PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 09347

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, PINS, MILI, PTER, CO
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE GUERRILLA WAR IN COLOMBIA IS
STALEMATED: THE GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL AREAS
OF SIGNIFICANT POPULATION OR ENGAGE IN SET-PIECE
BATTLES, BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY TO DESTROY
THEM. FIGHTING MAY INCREASE FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION
OF THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION. THE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE
PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT, BUT THE MAIN
LONG-TERM GUERRILLA THREAT IS THE FARC: WELL-ARMED,
WELL-FINANCED, POLITICALLY DURABLE, AND (FOR NOW) IN THE
PEACE PROCESS. THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES ARE HAMPERED
BY PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE AND EQUIPMENT,
AND WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO ENGAGE ALL COLOMBIA'S
GUERRILLA GROUPS AT ONE TIME. THE ARMED FORCES AND
PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO ARE AWARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES
AND WILL SEEK TO RECTIFY THEM. END SUMMARY.


A NEW BALL GAME?
--------------

2. (C) FROM NEW PRESIDENT A NEW APPROACH: COLOMBIA IS
ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW STAGE IN ITS THIRTY-YEAR BATTLE
WITH GUERRILLA INSURGENCY. VIRGILIO BARCO AS THE NEW
PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GUERRILLA FORCES RANGED AGAINST
IT. BARCO HAS TOLD US OF HIS INTENTION TO MAKE THE
PEACE PROCESS CONFORM TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AND REDUCE GUERRILLA MANIPULATION
OF THE PROCESS. HE WILL OFFER SOME ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL REFORMS, CONCENTRATED IN RURAL AREAS WHERE THE
INSURGENCIES ARE STRONG. HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT HE WILL
STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES. HOW THE GUERRILLA FORCES
WILL REACT TO BARCO'S TWO-HANDED POLICY IS THE KEY
QUESTION.

3. (C/NF) THE INSURGENT LINE-UP: THE COLOMBIAN
INSURGENCY IS A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTORY PHENOMENON.
THE LARGEST OF COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC),IS AT
PRESENT THE LEAST ACTIVE MILITARILY DUE TO ITS
PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FARC MAINTAINS
AROUND 4,000 PERSONNEL. COLOMBIAN ARMY SOURCES INDICATE
THAT THIS NUMBER INCLUDES ONLY HEAVILY ARMED FIGHTERS,
WITH SOME "FRONTS" (LOCAL FARC UNITS, DIVIDED ON A
GEOGRAPHIC BASIS) ABLE TO QUINTUPLE THEIR STRENGTH
THROUGH USE OF LIGHTLY ARMED AUXILIARIES. A SEPARATE
AND RECENT ESTIMATE DIVIDED FARC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN FULL
AND PART-TIMERS, AND CAME UP WITH 3,500 UNDER EACH
HEADING. THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL DETERMINE
WHETHER THIS CONSIDERABLE FORCE IS BROUGHT INTO THE
SCALES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE REMAINING INSURGENT
GROUPS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY SPECTRUM -- THE M-19,
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN),POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY
(EPL),AND THE MINOR GUERRILLA GROUPS HAVE LARGELY
ABANDONED THE PEACE PROCESS, ALTHOUGH TWO FRONTS OF THE
ELN REMAIN INSIDE. OFFICIAL COLOMBIAN ESTIMATES OF THE
STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING MAJOR INSURGENT GROUPS
(INCLUDING BOTH FULL AND PART-TIME GUERRILLAS) ARE AS
FOLLOWS: AROUND 650 EPL, ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER OF ELN,
AND OVER 1,400 M-19. WE DO NOT HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN
ANY OF THESE ESTIMATES. WHEN COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES
WISH TO LOOK SUCCESSFUL, THE NUMBERS GO DOWN; WHEN THEY
TALK ABOUT NEEDING MORE RESOURCES, THE NUMBERS GO UP.
IF FORCED TO CHOOSE, WE WOULD GUESS THAT ACTUAL STRENGTH
IS HIGHER THAN OFFICIALLY ESTIMATED, RATHER THAN LOWER.

