Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
85DAMASCUS7872
1985-12-18 10:26:00
SECRET
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIA AND IRAN: ALMOST A RETURN TO STATUS QUO

Tags:  PREL KPRP SY IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 181026Z DEC 85
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3672
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 07872 

LONDON FOR RAPHEL
PARIS FOR WINN
UNCINCCENT FOR POLAD LOWRIE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KPRP SY IR
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: ALMOST A RETURN TO STATUS QUO
ANTE

REF: A) DAMASCUS 7586, B) DAMASCUS 7844

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 07872

LONDON FOR RAPHEL
PARIS FOR WINN
UNCINCCENT FOR POLAD LOWRIE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KPRP SY IR
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: ALMOST A RETURN TO STATUS QUO
ANTE

REF: A) DAMASCUS 7586, B) DAMASCUS 7844


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: BY CUTTING OFF OIL TO SYRIA, IRAN
SIGNALED ITS DISPLEASURE OVER THE MOUNTING SYRIAN DEBT
TO IRAN, SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON, AND MOVES TOWARD
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH JORDAN AND IRAQ. BY ALL ACCOUNTS,
HOWEVER, PM KASM'S VISIT TO TEHRAN DECEMBER 1-3
PRODUCED AGREEMENT THAT THE OIL SHIPMENTS ARE TO BE
RESUMED. THE IRANIANS CANNOT EXPECT SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN
PAYMENT FOR PAST OR PRESENT DELIVERIES, BUT NOW THEY
SEEM WILLING TO GO AHEAD ANYWAY. THEY APPARENTLY HAVE
BEEN REASSURED ABOUT SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND
IRAQ, AND THEY MAY HAVE BECOME MORE RESIGNED TO SYRIAN
POLICIES IN LEBANON. ASAD APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM
THESE THREE MONTHS OF TENSION WITH IRAN WITH HIS BALANCE
OF SOURCES OF AID INTACT. END SUMMARY.

SYRIAN PRESSURE, IRANIAN COUNTER PRESSURE
--------------


3. THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1985 WAS ONE OF
HEIGHTENED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN. FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN THE RECENT RELATIONSHIP OF THOSE TWO
COUNTRIES, THE FLOW OF IRANIAN OIL TO SYRIA WAS INTER-
RUPTED. AT THE TIME OF THE OIL CUTOFF IN LATE AUGUST,
WE BELIEVED THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS THE EFFECTIVE
IRAQI BOMBINGS OF KHARG ISALND. HOWEVER, THE IRANIANS,
AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WERE ABLE FAIRLY QUICKLY TO
REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE TO KHARG, WHILE THE OIL CUTOFF
HAS CONTINUED UNTIL THE PRESENT.


4. IN SUM, THE IRANIANS WERE SENDING THE SYRIANS A
SIGNAL. THAT SIGNAL COINCIDED WITH SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN
PRESSURE AGAINST THE IRANIANS IN SEVERAL SECTORS.
FIRST WERE THE PALPABLY INCREASED SYRIAN STRICTURES
ON HIZBALLAH AND THE SIEGE OF THE IRANIAN-SUPPORTED
FUNDAMENTALISTS IN TRIPOLI IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY
OCTOBER, RESULTING IN A DEFEAT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS
(AND THUS FOR IRAN). IN THE SAME TIME PERIOD OCCURRED
PRINCE 'ABDALLAH'S MISSIONS TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, AND
BAGHDAD WHICH LED TO THE PRESENT RECONCILIATION WITH
JORDAN AND A SPATE OF RUMORS OF A RECONCILIATION WITH
IRAQ. THESE DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED AGAINST A BACKGROUND
OF THE MOUNTING SYRIAN DEBT TO IRAN, NOW POSSIBLY
AMOUNTING TO SEVERAL BILLION DOLLARS. THE IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT WAS--AND STILL IS--UNDER PRESSURE FROM
MEMBERS OF THE MAJLIS WHO ARE ANGERED BY SYRIAN FAILURE

TO PAY ON THE DEBT; AND THE IRANIAN PRESS HAS RECENTLY
HAD SOME VERY UNSAVORY THINGS TO SAY ABOUT SYRIA.

