Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
86ALGIERS5347
1986-10-21 11:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM

Tags:  PREL XF AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 211136Z OCT 86
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6046
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ALGIERS 05347 

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL XF AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM
RADICALISM TO MEDIATION

REF: KPRP-4 (FY-87)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ALGIERS 05347

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL XF AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM
RADICALISM TO MEDIATION

REF: KPRP-4 (FY-87)


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT


2. SUMMARY: UNLIKE ITS SELF-PERCEIVED LEADERSHIP
ROLE IN AFRICA, ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO POSITION
ITSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MEDIATOR/PEACEMAKER
AT THE CENTER OF COMPETING FACTIONS AND INTERESTS.
ALGERIA IS NO LONGER IN THE FOREFRONT OF RADICAL
ARAB CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT STILL TRADES ON THE
FORMER ASSOCIATIONS IT ESTABLISHED UNDER BOUMEDIENE
AND THUS RETAINS ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB
GROUPS. REFLECTING PRESIDENT BENDJEDID'S OWN
CONSENSUS-BUILDING DOMESTIC STYLE, ALGERIA HAS
WORKED FOR THE CREATION OF A GREATER ARAB MAGHREB
AS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION UNDER WHICH REGIONAL
PROBLEMS MIGHT BE SOLVED AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO
PROMOTE PLO UNITY AS A MEANS OF MOVING THE MIDDLE
EAST PEACE PROCESS FORWARD (IN CONJUNCTION WITH
RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN LEBANON). ALTHOUGH
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FINDING A CONCILIATORY
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE GULF WAR, ALGERIA HAS
PERSISTED IN SEEKING OPENINGS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST
A CEASEFIRE THERE. RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST
CONFRONTATION STATES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE
WAXED AND WANED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, AS HAVE
TIES WITH THE GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY SAUDI
ARABIA. ALGERIA REMAINS ACTIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE
AND ITS VARIOUS SUB-ORGANIZATIONS, BUT IS SKEPTICAL
ABOUT THE VITALITY OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS ABILITY
TO UNITE, INSTEAD OF DIVIDE, ITS MEMBER STATES.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES ARE BASED
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PETROLEUM--ITS PRICE AND
THE QUANTITIES MARKETED. AS A PRICE "HARDLINER,"
ALGERIA OFTEN FINDS ITSELF AT ODDS WITH ITS
FELLOW ARAB PRODUCERS WITHIN OPEC. THE GOA
LEADERSHIP ALSO DEVOTES CONSIDERABLE ENERGY TO
ADVANCING ITS INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, AT
LEAST IN PART TO ENCOURAGE GREATER STABILITY AS
A HEDGE AGAINST THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT OF
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM INTO NORTH AFRICA.


3. AS A CREDIBLE GO-BETWEEN WITH MOST ARAB GROUPS,
ALGERIA HAS CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO THE ACHIEVE-
MENT OF SOME U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES, FROM
THE MEDIATION OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS IN 1980/81
TO PRESENT GOA EFFORTS IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS
ACTING AS A COUNTER TO LIBYAN INFLUENCE. ALGERIA
WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY
WITH THE U.S. ON TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES
TO RESOLVING NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES, EVEN
WHERE WE SHARE A COMMON GOAL. HOWEVER, UNLIKE
UNDER BOUMEDIENE, THE BENDJEDID REGIME IS PREPARED

TO "REASON WITH US" AND EXPLORE POTENTIALLY WORKABLE
SOLUTIONS FREE OF THE RHETORIC WHICH PREVIOUSLY
CHARACTERIZED ALGERIAN POLICYMAKING. END SUMMARY.