4. (LOU) INSURGENT GAME PLANS: THE TACTICS OF THESE
GROUPS HAVE TRADITIONALLY CONSISTED OF EXTORTION,
KIDNAPPING, AND AMBUSHES OF COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES.
THE AVAILABLITY OF NARCO MONEY IN RECENT YEARS MAY HAVE
REDUCED THE PROPORTIONATE ROLE OF EXTORTION IN TOTAL
GUERRILLA FINANCING. URBAN TERRORISM REMAINS A PROBLEM,
BUT POLICE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL IN
HUNTING DOWN TERRORIST SAFE HOUSES. POSSIBLY AS A
RESULT, M-19 AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CONCENTRATED IN RECENT
MONTHS MAINLY ON RURAL OPERATIONS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA
(CALI) AREA. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR SINCE LATE 1985 HAS
BEEN THE FORMATION OF AN ALLIANCE OF ALL THE GUERRILLA
GROUPS WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE PEACE PROCESS, INTO THE
NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINADORA (CNG). THIS
ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY M-19 TO THE
POINT THAT SOME GUERRILLAS HAVE THEMSELVES COMPLAINED,
HAS PROBABLY ENABLED THE GUERRILLAS TO MASS LARGER
NUMBERS FOR PARTICULAR ATTACKS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE
BEEN POSSIBLE. SHOULD THE FARC ONE DAY LEAVE THE PEACE
PROCESS AND JOIN THE CNG, POSSIBILITIES WOULD OPEN FOR
EVEN LARGER-SCALE OPERATIONS.


FARC: ENEMY NUMBER ONE
--------------

5. (C/NF) FARC -- PATIENT AND DISCIPLINED: WHETHER AS
PART OF THE CNG OR OTHERWISE, THE FARC REPRESENT
POTENTIALLY THE GREATEST DANGER TO THE COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENT. UNLIKE THE OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE
FARC'S DEDICATION TO A REVOLUTIONARY TRIUMPH IS TEMPERED
BY PATIENCE AND DISCIPLINE. THE FARC LEADERSHIP IS TOO
SOPHISTICATED TO EXPECT POWER BASED ON A SHORT-TERM
MILITARY VICTORY. THIS ATTITUDE CONTRASTS WITH THAT OF
THE M-19, WHICH CONCENTRATES ON SPECTACULAR, BUT
ULTIMATELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, ACTIONS SUCH AS THE
PALACE OF JUSTICE SEIZURE, THE ATTACK AGAINST THE CIUDAD
JARDIN SUBURB OF CALI, OR THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE
MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT. THE KEY TO THE FARC'S STRATEGY
APPEARS TO BE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS.
THE FARC HAS USED THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE PEACE TREATY TO
GAIN MORE RECRUITS, AS WELL AS INCREASED NUMBERS AND
TYPES OF WEAPONS, WHILE ALSO ACQUIRING SOME POLITICAL
RESPECTABILITY. FARC LEADERS HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE
EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATING THEIR CONTROL IN AREAS UNDER
THEIR INFLUENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FARC
ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE ELN AND THE EPL IN
AREAS WHERE THEY COMPETE TO ENABLE JOINT OPERATIONS SUCH
THAT THE FARC'S PARTICIPATION WOULD BE COVERT. SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT WOULD GIVE FARC LEADERS PLAUSIBLE DENIAL FOR
TERRORIST ACTS WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OF THEIR AREAS OF INFLUENCE. MEANWHILE, COLOMBIAN
MILITARY SOURCES CLAIM THAT, OUT OF ANXIETY TO AVOID
BREAKING THE TRUCE, PRESIDENT BETANCUR ORDERED THE ARMED
FORCES NOT TO ENTER AREAS OF FARC ENCAMPMENTS. THE FARC
HAS BEEN THE LEADER AMONG THE GUERRILLAS IN FORGING
HIGHLY PROFITABLE LINKS WITH THE NARCO-TRAFFICKERS,
WHOSE AREAS OF ACTIVITY ARE FREQUENTLY IN TRADITIONAL
FARC OPERATING AREAS. IN VIEW OF THESE TANGIBLE
BENEFITS, THE FARC PROBABLY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN THE
PEACE PROCESS IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

