(U) SPR 0002, TUNISIA'S RELATIONS WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 12749

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSPR AINF KPRP PINR TS
SUBJECT: (U) SPR 0002, TUNISIA'S RELATIONS WITH
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES


1. (C) SUMMARY: ALMOST ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN TUNISIA.
THE SOVIET AND CHINESE REPRESENTATIONS ARE,
CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE LARGEST. OVERALL, TUNISIA'S
RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES ARE GOOD BUT NOT
OVERLY WARM. 1988, TUNISIAN PRESIDENT ZINE EL
ABIDINE BEN ALI'S FIRST FULL YEAR IN OFFICE, MARKED
THE CONTINUANCE OF A PERCEPTIBLE WARMING TREND IN
TUNISIAN-COMMUNIST BLOC RELATIONS. THE ROOT CAUSE OF
THIS TREND PROBABLY LIES IN BEN ALI'S DESIRE TO
PRESENT HIMSELF TO HIS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS
(PARTICULARLY LIBYA) AS A MODERATE, NON-ALIGNED ARAB
CHIEF OF STATE. WHILE TUNISIA RETAINS HER
TRADITIONAL STRONG TIES TO THE U.S., FRANCE, ITALY
AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS, THE BEN ALI ADMINISTRATION
HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO PLAY DOWN THE
TUNISIAN-WESTERN RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
THIS NOTED, IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MORE COSMETIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE IN
NATURE. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT
COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO
OFFER BEN ALI THE KIND OF FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT HE DESIRES. END SUMMARY.

PART I. OFFICIAL COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION:


2. (C) DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR, EMBASSY NOTED NO
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMMUNIST EMBASSY STAFFING OR
ACCREDITATION LEVELS APART FROM THE NOVEMBER
ACCREDITATION OF AN EAST GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE
(RESIDENT IN ALGIERS, SEE MILITARY RELATIONS BELOW).
THERE WERE NO COMMUNIST EMBASSY EXPULSIONS DURING THE
REPORTING PERIOD. FOLLOWING ARE 1988 ESTIMATES FOR
SOVIET EMBASSY AND OTHER PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
TUNISIA (SPOUSES, CHILDREN NOT INCLUDED):
--ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS: 25
--EMBASSY, CONSULAR, AND CULTURAL CENTER STAFF: 27
--TRADE STAFF: 16
--GKES (SOON TO BE INCORPORATED WITH TRADE
MISSION): 9
--AEROFLOT: 3
--JOURNALISTS: 3
--SOVIET EMBASSY GRADE SCHOOL EMPLOYEES: 4
--TOTAL: 87
(NOTE: THE REDUCTION FROM LAST YEAR'S ESTIMATED
TOTAL OF 120 IS PROBABLY DUE TO A REDUCTION IN STAFF
VICE OFFICIAL PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION TO THE
OFFICIALS LISTED ABOVE, ACCORDING TO A SOVIET
DIPLOMAT, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 300 SOVIET
COOPERANTS IN TUNISIA.)


3. (C) FOLLOWING ARE 1988 ESTIMATES FOR NON-SOVIET
COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN TUNISIA (TOTAL PRESENCE
FIGURES UNAVAILABLE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED):
--BULGARIA: 7 DIPLOMATS (D),9 STAFF/TRADE/OTHER (S)
--CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 7 D, 9 S
--EAST GERMANY: 6 D (WITH MILATT IN ALGIERS),5 S
--HUNGARY: 4 D, 4 S
--POLAND: 6 D, 3 S
--ROMANIA: 3 D, 1 S
--CUBA: 3 D
--CHINA: 21 D (TOTAL S UNKNOWN BUT ESTIMATED AT 30)
--ALBANIA: NON-RESIDENT AMBASSADOR (NRA)
--NORTH KOREA: 3 D
--VIETNAM: NRA
--YUGOSLAVIA: 3 D, 4 S

PART II. LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP:


