Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
88CARACAS1552
1988-02-17 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CUBA AFTER CASTRO -- ARE WE READY?

Tags:  PREL CU VE 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 171602Z FEB 88
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1154
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 01552 

FOR ARA ABRAMS; INR ABRAMOWITZ
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR SORZANO

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL CU VE
SUBJECT: CUBA AFTER CASTRO -- ARE WE READY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 01552

FOR ARA ABRAMS; INR ABRAMOWITZ
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR SORZANO

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL CU VE
SUBJECT: CUBA AFTER CASTRO -- ARE WE READY?


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.



2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: THIS CABLE ASKS THE
QUESTION: "IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR A
SUDDEN CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN CUBA?" IT DOES NOT
ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION, NOR DOES IT
SPECULATE ON THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH AN EVENT.
IT ALSO DOES NOT PROPOSE COURSES OF ACTION DESIGNED
TO BRING THAT EVENT ABOUT. IT DOES SUGGEST THE
USG ESTABLISH A STUDY GROUP TO CONSIDER OUR OPTIONS
IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, AS UNLIKELY AS IT MAY APPEAR
TO BE AT THIS TIME.



3. ALTHOUGH "EXPERTS" HAVE BEEN PREDICTING CASTRO'S
DOWNFALL FOR ABOUT 29 YEARS, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE
THAT HE WILL NOT LAST FOREVER. IF IT IS TRUE THAT
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN CUBA ARE VERY BAD
AND CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE; IF RECENT HIGH-LEVEL
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DEFECTORS ARE
INDICATIVE OF A COLLAPSE OF THE "NOMENKLATURA";
IF CASTRO'S AGE BEGINS TO TAKE ITS TOLL, COULD WE
BE SEEING THE BEGINNING OF THE END? MAYBE NOT, BUT,
IF SO, ARE WE READY TO SEIZE WHAT MAY BE A FLEETING
OPPORTUNITY BROUGHT ABOUT, FOR EXAMPLE, BY A MILITARY
COUP, AS FAR-FETCHED AS THAT IDEA SEEMS RIGHT NOW?
IT COULD BE A WORTHWHILE INVESTMENT TO STUDY OUR
OPTIONS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF
WHAT COULD BE CALLED THE "DENAZIFICATION" OF CUBA.
THE U.S. HAS HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH "EXORCISING"
OTHER SOCIETIES OF MILITARIZED, HATE-FILLED
IDEOLOGIES WHICH MAINTAINED THEMSELVES IN POWER
BY TERROR AND BRUTALITY. HAVE WE EXAMINED, ON THE
ONE HAND, THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
NAZI GERMANY, FASCIST ITALY AND JAPAN, AND CUBA ON
THE OTHER? IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE AND CERTAINLY
MORE THAN SIMPLY AN ACADEMIC EXERCISE. STRANGER
THINGS HAVE HAPPENED IN HISTORY, THAT A TYRANNY
SUDDENLY CEASES TO EXIST, DUE TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL
CAUSES. IF THAT HAPPENS IN CUBA, ARE WE PREPARED TO
WORK QUICKLY WITH WHATEVER CUBANS INSIDE THE ISLAND
MAY BE WILLING TO DETACH HER FROM THE SOVIET BLOC BEFORE
HARD-LINE COMMUNISTS AND CASTROITES CAN SUCCESSFULLY
REACT? IF WE ARE, CAN WE SUSTAIN THE EFFORT BY
BEGINNING A PROCESS OF UNDOING NEARLY THIRTY YEARS OF
BRAIN-WASHING AND PROPAGANDA?



4. WE COULD EXAMINE OUR EXPERIENCE IN A MINOR
BUT MORE RECENT AND STILL RELEVANT CASE: GRENADA.
WERE WE READY FOR A SUDDEN CHANGE IN GRENADA IN
1983? ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DIFFERENT,
DID WE MAKE OUR TASK EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT BY
OUR ADVANCE PLANS OR LACK THEREOF?
WHAT WAS OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE FIRST FEW WEEKS AND
MONTHS AFTER THE RESCUE MISSION? HOW WOULD IT HAVE
WORKED IN THE CASE OF A SPANISH-SPEAKING COUNTRY WITH
30 YEARS OF COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP INSTEAD OF 4 YEARS?
ALTHOUGH AN INVASION OR OCCUPATION OF CUBA BY U.S.
FORCES IS NOT AT ALL LIKELY, IT COULD BE THAT, FOR
EXAMPLE, UNDER A SCENARIO OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP BY
CUBAN MILITARY OFFICERS FOLLOWING, LET'S SAY A CASTRO
HEART ATTACK, THAT THE PROVISIONAL CUBAN
GOVERNMENT WOULD ASK THE USG FOR ALL TYPES OF
ASSISTANCE. IF WE ARE NOT READY TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY,
A COUNTER-COUP COULD BE LAUNCHED. THE FATE OF CUBA
FOR ANOTHER 30 YEARS COULD THUS BE DECIDED IN A
MATTER OF HOURS, WITH THE CORRESPONDING CONSEQUENCES
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. HOW MUCH HAS A COMMUNIST
BASE NINETY MILES FROM FLORIDA COST US IN THE PAST
THREE DECADES? EVEN IF THERE IS NO VIOLENT
RESISTANCE TO THE "NEW" CUBAN GOVERNMENT, ARE WE
PREPARED TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC (E.G., FOOD,
OIL) AND OTHER HELP WHICH THE NEW GOVERNMENT--ASSUMING,
OF COURSE, THAT IT IS PRN-US--SEEKS?



5. A WASHINGTON-BASED TASK FORCE OR STUDY GROUP
CONSISTING OF THE PRINCIPAL USG AGENCIES WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF CUBA, AUGMENTED BY CONSULTANTS
INCLUDING TRUSTWORTHY CUBANS AND AMERICANS SUCH
AS LONG-TIME EXILES, RECENT DEFECTORS, ACADEMICS, AND
PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH ISSUES SUCH AS "DE NAZIFICATION"
IN POST WWII GERMANY, COULD PREPARE AN ACTION
PLAN WHICH COULD SAVE THE UNITED STATES MUCH
COST AND SUFFERING IN THE EVENTUALITY OF A SUDDEN
CHANGE IN CUBA.


REICH