SOVIET REACTION TO KHOMEINI'S DEATH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 15118

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL UR IR IZ AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTION TO KHOMEINI'S DEATH

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 14076, (B) STATE 176500


1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. KHOMEINI'S DEATH EVOKES IN THE MINDS OF SOVIETS
THE DEATH OF STALIN. PERHAPS SIMPLY BECAUSE STALIN
IS ON EVERYONE'S MINDS THESE DAYS AS THE CONGRESS OF
PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES REVIEWS PAST CRIMES, SOVIET
CONTACTS IN TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH EMBOFFS
INDEPENDENTLY BROUGHT UP THE DEAD SOVIET DICTATOR IN
DESCRIBING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN: STALIN THE
COMPROMISE CHOICE FOR LEADER FOLLOWING LENIN'S DEATH
(LIKE KHAMENEI NOW); AND STALIN THE GIANT HISTORICAL
FIGURE WHOSE SHOES NO MORTAL COULD EVER FILL (LIKE
THE NOW-DEPARTED KHOMEINI).


3. OUR CONTACTS SUGGEST THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT ANY
SUDDEN CHANGES IN IRANIAN POLICY, WITH REGARD TO
BILATERAL RELATIONS, IRAN-IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN. BUT
THE SOVIETS DO APPEAR TO HOPE FOR A MORE PRAGMATIC
IRANIAN APPROACH TO EMERGE EVENTUALLY. ONE CONTACT
RAISED THE INTRIGUING POSSIBILITY THAT A DEBATE IS
UNDERWAY CONCERNING HOW EAGERLY THE SOVIETS SHOULD
PURSUE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH IRAN. FOR THE MOMENT
THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR FULL NORMALIZATION REMAINS
OFFICIAL POLICY, HOWEVER. THE RAFSANJANI VISIT MAY
WELL BE POSTPONED BECAUSE OF THE MOURNING PERIOD, BUT
NO WORD HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM IRAN ON THIS. THE
SOVIETS STILL DEFEND PROSPECTIVE ARMS SALES TO IRAN.
END SUMMARY.


4. EMBASSY OFFICERS MET JUNE 7 WITH MFA MIDDLE
EASTERN COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION IRAN SECTOR OFFICIAL
VADIM NAZAROV AND "IZVESTIYA" DEPUTY MIDDLE EAST
EDITOR ANDREY OSTALSKIY TO DISCUSS SOVIET REACTIONS
TO THE DEATH OF KHOMEINI.

THE STALIN IMAGE
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5. BOTH NAZAROV AND OSTALSKIY, INDEPENDENTLY, FOUND
THEMSELVES DRAWING ON THE IMAGE OF STALIN TO DESCRIBE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE WAKE OF KHOMEINI'S DEATH.
NAZAROV COMPARED THE SELECTION OF KHAMENEI TO SUCCEED
THE AYATOLLAH AS IRAN'S SPIRITUAL LEADER TO STALIN'S
SELECTION AS THE COMPROMISE CANDIDATE OVER OTHER,
MORE FACTIONALIZED RIVALS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF
LENIN. OSTALSKIY COMPARED THE REACTION OF THE
IRANIAN PEOPLE TO KHOMEINI'S DEATH TO THAT OF THE
SOVIET PEOPLE FOLLOWING STALIN'S DEMISE. OSTALSKIY
SAID THAT, AS WITH STALIN, THERE WOULD AT FIRST BE A
PERIOD OF INTENSE MOURNING OVER KHOMEINI--"BUT LATER
WOULD COME A RE-EVALUATION". OSTALSKIY SUGGESTED THE
SOVIETS WERE HOPING THIS RE-EVALUATION WOULD RESULT
IN THE ADOPTION OF A MORE PRAGMATIC COURSE BY THE
IRANIAN LEADERSHIP.

REACTIONS, PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL
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6. NAZAROV SUGGESTED THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE
AND MANY SOVIETS WERE NOT SORRY TO SEE KHOMEINI
DEPART THE SCENE. KHOMEINI'S REGIME HAD DESTROYED
MANY LIVES AND VIOLATED MANY STANDARDS OF
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.


7. THE OFFICIAL S0VIET REACTION, HOWEVER--WHICH HAD
TO TAKE SOVIET INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT--NATURALLY
CONSISTED OF OFFERING CONDOLENCES TO IRAN, NAZAROV
SAID. GORBACHEV SENT A SHORT MESSAGE TO KHAMENEI
(PUBLISHED AT THE BOTTOM OF FRONT PAGE OF THE JUNE 7
"PRAVDA"),AND SHEVARDNADZE AND FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET LUK'YANOV SIGNED THE CONDOLENCE
BOOK AT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY.

IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS
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8. IT WAS VERY HARD TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT
INSIDE IRAN, NAZAROV SAID. KHOMEINI HAD BEEN THE
ONLY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURE WHO EXERCIZED A
CONSISTENT LINE. THE FLIRTING WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
WHICH OTHER LEADERS HAD ENGAGED IN WOULD RE-EMERGE,
BUT WHETHER IT WOULD LAST REMAINED UNPREDICTABLE.


9. THE CHOICE OF KHAMENEI AS KHOMEINI'S SUCCESSOR HAD
BEEN TACTICAL, NAZAROV SAID, REPRESENTING A
COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE RADICAL SPIRITUAL LEADERS AND
THE PRAGMATISTS. IN ACCEPTING A LEADERSHIP ROLE,
THOUGH, KHAMENEI WAS TAKING A RISK: WHEREAS IRANIANS
HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO CRITICIZE KHOMEINI'S
LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY, THERE WAS EVERY CHANCE
THAT THEIR PENT-UP FRUSTRATIONS WOULD NOW BE
UNLEASHED ON A LESS-IDOLIZED LEADER LIKE KHAMENEI.


10. KHAMENEI WAS TIED TO THE BAZAARIS, NAZAROV SAID,
AND HAD CALLED FOR REDUCED GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
IN COMMERCIAL LIFE. LIKEWISE, HE HAD--AS SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE "PARTY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC"--AT
ONE TIME CALLED FOR A REDUCED POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE
COUNTRY'S SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP. KHAMENEI HAD ALSO
HELPED CREATE THE 25-MEMBER CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
COUNCIL WHICH WAS PROPOSING TO EXPAND THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENCY AND ABOLISH THE POST OF PRIME
MINISTER. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NAZAROV
SUGGESTED, KHAMENEI APPEARED TO FAVOR RAFSANJANI'S
ELECTION TO THE POST OF A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY,
THEREBY FACILITATING IRAN'S RETURN TO A MORE
PRAGMATIC, LESS SPIRITUALLY-INFLUENCED APPROACH. BUT
MUCH DEPENDED ON WHEN THE COUNCIL WOULD MAKE ITS
DECISIONS CONCERNING THE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENCY--NAZAROV COULD NOT ESTIMATE WHEN THIS
WOULD BE--AND IN ANY CASE, AS RAFSANJANI'S CALL FOR
THE DEATHS OF AMERICANS HAD DEMONSTRATED, THE ACTIONS
OF EVEN A "MODERATE" IRANIAN POLICIAL FIGURE WERE
ENTIRELY UNPREDICTABLE.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
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11. WHAT REMAINED CONSTANT, NAZAROV SAID, WAS IRAN'S
DESPERATE NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO EMERGE FROM
ITS ECONOMIC CRISIS. MUCH OF THIS ASSISTANCE COULD
ONLY COME FROM THE WEST, AS THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY
DID NOT HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO PROVIDE IT. THE
SOVIETS WERE IN A POSITION, HOWEVER, TO BUY IRANIAN
NATURAL GAS AND TO OFFER TRANSPORTATION ROUTES FOR
THE GAS AND OTHER IRANIAN PRODUCTS.


12. BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PRESENTLY PERCEIVED
AS A MAJOR THREAT BY IRAN, NAZAROV SAID, THE IRANIANS
WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN RECEIVING AS MUCH POLITICAL
SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE FROM THE USSR. THE "PRIMITIVE"
IRANIAN CONCEPTION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION--IN WHICH OTHER NATIONS
WERE EITHER FRIEND OR FOE-- WAS SLOWLY EVOLVING INTO
SOMETHING MORE SOPHISTICATED.

RAFSANJANI VISIT
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13. NAZAROV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD RECEIVED NO WORD ON
WHETHER RAFSANJANI WOULD CANCEL OR POSTPONE HIS JUNE
21 VISIT TO MOSCOW. GIVEN THAT DURING THE 40-DAY
PERIOD OF MOURNING A DEVOUT FOLLOWER OF KHOMEINI
WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT HOME AND GRIEVE,
HOWEVER, THERE WAS A CLEAR POSSIBILITY THAT THE VISIT
WOULD BE AT THE VERY LEAST POSTPONED, NAZAROV
INDICATED.

DEFENSE COOPERATION
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14. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION, THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR
(PROTECT) TOLD EMBOFF THAT VORONTSOV'S MAY 21 VISIT
TO TEHRAN HAD PRODUCED SUSPICIONS THAT A MUTUAL
DEFENSE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN IRAN AND
THE USSR. 8UCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE OF TREMENDOUS
CONCERN TO THE IRAQIS, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED, AND
HE WAS TO SEE MFA NEAR EASTERN AND NORTH AFRICAN
COUNTRIES ADMINI8TRATION CHIEF POLYAKOV JUNE 6 AT 4
P.M. TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.