--------------
THE MAGHREB
--------------


4. FOR ALGERIA, ITS POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD BEGINS
WITH THE MAGHREB AND EFFORTS TO FOSTER REGIONAL
STABILITY, PARTICULARLY ALONG ITS BORDERS. TO
FURTHER THIS GOAL THE GOA HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF
REGIONAL UNITY UNDER THE RUBRIC OF A "GREATER ARAB
MAGHREB" AND HAS CONCLUDED A FRIENDSHIP AND CONCORD
TREATY WITH TWO OF ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS, TUNISIA
AND MAURITANIA. WHILE A FUNCTIONING MAGHREB
ORGANIZATION IS STILL IN THE DISTANCE, THE IDEA
OFFERS ALGERIA A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO
SEEK RESOLUTION OF SOME OF ITS MAJOR REGIONAL
PREOCCUPATIONS. THE GOA BELIEVES A MAGHREB ORGANIZA-
TION COULD PROVIDE AN INSTITUTIONAL COVER FOR A
WESTERN SAHARA SOLUTION AND ALSO RESOLVE ALGERIA'S
OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH MOROCCO AND LIBYA.
IN ALGERIA'S VIEW IT WOULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR
GREATLY EXPANDING ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH
COMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIES AND A POSSIBLE FREE TRADE
ZONE PATTERNED AFTER THE COMMON MARKET. THE GOA
BELIEVES IMPROVED REGIONAL TIES WOULD ENHANCE
POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A
PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA AFTER BOURGUIBA.
FINALLY, THE GOA HOPES THAT THE POTENTIAL ADHERENCE
BY LIBYA TO SUCH A REGIONAL GROUPING WOULD
MODERATE QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR TO SOME EXTENT AND
INCREASE HIS STAKE IN COOPERATION.


5. DESPITE ALGERIA'S ASPIRATIONS FOR A GREATER
MAGHREB AS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL UNITY AND STRENGTH,
THE GOAL DOES NOT APPEAR ANY CLOSER TO REALIZATION
NOW THAN PRIOR TO THE MOROCCAN-LIBYAN ACCORD OF
AUGUST 1984. ALGERIA'S BILATERAL STRAINS WITH
MOROCCO AND THE CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS BY QADHAFI
TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF
ALGERIA'S AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA
MILITATE AGAINST A UNITED MAGHREB. IN ADDITION,
THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT REMAINS A MAJOR COMPLI-
CATING FACTOR BLOCKING GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION.


6. GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A GREATER
MAGHREB, THE GOA NEVERTHELESS DIRECTS ITS POLICIES
TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS AS IF SUCH A SCHEME MIGHT
BE ACHIEVABLE. WITH TUNISIA THE GOA FOLLOWS AN
ACTIVE POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
PROVIDING ASSURANCES AND MATERIAL SUPPORT
TO COUNTER LIBYAN PRESSURES AGAINST THE GOT,
EXCHANGING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO COORDINATE SOME
REGIONAL ACTIONS AND MAINTAINING AS CLOSE TIES
AS POSSIBLE WITH A VIEW TOWARD A PEACEFUL, POST-
BOURGUIBA TRANSITION. ON LIBYA, GOA POLICY HAS
MOVED AWAY FROM RADICAL SOLIDARITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO ONE OF SOMETIMES OPEN
AND OTHER TIMES DISGUISED OPPOSITION TO THE
QADHAFI REGIME. ALGERIA OPENLY OPPOSES LIBYAN
ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE GOA ATTEMPTS
TO COUNTER LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA, SUDAN,
AND EVEN AMONG RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS. DESPITE
THESE POLICY DIFFERENCES, ALGERIA HAS, SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF 1986, TRIED TO EASE BILATERAL TENSIONS
THROUGH A MEASURED PUBLIC RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA.
THIS POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US BY
BENDJEDID'S ADVISOR GENERAL BELKHEIR AS A MEANS
OF FOLLOWING THE LIBYAN DOMESTIC SITUATION CLOSELY
WHILE LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH WHICH
IT CAN MODIFY QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR OR HIS POSITION
WITHOUT RUINING FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A POST-QADHAFI
LIBYA.


