Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
86STATE227611
1986-07-21 16:52:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN

Tags:  IR IZ PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
O R 211652Z JUL 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T STATE 227611 

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IR IZ PK
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN

REF: ISLAMABAD 15582

S E C R E T STATE 227611

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IR IZ PK
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN

REF: ISLAMABAD 15582


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VERY MUCH MFA ADDITIONAL
SECRETARY KHAN'S READOUT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN
(REFTEL). WE AGREE WITH HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT
THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THE IRANIAN SIDE IS READY TO MOVE
TOWARD MEDIATION/NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WAR. WE ALSO
BELIEVE THAT HE IS CORRECT THAT A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE
SHOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, IF IT
CAN BE MANAGED LOGISTICALLY. WE WERE STRUCK, HOWEVER,
AND VERY INTERESTED, IN HIS COMMENTS REGARDING IRANIAN
MORALE AND DECREASING SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTION WHICH HE
OBSERVED, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND THE COUNTRYSIDE. HIS
OBSERVATION ON THE MODERATE GROUP AMONG THE CLERGY WAS
ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST TO US. ON DOMESTIC IRANIAN ISSUES
AS WELL AS ON MATTERS OF SHIA THEOLOGY AND THE
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE CLERGY AND THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH
A GROUP HAS BEEN IDENTIFIABLE FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE NOT
SEEN, HOWEVER, RECENT EVIDENCE THAT ITS DIFFERENCES WITH
THE DOMINANT, MORE RADICAL GROUP EXTENDED TO OPPOSITION
TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.


3. WITH THAT AS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY
FOLLOWING UP WITH KHAN, FOCUSSING ON THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS:

-THE CHANGED ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN: ON WHAT DOES HE
HINGE HIS JUDGMENT THAT THE MOOD TOWARD THE REVOLUTION OR
THE WAR HAS CHANGED? SPECIFICALLY, WHAT ARE HIS GROUNDS
TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRUSTRATIONS NOTED REFTEL EXTEND TO
LOWER CLASS SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME AND ARE THUS NOT
JUST A MIDDLE CLASS PHENOMENON? DO THE PAKISTANIS
BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GOOD SENSE OF POLITICAL TRENDS IN
SOUTH TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE? (SOUTH TEHRAN IS THE LOWER
CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA OF THE CAPITAL, WHERE MANY OF THE
RECENT MIGRANTS FROM THE COUNTRY LIVE).

--ON WHAT BASIS DOES HE JUDGE THAT THE MOOD "IN THE
COUNTRYSIDE" HAS CHANGED ALONG THE LINES OF THE MOOD IN
TEHRAN? HOW DOES HE MEASURE/ASSESS THAT MOOD?

--THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODERATE CLERICAL GROUP
INTERESTS US. WHO ARE ITS LEADERS? PROMINENT
SUPPORTERS? HOW DOES KHAN KNOW THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAR
(AS OPPOSED TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
WHICH ARE SUBJECTS OF OPEN DEBATE)? DOES HE HAVE THE
SENSE THAT THIS GROUP IS GROWING IN IMPORTANCE? AND,
ABOVE ALL, DOES HE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE
SUBJECT OF THE IRANIAN VIEW OF THE WAR IS A MATTER OF
POTENTIAL DEBATE OR CONCEIVABLE CHANGE OF POLICY WHILE
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI REMAINS IN ACTIVE CONTROL OF THE
REGIME? IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT A MIDDLE GROUND
MIGHT DEVELOP (OR EXISTS) WHEREBY IRAN WOULD ACCEPT AN
END TO THE WAR AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM
POWER, BUT NOT THE ELIMINATION OF BAATH PARTY CONTROL OF
THE STATE?


SHULTZ