THE KASM VISIT: THE HEAT IS OFF
--------------


5. BY ALL ACCOUNTS THAT WE HAVE SEEN OR HEARD, THE
VISIT OF SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER KASM TO IRAN DECEMBER 1-3
ALLEVIATED MANY OF THESE TENSIONS. WE HAVE NOT YET
FOUND SOLID CONFIRMATION THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE
RESUMED SHIPPING OIL TO SYRIA, BUT A WIDE RANGE OF
INTERLOCUTORS HERE--BOTH SYRIANS AND DIPLOMATS WHO HAVE
HEARD FROM THEIR EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN--HAVE BEEN IN AGREE-
MENT THAT SYRIA GOT ALL OR MOST OF WHAT IT WANTED ON
THE ECONOMIC FRONT. MINISTER OF ECONOMY 'IMADI, WHO
TRAVELED TO TEHRAN WITH KASM, TOLD THE AUSTRALIAN DCM
THAT THE IRANIANS AGREED TO RESUME OIL DELIVERIES, AND
THE FRENCH DCM GOT THE SAME MESSAGE DURING A VISIT TO
THE IRANIAN EMBASSY HERE. OUR JAPANESE COLLEAGUES
ASSERT THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE AGREED TO A NEW ONE-YEAR
SCHEME INVOLVING THE IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF OIL
SHIPMENTS. (ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE, THIS AGREEMENT
PROVIDES 1 MILLION TONS FREE, 2 MILLION TONS FOR HARD
CURRENCY, AND 2 MILLION TONS FOR BARTER. IF SO, THE
IRANIANS ARE ONCE AGAIN DISINGENUOUS: IT IS EXTREMELY
UNLIKELY THE SYRIANS WILL PAY HARD CURRENCY FOR EVEN
2 MILLION TONS, NOR DO THEY HAVE GOODS WORTH THE
EQUIVALENT OF 2 MILLION TONS TO BARTER.) OUR KUWAITI
COLLEAGUES ASSURE US THAT THE PORTION (THEORETICALLY)
TO BE PAID FOR IN HARD CURRENCY IS TO BE DELIVERED AT
"SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER RATES" THAN OBTAINED UNDER THE
PREVIOUS AGREEMENT OF APRIL 1985. FROM SUCH REPORTS,
IT APPEARS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY
ARE NOT GOING TO GET MUCH HARD CURRENCY--WHETHER FOR
THE NEW SHIPMENT OR IN PAYMENT FOR THE OLD. THE NET
RESULT IS A SYRIAN VICTORY ON THE KEY DEBT/PAYMENT ISSUE.


6. MEANWHILE, ON DECEMBER 13-18 THE IRANIANS SENT
THEIR MINISTER OF ISLAMIC GUIDANCE, MUHAMMAD KHATAMI,
TO DAMASCUS (REF B). KHATAMI WAS FULL OF WORDS OF
PRAISE FOR SYRIA, WAS WARMLY RECEIVED BY ASAD AND BY A
HOST OF SYRIAN MINISTERS, SIGNED AN INFORMATION COOPERA-
TIVE AGREEMENT, OPENED AN IRANIAN CULTURAL COUNCIL IN
DAMASCUS, AND IN GENERAL GAVE A FURTHER REAFFIRMATION
OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

