Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
85BEIRUT2325
1985-04-18 17:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST BEIRUT

Tags:  PGOV PREL LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 181756Z APR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2708
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 02325 

CAIRO ALSO FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST BEIRUT
FIGHTING

REF: (A) BEIRUT 2279, (B) BEIRUT 2287

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 02325

CAIRO ALSO FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST BEIRUT
FIGHTING

REF: (A) BEIRUT 2279, (B) BEIRUT 2287


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. FOLLOWING MAJOR
FIGHTING ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16-17, A TENSE CALM
NOW PREVAILS IN WEST BEIRUT. SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT
LEADER NABIH BARRI EMERGED AS THE PRIME VICTOR IN
THE INTRAMUSLIM FIGHTING. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
VARIOUS LEADERS TRACK WITH OUR ANALYSIS (REFTEL A)
THAT THE FIGHTING REFLECTED TWO MAJOR CONFLICTS:
LEBANESE SHIA VS. LEBANESE SUNNI AND LEBANESE SHIA
VS. PALESTINIANS. THE AMAL MOVEMENT, WITH THE
SUPPORT OF THE DRUZE PSP AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
"NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT," HAS DEALT A SEVERE
BLOW TO THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA AND HAS COME
OUT OF THE AFFAIR WITH ITS POSITION AS THE
STRONGEST POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE IN WEST
BEIRUT CONFIRMED AND ENHANCED.


3. THE SYRIAN ROLE REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT MANY HERE
SPECULATE THAT DAMASCUS MUST HAVE CONDONED THE
AMAL/PSP MOVE AGAINST THE MURABITUN AND ITS
PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIAN ALLIES AND MAY HAVE, IN
FACT, ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE CLASH.


4. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT, PRIME MINISTER
RASHID KARAMI EXPRESSED DESPAIR OVER THE APRIL
16-17 FIGHTING, POINTED AN ACCUSING FIGURE AT
DAMASCUS, AND ASKED FOR SYRIA TO HELP RESOLVE THE
ENSUING CRISIS. IT IS TOO SOON TO MAKE ANY FIRM
PREDICTIONS AS TO WHO THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER MAY
BE OR WHAT FORM THE NEW CABINET MAY TAKE, BUT WE
SET FORTH BELOW SOME OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS. END
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

--------------
AMAL, BACKED BY PSP, VICTORIOUS
--------------

5. THE DUST IS NOW SETTLING IN WEST BEIRUT AFTER
VERY HEAVY FIGHTING OCCURRED ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL
16-17, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERSONS
KILLED AND ONE HUNDRED WOUNDED. BEIRUT AIRPORT
REMAINS OPERATIONAL, AND THE GREEN LINE IS
PARTIALLY OPEN, BUT SPORADIC SNIPING CONTINUES IN
VARIOUS AREAS OF WEST BEIRUT.


6. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, STATEMENTS BY KEY
LEADERS CONFIRMED OUR EARLIER ANALYSIS THAT THE
EVENTS OF APRIL 16-17 REFLECTED A SHIA-SUNNI
CONFLICT. THE SHIITE AMAL MILITIA, BACKED BY THE
DRUZE PSP, HIT HARD AT THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA,
REPORTEDLY TAKING CONTROL OF ALL SIGNIFICANT
MURABITUN POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE "VOICE OF ARAB
LEBANON" RADIO STATION LOCATED IN THE ABDUL NASR

MOSQUE.


7. THE REACTION OF SUNNI LEADERS HAS BEEN STRONG.
PRIME MINISTER KARAMI RESIGNED (SEE BELOW),AND THE
GRAND MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, SHEIKH HASSAN KHALID,
STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE SHIA FOR STRIKING AGAINST
TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. "IT IS
INADMISSIBLE FOR BEIRUT TO BE STRUCK AND HUMILIATED
AND ITS AUTHORITY SEIZED BY THOSE VERY PEOPLE THAT
IT PROTECTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT...BY
THOSE THAT IT WELCOMED AND HONORED AND WILL
CONTINUE TO WELCOME AND HONOR." THE MUFTI ADDED
THAT THE SUNNIS WOULD NOT PERMIT THE INHABITANTS OF
WEST BEIRUT TO BE "STRUCK AS IF THEY HAD BECOME
ISRAELI AGENTS." EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH PRIME
MINISTER KARAMI, FORMER PM TAKIADDIN SOLH STRONGLY
REGRETTED THE FIGHTING WHICH "OPPOSED PARTIES
STRUGGLING FOR A COMMON CAUSE...WHO SHOULD DIRECT
THEIR WEAPONS EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST THE ISRAELI
ENEMY."


8. AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI RESPONDED VEHEMENTLY TO
THE MUFTI'S NOTION THAT THE SHIA WERE GUESTS IN
TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. "BEIRUT IS MY
CITY AND MY CAPTIAL," HE SAID, "WE WILL NOT ACCEPT
CANTONS THAT DEFINE US AS FOREIGNERS WHEN WE ARE
PEOPLE OF THE HOUSE." SUPPORTING BARRI'S
STATEMENT, THE DRUZE PSP SAID IT "COULD NOT
UNDERSTAND...HOW HE (THE MUFTI) COULD QUALIFY
CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF WEST BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA)
AS INTRUDERS. ...THOSE WHO DEFEND WITH THEIR BLOOD
THE CAPITAL AGAINST FASCIST-PHALANGE AGRESSION,
THOSE WHO STRUGGLE SO THAT BEIRUT WILL REMAIN ARAB
AND FREE CANNOT BE CALLED INTRUDERS."


