Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
89BOGOTA3471
1989-03-06 22:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

WHY HAS THE FARC DECLARED A UNILATERAL TRUCE?

Tags:  PTER PINS PGOV CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 062248Z MAR 89
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3740
INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 03471 

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER PINS PGOV CO
SUBJECT: WHY HAS THE FARC DECLARED A UNILATERAL TRUCE?

REF: BOGOTA 3191 AND PREVIOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 03471

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER PINS PGOV CO
SUBJECT: WHY HAS THE FARC DECLARED A UNILATERAL TRUCE?

REF: BOGOTA 3191 AND PREVIOUS


1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: THE FARC'S CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
FEBRUARY 28 (REFTEL) HIGHLIGHTED THAT GROUP'S ONGOING
ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE THE GOC INTO DECLARING ITS OWN
CEASEFIRE AND FORCE IT INTO ENGAGING IN PEACE TALKS WITH
ALL FOUR GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE SIMON BOLIVAR GUERRILLA
COORDINATOR (SBGC). THE FARC STRATEGY STEMS FROM
POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY IMPERATIVES. THE GOC IS
NOT BUYING IT. END SUMMARY

THE FARC PLOY; THE GOC RESPONSE
--------------

2. THE FARC WANTS THE GOC TO CALL OFF THE TROOPS AND
ENGAGE IN PEACE TALKS WITH THE SIMON BOLIVAR GUERRILLA
COORDINATOR (SBGC). ITS DECISION TO DECLARE A
UNILATERAL TRUCE FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
COMMISSION OF NOTABLES IS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE
THAT GOAL, AS IS ITS LATEST TACTIC OF SENDING A LETTER
TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE GROUP OF EIGHT IN HOPES OF
ENLISTING THEIR SUPPORT TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON BARCO TO
OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SBGC. THE GOC HAS REFUSED TO
BE PRESSURED.


3. THE GUERRILLA STRATEGY TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT INTO
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN EVIDENT SINCE AT LEAST MID
1988, WHEN THE M-19 FORCED THE CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE
FOR DEMOCRATIC COEXISTENCE AS THE PRICE FOR THE RELEASE
OF ALVARO GOMEZ HURTADO. THE GOC SUCCESSFULLY WITHSTOOD
THE M-19 PLOY AND THEN BEGAN A MORE PLANNED APPROACH OF
ITS OWN TO REGAIN POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE PEACE ISSUE.
ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1988, THE GOC CODIFIED AND PUBLICLY
ANNOUNCED THE POLICY IT HAD IN ESSENCE BEEN FOLLOWING
SINCE BARCO CAME INTO OFFICE IN AUGUST 1986; TO WIT: WE
WILL NOT TALK FOR THE SAKE OF TALK (IMPLICATION -- AS
BETANCUR DID),BUT MUST DEMAND PROOF BY WORD AND DEED
THAT THE GUERRILLAS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING PEACE.
ONCE THAT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED WE WILL TALK.


4. THE GOC IS TALKING WITH THE M-19 BECAUSE THAT GROUP
DECLARED ITS TRUCE OVER SIX MONTHS AGO. THIS, COMBINED
WITH THE GOC'S DESIRE TO SHOW THAT ITS PEACE PLAN WILL
WORK, MOTIVATED THE GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE M-19. THE GOC FEELS UNDER NO PRESSURE TO RUSH
INTO TALKS WITH THE FARC AND CAN POINT TO ITS TRACK
RECORD VIS A VIS THE M19 TO DEFEND ITS POSITION.
RAFAEL PARDO TOLD THE PRESS IN MEXICO MARCH 4 THAT "THE
GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH THE
GUERRILLA. IT INITIATED THEM IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR
WITH THE M-19 BECAUSE THAT GROUP HAD DEMONSTRATED OVER
THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTHS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR PEACE. THE
FARC DECLARED ITS TRUCE ONE WEEK AGO. WE HAVE NOTHING
AGAINST SUCH A DECLARATION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT
GOING TO INITIATE ANY DIALOGUE WITH ANY GUERRILLA
ORGANIZATION IF IT CONTINUES ITS TERRORISM, KIDNAPPINGS,
AMBUSHES AND EXTORTION." IN ESSENCE, THE GOVERNMENT CAN
SIT BACK AND WAIT TO SEE IF THE FARC COMPLIES WITH ITS
PROMISE TO END HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING EXTORTION.

THE MILITARY MOTIVATION
--------------

5. IT APPEARS THAT THE FARC DECLARATION OF A UNILATERAL
CEASEFIRE HAD ROOTS IN MILITARY EVENTS AS WELL.
MILITARY SOURCES SPECULATE THAT THE FARC WAS HURT WHEN
IT LOST AN IMPORTANT ARMS SHIPMENT IN JANUARY (SEE
BOGOTA 315) AND, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS, HAS INCURRED
MORE CASUALTIES THAN EXPECTED. IN ADDITION, CAMPESINOS
IN KEY AREAS HAVE BEGUN SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND ITS
ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS MORE THAN IN THE PAST -- AN
ADDITIONAL SETBACK TO THE FARC.


6. DEFENSE ATTACHE CONTACTS IN THE ARMED FORCES BELIEVE
THAT THE FARC'S CEASEFIRE AND ITS INSISTENCE ON DIALOGUE
WITHOUT DISARMAMENT IS A POLITICAL PLOY TO GAIN "TIME
AND SPACE" TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES. ACCORDING TO THEM,
1989 IS A CRITICAL YEAR FOR THE FARC, ONE IN WHICH IT
HOPES TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO
"GENERAL INSURRECTION" IN 1990. THESE SOURCES SHARE
PRESIDENT BARCO'S SUSPICIONS (REFTEL, PARA. 4) THAT THE
FARC IS USING THE TRUCE AND PEACE DIALOGUE AS PRETEXTS
TO GAIN A BREATHING SPELL AND COME BACK STRONGER IN LATE

1989.


7. IN CONCLUSION, THE ONUS IS ON THE FARC TO PROVE IT
IS SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE. FARC LEADERS WILL LIKELY FIND
IT DIFFICULT TO CONTROL THEIR SPREAD OUT AND
DECENTRALIZED FRONTS, ESPECIALLY PREVENTING THEM FROM
CARRYING OUT THEIR NORMAL "TAX" COLLECTIONS. IF THE
FARC CAN MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE, PRESSURE WILL MOUNT ON
THE GOVERNMENT TO OPEN TALKS. IF IT CANNOT, THE
GOVERNMENT WILL BE FREE TO PURSUE ITS CURRENT PEACE PLAN
WHILE KEEPING THE MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE FARC.


MCNAMARA