Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
85STATE80724
1985-03-16 08:23:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

THE IRANIAN SUCCESSION

Tags:  IR PINT PEPR 
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R 160823Z MAR 85
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S E C R E T STATE 080724 

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IR PINT PEPR
SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN SUCCESSION

S E C R E T STATE 080724

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IR PINT PEPR
SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN SUCCESSION


1. (S ENTIRE TEXT).


2. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS, PREPARED BY INR/NESA IN
FEBRUARY 1985, MAY BE OF BACKGROUND INTEREST TO ADDRESSEE
POSTS.

T H E I R A N I A N S U C C E S S I O N A N D I T S
C O N S E Q U E N C E S


3. IT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT PRECISELY HOW
EVENTS WILL UNFOLD IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS FOLLOWING
KHOMEINI'S DEATH. BUT THE CLERICAL GROUP NOW IN POWER IS
SO ENTRENCHED THAT IT COULD DOMINATE FOR SOME YEARS. AT
BEST, THERE COULD BE A GRADUAL SOFTENING OF THE REGIME'S
VIEW OF THE US. BUT INCREASING INSTABILITY AND SOVIET
PRESSURE ARE MORE LIKELY TO KEEP THE US IN THE POSITION
OF THE MAJOR ENEMY OF IRAN. OVER THE LONGER RUN, WE
THINK A SINGLE STRONG LEADER WILL EMERGE. IF HE COMES
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MILITIA, AS NOW APPEARS THE
BEST BET, HE WILL SHARE MUCH OF THE OUTLOOK OF THE
PRESENT LEADERSHIP. THAT WOULD MAKE HIM DIFFICULT FOR
THE US TO WORK WITH, THOUGH HE MIGHT NOT HAVE KHOMEINI'S
DEDICATION TO PURSUING THE WAR WITH IRAQ.


4. PROBABLE SUCCESSION SCENARIO: MOST LIKELY IS A
RELATIVELY SMOOTH INITIAL TRANSITION TO THE IMMEDIATE
POST-KHOMEINI ERA. THE CLERICS ARE PREPARED TO MOVE
QUICKLY TO MAINTAIN CONTINUITY AND CONTROL. A COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS TO MAKE THE CHOICE OF SUCCESSOR HAS BEEN
ELECTED AND MEETS SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. IT SEEMS
INCLINED TO SETTLE ON AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, A CHOICE WE
BELIEVE WILL BE ENDORSED IN KHOMEINI'S SEALED WILL.
MONTAZERI WOULD NOT BY ANY MEANS HAVE UNQUESTIONED
COMMAND. INDEED, THE INITIAL IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE
A COLLEGIAL AFFAIR BECAUSE NO SINGLE IRANIAN LEADER WILL
BE ABLE TO REPLACE KHOMEINI.


5. THE MAIN IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE TO THIS SUCCESSION
SCENARIO WOULD COME FROM THE JOCKEYING FOR POWER ALREADY
APPARENT BETWEEN FACTIONS INSIDE THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP
CADRE. SHOULD SUCH RIVALS AS PRESIDENT ALI KHAMENEI AND
MAJLES LEADER ALI AKBAR RAFSANJANI CLASH, THAT WOULD
INEVITABLY LEAD TO SERIOUS DISORDER.


6. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WILL BE PRESENTED BY THE
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION WHICH
HAS FUNCTIONED AS THE REGIME'S PRAETORIAN GUARD. EVEN
KHOMEINI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIT THE GUARD SMOOTHLY INTO
THE CURRENT SOCIAL OR GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. AND SHOULD
THE GUARD THROW ITS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT BEHIND ONE
FIGURE, HIS PRIMACY WOULD BE GIVEN A STRONG BOOST.