4. (C) THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF TUNISIA (PCT) WAS
LEGALIZED IN JULY 1981 AND HAS APPROXIMATELY 400-500
ACTIVE MEMBERS AND APPROXIMATELY 2000-3000
SYMPATHIZERS. IN 1988, PCT ACTIVITY ON TUNISIAN
CAMPUSES WAS MINIMAL DUE TO GROWING ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALIST, ARAB NATIONALIST, AND RIVAL LEFTIST
ACTIVITIES. THE LEFTIST STUDENTS, WHO STILL VIEW THE
PCT AS TOO MODERATE, BELONG TO A SMALL GROUP OF
POORLY ORGANIZED STUDENT COMMUNIST/LEFTIST MOVEMENTS
THAT ARE LOOSELY UNITED UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE
RECOGNIZED GENERAL UNION OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS (UGET)
LED BY SELF-AVOWED MARXIST SAMIR LABIDI. DURING THIS
REPORTING PERIOD, THE "HONEYMOON" BETWEEN THE BEN ALI
ADMINISTRATION AND PCT LEADER MOHAMMED HARMEL
CONTINUED. HARMEL WAS ONE OF SEVERAL LEGAL
OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO SIGNED THE 7 NOVEMBER 1988
"NATIONAL PACT" (A SYMBOLIC DOCUMENT PLEDGING
COOPERATION AND FAIR PLAY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, THE
RULING PARTY, THE UNIONS, AND VARIOUS OPPOSITION
PARTIES). HARMEL SPEAKS RUSSIAN AND MAINTAINS GOOD
CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET AND OTHER EAST BLOC
EMBASSIES AND THE PCT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE CPSU AS A
LEGITIMATE COMMUNIST PARTY. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE
PCT WILL BECOME AN APPRECIABLE POLITICAL FORCE IN THE
NEAR FUTURE. BEN ALI HAS MANAGED TO TAME THE PCT TO
POINT OF ALMOST TOTAL CONCILIATION, AND THE PCT'S
POSSIBLE STUDENT BASE OF SUPPORT APPEARS TO HOLD
DISDAIN FOR THIS MODERATE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN
ADDITION, THE PCT REMAINS AT ODDS WITH THE BROAD
POPULAR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SECTOR OF TUNISIAN
SOCIETY. IN DECEMBER, THE PCT ATTEMPTED TO
CAPITALIZE ON THE POPULARITY OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE
BY STAGING THREE DAYS OF FESTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF
THE INTIFADAH UPRISINGS.


5. (S) DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, BEN ALI'S
DECISION TO LEGALIZE THE TRADITIONAL UGET STUDENT
UNION HAS TAKEN THE WIND FROM THE SAILS OF THE MORE
RADICAL LEFTIST STUDENT GROUPS. RADICAL LEFTIST
INFLUENCE CONTINUED TO FLOURISH IN THE FORM OF
ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE GOT-CONTROLLED GENERAL
UNION OF TUNISIAN WORKERS (UGTT),HOWEVER, BEN ALI'S
ONGOING REFORM PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE ATTRACTING THE
GREATER MAJORITY OF TUNISIAN WORKERS AWAY FROM THE
RADICALS. THERE IS IN FACT AN UNRECOGNIZED COMMUNIST
WORKER'S PARTY OF TUNISIA (POCT) WHOSE MEMBERSHIP AND
INFLUENCE IN THE TUNISIAN UNIONS AND ON CAMPUS
REMAINS UNKNOWN. ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE COULD
GROW WITHIN THE INCREASINGLY LIBERAL TUNISIAN
POLITICAL CLIMATE, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT BEN ALI WOULD
ALLOW THE COMMUNIST/LEFTIST MOVEMENTS TO GO VERY FAR
BEYOND ACTING AS DE FACTO COUNTERWEIGHTS TO THE
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS. IN SHORT, TUNISIAN
COMMUNISM, WITH THE ESSENTIALLY WEAK PCT AS ITS
CENTERPIECE, DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A VERY PROMISING
FUTURE.

PART III. CULTURAL RELATIONS, EDUCATION EXCHANGE:


6. (LOU) THE SOVIET UNION PROMOTES SOVIET CULTURE IN
TUNISIA. ITS CULTURAL CENTER OFFERS A TUITION FREE
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PROGRAM AND ALSO SPONSORS FILMS, ART
AND PHOTOGRAPHY EXHIBITS, AND MUSICAL PERFORMANCES.
THERE IS A TUNISIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION
WHICH SPONSORS SUCH ACTIVITIES AS LECTURES BY
VISITING SOVIET ACADEMICS. HE EAST EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES ALSO SPONSOR CULTURAL EVENTS (MID JANUARY
1988 GAVE US A CZECHOSLOVAK CULTURAL WEEK ALONG WITH
THE CONCURRENT VISIT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CULTURAL
MINISTER TO TUNIS). CUBAN SPONSORSHIP OF SUCH EVENTS
IS USUALLY LIMITED TO ACTIVITIES CO-SPONSORED BY
OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN TUNISIA.
CHINESE CULTURAL INFLUENCE IS ALSO PRESENT BUT
LIMITED AS CHINA TENDS TO CENTER ITS BILATERAL
RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA ON TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES. TASS AND THE NEW CHINA NEWS
AGENCY ARE BOTH REPRESENTED IN TUNIS. IN ADDITION,
SEVERAL COMMUNIST JOURNALS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET
FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSION OF "MOSCOW NEWS" ARE
AVAILABLE AT DOWNTOWN TUNIS NEWSSTANDS. SOME LOCAL
VIDEO CLUBS ALSO CARRY SOVIET FILMS FOR VIDEOCASSETTE
RENTAL.


