THE REGIME IS PART OF THE PROBLEM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 01177

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL IZ
SUBJECT: THE REGIME IS PART OF THE PROBLEM


1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)


2. SUMMARY. IRAQI MORALE IS AT A LOW POINT, ALTHOUGH
IRAQIS REMAIN AS WEARILY DETERMINED AS EVER NOT TO
LOSE THE WAR. SEVERAL RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS --
RENEWED POPULAR ARMY RECRUITING, THE EX POST FACTO
CANCELLATION OF AN AMNESTY FOR DESERTERS, AND THE
BUNGLED EVACUATION EXERCISE -- ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THIS DIP. EROSION OF LIVING STANDARDS THROUGH
INFLATION REMAINS A SERIOUS LONG TERM PROBLEM. THE
RECENT MISSILE EXCHANGE HAS ADDED TO CIVILIAN FEARS.
IT HAS ALSO GIVEN A BOOST TO THE MORALE OF SOME TO
SEE IRAQ ABLE TO STRIKE BACK AT TEHRAN, BUT THIS
POSITIVE EFFECT WILL DISSIPATE IF THE EXCHANGE
CONTINUES VERY LONG. OFFICIAL BRAVADO IS A RESULT
OF LOCAL MACHISMO AND A DESIRE TO BOOST SAGGING
HOME-FRONT MORALE. END SUMMARY.


3. IN THE OPINION OF THE AMBASSADOR, CIVILIAN MORALE
IN BAGHDAD IS CURRENTLY LOWER THAN AT ANY TIME DURING
HIS THIRTY-NINE MONTHS AT POST. WHILE THE QUESTION
MAY NOT BE CRITICAL FOR IRAQ, SINCE IRAQIS SOMEHOW
DO AND MUST KEEP ON WITH THEIR DAILY LIVES IN THE
FACE OF OFFICIAL COMPULSION AND POSSESS A GENUINE
IF WEARY DETERMINATION NOT TO BE DEFEATED BY A
DESPISED IRANIAN REGIME, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BURDEN
IS MORE ANGUISHING NOW THAN IN RECENT MEMORY.


4. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE IRAQIS, MUCH OF THE ADDED
BURDEN ON MORALE IS DUE DECISIONS AND MISCALCULATIONS
BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT IN RECENT MONTHS, INCLUDING:

-- 1) A MAJOR REAPPEARANCE OF POPULAR ARMY PRESS GANGS
AFTER AN ABSENCE OF A YEAR. ONE EXPLANATION IS THAT THE
REGIME IS RAISING UNITS TO REPLACE KURDISH TRIBAL
IRREGULAR UNITS DOING GARRISON AND REAR-AREA PATROL DUTY,
SINCE THESE UNITS ARE CONSIDERED EVEN LESS RELIABLE
IN THE WAKE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S WHOLESALE DESTRUCTION
OF KURDISH VILLAGES. (THE STREET RUMOR IS THAT
THREE-FOURTHS OF THE NEW PA FORCES WILL GO NORTH TO
KURDISTAN;ONE FOURTH TO GUARD PIPELINE.) MIDDLE-AGED
BAGHDADIS REALLY FEAR DUTY IN KURDISTAN, EXPECTING
TO HAVE THEIR THROATS CUT IN THE DARK OF NIGHT.
ANOTHER EXPLANATION IS THAT AFTER A YEAR OF RECRUITING
INACTIVITY, MANY PA UNITS ARE DUE TO BE DEMOBILIZED
AFTER THEIR FOURTEEN MONTHS DUTY PERIOD AND MUST NOW
BE REPLACED WHOLESALE.

-- 2) THE EX POST FACTO CANCELLATION BY SADDAM OF THE
LAST AMNESTY DECLARED IN JANUARY. MANY IRAQIS
ACCUSE THE REGIME OF LURING DESERTERS IN TO SENTENCE
THEM TO PRISON AND SOME TO EXECUTION. THIS PERCEIVED
DOUBLE-DEALING HAS HARMED THE REGIME'S ALREADY POOR
CREDIBILITY WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE.

