LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 02090

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT ADDED PARA 7)

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER SY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM

REF: STATE 98378


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDIUM AND
LONG-TERM THREAT OF LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN
THE WAKE OF THE MARCH 24-25 EVENTS IN THE GULF OF
SIDRA, PER REFTEL.


3. IN OUR VIEW, QADHAFI'S COFFERS WILL PROBABLY BE
EVEN MORE OPEN TO ABU NIDAL AND SOME OF THE DAMASCUS-
BASED PALESTINIANS THAN PREVIOUSLY ON ACCOUNT OF
THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA. WHETHER THESE
GROUPS WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM
FOR THIS REASON IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. THEY HAVE
THEIR OWN AGENDA, WOULD OPERATE WITH OR WITHOUT
QADHAFI, AND ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED WITH
LIBYAN ISSUES SUCH AS THE GULF OF SIDRA PER SE. WE
ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER LIBYANS
WILL THEMSELVES BECOME MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. QADHAFI IS PROBABLY NOW
MOTIVATED TO PAY A HANDSOME PRICE TO HIRED KILLERS
TO GET AT AMERICANS, BUT HE WILL PRESUMABLY STILL
BE CONCERNED THAT ACCOUNTABILITY NOT BE DIRECTLY
TRACEABLE TO HIM.


4. WHEN ABU NIDAL COMMITS HIS NEXT OUTRAGE, WE
THINK IT VERY LIKELY HE WILL CITE THE EVENTS IN
THE GULF OF SIDRA AS AN EXCUSE. OTHER DAMASCUS-
BASED PALESTINIAN GROUPS, MOST OF WHICH DO NOT
TARGET U.S. INTERESTS, ARE LESS LIKELY TO DO SO.


5. SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE
IN SYRIA AND IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED LEBANON. RECENT
PUBLICITY GIVEN TO ITS CONNECTION TO ABU NIDAL
HAS BEEN A CAUSE OF SOME EMBARRASSMENT, BUT NOT
YET SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE SYRIA TO CLOSE THE DOOR
TO ABU NIDAL. HOW MUCH SUPPORT SYRIA GIVES ABU NIDAL
IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. THE SYRIAN STYLE IS
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM QADHAFI'S--MORE SUBTLE,
LESS PUBLIC, LESS SELF-CONGRATULATING--AND THE
SYRIAN FOCUS IS NARROWER, MORE PURELY LOCAL AND
LESS IDEOLOGICAL.


6. AS WAS EVIDENT IN THE MARCH 27 DEMONSTRATION
IN DAMASCUS AGAINST AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE
GULF OF SIDRA, SYRIAN POLICY IS TO PROTECT U.S.
FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN SYRIA. SYRIA WANTS TO
MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. AND DOES NOT PERCEIVE
AN INTEREST IN BEING SEEN TO DO HARM AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS HERE. DAMASCUS REMAINS ONE OF THE MORE
SECURE CITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALTHOUGH IT TOO
HAS SUFFERED FROM TERRORISM (MORE BOMBS HAVE
EXPLODED HERE IN THE LAST NINE MONTHS THAN IN AMMAN,
FOR EXAMPLE).


7. THERE REMAINS THE POSSIBILITY THAT LIBYA MAY
ATTEMPT TO STAGE AN ATTACK AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL
OR FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS WITHOUT SYRIAN KNOWLEDGE
OR APPROVAL. THERE ARE TWO FACTORS WHICH MITIGATE
THIS: THE VIGILANCE OF THE SYRIAN SECURITY
SERVICES, AND QADHAFI'S CONCERN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE
EFFECT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD HAVE ON SYRIAN-LIBYAN
RELATIONS.


8. EXCEPT FOR SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE SA-5 SYSTEM, THE SYRIANS PROBABLY DERIVE
SATISFACTION FROM THE GULF OF SIDRA INCIDENT.
IT BROUGHT ARABS TOGETHER AGAINST THE U.S.,
DEFLECTED ARAB LEAGUE ATTENTION FROM THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR, AND PRODUCED THE APPEARANCE OF A CLOSER USSR
TIE TO THE ARABS. IT WILL NOT MAVE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT ON ALREADY COOL BILATERAL
U.S.-SYRIAN TIES, EXCEPT TO ADD SOMEWHAT TO THE
PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS ANTI-ARAB.


EAGLETON