KUWAITI SAUDI RELATIONS - A KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JEDDAH 02807


FROM GNEHM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KU SA
SUBJECT: KUWAITI SAUDI RELATIONS - A KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.



2. SUMMARY
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GIVEN THE VAST DIMENSIONS OF THE GULF CRISIS AND THE
INTENSE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT AT
THE PRESENT TIME, FRICTION OR DISAGREEMENTS ARE AMAZINGLY
FEW AND GENERALLY OF A MARGINAL NATURE - AT LEAST FROM
THE KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AS MIGHT BE
EXPECTED GIVEN THE PASSAGE OF TIME, A NUMBER OF RUBS IN
THE RELATIONSHIP. WHILE KUWAITI OFFICIALS REMAIN
GENERALLY CONFIDENT ABOUT SAUDI POLICY, THERE ARE
CONCERNS LACED WITH FEAR OVER THE SAUDIS BOTH WITHIN AND
OUTSIDE THE AL SAUD FAMILY WHO ESPOUSE COMPROMISE WITH
IRAQ AT KUWAITI EXPENSE. KUWAITIS ALSO QUESTION THE
SAUDI DECISION TO LOCATE THE GOK IN ISOLATED TAIF AND
THEY ARE UPSET OVER SAUDI CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR REBUILDING
OF THE KUWAITI MILITARY. END SUMMARY.



3. KUWAIT LITERALLY DRIVEN INTO SAUDI ARABIA
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THE AUGUST 2 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND SUBSEQUENT
IRAQI BRUTALITIES IN KUWAIT LITERALLY DROVE KUWAIT INTO
SAUDI ARABIA. THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND THE BULK OF
KUWAIT'S GOVER`MENT ARRIVED ON THE SCENE IN NEED OF
SUPPORT AND SUSTENANCE. THE SAUDIS WERE AND REMAIN
GENEROUS WITH BOTH. THE SAUD FAMILY OPENLY RECALLED THE
SABAH FAMILY (AND KUWAITI) SUPPORT FOR THE SAUDS DURING
THEIR EXILE FROM SAUDI ARABIA EARLIER IN THE CENTURY AND
THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WERE STANDING BY THEIR FRIENDS IN
NEED DURING THIS CRISIS. SAUDI SUPPORT HAS BEEN
EXTENSIVE WITH MATERIAL AID (FOOD AND HOUSING) TO
THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED KUWAITI NATIONALS. THE SAG HAS
ALSO HELPED THE GOK TO RECONSTITUTE ITSELF IN THE KINGDOM
AND HAS FACILITATED THE COMINGS AND GOINGS OF KUWAITI
OFFICIALS AND THEIR GUESTS. GENERALLY THE SAUDIS HAVE
GIVEN THE GOK FREE REIGN MOST DRAMATICALLY SEEN IN THE
CONVOCATION OF AN ALL-KUWAITI CONFERENCE THAT HIGH-
LIGHTED KUWAITI COMMITMENTS TO PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT.
ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THE SAUDIS PERMITTED THE KUWAITIS
TO REFURBISH THEIR AIR FORCE ON SAUDI BASES AND THERE IS
A SIMILAR PROGRAM WITH KUWAITI LAND FORCES.


4. KUWAITIS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR SAUDI
HOSPITALITY AND GENEROSITY AND THAT GRATITUDE REMAINS
BASIC IN THE RELATIONSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME THE KUWAITIS
DO EXPRESS SOME FRUSTRATION - LARGELY STEMMING FROM AN
UNNATURAL DEPENDENCY. MANY KUWAITI OFFICIALS ARE
INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH THE LOCATION OF THE GOK IN
TAIF. WHILE INITIALLY ACCEPTING THE SAUDI ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF SECURITY, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND A CHANGED
POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE
KUWAITIS NOW FEEL INCREASINGLY ISOLATED AND CUT OFF FROM
EVENTS. KUWAITI OFFICIALS NOTE THAT VISITORS (INCLUDING
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS) PASS
THROUGH NEARBY JEDDAH BUT DO NOT MAKE IT TO TAIF. THEY
LISTEN TO NEWSCASTERS WHO REPEATEDLY DISPARAGE THE GOK AS
RESIDENT IN A POSH HOTEL IN THE SAUDI MOUNTAIN RESORT.
KUWAITIS IN EXILE CERTAINLY DO NOT CONSIDER TAIF A RESORT
AND DESPAIR AT THE MEDIA'S CONTINUED HARPING ON THIS
THEME. THE KUWAITIS TEND TO BLAME THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR
PREDICAMENT. WE HEAR MORE AND MORE TALK FROM THE
KUWAITIS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO RELOCATE BUT THEY
BELIEVE THE SAUDIS WILL NOT AGREE.