--------------
THE IRANIANS MAY HAVE GIVEN UP ON SOME POINTS
--------------


7. WE DO NOT WANT TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE POINT,
BUT IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE NET RESULT OF THESE PAST
THREE MONTHS OF INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SYRIA AND
IRAN IS A RESOLUTION AT SOME EXPENSE TO IRAN. IF THE
IRANIANS ARE RESUMING OIL SHIPMENTS AT THE PREVIOUS
RATE OR NEAR TO IT, THE LOSS IS AN EXPENSIVE ONE--WORTH
$1 BILLION/YEAR IN OIL. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE
IRANIANS HAVE GIVEN UP POINTS AS WELL,
PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS LEBANON. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE
OF THE KASM VISIT TREATED LEBANON IN A WAY TO SUGGEST
THAT IRAN NOW ENDORSES SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON.
SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT IRAN OPPOSES MANY OF SYRIA'S
POLICIES IN LEBANON, THIS ENDORSEMENT IS A REMARKABLE
PUBLIC CONCESSION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE
THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE PUT AWAY THEIR AMBITIONS FOR A
FUNDAMENTALIST SHI'A-DOMINATED STATE IN LEBANON,
ESPECIALLY SINCE IRAN'S ALLIES THERE ARE NOT PART OF
THE SYRIAN-BROKERED TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION. WE WOULD
NOT BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE SYRIANS HAD PRIVATELY
MADE PROMISES TO THE IRANIANS ABOUT LEBANON. THE PUBLIC
STATEMENT MAY, THEREFORE, NOT BE WORTH THE PAPER IT IS
WRITTEN ON, BUT IT DOES SUGGEST THAT IRAN MAY BE A
LITTLE MORE RESIGNED THAN PREVIOUSLY TO SYRIA'S DETER-
MINATION TO HAVE ITS WAY IN LEBANON.


8. AS REGARDS JORDAN AND IRAQ, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
SYRIANS HAVE GONE TO SOME LENGTHS TO REASSURE THE
IRANIANS. NOTHING HAS COME OF 'ABDALLAH'S EFFORTS
FOR SYRIAN RECONCILIATION WITH IRAQ AS YET, AND NOTHING
IN THE COMMUNIQUE EMERGING FROM TEHRAN WOULD GIVE
REASON FOR OPTIMISM ABOUT SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. AS FOR JORDAN, ASAD PROBABLY
AFFIRMED TO THE IRANIANS THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP NOTHING
AT ALL IN THE PROCESS, I.E., THAT THE RECONCILIATION
HAS INVOLVED ONLY JORDAN'S COMING TOWARD SYRIA AND
NONE OF THE REVERSE.


9. THE IRANIAN CONCESSIONS ON DEBT AND LEBANON
ILLUSTRATE HOW IMPORTANT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA
IS TO IRAN. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN WE PUT EMPHASIS
ON THE SYRIAN CLOSURE OF THE KIRKUK-HOMS PIPELINE,
BUT WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE PIPELINES,
THIS IS NO LONGER A COMPELLING ARGUMENT. THE
IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA TO IRAN NOW IS POLITICAL. IRAN
PLACES GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE ON NOT HAVING TO
CONFRONT UNITED ARAB HOSTILITY. IT ALSO VALUES SYRIAN
ASSISTANCE IN IRANIAN PURCHASES OF ARMS, ALTHOUGH
IRAN COULD PROBABLY FIND OTHER AVENUES TO MEET ITS
MILITARY NEEDS.


