Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
86DAMASCUS3747
1986-06-20 11:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIA AND IRAN ON LEBANON: WHO THREATENS WHOM?

Tags:  PREL PTER ECON SY IR LE IZ IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 201102Z JUN 86
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5703
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
ARAB-ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03747 

SIPDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON SY IR LE IZ IS
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN ON LEBANON: WHO THREATENS WHOM?

REF: DAMASCUS 3628

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03747

SIPDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON SY IR LE IZ IS
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN ON LEBANON: WHO THREATENS WHOM?

REF: DAMASCUS 3628


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: IN ITS PRESENT SPARRING WITH IRAN, SYRIA
PROBABLY DOES NOT HOLD A STRONG LEBANON CARD. IRAN
NOW VIES WITH ISRAEL AS THE SECOND-MOST INFLUENTIAL
FOREIGN POWER IN LEBANON, WHERE SHI'A FUNDAMENTALISM,
NATURALLY ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN, HAS BECOME WELL-INGRAINED.
SYRIA COULD CAUSE IRAN SHORT-TERM DIFFICULTIES BY
TERMINATING THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN BA'LBAKK, AND IT
COULD AT GREAT COST ATTACK HIZBALLAH (JUST AS IT COULD
THEORETICALLY ATTACK THE MARONITES). HOWEVER, TO DO SO
WOULD NOT ONLY BE A DEPARTURE FROM SYRIA'S POST-1978
POLICY OF KEEPING COSTS DOWN IN LEBANON, IT WOULD RISK
CHANGING THE SHI'A INTO ACTIVE ANTAGONISTS AGAINST SYRIA.
THIS POTENTIALLY WOULD BE A NIGHTMARE FOR SYRIA, BOTH IN
LEBANON AND WITHIN SYRIA ITSELF. END SUMMARY.


3. EVENTS SURROUNDING THE FAILURE OF THE IRAQI-SYRIA
BORDER MEETING SUGGEST THAT THE IRAN-SYRIA RELATIONSHIP
HAS SURVIVED A ROCKY PERIOD. THE PRINCIPAL IRRITANTS
WERE SYRIA'S ECONOMIC NEED AND THE TWO COUNTRIES' SHARPLY
DIVERGENT GOALS IN LEBANON. IF THE RELATIONSHIP SEEMS
FOR THE MOMENT TO HAVE GONE BACK TO "NORMAL," IT IS
EVIDENTLY BECAUSE THE IRANIANS HAVE GIVEN THE SYRIANS TO
BELIEVE THAT OIL SUPPLY WILL RESUME WITHOUT SERIOUS
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT EITHER FOR PRESENT OR PAST SHIPMENTS.
BUT WHERE DOES LEBANON FIT INTO THE EQUATION? IT SEEMS
AXIOMATIC THAT FUNDAMENTALIST IRAN AND SECULAR SYRIA ARE
ON A LONG-TERM COLLISION COURSE IN LEBANON AND THAT THEY
HAVE NOT ALTERED THEIR GOALS IN LEBANON, AND WILL NOT DO
SO. IN THE MOST RECENT SPARRING, THE QUESTION ARISES
WHETHER IRAN FELT CONSTRAINED BY THE PROSPECT OF A SYRIAN
CLAMPDOWN AGAINST HIZBALLAH, OR--TO THE CONTRARY, AS SOME
PRESS REPORTS HAVE SUGGESTED--WHETHER SYRIA FELT ALARMED
OVER POSSIBLE IRAN/HIZBALLAH ACTIONS AGAINST SYRIAN
INTERESTS. WHO THREATENS WHOM OVER LEBANON?