15. ASKED ABOUT SOVIET-IRANIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION,
NAZAROV SAID THAT THE IRANIAN PRESS AGENCY STATEMENT
ON THE VORONTSOV VISIT TOOK LIBERTIES WITH REALITY.
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE
PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN IN A VARIETY OF
SPHERES, WHICH WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE MILITARY
COOPERATION AS WELL. THIS IN NO WAY ENVISAGED A
MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT, NAZAROV SAID. THE IRANIANS
STILL VIEWED THE SOVIETS AS TOO MUCH OF A THREAT FOR
THAT.


16. ARMS SALES WERE ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER, AND HE
REITERATED ARGUMENTS OUTLINED IN REF (A) IN DEFENSE
OF SUCH SALES. NAZAROV DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN WEAPONS
SUCH AS MISSILES, WHICH WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE, AND
FIELD ARTILLERY, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING
"LIMITED USES". HE PROVIDED NO FURTHER CLUE AS TO
THE TIMING OF THE SALES, BUT ASSERTED THAT THE
RAFSANJANI VISIT WOULD BE "TOO SOON" BECAUSE SOVIET
PRODUCTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS WERE INVOLVED.

IRAM-IRAQ
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17. NAZAROV FORESAW NO IMMINENT CHANGE IN IRAN'S
POLICY ON THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ. A MAJOR CONSTRAINT
UNDER WHICH ANY IRANIAN REGIME HAD TO OPERATE, HE
SUGGESTED, WAS THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT IRAN'S POLICY
ON TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WITH IRAQ DID NOT APPEAR
WEAKER THAN THAT OF THE SHAH, WHO HAD CONSOLIDATED
SOME OF IRAN'S CLAIMS.

AFGHANISTAN
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18. IN A MOMENT OF FRANKNESS, NAZAROV CONCEDED THAT
THE IRANIANS WERE SPEAKING OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF THEIR
MOUTHS WITH REGARD TO THEIR AFGHAN POLICY. IRAN WAS
TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT AN AFGHAN POLITICAL SOLUTION
HAD TO COMPRISE ALL POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY,
WHEREAS THEY WERE TELLING THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE THAT
NAJIB HAD TO GO BEFORE A SETTLEMENT COULD BE
REACHED. THE SOVIET VIEW REMAINED THAT NAJIB
INTENDED TO FIGHT TO THE BITTER END AND THAT ONLY A
DECISION TO INCLUDE HIM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OFFERED
ANY HOPE FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE ALLIANCE OF EIGHT,
HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO INSIST ON NAJIB'S DEPARTURE.

SOVIET POLICY-MAKING ON IRAN
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19. OSTALSKIY SUGGESTED THAT SOME SOVIET
OFFICIALS--INCLUDING CERTAIN DEPUTIES TO THE CONGRESS
OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES FROM THE MOSCOW REGION--DID NOT
SHARE THE OFFICIAL VIEW THAT RELATIONS WITH IRAN
SHOULD BE FULLY NORMALIZED WHILE IRAN REMAINED
EMBARKED ON ITS REVOLUTIONARY COURSE. HE SUGGESTED
THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO MEET WITH
KHOMEINI LAST FEBRUARY, AND PREFERRED TO DEAL WITH
OTHER, "MORE NORMAL" MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN
LEADERSHIP.


20. OSTALSKIY SAID HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO CALLED FOR
THE SOVIET UNION TO COORDINATE ITS APPROACH TO IRAN
WITH THE UNITED 8TATES. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS NOT IN
THE SOVIET INTEREST FOR U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS TO BE
ESTRANGED, AND THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND TO
SEEK ADVANTAGE FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION. OSTALSKIY
WOULD NOT ELABORATE ON WHO IN THE "MOSCOW GROUP" OF
DEPUTIES SHARED HIS VIEWS. ALTHOUGH FOR THE PRESENT
THOSE VIEWS WERE CLEARLY IN THE MINORITY AS FAR AS
OFFICIAL SOVIET POLICY WAS CONCERNED, OSTALSKIY SAW A
TIME APPROACHING WHEN SOVIET LEGISLATORS WOULD DEBATE
THIS AND OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE SUPREME
SOVIET.


COMMENT
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21. DESPITE ANY PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT WHICH SOVIET
ASSOCIATION WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN MAY BE CAUSING
SOVIET OFFICIALS AND JOURNALISTS, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET
APPROACH CONTINUES TO BE AIMED AT CULTIVATING
NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH IRAN IN THE HOPE THAT
WHOEVER EMERGES AT THE TOP FOLLOWING THE PROTRACTED
LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN IRAN WILL BE A "PRAGMATIST".
AS SOVIET OFFICIALS CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THIS TERM IN
THE IRANIAN CONTEXT IS ONLY RELATIVE.


MATLOCK