7. CURIOUSLY, ALGERIANS FEEL THE CLOSEST AFFINITY
WITH MOROCCANS EVEN THOUGH IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS
MOROCCO IS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH COULD LAY
PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO BEING A REGIONAL RIVAL. FOR
THE MOMENT, THAT RIVALRY IS FOCUSED ON THE WESTERN
SAHARA CONFLICT, WHICH APPEARS STALEMATED BOTH
MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY. IT IS LIKELY THAT
THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ISOLATE MOROCCO
WITHIN THE REGION, IN THE ARA8 WORLD AND IN AFRICA,
AS A MEANS OF INCREASING PRESSURE FOR A NEGOTIATED
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT.
HAVING SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO CAUSE FOR THE PAST
TEN YEARS, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONIALIZATION
FOR EVEN LONGER, THE GOA LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY
TO ABANDON THE POLISARIO AND CEDE SOVEREIGNTY TO
MOROCCO WITHOUT A CREDIBLE POLITICAL PROCESS BEING
ESTABLISHED TO SETTLE THE ISSUE. UNTIL THEN,
DESPITE THE VOICED BEST INTENTIONS OF THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN COM-
PETITIVE RATHER THAN COOPERATIVE, WITH THE RISK OF
DIRECT CONFRONTATION BEING LOW. ON THE MARGINS
WILL BE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN MAURITANIA
IN WHICH THE GOA COMPETES FOR INFLUENCE THROUGH
ITS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GIRM.

--------------
EGYPT
--------------

8. EGYPT, AT THE EDGE OF THE MAGHREB, HAS HAD
ALTERNATELY WARM AND COOL RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA.
DURING ALGERIA'S INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE NASSER'S
EGYPT PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY TRAINING AND
ASSISTANCE. MANY OF THE ALGERIAN SOLDIERS WHO
SURVIVED ON THAT AID HAVE ATTAINED RANKING POSITIONS
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY AND ARE A
SOURCE OF WARM PERSONAL CONTACTS FOR EGYPT.
HOWEVER, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS OF 1978 PUSHED
BOUMEDIENE'S ALGERIA INTO BECOMING AN ACTIVE MEMBER
OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO MOBILIZE ARAB
EFFORTS TO ISOLATE EGYPT. BUT BENDJEDID BEGAN
TO MOVE ALGERIA GRADUALLY BACK TOWARD EGYPT IN
THE EARLY 1980'S. THE PACE OF THIS RAPPROCHEMENT
HAS ACCELERATED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY
SINCE AUGUST 1984 WHEN, IN THE WAKE OF THE OUJDA
ACCORD, ALGERIA SOUGHT TO BALANCE AN INCREASED
THREAT IT PERCEIVED FROM LIBYA WITH GREATER
COORDINATION ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH
EGYPT ALONG LIBYA'S EASTERN AND WESTERN BORDERS.
HIGH-LEVEL VISITS HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT AND
VISIBLE, AS HAVE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES.
IN RECENT MONTHS, THE PACE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS
HAS SLOWED, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF IMPROVING
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF A
DIMINISHED LIBYAN "THREAT." NEVERTHELESS,
SUBSTANTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS CONTINUE, WITH
THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MONITORING AND INFLUENCING
QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR. IT IS NOT LIKELY THE GOA
WILL RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH EGYPT ANYTIME
SOON, BUT COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE AS
EACH ATTEMPTS TO PURSUE ITS INTERESTS--ALGERIA
TO FORESTALL ANOTHER SHIFT IN EGYPTIAN POLICY ON
THE WESTERN SAHARA BACK TO FAVORING MOROCCO
(EGYPT SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN POSITION IN THE 1985
UNGA) AND EGYPT TO MAINTAINING SYMPATHETIC ACCESS
TO ARAB "RADICAL" STATES AND GROUPS THROUGH
ALGERIA WHEN NECESSARY.

--------------
PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS
--------------


9. ALGERIA HAS ALWAYS PRIDED ITSELF AS BEING ONE
OF THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF THE PALESTINIAN
CAUSE AND OF ITS MAJOR POLITICAL/MILITARY ORGANIZA-
TION, THE PLO. ALGERIA'S OWN EXPERIENCE IN GAINING
INDEPENDENCE HEAVILY INFLUENCES ITS VIEW OF THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ITS BELIEF THAT THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE MUST HAVE THEIR OWN LAND IN WHICH THEY CAN
EXPRESS THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER. AS ALGERIA WAS
ABLE TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE ONLY THROUGH THE
UNITY THE FLN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FACE OF THE
FRENCH "OCCUPATION," SO THE LOCAL CATECHISM GOES,
THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS HOMELAND ONLY
THROUGH A SIMILAR POLICY OF UNITY. THEREFORE, THE
GOA BELIEVES PLO UNIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE
IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. ALGERIA ACKNOWLEDGES THERE ARE
SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES
WITHIN THE PLO, BUT HAS URGED THE PLO TO SUBMERGE
THESE DIFFERENCES BEHIND A FACADE OF UNITY.
ALGERIA'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH UNITY HAS
TENDED TO MAKE ALGERIA A SUPPORTER OF PLO CHIEF
ARAFAT WHO THE GOA BELIEVES IS THE ONLY PALESTINIAN
LEADER WHO HAS THE STATURE AND BROAD FOLLOWING TO
UNITE THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE
GOA DIFFERS WITH ARAFAT ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS,
AS IT DID IN EARLY 1985 OVER THE HOLDING OF THE
PNC IN JORDAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMMAN ACCORD.
(THE GOA REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC DENUNCIATION BUT
PRIVATELY EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM THAT THE
AMMAN ACCORD COULD HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT ON
THE PEACE PROCESS.)


