SYRIA AND TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 03741

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER KPAL KPRP JO IS LE IS SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND TERRORISM


1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: SYRIA CONSIDERS ITSELF A TRUE CONFRONTATION
STATE--EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES TO DEFEATING THE
ENEMY IS POSITIVE. THE "STRUGGLE" PROVIDES A GUIDE
FOR CHOOSING THE TARGET AND LEGITIMIZES THE MEANS,
INCLUDING TERRORISM, WHICH IS VIEWED AS COST-EFFECTIVE.
SYRIA IS HOST TO PLENTY OF WILLING HELPERS, PRIMARILY
LARGE NUMBERS OF DISAFFECTED AND RADICALIZED PALESTINIANS,
BUT ALSO KURDS AND ARMENIANS. AS LONG AS COMMON FOES
ARE TARGETED, SYRIA TOLERATES TERRORIST ACTIONS BY
OTHERS. RETALIATION AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE PROBLEMATIC
EFFECTS, AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT DETER FUTURE TERRORISM.
END SUMMARY.


3. SYRIA HAS A RECORD OF SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM AND
A HISTORY OF HARBORING GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO ENGAGE
IN TERRORIST ACTS. SYRIA HAS ALSO BEEN A VICTIM OF
A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TERRORIST ACTIONS. SYRIA
CONSIDERS ITSELF A CONFRONTATION STATE IN THE PURE SENSE--
IT IS AT WAR WITH ISRAEL AND EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES
TO THE EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IS POSITIVE. SPECIFIC
TERRORIST OPERATIONS WILL B MOUNTED OR NOT, ACCORDING
TO THIS CRITERION.


4. OTHER ARAB STATES WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IS
NOT JURIDICALLY ONE OF PEACE DO NOT CONDONE OR PROMOTE
TERRORISM. IN THIS MESSAGE WE EXAMINE SOME ASPECTS OF
SYRIA THAT MAKE IT DIFFERENT.

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WHAT MAKES SYRIA DIFFERENT?
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5. THE BA'THI, MINORITY GOVERNMENT OF HAFIZ AL-ASAD IS
BUILT UPON AN IDEOLOGY THAT INCREASINGLY HAS COME TO
FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF SYRIA'S ROLE IN CONFRONTING THE
"ZIONIST ENEMY," ISRAEL. SYRIA PERCEIVES THAT IT
STANDS ALONE AMONG THE STATES NEIGHBORING ISRAEL IN
PROMOTING "REAL" CONFRONTATION, SINCE JORDAN AND EGYPT
HAVE FALLEN FROM GRACE INTO "CAPITULATIONISM," LEBANON
HAS TURNED INWARD, AND IRAQ HAS SHIFTED TOWARDS THE
ARAB RIGHT. SYRIA'S REGIONAL ISOLATION--AS A RADICAL
STATE WITH TIES TO IRAN AND LIBYA--ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO
THE STRONG SENSE OF UNIQUENESS FELT BY THE SYRIAN LEADER-
SHIP. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY ARE ADDITIONAL FACTORS:
SYRIA IS STRATEGICALLY PLACED ON THE CROSSROADS OF THE
LEVANT WITH ACCESS TO AND VULNERABILITY FROM MANY
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. DEMOGRAPHICALLY, SYRIA'S
POPULATION IS HETEROGENOUS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE,
SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS, KURDS, AND ARMENIANS.
THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN SYRIA WHO HAVE
GRIEVANCES AGAINST SOMEBODY ELSE, SOMEWHERE ELSE.


6. WHAT REALLY DISTINGUISHES SYRIA, HOWEVER, IS ITS
CANDID ASSESSMENT THAT TERRORISM IS COST EFFECTIVE.
IN PART, THIS IS A FUNCTION OF THE DETERRENTS TO ANY
DIRECT MILITARY ACTION POSED BY SUPERIOR ISRAELI FORCES
OR ARAB OPINION. SYRIA IS ALSO NOT THE FIRST REGIME
TO HAVE DISCOVERED THAT ONE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING
WITH POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS TO EXTINGUISH IT. ANOTHER
FACTOR WHICH WE CANNOT ASSESS PRECISELY IS THE EXTENT
AND NATURE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
WHICH MAY BE DIRECTED FROM SYRIA. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS
NOT FAR FETCHED TO CONCEIVE OF A SOVIET ROLE IN PROMOTING
INSURGENT ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE KURDS AGAINST TURKEY
OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OTHER GROUPS AGAINST
EUROPEAN TARGETS. (THE SOVIETS HERE STOUTLY MAINTAIN
THEIR OPPOSITION TO, AND NON-INVOLVEMENT IN, ANY SUCH
ACTIVITIES.)


7. SYRIA DOES NOT LABEL THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE
ISRAELI ENEMY AS "TERRORISM." INDEED, IT IS NOT
POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS WITH MOST AVERAGE SYRIANS THE ISSUE
OF TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL; IT IS CONSIDERED AN
OXYMORON, I.E., IF AMERICANS FOUGHT TO LIBERATE THEIR
LAND FROM BRITISH OCCUPIERS, THEN LEBANESE AND
PALESTINIANS ARE ALSO FREEDOM FIGHTERS, NOT TERRORISTS.
MOREOVER, SYRIA DEFINES THE "NATIONAL RESISTANCE"
BROADLY, SO THAT MODERATE ARABS BECOME LEGITIMATE
TARGETS. BUT THE OBJNCTIVES ARE ALWAYS THE SAME--UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS THE ARABS ARE UNITED AND STRONG, SYRIA MUST
WEAKEN THE ENEMY, DISCOURAGE INDEPENDENT ARAB INITIATIVES,
AND BLOCK A MODERATE CONSENSUS.


