWN EXPERIENCE, SYMPATHISED WITH A
SUDANESE WAR LARGELY AGAINST NONARABS. ALL OF THE ABOVE
WERE PROBABLY FACTORS.


28. SADDAM'S AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE RCC PUT IRAQ'S
KEY INSTITUTION IN SUDAN, THE IRAQI BAATHIST PARTY, IN A
PREDICAMENT. COMPOSED LARGELY OF SUDANESE STUDENTS WHO
ONCE STUDIED IN BAGHDAD, THE BAATHIST PARTY, WHICH IS
SMALL BUT INFLUENTIAL AMONG SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS,
STAUNCHLY SUPPORTS SECULARIST RULE AND OPPOSES THE NIF.
BAATHISTS ENJOYED SOMEWHAT OF A GRACE PERIOD FROM
SECURITY OFFICIALS AFTER THE COUP WITH ARRESTS OF ONLY A
FEW PARTY LEADERS. INCLINED TO JOIN THE COMMUNISTS AND
OTHER SECULARISTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE RCC, PARTY MEMBERS
WERE TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY TO IRAQ AND SECULARIST
IDEOLOGY. IT THUS VACILLATED BEFORE JOINING OTHER
PARTIES AND UNIONS AND SIGNING AN OPPOSITION CHARTER
AGAINST THE RCC. THE UNCERTAINTY WAS EVIDENT AGAIN AT
THE TIME OF THE DOCTORS STRIKE IN DECEMBER 1989, AS MANY
BAATHISTS, ESPECIALLY IN LEGAL CIRCLES, WERE SAID TO BE
RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED. BAATHISTS, ALONG WITH OTHER
LEFTISTS, WERE ARRESTED IN LARGE NUMBERS AFTER THE
STRIKE. AROUND THE SAME TIME, IRAQ SEEMS TO HAVE JOINED
OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IN THEIR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE
GOS, AND STOPPED SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE. BAATHIST
CHAIRMAN TAISEER MUTASSIR RECENTLY TOLD A FELLOW ATTORNEY
THAT IRAQ PLANNED TO CUT ALL ITS AID TO SUDAN.

THE PENINSULAR STATES


29. FOLLOWING EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE LARGEST NUMBER
OF EXPATRIATE SUDANESE WORK AND RESIDE IN THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES. ACCORDING TO ONE SUDANESE ESTIMATE, THERE ARE
BETWEEN 50,000 AND 100,000 SUDANESE IN THE UAE. MOST ARE
MIDDLE CLASS BUSINESSMEN, CIVIL SERVANTS, TEACHERS AND
PROFESSIONALS. TWO CURRENT CABINET MINISTERS WERE
WORKING IN ABU DHABI WHEN THEY WERE PICKED FOR THE
CABINET. KAMAL HAMZA, EX-MAYOR OF DUBAI AND NOW
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RULER'S DIWAN, HEADS A DISTINGUISHED
SUDANESE COMMUNITY IN DUBAI. THIS EXPATRIATE PRESENCE
HAS FOCUSED SOME UAE ATTENTION ON SUDAN. THE ABU DHABI
FUND HAD COMMITTED USDOLS 239,580,000 TO SUDANESE
PROJECTS THROUGH 1988. SHEIKH ZAYID CONTRIBUTED USDOLS
35 MILLION TO SUDAN AFTER GENERAL OMAR PAID A VISIT, AND
THE UAE NAVY REPORTEDLY TRAINS SUDANESE OFFICERS. THERE
ARE ALSO SAID TO BE A NUMBER OF SUDANESE IN THE POLICE
FORCES OF THE VARIOUS EMIRATES. A RECENT VISITOR TO THE
UAE, WHO MET A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, REPORTED
COINSIDERABLE DISMAY OVER SUDAN. SHEIKH SULTAN OF
SHARJAH (WHO HAS DONATED CONSIDERABLE MONEY TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM INCLUDING SHARJAH HALL) BLUNTLY
TOLD THE VISITOR THAT HE AND OTHER OFFICIALS INTENDED TO
AVOID ASSISTANCE TO THE GOS UNTIL IT "SHAPED UP."


30. KUWAIT ALSO HAS ATTRACTED SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS,
THOUGH IN LESS NUMBERS THAN THE UAE--ABOUT 20,000 TO
30,000. KUWAIT'S MAJOR INPUT IN SUDAN HAS BEEN THROUGH
THE KUWAIT FUND WHICH HAS PROVIDED LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID
FOR DEVELOPMENT, MOSTLY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL (E.G. KENANA
SUGAR FACTORY, A MAJOR POULTRY FARM),PROJECTS. USDOLS
809,353,000 WAS COMMITTED THROUGH 1988, SECOND ONLY TO
THE SAUDIS. KUWAIT HAS UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPLIED OIL.
SUDANESE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT KUWAITI INTEREST IN SUDAN
IS ALSO DECLINING. ECHOING THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES,
KUWAITIS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE GOS IS ISOLATING
ITSELF INTERNATIONALLY AND MAKING LITTLE PROGRESS IN
ECONOMIC REFORM.