10. SINCE MARCH 1986 THE GOA HAS ATTEMPTED TO GIVE
SUBSTANCE TO ITS PRINCIPLES ON PLO UNITY. FOLLOW-
ING BENDJEDID'S MARCH 25-28 VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE
LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO HOLD A UNITY MEETING
IN ALGIERS OF THE NINE PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FACTIONS. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE GOA HAS
SENT SPECIAL MISSIONS TO SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THE
USSR, AS WELL AS RECEIVED MOST OF THE SIGNIFICANT
PLO LEADERS IN ALGIERS. THUS FAR, ALGERIAN EFFORTS
HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY CONTINUING INTERNAL PLO
DIFFERENCES, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SYRIA TO CONTRIBUTE
TO A PLO UNITED BEHIND ARAFAT, AND A LACK
OF SUFFICIENT SOVIET LEVERAGE ON SYRIA TO FORCE
SYRIAN COOPERATION. DESPITE THESE SETBACKS, THE
GOA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR PLO UNITY, WHILE
PROVIDING MODEST MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN ALGERIA,
AS THE ONLY MEANS, IN THE GOA VIEW, OF OBTAINING
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.


11. CONCURRENTLY, THE GOA MAINTAINS SOME ACCESS TO
THE MARGINAL "RADICAL" FACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, INCLUDING ABU NIDAL, ABU MUSA, AND HIZBOLLAH.
ALGERIA HAS SERVED AS A CONDUIT TO THESE GROUPS ON
VARIOUS HOSTAGE ISSUES, BUT ALSO HAS ACQUIRED
INTELLIGENCE ON THEIR LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURES.
IN SOME CASES, THE GOA HAS BEEN WILLING TO SHARE
THIS INTELLIGENCE WITH NON-ARAB COUNTRIES. UNLIKE
THE BOUMEDIENE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESENT ALGERIAN
REGIME APPARENTLY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO THESE FACTIONS.

-------------- --------------
RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES
-------------- --------------


12. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE
IN LEBANON WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF CREATING
A STABLE ARAB BASE FROM WHICH MORE EFFECTIVE
CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL COULD BE ORGANIZED. IN
THE PROCESS THE GOA HOPES TO PRESERVE THE LIVES
OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE ENCAMPED IN LEBANON,
END THE INTERNECINE KILLING AMONG ALGERIA'S ARAB
BROTHERS, ENCOURAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS,
EXPEL ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND
EVENTUALLY RE-ESTABLISH A VIABLE LEBANESE STATE--
ALL IN ALL A TALL ORDER. THE GOA HAS MOVED
CAUTIOUSLY TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON,
USING ITS FORMER AMBASSADOR (ABDELKRIM GHERAIEB)
TO OPEN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEBANESE GROUPS AND SEEK
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER TALKS AMONG
THESE GROUPS. ALGERIAN CONTACTS WITH NABIH BERRI'S
AMAL WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL DURING THE JUNE 1985
TWA HIJACKING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH U.S.
HOSTAGES REMAINING IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH ALGERIA
HAS SUSPENDED ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARAB
LEAGUE'S SOLIDARITY FUND FOR LEBANON, IT REMAINS
ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
EFFORTS, RECENTLY DISPATCHING A SPECIAL ENVOY
(MINISTER OF CULTURE BOUALEM BESSAIEH) AND A
RANKING FLN PARTY MEMBER (SADEK ZOUATEN) TO EXPLORE
THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS. ALGERIA DOES PROVIDE
SOME BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF 200
UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS ANNUALLY, BUT NOT MUCH
FINANCIAL AID DESPITE GEMAYEL'S BEST EFFORTS.
OVER THE NEXT YEAR, THE GOA IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN
AN ACTIVELY NEUTRAL "WATCHING BRIEF" IN LEBANON
RATHER THAN RISK ITS PRESTIGE IN A DRAMATIC POLICY
INITIATIVE.