5. KING SOLID, UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OTHERS
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THE KUWAITIS REMAIN GENERALLY CONVINCED THAT SAUDI POLICY
IS FIRMLY BEHIND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS
- SPECIFICALLY FULL AND COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND
RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT. THIS
CONVICTION RESTS LARGELY ON THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE AMIR AND KING FAHD. KUWAITIS REPEATEDLY
REFER TO THE KING'S STAUNCH SUPPORT. IN DOING SO,
HOWEVER, IT OFTEN IMPLIES AN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE
STRENGTH OF SUPPORT ELSEWHERE WITHIN THE SAUDI
GOVERNMENT. AT VARIOUS TIMES ONE HAS HEARD CONCERNS
ABOUT THE POSITION OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OR DEFENSE
MINISTER PRINCE SULTAN, BUT THESE DOUBTS APPEAR MORE A
CONSEQUENCE OF THE EVER ONGOING KUWAITI PROPENSITY TO
DISSECT AND TO ANALYZE EACH AND EVERY INDICATOR OF
POSSIBLE SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THEIR CAUSE. THERE
ARE ALWAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, NERVOUS DISCUSSIONS OF EACH NEWS
REPORT THAT SOME ARAB OR OTHER POLITICAL FIGURE IS
UNDERTAKING AN EFFORT TO MEDIATE THE CRISIS. INEVITABLY,
THEY FRET OVER ANY INDICATION THE SAUDIS MAY BE INVOLVED.
THUS FAR, SENIOR KUWAITI OFFICIALS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT
SAUDI POLICY IS FIRM, BUT ONE NOW HEARS MORE RUMBLINGS
THAN BEFORE FROM LESSER OFFICIALS CONCERNED THAT SAUDI
DETERMINATION MAY ERODE. THEY CITE MOUNTING DEBATE
WITHIN THE KINGDOM BY SOME LESSER MEMBERS OF THE SAUD
FAMILY AS WELL AS NON-ROYALS OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE
KINGDOM SHOULD RISK WAR AND DISTRUCTION FOR KUWAIT, AND
WHETHER KUWAIT SHOULD COMPROMISE AND OFFER SADDAM
FACE-SAVING CONCESSIONS.


6. KUWAITI-SAUDI COOPERATION FINANCIALLY IN SUPPORT OF
COALITION PARTNERS HAS BEEN CLOSE AND GENERALLY
HARMONIOUS. WORKING SOMEWHAT WITHIN A GCC CONTEXT THE
TWO HAVE BASICALLY AGREEED ON RECIPIENTS AND LEVELS. THE
KUWAITIS ARE PROBABLY MORE WILLING THAN SAUDI ARABIA TO
PROVIDE SOME ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN BUT THEY BOW TO STRONG
SAUDI FEELINGS. THE KUWAITIS SEEM AS FIRM AS THE SAUDIS
IN OPPOSING AID TO JORDAN. THE ONLY FRICTIONS WE DETECT
IN THIS AREA WAS IN THE ALLOCATION OF DOLS 100 MILLION IN
KUWAITI ASSISTANCE TO SOME SMALLER STATES (DJIBOUTI,
SOMALIA, AND LEBANON). THE KUWAITIS APPARENTLY GAVE
THEIR DOLS 100 MILLION TO THE SAUDIS TO DISBURSE. THE
SAUDIS WITHOUT ASKING RECONFIGURED THE APPORTIONMENT
AFTER THE KUWAITIS HAD TOLD THOSE GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR
AID LEVELS LEADING TO SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO KUWAIT.