7. (C) THE NUMBER OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS STUDYING IN
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES REMAINED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME IN

1988. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT COMMUNIST
EDUCATED PERSONNEL ARE ACCEDING TO POSITIONS OF
AUTHORITY IN THE GOVERNMENT OR THE RULING PARTY.
REGARDING THE PRC, ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATE OF ONE
CHINESE DIPLOMAT, THE MAJORITY OF TUNISIANS IN CHINA
ARE LANGUAGE STUDENTS. OVERALL, THE MAJORITY OF
TUNISIAN STUDENTS WHO STUDY ABROAD DO SO IN WESTERN
COUNTRIES. THIS IS DUE BOTH TO THE GENERAL
PERCEPTION THAT THE QUALITY OF A WESTERN EDUCATION
CANNOT BE MATCHED ELSEWHERE, AND A CERTAIN TUNISIAN
CULTURAL AFFINITY TOWARDS THE WEST. NO NEW MAJOR
SCIENTIFIC OR CULTURAL AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES WERE SIGNED IN 1988. ACCORDING TO A SOVIET
OFFICIAL WITH ALLEGED CONSULAR DUTIES, THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT GRANTS APPROXIMATELY 60 FOUR YEAR
UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS A YEAR AND CLAIMS THAT, AT
ANY GIVEN TIME, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 400 TUNISIAN
STUDENTS IN THE USSR. A BULGARIAN OFFICIAL SAID THAT
HIS GOVERNMENT GRANTED SEVEN SCHOLARSHIPS A YEAR AND
THAT THE TOTAL OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS IN HIS COUNTRY
RARELY EXCEEDED FIFTY (INCLUDING THOSE WHO FINANCE
THEIR OWN STUDIES). A CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIAL SAID
THAT THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDYING IN HIS COUNTRY
HAS REMAINED CONSTANT SINCE THE CHANGE OF
ADMINISTRATIONS IN TUNISIA.

PART IV. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS: NO
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OTHER THAN THE ACCREDITATION OF
SOME MILITARY ATTACHES (SEE MILITARY RELATIONS).

PART VI. APPRAISAL OF POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/MILITARY
RELATIONS:


8. POLITICAL:


A. (S) PRIOR TO BEN ALI'S LATE 1987 ASSUMPTION OF
POWER, TUNISIA HAD MAINTAINED CORRECT BUT COOL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOST COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
FOR SEVERAL YEARS. FORMER PRESIDENT HABIB BOURGUIBA
WAS A STAUNCH ANTI-COMMUNIST AND NOT AVERSE TO MAKING
HIS PRO-WESTERN VIEWS KNOWN. DURING THIS PERIOD, IT
IS PROBABLE THAT THE MAJORITY OF COMMUNIST EMBASSIES
IN TUNISIA WERE THERE SIMPLY TO CARRY ON RELATIONS
WITH THE PLO AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE ARAB
LEAGUE (BOTH OF WHICH ARE HEADQUARTERED IN TUNIS)
RATHER THAN TO FOCUS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH
TUNISIA. SINCE THE 1987 CHANGE AND ON INTO 1988,
THERE HAS BEEN A PERCEPTIBLE WARMING TREND IN
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER BLOC
COUNTRIES THAT HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF WITH INCREASED
CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND INCREASED COVERAGE OF SOVIET
INTERNAL EVENTS IN THE TUNISIAN MEDIA. TUNISIA'S
TRADITIONAL REASON FOR MAINTAINING CORRECT RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS STEMMED FROM THE GOT BELIEF THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE OVER LIBYA
(WITH WHOM THE GOT REESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
IN DECEMBER OF 1987). NOW THAT THE TUNISIAN-LIBYAN
RAPPROCHEMENT HAS CONTINUED FOR ALMOST A FULL YEAR,
TUNISIA MAY NOT NEED THIS PERCEIVED "RESTRAINING
INFLUENCE" OVER QADHAFI. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE NEITHER THE RESOURCES NOR
THE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE GREAT AMOUNTS OF FOREIGN AID
TO TUNISIA, THE WARMING TREND MAY RETAIN ITS PRESENT
COSMETIC NATURE AND NOT GO MUCH FURTHER. THE GOT
WILL CONTINUE TO MARKET PHOSPHATES, FERTILIZERS, AND
OLIVE OIL TO THE SOVIET BLOC. THIS SAID, PAST
EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THESE COUNTRIES TEND TO
DRIVE HARD BARGAINS WITH TUNISIA. BEN ALI VERY
OBVIOUSLY CONTINUES TO PLACE A GREATER EMPHASIS ON
REGIONAL MAGHREB ISSUES THAN ON EAST-WEST AFFAIRS.