13. RELATIONS WITH JORDAN HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY
SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, INCLUDING AN EXCHANGE OF
HIGH-RANKING MILITARY DELEGATIONS AND THE VISIT OF
THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN 1985. THE MILITARY
EXCHANGES WERE USEFUL FOR THE GOA BECAUSE THEY
PROVIDED FURTHER INSIGHTS ON HOW TO APPROACH AND
DEAL WITH WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY THE U.K.
AND THE U.S., WITH WHOM ALGERIA HOPES TO DIVERSIFY
ITS ARMS PURCHASES. SECONDLY, THE GOA WAS EXPOSED
TO WESTERN ARMS SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.
DESPITE CRITICISM FROM RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS AND
STATES OF THE AMMAN ACCORD, ALGERIA RESERVED ITS
JUDGMENT, THUS PRESERVING ITS ENTREE WITH THE
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, BILATERAL
RELATIONS ARE CORDIAL WITHOUT BEIMG PARTICULARLY
PROFOUND. WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT ALGERIA NOW
RECOGNIZES THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING CORDIAL TIES
WITH ARAB "MODERATES" (EVEN MONARCHS),A
RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF SUCH TIES THAT ONLY
FAINTLY EXISTED IN THE PRE-BENDJEDID ERA.


14. PERHAPS ALGERIA'S MOST FRUSTRATING POLITICAL
RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WITH SYRIA, A
COUNTRY WITH WHICH ALGERIA USED TO SHARE AN
IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY AND INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK.
THE IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY HAS BEEN FADING RAPIDLY
IN RECENT YEARS, AND ALGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE HAS BEGUN TO DIVERGE SIGNIFICANTLY
FROM THAT OF SYRIA IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS. ALGERIA
NO LONGER FINDS ITSELF ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A
REJECTIONIST FRONT MEETING AND IS RELUCTANT TO
RECONSTITUTE SUCH A FRONT. WHILE SYRIA SUPPORTS
ALGERIA ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND COOPERATES WITH
ALGERIA IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE MOROCCO, IT REMAINS
THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALGERIA'S ATTEMPT TO UNIFY
THE PLO. ALGERIA HAS ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF SYRIA'S
ROLE IN LEBANON (AS A COMPLICATING FACTOR
PREVENTING RECONCILIATION) AND HAS BEEN UNHAPPY
WITH SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR HIZBOLLAHS "TERRORIST"
ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE TWO COUNTRIES
MAINTAIN VERY ACTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS TO
COORDINATE POLICIES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, WITH THE
GOA HOPING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ON PLO UNITY
AND SYRIA HOPING TO EXCHANGE THIS FOR A NEW
REJECTIONIST FRONT.

--------------
THE GULF WAR
--------------


15. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, LIKE THEIR
PREVIOUS DISPUTE IN THE 1970'S MEDIATED BY ALGERIA,
IS AN ONGOING CONCERN FOR THE GOA. IN DISCUSSING
THE SITUATION, FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI IS ALWAYS
QUICK TO POINT OUT HIS PREDECESSER LOST HIS LIFE
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE WAR. PERHAPS
BECAUSE OF THIS SETBACK, AND ALGERIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
OF THE CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE OF BOTH PARTIES, THE
GOA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE
ON THE WAR. IN THE INTERIM ALGERIA HAS MAINTAINED
ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY ABSTAINING ON ONE-
SIDED ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS FAVORING IRAQ AND
CONTINUING HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES. THE GOA HAS USED
THESE CONTACTS TO PROBE IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY, THUS
FAR WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS, ADDING TO THE
PESSIMISM IBRAHIMI HAS EXPRESSED TO US. RECENT
IRANIAN GAINS AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY
HAVE "TILTED" ALGERIAN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. HOWEVER,
ALGERIA IS ONE OF THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH CAN
APPROACH EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE
THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