6. (C/NF) FARC-UP IN CONGRESS: PERHAPS THE GREATEST
BENEFIT ACHIEVED BY THE FARC IS THE MODICUM OF
RESPECTABILITY DERIVING FROM ITS ENTRY INTO COLOMBIAN
ELECTORAL POLITICS VIA ITS FRONT PARTY, THE PATRIOTIC
UNION (UP). THOUGH THE UP'S VOTE TOTAL WAS NOT
SPECTACULAR, THE PARTY HAS INJECTED THE FARC INTO
MAINSTREAM POLITICS. REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE FARC
INTENDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS SEVERAL SEATS IN
CONGRESS TO PRESS FOR A UNITED OPPOSITION FRONT TO THE
NEW BARCO GOVERNMENT. SUCH A FRONT WOULD FEATURE
ALLIANCES WITH CONGRESSMEN FROM ANY PARTY OR BACKGROUND
DISAFFECTED WITH THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED
FRONT IDEA IS OVER-AMBITIOUS BUT NOT TOO FAR-FETCHED.
ASSORTED LIBERALS AND NEW LIBERALS ALLIED READILY WITH
THE UP IN THE MARCH LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. A "NEW
LIBERAL" LEADER SAID BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
THAT HIS PARTY WOULD SEEK TO RECOUP ITS STANDING BY
ALIGNING ITSELF WITH ANY PARTY IN THE CONGRESS,
INCLUDING THE UP. THE UP/FARC LEADERS HOPE THIS
STRATEGY WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE THEIR GROUP THE LEADING
OPPOSITION FORCE IN COLOMBIA. THEY WILL PUSH THE PUBLIC
ARGUMENT THAT THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES ARE MUTUALLY
COMPROMISED LOOK-ALIKES.

7. (C/NF) FARC FALLBACK TO ARMS: EVEN WHILE IT PLAYS ITS
LEGAL POLITICAL "CARD," THE FARC HAS NOT LOST SIGHT OF
ITS AMBITION TO ACHIEVE PRIMACY AMONG COLOMBIA'S
GUERRILLA FACTIONS. THE FARC LEADERSHIP MAY BE
CONSIDERING JOINING THE CNG. THE GOAL OF SUCH A MOVE
WOULD MOST LIKELY BE TO DOMINATE ALL COLOMBIA'S
GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, SUBJECT THEM TO FARC/COMMUNIST
PARTY DISCIPLINE, AND LEAD THEM BACK INTO THE PEACE
PROCESS. FARC LEADERS PRIVATELY ARGUE THAT ALL GROUPS
COULD CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHILE INSIDE THE
PEACE PROCESS, DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM, AND THEREBY
ATTAIN A MEASURE OF PROTECTION AGAINST COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS -- AS THE FARC HAS DONE.


M-19: VIOLENCE IN A VACUUM
--------------

8. (C/NF) SEEKING ATTENTION, FACING ATTRITION: WHILE THE
FARC POSES THE GREATEST LONG-TERM THREAT TO COLOMBIA,
THE 19TH OF APRIL MOVEMENT (M-19) CONTINUES TO DOMINATE
THE HEADLINES BOTH IN COLOMBIA AND ELSEWHERE. THE
M-19'S RECENT HISTORY IS REPLETE WITH GROSS
MISCALCULATIONS. THE CONTINUING ATTRITION OF THE M-19'S
LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED BY THE DEATHS OF MEN SUCH AS
JAIME BATEMAN THREE YEARS AGO, IVAN MARINO OSPINA IN
CALI IN AUGUST 1985, ANDRES ALMARALES IN THE PALACE OF
JUSTICE SIEGE LAST NOVEMBER, AND ALVARO FAYAD IN A MARCH
1986 BOGOTA FIGHT, HAS LEFT THE MOVEMENT WITH MANY
PISTOLEROS BUT FEW POLITICALLY ASTUTE CHIEFS. M-19'S
CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO GO FOR THE ELUSIVE KNOCKOUT, WITH
ACTIONS LIKE THE SEIZURE OF THE PALACE OF JUSTICE AND
THE CIUDAD JARDIN ATTACK, SHOW THE UNREALITY OF ITS
POLITICAL CALCULATIONS. AS A RESULT, ITS POPULAR
SUPPORT -- WHICH WAS ONCE QUITE LARGE (IN A 1981 OPINION
POLL, 40 PERCENT NATIONALLY EXPRESSED "SOME SYMPATHY"
FOR M-19) -- IS DECLINING.