B. (S) AFTER THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA HAS THE LARGEST
COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN TUNISIA. OVERALL,
SINO-TUNISIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON
COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AND LESS ON
POLITICS PER SE. ONE CHINESE OFFICIAL VIEWED THE
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AS CORDIAL BUT COOL. DESPITE
THE LARGE IN COUNTRY PRC REPRESENTATION, THERE ARE
ONLY A HANDFUL OF TUNISIAN DIPLOMATS IN CHINA. AS
WITH MANY EMBASSIES IN TUNIS, THE PRINCIPLE REASON
FOR THE CHINESE EMBASSY PRESENCE MAY WELL BE THE
PRESENCE OF THE PLO. A CHINESE ASSISTANT FOREIGN
MINISTER VISITED TUNIS IN LATE 1988, HOWEVER ALL
INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE MET WITH TUNISIAN OFFICIALS
TO CONVEY CHINESE VIEWS ON MAJOR WORLD EVENTS AND NOT
TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL ISSUES.


C. (C) ON THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SIDE, POLITICAL
RELATIONS APPEAR TO BE GOOD BUT NON-SUBSTANTIVE. IN
MID SUMMER, A MEMBER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST
PARTY PRESIDIUM VISITED THE TUNISIAN PARLIAMENT,
HOWEVER, APART FROM SOME VAGUE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF
FRATERNITY AND FRIENDSHIP, THE VISIT SEEEMS TO HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE. THE EARLY 1988 VISIT OF
THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER APPEARS TO HAVE PRODUCED
SIMILAR RESULTS AND THE SAME CAN BE SAID FOR THE
MARCH VISIT OF A BULGARIAN STATE COUNCIL VICE
PRESIDENT.


9. ECONOMIC:


A. (LOU) TUNISIA'S ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL LINKS
WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE SLIGHT IN COMPARISON TO
THOSE WITH TUNISIA'S TRADITIONAL TRADING PARTNERS
AND, DURING 1988, REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT.

-USSR: IN NOVEMBER, THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT
ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO REINFORCE BILATERAL
COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN 1989. TO
THIS END, THE TUNISIAN-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION WILL
MEET IN TUNIS IN DECEMBER (WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION
LED BY THEIR MINISTER OF PLANS). ALSO DURING THIS
PERIOD, THE SOVIETS PROVIDED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE IN
THE FORM OF TWO LARGE BIPLANE CROP DUSTERS TO ASSIST
TUNISIA AGAINST THE NORTH AFRICAN LOCUST INVASION.
THE SOVIET UNION EXPORTS LUMBER, AMMONIA, POTASSIUM,
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT, HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS, BOOKS AND FILMS TO TUNISIA. IN 1988, THE
USSR PURCHASED APPROXIMATELY 180,000 METRIC TONS OF
TUNISIAN TRIPLE SUPERPHOSPHATE (FOR APPROXIMATELY
U.S. DOLLARS 27 MILLION) AND OLIVE OIL.


B. (C) EASTERN EUROPE: BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH
SEVERAL EAST BLOC OFFFICIALS, THE CHANGE IN TUNISIAN
GOVERNMENT HAS HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: TRADE FIGURES DROPPED CONSIDERABLY
FROM U.S. DOLLARS 10 MILLION WORTH OF CZECHOSLOVAK
EXPORTS TO TUNISIA IN 1986 TO 4.9 MILLION IN 1987.
TUNISIAN EXPORTS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOSTLY PHOSPHATE
BASED PRODUCTS) DROPPED FROM U.S. DOLLARS 11 MILLION
TO 6.6 MILLION DURING THE SAME PERIOD. ACCORDING TO
A CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIAL, BOTH FIGURES ARE EXPECTED TO
INCREASE BY APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERCENT IN 1988.