8. THE TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO
SHORTAGE OF DISAFFECTED, RADICAL PALESTINIANS WHO ARE
PREPARED TO ACT NOT ONLY AGAINST THE ISRAELIS BUT,
MORE IMPORTANTLY, AGAINST THE JORDANIANS AND MODERATE
PALESTINIANS. THERE ARE WILLING RECRUITS HERE AND
ELSEWHERE FOR MANY OF THE ACTIONS WHICH COMMONLY ARE
LABELED SYRIAN-SPONSORED BUT WHICH IN FACT ARE CONDUCTED
WITHOUT EXPLICIT SYRIAN APPROVAL. SINCE SYRIA DOES NOT
GENERALLY OBJECT TO TARGETTING A COMMON FOE, IT MIGHT,
THEREFORE, BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO CALL THESE TERRORIST
ACTIONS SYRIAN-TOLERATED.

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TARGETS
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9. ALMOST ANY TARGET IS "LEGITIMATE." HOWEVER, THE
PROBABILITY OF A TERRORIST ACT, AS WELL AS ITS LINKAGE
TO SYRIA, RISES WITH THE DEGREE OF THE TARGET'S
ASSOCIATION WITH ISRAEL OR A PEACE PROCESS THAT DOES NOT
HAVE SYRIAN APPROVAL. THUS, SYRIA PROBABLY AT WORST
TOLERATES AND AT BEST IS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL TERRORISM
SUCH AS THAT BY ARMENIANS OR KURDS AGAINST TURKS. ON
THE OTHER HAND, IT COOPERATES ACTIVELY IN TERRORISM
DIRECTED AGAINST JORDAN, WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS SHOWS LIFE.
SOMETIMES SYRIA'S HAND IS QUITE DIRECT, AS IN THE CASES
OF ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
FIGURES ABROAD AND IN ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI CITIZENS
AND FACILITIES. MORE OFTEN, "FRIENDS" DO THE DIRTY
WORK. THUS, THE CRAZY-QUILT OF PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN
DAMASCUS ALL OCCASIONALLY GET THEIR CHANCE AT THE
JORDANIANS, FATAH, OR THE ISRAELIS.

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RETALIATION
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10. SINCE THE IDEA OF RETALIATION FOR A TERRORIST ACT
HAS OCCURRED TO ALL AT SOME POINT, IT IS WORTH CONSIDER-
ING IN THE CASE OF SYRIA. OBVIOUSLY, THE GREATEST
DIFFICULTY IS IN ESTABLISHING SYRIAN COMPLICITY. THAT
ASIDE, RETALIATION WOULD MEET HERE WITH A CONTRADICTORY
RANGE OF EMOTIONS: IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN TYPICALLY
MIDDLE EAST FASHION, BUT IT WOULD NOT DETER, BECAUSE
FOR THOSE WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTIONS THI
CAUSE AND THEIR DEDICATION TO IT ARE PARAMOUNT. MORE-
OVER, FAILURE OF A RETALIATORY ACTION COULD BE
DISASTROUS. U.S. POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE PERCEIVED TO
BE DIRECT, ACCURATE, AND EFFECTIVE. (THE IMAGE OF U.S.
ABILITY TO RESPOND IS THREATENED BY OUR PRESUMED ASSOCIA-
TION WITH EVENTS SUCH AS THE BIR AL-ABID CAR BOMBING IN
WEST BEIRUT, NOT TO MENTION THE DECEMBER 1983 AIR STRIKE
IN THE BIQA' WHICH RESULTED IN CAPTURE OF A U.S. FLYER.)
FINALLY, RETALIATION IS A FAVORITE ISRAELI POLICY WHICH
MOST TERRORIST ANALYSTS ACKNOWLEDGE HAS NEVER WORKED.
THE U.S. COULD END UP ADDING TO THE PROBLEM BY FURTHER
ALIENATING ARAB OPINION.


11. WE HAVE NOT TOUCHED UPON THE QUESTION OF PREEMPTION
BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW, GIVEN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE,
PREEMPTION WOULD SEEM TO BE LOGICAL AND NECESSARY IF IT
IS POSSIBLE.


12. FINALLY, IRANIAN- AND LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM,
WHICH TAINTS SYRIA BY ASSOCIATION, IS NOT NECESSARILY
APPROVED OR EVEN CONDONED BY SYRIA. A GOOD EXAMPLE IS
HOSTAGE-TAKING IN LEBANON. THERE IS LITTLE SYRIA CAN
DO TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIONS WITHOUT PAYING A HIGH PRICE
IN OTHER NATIONAL INTERESTS. SYRIA COULD DO MUCH MORE,
WE BELIEVE, TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF HOSTAGES AFTER THEY
ARE TAKEN, BUT PREVENTION OF INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST ACTS
SUCH AS THOSE OCCURRING NOW IN BEIRUT, IS PROBABLY NOT
POSSIBLE FOR SYRIA.


13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.


GLASPIE