9. (C/NF) LEADING FROM WEAKNESS?: SEVERAL ACTIONS ATTEST
TO THE M-19'S INFLATED SENSE OF ITS CAPABILITIES. THE
FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONALIST "AMERICAS BATTALION"
IN DECEMBER 1985 WAS AN OSTENSIBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM A NEW
"BOLIVARIAN ARMY" TO LIBERATE ANEW THE ANDEAN
COUNTRIES. BUT THE AMERICAS BATTALION HAS NOT ENJOYED
MUCH SUCCESS IN ITS CHOSEN THEATER, THE CAUCA VALLEY.
DESPITE THEIR WEAKNESS IN NUMBERS, THE M-19 LEADERSHIP
CONTINUES TO PLAN TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE GOVERNMENT
IN VALLE DEL CAUCA DEPARTMENT AND CONVENE A NATIONAL
"CONGRESS" THERE IN AUGUST 1986. THE M-19 HAS SAID IT
WILL NOT RPT NOT SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE BARCO
REGIME, BUT WILL CONTINUE ITS OPERATIONS AS USUAL.
(ATTEMPTS TO SEEK PAPAL MEDIATION, IN THE NEWS LATELY,
WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY MADE WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT
THEY WOULD FAIL IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE PUBLICITY
GESTURES ONLY.)


PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES
--------------

10. (C/NF) RESOURCES THINLY STRETCHED: AS IT PREPARES
FOR A SITUATION WHICH MAY CHANGE CONSIDERABLY OVER THE
NEXT YEAR, THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES CONFRONT SEVERAL
MAJOR PROBLEMS. ONE IS A SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL: THE
COLOMBIAN ARMY TOTALS ABOUT 70,000 MEN. GIVEN THE
GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF THE GUERRILLA FORCES, THE
INHOSPITABLE TERRAIN, THE NEED TO DEFEND MANY FIXED
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS, AND THE SHORTAGE OF DEPLOYABLE
FORCES, THE ARMY IS ALREADY STRETCHED THIN. SHOULD THE
PEACE PROCESS UNRAVEL AND THE FARC RESUME THE ATTACK,
THE ARMY WOULD BE HARD PRESSED. ONE GENERAL OFFICER
SPECULATED THAT 15,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE
REQUIRED, SHOULD THE FARC SHIFT TO A WAR FOOTING.

11. (C/NF) SEEING THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: LACK OF
INTELLIGENCE IS ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM FOR COLOMBIAN
MILITARY PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAS CONDUCTED
OPERATIONS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AGAINST THE AMERICAS
BATTALION IN VALLE DEL CAUCA AND CAUCA DEPARTMENTS, THE
LACK OF GOOD AND READILY AVAILABLE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PREVENTS A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. AT LEAST IN
THIS THEATER, THE ARMY APPEARS BOGGED DOWN AND UNABLE TO
BRING ITS CONCENTRATED STRENGTH TO BEAR. THE POLICE
(MORE THAN 60,000 STRONG, AND PARA-MILITARY) ALSO PLAY A
LARGE ROLE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN ALL AREAS, BUT
PARTICULARLY IN THE CITIES. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
APPEARS MORE AVAILABLE IN THE CITIES, AND GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS THERE HAVE BEEN HURT RECENTLY.

12. (C/NF) ARMS SHORTFALLS: QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT IS YET
ANOTHER ISSUE. GOC OFFICERS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
QUALITY OF ARMS IN THE HANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS,
PARTICULARLY THE FARC, ACTUALLY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE
ARMY'S WEAPONS. GIVEN THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE
TO THE GUERRILLAS THROUGH EXTORTION AND NARCOTICS, THEIR
ABILITY TO PURCHASE SUCH ARMS IS UNQUESTIONED. SOME
COLOMBIAN OFFICERS FEEL THAT THE GAP CAN BE BEST
ADDRESSED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY,
STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE USE OF MORE HELICOPTERS TO
PROVIDE LIFT AND MOBILITY.