7. SOME SNAGS IN MILITARY COOPERATION
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MILITARY COOPERATION APPEARS TO BE LARGELY SUCCESSFUL
THOUGH WE ARE NOW HEARING REPORTS OF SOME DIFFICULTIES IN
THIS AREA. WHEN IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT, KUWAITI PILOTS FLEW
THEIR FIGHTERS TO SAUDI ARABIA. KUWAITI SOURCES SAY THE
SAUDIS REFUSED TO REFUEL THE PLANES SO THEY COULD
CONTINUE TO FIGHT. ULTIMATELY THE SAUDIS BASED THE
KUWAITI A-4S IN KHAMIS MUSHAYT AND THE MIRAGE FIGHTERS IN
TAIF. IN THE DAYS AFTER THE INVASION, THE REMNANTS OF
KUWAITI LAND FORCES STRAGGLED ACROSS THE SAUDI BORDER AND
WERE EVENTUALLY COLLECTED IN HAFR AL-BATIN. THROUGH THE
PAST THREE MONTHS THE GOK MADE A HIGH PRIORITY OF GETTING
THEIR FORCES REORGANIZED AND READY TO HELP LIBERATE THEIR
COUNTRY. WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE SAUDIS THEY OBTAINED
PERMISSION FOR THE ENTRY OF U.S. TECHNICIANS, SPARE
PARTS, AND MUNITIONS FOR THE A-4 PROGRAM. THE PLANES ARE
NOW FLYING AND PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT EXERCISE WITH
U.S. FORCES. A SENIOR KUWAIT OFFICIAL, WHO RECENTLY
DISCUSSED THIS SUCCESS STORY, RELATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE
SAUDIS HAD STRONGLY RESISTED MOVING THE A-4'S FROM
SOUTHWESTERN SAUDI ARABIA TO THE EASTERN PROVINCE
PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE SAUDIS WERE AFRAID THE KUWAIT AIR
FORCE MIGHT PRECIPITATE HOSTILITIES WITH THE IRAQIS. THE
KUWAIT OFFICIAL SAID THE GOK BROUGHT MAJOR PRESSURE TO
BEAR AT SENIOR LEVELS IN THE SAG TO FORCE THE SAUDIS TO
AGREE TO THE MOVEMENT.


8. SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES REPORTEDLY CONTINUE WITH EFFORTS
TO REORGANIZE KUWAITI LAND FORCES. KUWAITI OFFICIALS
COMPLAIN THE SAUDIS ARE SLOW IN ANY DECISION RELATED TO
THIS EFFORT INCLUDING DELIVERY OF ITEMS NEEDED TO
RE-EQUIP THE NEW BRIGADES AS WELL AS LAUNCHING THE
TRAINING PROGRAM. IN A RARE DISPLAY OF REAL ANGER TOWARD
THE SAUDIS, ANOTHER KUWAITI OFFICIAL ACCUSED THE SAUDIS
OF BLOCKING KUWAITI EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A TRAINING CAMP
FOR UP TO 30,000 NEW RECRUITS. THE OFFICIAL SAID THE GOK
HAD BEEN PRESSING THE SAG FOR ALMOST TWO MONTHS TO
PROVIDE A SITE WHERE BASIC TRAINING COULD TAKE PLACE; BUT
THE SAUDIS SEEMED OPPOSED TO SUCH AN EFFORT. HE SAID THE
GOK WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SAUDIS.



9. OVERALL: CLOSE COOPERATION, DESPITE A FEW FRICTIONS
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ALL IN ALL, GIVEN THE BIZARRE SITUATION, RELATIONS
BETWEEN KUWAITIS AND SAUDIS - AT LEAST FROM THE KUWAITI
PERSPECTIVE - REMAIN REMARKEDLY GOOD. THE MANY AREAS OF
CLOSE COOPERATION AND INTERRELATIONSHIP REFLECT THE
FUNDAMENTAL MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO AS WELL AS THE
ADMITTEDLY DEPENDENT POSITION OF THE GOK AT THIS TIME.
MUCH OF THE NEGATIVES WE HEAR ARE EASILY UNDERSTOOD AS
STEMMING FROM CONTINUED KUWAITI FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE
EVOLVING CRISIS SITUATION. MOST ARE TO BE EXPECTED AND
ON BALANCE IT IS SURPRISING HOW FEW PROBLEMS WE FIND. AT
THE SAME TIME THERE ARE SOME FRICTIONS AND THEY WILL GROW
AS MORE TIME PASSES WITHOUT ANY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE
CRISIS. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT THESE FRICTIONS TO
AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY THE CLOSE COOPERATION THAT EXISTS
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DURING THE CRISIS.


10. DOHA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

GRIFFIN