7. THE LONGER TERM: WHILE NON-CLERICAL ELEMENTS WILL
HAVE A HARD TIME COMPETING IN THIS ARENA FOR A LONG TIME

TO COME, THE CLERICS HAVE NOT INSTITUTIONALIZED CONTROL
IN ANY DURABLE WAY. THE INSTABILITY PROVOKED BY
INFIGHTING AMONG VARIOUS CLERICAL FACTIONS IS LIKELY TO
BE INCREASED BY ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND OTHER STRUCTURAL
WEAKNESSES (E.G., CONTINUED MIGRATION TO THE CITIES).


8. WE THUS REGARD A POSTKHOMEINI CLERICAL REGIME AS
ESSENTIALLY TRANSITIONAL. THE CHANCES SEEM GOOD THAT IT
WILL GIVE WAY SOONER OR LATER TO A SINGLE STRONG LEADER.
ASSUMING THAT THERE WILL BE NO MAJOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION
TO DEFLECT THIS NATURAL COURSE OF EVENTS, THE TRANSITION
MANEUVERING COULD BE LENGTHY. THAT WOULD OPEN
OPPORTUNITIES TO A BROADER RANGE OF PLAYERS.


9. IN THE END, HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THE CHANCES FAVOR
THE EMERGENCE OF A "MAN ON HORSEBACK." WE WOULD EXPECT
HIM TO ACT IN THE NAME OF ISLAM AND CLAIM TO DEFEND THE
FRUITS OF THE REVOLUTION. AT PRESENT, THE MOST LIKELY
INSTITUTION TO PRODUCE SUCH A FIGURE IS THE REVOLUTIONARY
GUARD. IF THE TRANSITION IS LONG ENOUGH, HOWEVER,
SOMEONE COULD EMERGE FROM THE REGULAR MILITARY, DESPITE
EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY POPULAR HERO FROM USING THE WAR
WITH IRAQ TO CATAPULT INTO PROMINENCE. AS YET WE ARE
UNABLE TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL CANDIDATES.


10. POSSIBLE SOVIET ROLE: ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE
ASSETS AND CAN BRING SOME PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE
SUCCESSION SITUATION, WE DO NOT BELIEV THAT THEY WILL BE
ABLE TO EXERT A DETERMINING INFLUENCE OVER THE COURSE OF
EVENTS. THE TUDEH PARTY HAS BEEN CRIPPLED THROUGH
ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS, THOUGH ITS PRINCIPAL LEADERS ARE
STILL ALIVE IN IRANIAN JAILS. WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY BE
ENCOURAGING THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PARTY ORGANIZATION,
THE PARTY HAS NEVER ENJOYED BROAD APPEAL. SIMILARLY,
SOVIET ASSETS AMONG THE MINORITIES WOULD FIND IT
DIFFICULT TO INFLUENCE THE NATIONAL SCENE IN IRAN.


11. THE USSR CAN USE ITS CONTROL OVER LAND ROUTES TO
IRAN, ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF WHICH PASS THROUGH SOVIET
TERRITORY, TO EXERT PRESSURE. AND IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO
MANIPULATE ARMS SALES, IF BY THAT TIME THE SOVIETS HAD
MANAGED TO ESTABLISH A MAJOR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. BUT
PRESSING IN THIS WAY WOULD BE RISKY AND THE SOVIETS
PROBABLY WOULD NOT MAKE AN ALL-OUT PUSH IN THIS DIRECTION.


12. WE DO NOT EXPECT A SOVIET MILITARY INVASION OF
IRAN. A LIMITED STRIKE INTO THE BORDER PROVINCE OF
AZERBAIJAN WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF IRAN WERE IN CHAOS AND
APPEARED TO BE FRAGMENTING. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WOULD
PROBABLY ACT ONLY IF A US MILITARY RESPONSE APPEARED
UNLIKELY. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY MIGHT ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY
AZERBAIJAN IF THEY BELIEVED THE US WERE PREPARING TO
SEIZE PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN IRAN. THE USSR MIGHT LAUNCH A
PREEMPTIVE INVASION IF IT SUSPECTED US PREPARATIONS
EITHER TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF PRO-AMERICAN ELEMENTS OR
TO SECURE IRANIAN OIL FIELDS.