THE YEAR AHEAD: DRAWING THE BATTLE LINES
--------------

13. (C) SLIPPING STALEMATE?: THE PRESENT MILITARY
SITUATION IS IN MANY RESPECTS A STALEMATE. THE
COLOMBIAN ARMY IS UNABLE TO DEFEAT THE GUERRILLAS
CURRENTLY RANGED AGAINST IT. FOR THEIR PART, THE
GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO MAKE INROADS AGAINST THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN AREAS OF DENSE SETTLEMENT, BUT ARE
EXPANDING IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL REGIONS -- PARTICULARLY
WHERE THEY ALREADY HAVE TRADITIONAL SUPPORT. THE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT A GOVERNMENT IS LOSING
WHEN MERELY KEEPING AN INSURGENCY AT BAY. THE SHIFT IN
STRENGTH MAY BE GLACIAL, BUT OVER TIME THE DECAY OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS REAL. THERE ARE MORE
GUERRILLAS ACTIVE NOW IN COLOMBIA, AND THE LEVEL OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IS HIGHER, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE
CIVIL WAR OF THE 1950'S -- BUT DURING THAT WAR, MOST
GUERRILLAS WERE LIBERALS, NOT COMMUNISTS. THE SITUATION
IS NO CAUSE FOR PANIC. THE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS IS
SMALL IN PROPORTION TO THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY, AND
COLOMBIANS CAN TOLERATE A LOT OF VIOLENCE. BUT IT CAN
SCARCELY PROMOTE EASY SLUMBER FOR COLOMBIAN LEADERS.

14. (C/NF) THE COMING YEAR: AS THE PRESIDENTIAL
INAUGURATION APPROACHES, ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
ANTICIPATE CHANGES IN THE PRESENT REALITY. IN PRIVATE
TALKS AND IN HIS SIX-POINT PEACE PROGRAM,
PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO HAS SERVED NOTICE THAT THE PEACE
PROCESS MUST AND WILL CHANGE. THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF
STAFF EXPECTS AN INEVITABLE (BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL)
INCREASE IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AFTER THE INAUGURATION,
AS THE GUERRILLAS REACT TO BARCO'S HARDER LINE. THE
PAYOFF WOULD, HOPEFULLY, COME IN A YEAR OR TWO WHEN THE
GUERRILLAS HAVE EITHER LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS OR BEEN
DEALT WITH FORCEFULLY. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
RESOURCES TO MEET THIS EXPECTED UPTURN IN GUERRILLA
ATTACKS. WHILE CONTINUED AND EVEN EXPANDED ACTIVITIES
BY GROUPS SUCH AS THE M-19, ELN, AND EPL, SEEM
INEVITABLE, THE WILD CARD REMAINS THE FARC. MANUEL
MARULANDA VELEZ (AKA TIROFIJO),TOP LEADER OF THE FARC,
HAS HINTED THAT THE GROUP WILL NOT ACCEPT AN ATTEMPT BY
BARCO TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME. IN AN INTERVIEW
PUBLISHED IN THE COLOMBIAN WEEKLY "SEMANA," TIROFIJO
DECLARED THAT THE FARC WILL NOT ACCEPT ULTIMATUMS FROM
THE BARCO GOVERNMENT, VIEWING SUCH DEMANDS AS AN ATTEMPT
TO RUPTURE THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ALSO DECLARED THAT HIS
GUERRILLAS WOULD NOT DEMOBILIZE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT
IMPLEMENTED THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
REFORMS DEMANDED BY THE FARC. HIS STATEMENT AGREES WITH
REALITY, AS WE SEE IT FOR THE FARC: WITHOUT GUNS, THE
FARC WOULD BE A NEGLIGIBLE MINI-PARTY. WITHOUT GUNS,
THEY WOULD HAVE NO ATTRACTION FOR NARCO MONEY. WITHOUT
GUNS, THEY WOULD SWIFTLY FADE FROM PUBLIC ATTENTION. WE
CONCLUDE THAT, THEREFORE, THEY WILL FIND A PRETEXT TO
KEEP THE GUNS. THE SPARRING HAS BEGUN. OVER THE COURSE
OF THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE AUGUST 7 INAUGURATION, WE
THINK THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE GOC AND ITS GUERRILLA
ENEMIES WILL GET HOTTER BEFORE IT GETS COLDER.


GILLESPIE