-- 3) THE BUNGLED EVACUATION EXERCISE CANCELLED IN
LATE FEBRUARY. THE GOVERNMENT'S CHARACTERISTIC
FAILURE TO EXPLAIN ITSELF AND THE POPULATION'S USUAL
PENCHANT FOR WILD RUMORS IN THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF
RELIABLE INFORMATION SOWED REAL PANIC, WITH RUMORS OF
IMPENDING NUCLEAR ATTACK, CHEMICAL WARFARE, AND FLOODING
DUE TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SADDAM TIGRIS DAM NEAR
MOSUL.


5. A LONGER TERM SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR IRAQIS REMALNS
THE STEADY EROSION OF THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING
THROUGH STEADY INFLATION IN THE FACE OF A NINE-YEAR
GOVERNMENT WAGE FREEZE AND THE DRAFTING ONE AFTER
ANOTHER OF WORKING MALE FAMILY MEMBERS. A HIGH
GOVERNMENT MONTHLY SALARY OF 250 DINARS (800 DOLLARS
AT THE OFFICIAL RATE, 125 AT THE BLACK MARKET AND
REAL VALUE RATE) BUYS LITTLE WHEN MEAT ON THE BONE
COSTS NINE DINARS A KILO AND A KILO OF FRUITS OR
VEGETABLES TWO TO THREE DINARS.


6. ONE NOTICEABLE RESULT OF THESE CURRENT PRESSURES
HAS BEEN THE GROWING NUMBER OF BAGHDADIS MOVING THEIR
FAMILIES OUT OF THE CITY OR MAKING ALTERNATIVE
EMERGENCY ACCOMMODATIONS ARRANGEMENTS ELSEWHERE.
THE EVACUATION EXERCISE AND THE LATEST MISSILE EXCHANGE
WITH IRAN HAVE ACCELERATED THIS TREND. (THE
AMBASSADOR'S NEAREST NEIGHBOR, ONE OF IRAQ'S RICHEST
BUSINESSMEN, HAS DECAMPED TO MOSUL AND POORER PEOPLE
ARE TRYING TO MOVE IN WITH RELATIVES ELSEWHERE.) WE DO
NOT EXPECT ANY WHOLESALE FLIGHT, BUT TRAFFIC IN BADHDAD
IS CURRENTLY NOTICEABLY LIGHTER THAN USUAL.


7. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT THE LONGER-TERM EFFECT
OF THE MISSILE EXCHANGE WILL BE. FOR MANY, IF NOT
MOST, IT HAS MEANT FEAR. OTHERS ARE PLEASED TO SEE
IRAQ AT LAST ABLE TO RESPOND IN KIND AND IN FORCE TO
PREVIOUS IRANIAN SCUD ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD AND HOPE IT
WILL FRIGHTEN IRAN FROM FURTHER ATTACKS. IF, AS WE
WOULD EXPECT, IRAN RESPONDS INSTEAD WITH MORE SCUDS,
THESE LATTER PEOPLE WILL LIKELY LOSE THIS OPTIMISTIC
INTERPRETATION. FINALLY SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
INCLUDING A NORMALLY PACIFIC MFA SOURCE, ARGUE THAT
IRAQ SHOULD ENCOURAGE A MAJOR IRANIAN ATTACK SINCE THE
IRAQI ARMY HAS NEVER BEEN STRONGER, ITS MORALE BETTER,
WHILE THE IRANIANS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY MOBILIZING.
WE PUT THIS VIEW DOWN TO OFFICIAL BRAVADO ARISING OUT
OF A RESURGENCE OF IRAQI MACHISMO AND A DESIRE TO
COMBAT SAGGING HOME-FRONT MORALE.


NEWTON