-POLAND: A POLISH OFFICIAL SAID THAT COMMERCIAL
RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA HAD IN FACT CHANGED FOR THE
BETTER SINCE THE CHANGE OF POWER. HE FIRST NOTED
THAT THE TUNISIAN MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY NO LONGER HAD
TO GRANT SPECIAL WAIVERS TO TUNISIAN COMPANIES WHO
DESIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH POLAND AND THAT THE
CENTRAL BANK BUREAUCRACY WAS "MORE COOPERATIVE".
THIS NOTED, HE SAID THE TRADE FIGURES REMAINED
RELATIVELY CONSTANT, I.E. POLISH EXPORTS TO TUNISIA
REMAINED AT THE APPROXIMATE U.S. DOLLARS 22 MILLION
LEVEL AND TUNISIAN PRODUCTS IMPORTED TO POLAND
ACTUALLY FELL TO APPROXIMATELY U.S. DOLLARS 1.5
MILLION IN 1988. THE OFFICIAL ATTRIBUTED THIS DROP
TO ONGOING INTERNAL REFORMS IN POLAND. HE WOULD NOT
SPECULATE ON WHAT EFFECT THE PLANNED JANUARY 1988
ABOLISHMENT OF POLAND'S CENTRAL EXPORT/IMPORT
PARASTATAL COMPANY WOULD HAVE ON POLISH-TUNISIAN
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE TUNISIAN
SIDE "PUSHED" BARTER TRADE OVER HARD CURRENCY
PURCHASES.

-BULGARIA: A BULGARIAN OFFICIAL TOLD THE EMBASSY
THAT BILATERAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS REMAINED
RELATIVELY CONSTANT DURING 1988. HE ADDED THAT THERE
WAS NO BULGARIAN ECONOMIC AID FOR TUNISIA (CITING
LIMITED RESOURCES AS THE REASON) AND SAID HE BELIEVED
THIS WAS THE CASE FOR OTHER EAST BLOC COUNTRIES.

-ROMANIA: A ROMANIAN OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT THERE IS
NO ROMANIAN ECONOMIC AID PER SE TO TUNISIA AND THAT
ROMANIAN-TUNISIAN COMMERCIAL TIES HAVE REMAINED
RELATIVELY CONSTANT. HE NOTED THAT THE
"LIBERALIZATION" OF TUNISIA'S IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
COULD INCREASE ROMANIAN TRADE WITH TUNISIA DURING THE
COMING YEAR.


C. (LOU) CHINA: SINO-TUNISIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
HAS CONTINUED MUCH AT THE SAME PACE DURING THIS
PERIOD AS DURING THE PAST. BASED ON A 1985
AGREEMENT, CONSTRUCTION BEGAN IN MID 1988 IN CHINA ON
A SINO-TUNISIAN-KUWAITI FERTILIZER PROCESSING PLANT.
TUNISIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE VENTURE IS 30 PERCENT
AND TUNISIA WILL SUPPLY CHINA WITH 250,000 METRIC
TONS OF PHOSPHORIC ACID PER YEAR.


10. MILITARY:

(S) TUNISIAN MILITARY TIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
ARE MINIMAL. AS OF THIS REPORT, ONLY ONE COMMUNIST
MILITARY ATTACHE HAD BEEN ACCREDITED TO TUNISIA (GDR,
RESIDENT IN ALGIERS). AS OF LATE NOVEMBER, THERE
WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLANNING TO
PRESENT THE ACCREDITATION PAPERS OF THEIR OWN
MILITARY ATTACHE. IN EARLY DECEMBER, A CHINESE
OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE PRC WOULD PROBABLY ACCREDIT A
MILITARY ATTACHE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THIS
MARKS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN TUNISIAN-COMMUNIST BLOC
RELATIONS AS FORMER PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD
SPECIFICALLY BARRED THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FROM
OPENING MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICES. AS OF THIS
WRITING, THERE WERE NO COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS
OR ADVISORS IN TUNISIA. ASIDE FROM THE SOVIET SHIP
REPAIR CONTRACT, THERE IS NO KNOWN SIGNIFICANT
COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA. THERE HAVE
BEEN NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF TUNISIANS TRAVELING TO
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY TRAINING. COMMUNIST
BLOC MILITARY AID HAS THUS FAR BEEN NON-EXISTANT.
THIS NOTED, A CHINESE OFFICIAL SAID THAT, DURING THE
RECENT MAGHREB TOUR OF A CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION,
TUNISIA REQUESTED CHINESE AID IN THE FORM OF
UNSPECIFIED NAVAL VESSELS. HE ADDED THAT, AS OF
DECEMBER, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET COME TO
A DECISION ON THE MATTER.


PELLETREAU