--------------
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES
--------------


16. ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN THE GULF, AS FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES, REVOLVE AROUND TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA.
IN THIS REGARD, WHILE THE TENOR OF GOA-SAG RELATIONS
HAS IMPROVED TO THE LEVEL OF A POLITE DIALOGUE,
THERE ARE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES PREVENTING
CLOSER COOPERATION. SIMILAR TO THE SAUDIS, THE
ALGERIANS ARE QUICK TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED
SLIGHTS AND THEY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE
ETIQUETTE OF RELATIONS, GRANTING OR WITHDRAWING
ACCESS FOR SAUDI EMISSARIES DEPENDING ON TREATMENT
ACCORDED TO ALGERIANS. BEYOND SUCH ATMOSPHERIC
ISSUES, THE GOA HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF SAUDI SUPPORT
FOR THE MOROCCAN WAR EFFORT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA,
SAUDI STRATEGY WITHIN OPEC, AND SAUDI PARTICIPATION
IN THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT ORGANIZED IN
CASABLANCA IN AUGUST 1985. FM IBRAHIMI HAS ALSO
VOICED IMPATIENCE OVER REPEATED SAUDI REQUESTS FOR
ALGERIAN INTERVENTION WITH "RADICAL" ARABS WITHOUT
RECEIVING RECIPROCAL SAUDI SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN
SAHARA. NEVERTHELESS, ALGERIA RECOGNIZES THE
DEGREE OF SAUDI INFLUENCE WITHIN OPEC, THE ARAB
LEAGUE AND WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT, AND
HAS ATTEMPTED TO EMPLOY A QUIET DIPLOMACY IN THE
PAST YEAR TO MODIFY SAUDI POLICIES. THE GOA GIVES
ITSELF CREDIT FOR SOME PROGRESS WITHIN OPEC AND
IS MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL
AGREE TO HOLD AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN DECEMBER
TO "CLOSE ARAB RANKS." (THIS WOULD BE THE LONG-
DELAYED SUMMIT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 1984.)
ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE.


17. ALGERIA MAINTAINS CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT,
THE UAE, AND OMAN. THE GOA JUST ASSIGNED NEW
RESIDENT AMBASSADORS TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR, AND THIS
MAY PORTEND AN UPSURGE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF
BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, RELATIONS
ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS CHIEFLY ON OIL PRICING AND
PERHAPS SECONDARILY ON KEEPING THE "WOLF" OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM AWAY FROM THE GULF'S DOOR. FURTHER
SOUTHWEST, ALGERIA WAS DISTURBED BY THE OVERTHROW
OF THE ALI NASIR MUHAMED REGIME IN SOUTH YEMEN AND
THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUPPORTING HIS SUCCESSOR. THE
GOA LEADERSHIP DERIVED A CERTAIN LESSON FROM THESE
EVENTS AND HAS INFUSED A COOLNESS INTO ITS
FORMERLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH YEMEN.
INFREQUENT CONTACTS PERSIST WITH ALI NASIR MUHAMED,
ALTHOUGH THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOT ASSISTED ANY
EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE ATTAS GOVERNMGNT. ON
THE CONTRARY, THERE HAS BEEN A RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE
OF ATTAS, WHO IS EXPECTED TO VISIT ALGIERS
LATER THIS YEAR OR IN EARLY 1987. AS FOR NORTH
YEMEN, THE YAR JUST APPOINTED A NEW AMBASSADOR
TO ALGIERS WHO APPEARS WELL-CONNECTED WITHIN
SANAA, POSSIBLY SIGNIFYING IMPROVING
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ALGERIA HAS
COORDINATED TO A SMALL EXTENT ITS RESPONSES WITH
NORTH YEMEN ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF
ALI NASIR.