10. SECOND, THE RELIGIOUS-IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT IS
IMPORTANT. IRAN IS AN EVANGELIZING NATION, BOTH
ON THE ISLAMIC PLANE AND, PARTICULARLY, ON THE SHI'A
PLANE. LEBANON IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THIS MISSION; AND
SYRIA HOLDS THE KEY TO LEBANON. MOREOVER, SYRIA IS
SYMPATHETIC WITH IRAN'S CRUSADE AGAINST THE SUNNI OVER-
LORD OF IRAQ, WHICH IS A MAJORITY SHI'A COUNTRY. A
FACTOR OF POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE IS THE SHI'A/'ALAWI TIE.
MANY OF THE IRANIAN MULLAHS VIEW THE 'ALAWIS AS
HERETICAL AND DESPICABLE; BUT WE ALSO THINK IT LIKELY
THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE MULLAHS FEEL CLOSER TO THE
'ALAWIS THAN TO THE SUNNIS. FOR HIS PART, ASAD IS
FIRST AND FOREMOST A SECULAR BA'THI, BUT WE NEVER
UNDERESTIMATE HOW DEEP THE ETHNIC STRAINS RUN IN
SYRIA, AND WE DO NOT EXCLUDE ASAD FROM THESE PREJUDICES.
THE 'ALAWIS SHARE WITH THE OTHER SYRIAN MINORITIES A
HOSTILITY TOWARD THE SUNNI MAJORITY; UNDER ASAD, THEY
HAVE PROCLAIMED THEMSLEVES TO BE ORTHODOX SHI'A; AND
ASAD IS THEIR LEADER, AS WELL AS--AND PERHPAS BEFORE
BEING--LEADER OF THE COUNTRY.


ASAD, THE CONSUMMATE BALANCER
--------------


11. WE DOUBT THAT KASM WENT TO IRAN WITH ANY
SPECIFIC THREATS, BUT IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT ASAD
LET IT BE KNOWN POLITELY TO THE IRANIANS THAT HE HAD
OTHER ALTERNATIVES--IN PARTICULAR, TURNING TO THE
SAUDIS TO MAKE UP FOR THE CUTOFF OF IRANIAN OIL
DELIVERIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, A COURSE WHICH ASAD WANTED
TO AVOID. THE PRESENT SITUATION--OF HOSTILE BENE-
FACTORS--IS ONE THAT SUITS ASAD PERFECTLY. WHILE
NEITHER OF HIS PRINCIPAL BENEFACTORS IS HAPPY, THEY
GO ON BEING GENEROUS--IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF THEIR
MUTUAL ANTIPATHY. THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD, FOR THE
NEAR TERM, AT LEAST, THAT ASAD WILL BE ABLE TO GO
ON EXTRACTING LARGESSE FROM BOTH OF THESE GOLDEN GEESE.
FOR THEIR PART, THE SAUDIS APPEAR TO SEE SOME VALUE IN
THE SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP TO IRAN, AS THEY HOPE THAT
SYRIA WILL USE IT TO PRESSURE IRAN NOT TO ATTACK THE
GULF.

--------------
CONCLUSION
--------------


12. THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN
RELATIONSHIP DURING THE KASM VISIT TO TEHRAN INDICATES
THAT THE TENSIONS OF THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAVE ABATED.
AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, THERE IS
CONSIDERABLE RESILIENCY IN THE RELATIONSHIP, DESPITE
THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' CULTURES
AND IDEOLOGIES. FOR IRAN, THE RELATIONSHIP RESTS ON
MORE THAN LEBANON OR A PIPELINE, IMPORTANT AS THESE ARE.
FOR SYRIA, THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT IS VERY IMPORTANT,
AND ASAD'S ATTACHMENT.TO IRAN MIGHT FALL BY THE WAYSIDE
IF IRAN PERSISTED IN WITHHOLDING OIL (INDEED, WE STILL
AWAIT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT OIL DELIVERIES HAVE
RESUMED). YET, IT IS CLEAR THAT ASAD PREFERS TO HAVE
IRAN AS ONE OF HIS MAJOR BENEFACTORS, HE IS CONTENT
WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (THOUGH
AN IRANIAN INVASION OF KUWAIT OR A TOTAL DEFEAT OF
IRAQ WOULD PRESUMABLY ALTER THIS VIEW--WHILE A "MERE"
SUCCESS NORTH OF BASRA MIGHT NOT),AND HE SHARES WITH
IRAN AN IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAQ AND ISRAEL.
THE 'ALAWI-SHI'A BOND MAY BE A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE.


13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.


EAGLETON