13. ALL THESE CONTINGENCIES APPEAR EXTREMELY DISTANT.
THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO ANTICIPATE THAT THEY WOULD FACE
A US MILITARY RESPONSE AS WELL AS DIFFICULT LOGISTICAL
AND TERRAIN PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET LEADERS
PROBABLY PROJECT THAT IRANIAN RESISTANCE WOULD BE ON THE
ORDER OF THEIR AFGHAN EXPERIENCE AND THAT MAJOR RESOURCES
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PACIFY A COUNTRY AS LARGE AND
POPULOUS AS IRAN.


14. OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE US? THE US WILL PROBABLY HAVE
LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN
THE IMMEDIATE POST-KHOMEINI PERIOD. LEADING POLITICAL
FIGURES APPARENTLY STILL BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS NOT
ACCEPTED THE REVOLUTION AND ITS RESULTS. AS LONG AS WE
APPEAR TO BE TILTING TOWARD IRAQ AND ARE ISRAEL'S CLOSEST
SUPPORTER, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE THAT OPINION. IN
ADDITION, THE REGIME SEES ITSELF LOCKED IN A STRUGGLE
WITH THE US FOR CONTROL OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE
ISLAMIC WORLD. THUS THEY IDENTIFY THE US AS THE PRIMARY
ENEMY TO BE DEFEATED IN THE EFFORT TO LIBERATE THE
ISLAMIC WORLD FROM THE GRIP OF WESTERN CULTURAL VALUES.


15. THESE PERCEPTIONS PUT THE US IN A PARTICULARLY
DIFFICULT POSITION AS IRAN MOVES INTO THE POST-KHOMEINI
ERA. ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME SEEMS DESTINED TO MAINTAIN
ITSELF IN POWER IN THE NAME OF ISLAM AND THE REVOLUTION.
THUS IT WILL HAVE A BUILT-IN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS. IRAN
MIGHT GROW LESS HOSTILE TO THE US OVER TIME IF WE WERE
NOT SEEN AS WORKING AGAINST THE REGIME IN TEHRAN, E.G.,
BY ENCOURAGING THE CUT-OFF OF ARMS TO IRAN. BUT THIS
WOULD BE A SLOW PROCESS AT BEST, AND IT COULD BE SET BACK
BY EVENTS OVER WHICH WE WOULD HAVE NO CONTROL.


16. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: KHOMEINI'S DEATH WOULD REMOVE
ONE OF THE STAUNCHEST ADVOCATES IN IRAN OF WAR TO THE
BITTER END. YET THE CLERICS ARE BY AND LARGE UNITED ON
THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR, UNLESS IRAN CAN EMERGE WITH
HONOR. THAT WOULD INCLINE MOST OF THEM TO INSIST ON THE
OUSTER OF IRAQI PRESIDENT SADAM HUSSEIN AS A PRECONDITION
FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES.


17. NONETHELESS, THE SUCCESSOR REGIME, ONCE IT FELT MORE
OR LESS SOLIDLY IN CONTROL AT HOME, MIGHT BECOME MORE
FLEXIBLE IN ITS ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR. TACTICS FOR
FIGHTING AND TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AMONG SEVERAL
ISSUES THAT WILL DIVIDE THE REGIME LOYALISTS. OPPONENTS
OF THE WAR ARE LIKELY TO BLAME ITS ADVOCATES FOR
WEAKENING THE REGIME'S BASE OF SUPPORT, FOR THE LARGE
CASUALTIES, AND FOR DIVERSION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES. THE
WAR'S PROPONENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL CHARGE THAT ITS
OPPONENTS LACK REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC FERVOR AND ARE NOT
ADHERING TO KHOMEINI'S WISHES.


18. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE BELIVE THAT THE CHANCES OF
ENDING THE WAR WILL RISE SOMEWHAT AFTER KHOMEINI
DEPARTS. BUT IRAN'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE IS BY NO
MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

SHULTZ