--------------
THE ARAB LEAGUE
--------------

18. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS ALGERIA HAS VIEWED THE
ARAB LEAGUE AS A NEARLY MORIBUND, INCREASINGLY
IRRELEVANT ORGANIZATION, REFLECTIVE OF THE
DISARRAY IN THE ARAB WORLD. APPARENTLY,THOUGH,
WITHIN THE PAST TWO MONTHS THE GOA HAS SEIZED UPON
THE LEAGUE AS A POTENTIAL VEHICLE FOR RENEWING/
REVITALIZING ARAB UNITY. TO THIS END THE GOA HAS
SENT EMISSARIES TO DAMASCUS (MESSAADIA),SAUDI
ARABIA (IBRAHIMI) AND BEIRUT (BESSAIH/ZOUATEN)
TO LOBBY FOR THE NECESSITY OF A SUMMIT, OPTIMISTICALLY
IN DECEMBER. THE GOA HAS ALSO USED THE ARAB
LEAGUE TO REINFORCE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN
BY OPPOSING ANTI-IRANIAN RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF
WAR. HOWEVER, ALGERIA HAS BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL
IN GAINING ARAB SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA
ISSUE, AND THIS HAS HINDERED ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO
GAIN SDAR ADMISSION INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
(NAM). FURTHERMORE, THE GOA HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEAGUE AND HAS WORKED
TO BOTH STREAMLINE AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS
AT THE LEAGUE'S HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS.

--------------
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
--------------

19. OIL AND HYDROCARBON REVENUES ARE THE LIFEBLOOD
OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY, AND THEREFORE DEVELOPMENTS
AFFECTING OIL ARE CRITICAL TO ALGERIA'S WELFARE.
ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN HIGH PRICES WHILE
PRESSURING MAJOR PRODUCERS TO ACCEPT "REASONABLE"
PRODUCTION LEVELS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. THIS
PRESSURE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH LIBYA AND IRAN
PRINCIPALLY, BUT RECENTLY THE GOA HAS TRIED TO
FORM AN ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN PRODUCERS FOR A
SIMILAR OBJECTIVE. AS PRICES HAVE STABILIZED
SINCE AUGUST, ALGERIA HAS TAKEN SOME SATISFACTION
FROM ITS EFFORTS, EVEN IF IN REALITY THEY HAD ONLY
A MARGINAL IMPACT ON OPEC DECISIONS. BESIDES OIL,
THERE IS VERY LITTLE TRADE BY ALGERIA WITHIN THE
ARAB MARKET, AND ONLY A BARELY MORE SIGNIFICANT
MONETARY INTEREST BY ARAB BANKS AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE ARAB DEVELOPMENT BANK
AND THE SAUDI DEVELOPMENT BANK. WE BELIEVE LOANS
FROM THESE SOURCES WERE LESS THAN $100 MILLION,
REPRESENTING A DECLINE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR.
THUS, AS THE OIL MARKET GOES, SO GO ALGERIA'S
TRADE RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, HAVING SOME
REPERCUSSIONS FOR ITS POLITICAL RELATIONS.

--------------
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
--------------

20. AS IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES, ISLAM IS THE STATE
RELIGION IN ALGERIA AND, AS SUCH, ENJOYS A
PRIVILEGED POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER INSTITUTIONS.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO CO-OPT ISLAMIC
PRECEPTS AND VALUES BY INCORPORATING THEM INTO
THE NATIONAL CHARTER AND BY ENCOURAGING MOSQUE
CONSTRUCTION AND PAYING AND TRAINING THE IMAMS.
THERE IS ALSO SUBSTANTIAL ANNUAL SUPPORT FOR ALGERIAN
PILGRIMS TO PERFORM THE HAJJ TO MECCA.
HOWEVER, WHEN EXTERNAL INFLUENCES HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO INVADE THE GOA'S MONOPOLY ON ISLAM, IT REACTS
VIGOROUSLY. THE GOA WAS PARTICULARLY INCENSED
BY LIBYAN EFFORTS IN 1983-84 TO FUND "PRIVATE"
MOSQUES, WHICH THE GOA CORRECTLY VIEWED AS SOURCES
OF FUNDAMENTALISM. RUMORS OF SAUDI FINANCING TO
ALGERIAN ISLAMISTS IN MID-1986 ALSO RAISED GOA
SUSPICIONS ABOUT SAUDI INTENTIONS. THE GOA CON-
TINUES TO BE CONCERNED BY BEN BELLA'S EFFORTS TO
USE ISLAM TO RECRUIT ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS. TO
COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES, THE GOA HAS WORKED CLOSELY
WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECRUIT
TRADITIONALLY ORIENTED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO STAFF
ALGERIA'S NEW UNIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC AND SCIENTIFIC
STUDIES IN CONSTANTINE. THE GOA ALSO TRIES TO
CONTROL THE INFLOW OF ISLAMIC MATERIALS, SUCH AS
RECORDED SERMONS AND LITERATURE, WITH ONLY
MODERATE SUCCESS. DESPITE RELATIVELY ACTIVE
CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS
OF FUNDAMENTALISM, THE GOA DOES NOT APPEAR TO
COORDINATE ITS RESPONSES WITH ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS.
FOR ALGERIA, FUNDAMENTALISM REMAINS MORE OF A LONG-
TERM POTENTIAL PROBLEM RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE
THREAT, AND AS SUCH IS USUALLY NOT ON ALGERIA'S
AGENDA IN ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MOST
ARAB COUNTRIES.