4. WE DOUBT THAT IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
BESHARATI DELIVERED BALD THREATS TO THE SYRIANS WHEN HE
MADE HIS JUNE 5-15 TRIP TO SYRIA AND LEBANON. BUT WE
ARE STRUCK BY THE BOLDNESS OF HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND

ACTIONS; THE HIGH LEVEL AT WHICH HE WAS RECEIVED IN
DAMASCUS BEFORE AND AFTER GOING TO LEBANON--WHERE HE
ENGAGED IN A NEGOTIATING TRACK ON THE CAMPS WAR SEPARATE
FROM KHADDAM'S--; SYRIA'S POSITIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON
IRAN SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE FAILURE OF THE IRAQ-SYRIA
BORDER MEETING; AND INDICATORS OF SYRIAN TIMIDITY TOWARD
IRAN VIS-A-VIS LEBANON.


5. OF THESE INDICATORS, WE NOTE ESPECIALLY LEBANON
BA'TH PARTY CHIEF 'ASIM QANSUH'S REMARKS JUNE 12 (REFTEL).
QANSUH WAS PROVEN WRONG ABOUT SYRIAN MILITARY
INTERVENTION AT MASHGHARA--THE SYRIANS DID EVENTUALLY AND
TARDILY INTERVENE--AND ONE FACTOR IN SYRIAN HESITANCY
MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI REACTION.
NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT QANSUH SAID THAT THE
SYRIANS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON HIZBALLAH AND OFFEND
IRAN.


6. IN OUR VIEW, NEITHER SYRIA NOR IRAN IS IN A POSITION
IN LEBANON TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER THREATS. EACH HAS
REASON TO BE ALARMED AT THE OTHER'S ACTIVITIES AND
AMBITIONS IN LEBANON, BUT THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH
ELSEWHERE--FOR SYRIA, THE PROSPECT OF VIRTUALLY FREE OIL
IN LARGE QUANTITY--TO ALLOW LEBANON TO SOUR THE OVERALL
RELATIONSHIP.


7. SYRIA HAS GIVEN IRAN A FEW KNOCKS IN LEBANON, BUT
NONE OF THESE HAS BEEN LARGE ENOUGH TO HARM THE RELATION-
SHIP. SYRIA CLAMPED DOWN ON IRAN'S SUNNI ALLIES IN
TRIPOLI, IT HAS ENGAGED IN OCCASIONAL ALTERCATIONS WITH
HIZBALLAH, AND NOW IT HAS INTERVENED IN MASHGHARA BECAUSE
OF HIZBALLAH'S ATTACKS AGAINST ITS SSNP ALLY. BUT WHAT
SYRIA HAS FAILED TO DO IS MUCH MORE IMPRESSIVE. THE
IRANIAN GUARD PRESENCE IN SYRIAN-"CONTROLLED" LEBANON
CONTINUES AS BEFORE; IRAN CONTINUES TO MOVE SUPPLIES TO
HIZBALLAH VIA SYRIA, VIRTUALLY UNIMPEDED; AND THE SYRIANS
HAVE BEEN LIMP AND INEFFECTUAL IN PUSHING IRAN ON THE
HOSTAGES. MEANWHILE, AS HIZBALLAH HAS GAINED IN STRENGTH
IN RECENT YEARS, SO HAS IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON
INCREASED MARKEDLY. IRAN NOW, WE WOULD JUDGE, VIES WITH
ISRAEL AS THE SECOND-MOST INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN POWER IN
LEBANON.


8. BY ALLOWING A REVOLUTIONARY GUARD PRESENCE AND GIVING
THE IRANIANS EASY ACCESS SINCE 1982, SYRIA MAY HAVE
ACCELERATED THE PACE OF GROWTH OF HIZBALLAH AND IRANIAN
INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS THE SINGLE
MOST DYNAMIC AND ALLURING MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER
THE PAST DECADE; IT WAS BOUND TO HAVE AN EXTRAORDINARY
IMPACT ON THE LEBANESE SHI'A COMMUNITY. IT IS OPEN TO
QUESTION HOW MUCH SYRIA COULD HAVE DONE TO STEM THE TIDE.
THERE ALWAYS WERE, AND STILL ARE, OTHER ROUTES--THAN
THROUGH SYRIA--FOR IRAN TO REACH AND INFLUENCE THE HIGHLY
RECEPTIVE LEBANESE SHI'A. THE SYRIANS HAVE ACTIVELY
ATTEMPTED TO COUNTERBALANCE THE IRANIANS BY GIVING SUPPORT
TO NABIH BARRI, BUT WITH WHAT LONG-TERM EFFECT REMAINS
TO BE SEEN.


