Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
89ABUDHABI3092
1989-06-08 06:53:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

POSSIBLE SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN

Tags:  PARM PINR IR UR 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 080653Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3927
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
CJTFME
GULFWAR COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 03092 


E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM PINR IR UR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN

REF: STATE 176500

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 03092


E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM PINR IR UR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN

REF: STATE 176500


1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)


2. SUMMARY. UAE GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT POSSIBLE
SOVIET ARMS SALE TO IRAN WOULD BE UNHELPFUL, BUT
THEY ARE DUBIOUS THAT THEY CAN HAVE MUCH WEIGHT
IN PREVENTING IT. MOREOVER, THEY ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT DRAWING IRANIAN ENMITY. LINGERING EFFECTS
OF U.S.-IRAN ARMS SALE SCANDAL AFFECT THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO RAISE ISSUE WITH SOVIETS. END
SUMMARY.


3. IN CONJUNCTION WITH BRIEFINGS ON IRAN BY
INR/CENTCOM TEAM, AMBASSADOR MADE POINTS IN REFTEL,
MODIFIED TO ACCOUNT FOR PROBABLE POSTPONEMENT OF
RAFSANJANI VISIT TO MOSCOW UNTIL AFTER 40-DAY
MOURNING PERIOD FOR KHOMEINI. IN TALKS WITH
PRESIDENTIAL COURT CHAMBERLAIN SHEIKH SUROUR AND
TOP FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL IN COUNTRY,
AMBASSADOR PRESSED VIEW THAT KHOMEINI'S DEATH
MAKES ARMS SALES BY SOVIETS OR ANYONE ELSE PARTICU-
LARLY DESTABILIZING. AT TIME OF INTERNAL POWER
STRUGGLE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TRY TO FOCUS IRANIAN
ENERGIES ON ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND NOT TO
ENCOURAGE FACTIONS WHICH MAY SEEK WEAPONS WITH
IDEA OF EVENTUALLY RESUMING WAR WITH IRAQ AND
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING.


4. SHEIKH SUROUR LISTENED PATIENTLY BUT WAS
CLEARLY NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RAISING THIS ISSUE
WITH THE SOVIETS. HE TOOK THE LINE THAT ANY SOVIET
ARMS IRAN COULD NOW AFFORD WERE UNLIKELY TO BE IN
SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO RECTIFY CURRENT IMBALANCE
FAVORABLE TO IRAQ. THUS IT WOULD NOT LEAD TO A
RESUMPTION OF THE WAR. AS FOR LONG-TERM SOVIET
INFLUENCE, HE SAID, IRANIANS WILL NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE.
HE CLAIMED THAT IRANIANS ARE BASICALLY PRO-WESTERN
AND THAT THEIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS ALSO TIE THEM TO
THE WEST. SOVIETS, HE THOUGHT, WERE ONLY DOING WHAT
GREAT POWERS WILL ALWAYS DO --SERVING THEIR INTERESTS.
IN THIS CASE, HE THOUGHT, IT WOULD BE ONLY OF SHORT-
TERM SIGNIFICANCE. IF, HE CHALLENGED, THE U.S.
ENJOYED GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AS THE SOVIET
UNION TEMPORARILY DOES, WOULD IT NOT SELL ARMS TO
THEM?


5. WE PRESSED IDEA THAT ARMS SALES COULD INDEED
BE VERY DESTABILIZING DUE TO CURRENT POLITICAL
TURMOIL. THE SALE OF ARMS BY ANY SOURCE --SOVIET
UNION, CHINA, WESTERN EUROPE STATES, OR FOR THAT
MATTER THE U.S.-- WOULD SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THE
ELEMENTS THAT SEEK TO EXPAND THE REVOLUTION AND
REARM TO RESUME WAR WITH IRAQ. RESPONSIBLE GOVERN-
MENTS SHOULD BE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO FOCUS IRANIAN
ENERGIES ON ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.


6. DURING OUR CALL ON YACOUB AL-KINDI AT MFA WE
GOT A MORE RESERVED RESPONSE. AL-KINDI AGREED THAT
WE NEEDED TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS BUT THOUGHT IT TOO
EARLY TO REACH ANY CONCLUSION ABOUT POLICIES
TOWARD IRAN. WE SHOULD WATCH TO SEE HOW MATTERS
DEVELOP. HE ACCEPTED A NON-PAPER SUMMARIZING
AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE AND AGREED TO BRIEF FOREIGN
MINISTER RASHID ABDULLA AND UNDERSECRETARY HAMDAN
BIN ZAYED UPON THEIR RETURNS FROM FOREIGN TRAVEL.


7. COMMENT: THE LEGACY OF THE U.S.-IRAN ARMS
SCANDAL STILL BURDENS OUR DIALOGUE WITH SHEIKH
SUROUR ON THIS ISSUE. HE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY
ACTIVE IN PRESSING THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA TO
COOPERATE WITH OPERATION STAUNCH. IN THE WAKE OF
IRANGATE REVELATIONS HE FELT POLITICALLY EMBARRASSED
AND EXPOSED AS AN UNWITTING TOOL OF USG DECEPTION.
SUROUR HAS NO DOUBT THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION IS
PERSUADED NOT TO SELL ARMS TO IRAN, IT WILL TELL
THE IRANIANS IT CANNOT DO SO BECAUSE OF U.S. AND
ARAB PROTESTS. MOREOVER, HE VIEWS IRANIAN HEGEMONY
OVER THE GULF AS A NATURAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. IN
THE LONG TERM, HE BELIEVES THAT IRAN WILL RETURN
TO BOTH SANITY AND STRENGTH AND WILL THEN PLAY A
STABILIZING ROLE. IN SHORT, IRAN WILL HELP DEFEND
THE AREA FROM THE SOVIETS. IN THE SHORT-TERM, HE
BELIEVES USG HAS SHOWN IT WILL HELP DEFEND THE GULF
AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. THAT BEING THE CASE,
HE APPEARS TO BELIEVE, WHY SHOULD THE U.A.E. RUN
MORE THAN NECESSARY RISKS WITH IRAN? FOR NOW, AT
LEAST, HE PUTS A U.A.E. DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS IN
THE CATEGORY OF UNNECESSARY RISKS.


MACK