--------------
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
--------------


21. MUTUAL U.S.-ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON
ALGERIA'S APPROACH ON NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED
ISSUES. DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS,
OUR SHARED DISTRUST OF QADHAFI HAS ALLOWED US TO
MAINTAIN A USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOA ON LIBYA.
SIMILARLY, ALGERIA HAS ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE,
NON-AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD TUNISIA TO CONTRIBUTE
TO A STABLE TRANSITION THERE. ALGERIAN REACTIONS
WERE RELATIVELY MUTED TO THE U.S. RAID ON
TRIPOLI (APRIL 15),AND, AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE,
THERE WAS AN UPSURGE IN BILATERAL COOPERATION
ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM, INCLUDING MILITARY AND
SECURITY INTERESTS. FOREIGN MINISTRY SECGEN HAMDANI
EXPLAINED TO US THAT ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE
PLO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ARE INTENDED TO ENABLE
THE PLO TO RESPOND TO PEACE INITIATIVES IN A MORE
POSITIVE MANNER. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS MADE TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE
OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, AIDED BY ALGERIA'S
ACCESS TO THOSE RADICAL GROUPS HOLDING THE AMERICANS.
FINALLY, THE GOA HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. ON COUNTERING TERRORISM.



22. THESE CONCRETE ACTIONS BY THE GOA TO WORK WITH
THE U.S. ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR
INTERESTS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED TOO IN ALGERIA'S
RHETORICAL PUBLIC APPROACH, WITH A LOWERING OF
DIRECT CRITICISM, EVEN WHILE VOTING AGAINST U.S.
POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. THE GOA LEADERSHIP
HAS BEEN WILLING TO PAY A DOMESTIC PRICE FOR THIS
POLICY, DEFLECTING CRITICISM BY INTERNAL HARDLINERS
AND MOVING FORWARD, ALBEIT GRADUALLY, WITH A VARIETY
OF BILATERAL PROGRAMS. ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT FOR
ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT TOUCHES UPON NORTH
AFRICA, AS IT DID IN THE OCTOBER 1985 ISRAELI
BOMBING OF PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS, WILL GIVE
THE GOA SERIOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING
TOWARD BROADLY DEEPER COOPERATION ON ARAB-RELATED
ISSUES. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A GROWING CAPACITY
TO SEPARATE ISRAELI ACTIONS FROM U.S. POLICIES,
AS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE WITH ALGERIAN ACCUSATIONS
OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN MOROCCO. IF THIS TREND
CONTINUES, IT MIGHT BE A STRONG INDICATION
THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS TAKEN ON AN
IMPORTANCE WHICH COULD TRANSCEND PREVIOUS ALGERIAN
CONVICTIONS THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY
WAS THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ITS
POLICY FORMULATION. IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR
THAT ALGERIA NOW INCLUDES POTENTIAL U.S.
REACTIONS AS PART OF ITS POLICY DELIBERATIONS AND
FREQUENTLY GIVES THESE REACTIONS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT
IN ITS DECISION-MAKING. THIS WILL CONTINUE TO
PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH THE GOA TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN
THE ARAB WORLD.


JOHNSTONE