9. SYRIANS OCCASIONALLY TELL US THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE
TO CONTAIN THE LEBANESE SHI'A "WHEN THE NEED ARISES."
HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THEIR BOAST IS HOLLOW AND THAT
THE SYRIANS WELL KNOW IT. THEY HAVE MADE THE BEST OF THE
SITUATION BY MILKING THE IRANIANS--KEEPING THAT
RELATIONSHIP BOTH CORDIAL AND LUCRATIVE--WHILE ATTEMPTING
TO BOLSTER BARRI. THE FUTURE MUST BE WORRISOME.


10. THE REAL TEST OF WHETHER SYRIA CAN OR WILL ACT
AGAINST IRAN/HIZBALLAH WILL COME IF IRAN'S PROMISES OF
CONTINUED OIL DELIVERIES PROVE FALSE. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER,
WE WOULD PREDICT THAT THE SYRIANS WILL MOVE IN A
GINGERLY FASHION. THE ULTIMATE PROSPECT IS OF A
LEBANESE SHI'A COMMUNITY ALIENATED FROM SYRIA AND,
POSSIBLY, WITH IRANIAN SUPPORT ENERGIZED TO COMBAT SYRIA.
IF SYRIA WENT TOO FAR IN ALIENATING IRAN/HIZBALLAH, IT
MIGHT EVEN FACE AN ACTIVE IRANIAN/HIZBALLAH EMBRACE OF
THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. THE MOST RADICAL (ALSO
THE MOST DANGEROUS) ELEMENTS OF THE BROTHERHOOD ARE
ANTAGONISTIC TO IRAN BECAUSE OF IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
HERETICAL ALAWI BA'THI REGIME; IF THAT SUPPORT WERE
REMOVED, THE NATURAL AFFINITY THAT IRAN HAS FOR THIS
GROUP WOULD PRESUMABLY COME TO THE FORE. THE PRECEDENT
FOR FUNDAMENTALIST SUNNI-SHI'A COOPERATION HAS ALREADY
BEEN ESTABLISHED IN TRIPOLI.


11. IN ANY CASE, A STRONG SYRIAN MOVE AGAINST HIZBALLAH
WOULD RUN AGAINST THE GRAIN OF SYRIAN POLICY IN LEBANON
AS ESTABLISHED OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS. AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1976-78) SYRIA INTERVENED
DIRECTLY IN MAJOR FIGHTING, AT GREAT COST; SINCE THEN IT
HAS PURSUED A LOW-COST POLICY, TRYING TO BALANCE PARTIES
AGAINST EACH OTHER AND USING PROXIES IN LIMITED
ENGAGEMENTS. DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY AND
DESPITE THE EMBARRASSING FAILURE OF THE TRIPARTITE ACCORD,
THE SYRIANS HAVE BACKED OFF FROM ATTACKING THE MARONITES.
THE PROSPECT OF A FULL-SCALE ATTACK AGAINST HIZBALLAH IS
EVEN MORE REMOTE.


12. HOWEVER, LIMITED ENGAGEMENTS ARE BOUND TO CONTINUE.
MASHGHARA IS A CASE IN POINT. THE SYRIANS ARE ESPECIALLY
NERVOUS ABOUT SOUTHERN LEBANON, BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL
THERE FOR ROUSING THE ISRAELIS. THE SHI'A OF SOUTHERN
LEBANON HAVE ALSO, THUS FAR, BEEN THE LEAST RECEPTIVE TO
HIZBALLAH. WITH MASHGHARA THE SYRIANS MAY BE NERVOUSLY
DRAWING A LINE WHICH THEY HOPE HIZBALLAH AND IRAN WILL
ACCEPT, FOR THE TIME BEING.


13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

RANSOM