31. ABOUT FOUR TO SIX THOUSAND SUDANESE, MOSTLY
TEACHERS, WORK IN OMAN AND NORTH YEMEN. THESE COUNTRIES
HAVE PROVIDED LITTLE DIRECT ASSISTANCE, THOUGH OMAN MADE
A SMALL CONTRIBUTION AFTER A VISIT BY OMAR AL-BASHIR.
THE SUDANESE HAVE HAD A LENGTHY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
YEMENIS--MANY ATTENDED SCHOOL IN KHARTOUM, OTHERS WORKED
AS PEDDLERS. INTERESTINGLY, SUDANESE TEND TO PICK
YEMENIS, WHO ARE PERCEIVED AS HONEST AND UNPRETENTIOUS,
AS ARABS WITH WHOM THEY ARE MOST COMFORTABLE. QATAR,
ANOTHER DISPLEASED ARAB STATE, REFUSED GENERAL OMAR'S
PLEA FOR AID AND REPORTEDLY WANTS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
SUDANESE EMPLOYED IN QATAR. ROUNDING OUT THE PENINSULAR
STATES, SUDAN HAS LITTLE COMMERCIAL AND NO DIPLOMATIC
PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN OR ADEN.

PERIPHERY STATES


32. SUDAN'S MODEST RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REMAINING ARAB
STATES, PERCEIVED AS DISTANT AND UNLIKELY DONORS, RARELY
CONCERN THE GOS. EXCEPT FOR A COTERIE OF AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT ALUMINI NOW IN THEIR 40'S, FEW
SUDANESE HAVE VENTURED TO THE LEVANT. LEBANON IS CITED
IN CONVERSATION ONLY AS A WARNING OF WHAT DECENTRALIZED
LOYALTIES AND INTOLERANCE MIGHT PRODUCE IN SUDAN. THE
ARAB BAR ASSOCIATION'S ANNUAL MEETING IN 1989 IN DAMASCUS
WAS THE FIRST VISIT TO SYRIA BY MEMBERS OF THE SUDANESE
DELEGATION. SYRIA GIVES NO AID TO SUDAN, THOUGH RELIEF
ASSISTANCE GIVEN IN 1988 IS DRAWING ATTENTION AS IT IS
THE BASIS FOR A MISAPPROPIATION AND CORRUPTION CASE
AGAINST FORMER STATE COUNCIL MEMBER IDRIS AL-BANNA.
JORDAN HAS DONATED SOME MEDICINE AND SENDS A ROTATING
MEDICAL TEAM TO WORK IN DARFUR. THE "PALESTINE
AMBASSADOR" ACTIVELY BUT NOT TOO SUCCESSFULLY SEEKS TO
SPARK SUDANESE INTEREST IN THE INTIFADA. HE HAS BEEN
GIVEN PERMISSION TO CONSTRUCT A PALESTINE UNIVERSITY IN
KHARTOUM. YASSIR ARAFAT'S OCCASIONAL VISITS ATTRACT
LITTLE ATTENTION.


33. SUDAN ALSO HAS FEW TRADE OR OTHER LINKS WITH THE
MAHGREB STATES. MOROCCAN LINKS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE
CONFINED TO 60 STUDENTS STUDYING IN MOROCCO AND A PRIVATE
BANK'S FINANCING OF AN AGRICULTURE PROJECT. NONE OF THE
DIPLOMATS FROM THE MAGHREB SEEM TO PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO
LOCAL AFFAIRS. THE SOMALI EMBASSYS ONLY APPARENT
FUNCTION IN SUDAN IS TO ISSUE REFUGEE DOCUMENTS TO
ETHIOPIAN REBELS. MANY SUDANESE ARE NOT EVEN AWARE OF
DJIBOUTI OR MAURITANIA, NEITHER OF WHICH HAVE AN EMBASSY
IN KHARTOUM.


34. COMMENT. SUDAN DELIGHTS IN TRUMPETING ITS ROLE AS A
BRIDGE BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS
COMMENDABLE THOUGH UNATTAINED IDEAL OVERLOOKS A
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM--SUDAN'S BRIDGES TO BOTH ARABS AND
AFRICANS ARE IN DISREPAIR. IRONICALLY WHILE ARAB
RELATIONS WITH THE RCC HAVE GRADUALLY WORSENED UNTIL THEY
HAVE RETURNED TO, OR EVEN BECOME WORSE THAN, THEIR
PRE-COUP STATUS, GENERAL OMAR HAS MANAGED, DESPITE
CONTINUING CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA AND ALLEGATIONS OF NIF
INFLUENCE, TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH SOME OF HIS AFRICAN
NEIGHBORS INCLUDING KENYA, ZAIRE, AND THE C.A.R., DAMAGED
BY SADIQ.


35. COMMENT CONTINUED. WHILE THE SPECTER OF PAN-ARABISM
WHICH LOOMS IN ANY DISCUSSION OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS IS
REVILED BY SOUTHERN SUDANESE, BROAD ARAB COLLABORATION
TODAY, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IS NOT INIMICAL TO SOUTHERN
INTERESTS OR TO THOSE OF THE U.S. WITH THE REGRETTABLE
EXCEPTION OF LIBYA, ARAB NATIONS WITH CONNECTIONS TO
SUDAN WANT PEACE, STABILITY AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN
SUDAN. THEY RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF, AND THEIR
LEADERS HAVE ENCOURAGED, COMPROMISE ON SHARIA, ADJUSTMENT
OF POLICIES TO BROADEN GOS POLITICAL APPEAL, AND
COOPERATION WITH THE IMF FOR REAL ECONOMIC REFORM.
MENDING ITS ARAB BRIDGES MAY WELL PROVE A KEY TO
IMPROVING SUDAN'S FORTUNES.

ONEILL