9. IN THE SECOND INSTANCE, THE APRIL 16-17
FIGHTING WAS A SHIA-PALESTINIAN SET-TO. THE SHIA,
BACKED BY THE DRUZE, STRUCK HARD NOT ONLY AT THE
SUNNI MURABITUN BUT ALSO AT THE PRO-ARAFAT
PALESTINIANS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE
MURABITUN. THEIR SUCCESS IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WAS
LESS OVERWHELMING, IN PART BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS
APPARENTLY DID NOT "RISE TO THE BAIT" AND
PARTICIPATE IN THE FIGHTING WITH ALL THEIR FORCE.
SINCE THE FIGHTING, AMAL AND PSP HAVE REPORTEDLY
ESTABLISHED CHECKPOINTS AROUND THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE CAMPS, TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER THE INFLUX
OF ARMS.


10. IN A MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENT, AMAL HIT HARD AT
THE PALESTINIANS. BARRI CALLED THE FIGHTING A
"NIGHTMARE" IN WHICH HIS AMAL MILITIA CONFRONTED
"AN UPRISING CAREFULLY PLANNED BY ARAB HANDS
EXPLOITING SECTARIAN IDEAS, FOREIGNERS, INTRUDERS,
AND GUESTS IN BEIRUT." BARRI ASKED RHETORICALLY
"WHY SOME OUTSIDERS (I.E., THE PALESTINIANS) ARE
CONSIDERED AS GUESTS, EVEN IF THEY COME FROM
ANOTHER REGION AND ANOTHER CONFESSION, WHILE THE
REAL GUESTS IN BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA),WHO HAD THE
HONOR OF LIBERATING THE CITY FROM THE CHAINS OF MAY
17 AND THE AGENTS OF ISRAEL, ARE NOT WELL LOOKED
UPON..."


11. ON THE GROUND, THE VICTORS HAVE MOVED TO
CONSOLIDATE THEIR GAINS. LEADERS OF AMAL, PSP, AND
THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST "NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC FRONT" (SYRIAN SOCIALIST NATIONAL PARTY,
LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SYRIAN ARAB BAATH PARTY)
MET AT BARRI'S WEST BEIRUT RESIDENCE ON APRIL 17
AND ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A UNIFIED MILITARY
COMMAND TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN ORDER IN WEST
BEIRUT (A THROW-BACK TO AN IDEA FIRST FIELDED AFTER
THE FEBRUARY 6, 1984, FIGHTING AND DROPPED AFTER
STIFF SUNNI RESISTANCE). THIS GROUP PLANS TO SET
UP AN OPERATIONS ROOM AND A BUREAU OF CITIZENS
AFFAIRS. IT SAYS IT WILL ALSO COMMAND A JOINT
"STRIKE FORCE" INITIALLY COMPRISING 300 MEN, TO BE
DOUBLED TO 600, DRAWN IN EQUAL NUMBERS FROM AMAL,
THE PSP, AND THE JUNIOR MEMBERS OF THE NDF.
ACCORDING TO THE BEIRUT DAILY, "LE REVEIL," WEST
BEIRUT NEIGHBORHOODS HAVE BEEN PARCELED OUT AMONG
THESE GROUPS. AMAL IS REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
SECURITY IN TARIQ AL-JADIDAH, FAKAHANI, MAZRAH, AND
KARAKAS; THE PSP IN RAS BEIRUT, HAMRA, AYN
AL-MURAYSA, MINAT AL-HISN, MUSAYTIBAH, AND RAWSHAH;
AND THE VARIOUS SMALLER GROUPS UNDER THE EGIS OF
THE PSP IN SMALL, TOKEN SECTIONS OF TERRITORY.


12. NOTABLY ABSENT FROM REPRESENTATION ON THE
UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND OR IN THE DIVISION OF
SPOILS IS ANY SUNNI MUSLIM GROUP. LACK OF GOL OR
LAF PARTICIPATION GOES WITHOUT SAYING. MORE THAN
EVER BEFORE, NABIH BARRI HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS
THE STRONGMAN OF WEST BEIRUT. THROUGH THE
FORMATION OF THE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND AND THE
ANNOUNCED FORMATION OF A "POLITICAL HIGH COMMAND,"
THE SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT WITH ITS ALLIES IS
CONSOLIDATING AND FORMALIZING ITS CONTROL OF WEST
BEIRUT. THIS WILL BE A BITTER PILL FOR THE SUNNI
COMMUNITY TO SWALLOW.

--------------
SYRIAN ROLE
--------------

13. THERE AS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION AND LITTLE
CONCRETE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ROLE THAT SYRIA
MAY HAVE PLAYED IN THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING. AS WE
ANTICIPATED (REFTEL A),THE FACT THAT NABIH BARRI
HAD JUST RETURNED FROM DAMACUS BEFORE THE FIGHTING
HAS FUELED SPECULATION THAT SYRIA CONDONED AND
PERHAPS ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE MOVE AGAINST THE
MURABITUN AND, ESPECIALLY, AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT
PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO THIS LINE OF REASONING,
SYRIA MAY NEXT UNLEASH AMAL AND THE PSP AGAINST THE
PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS IN THE BEIRUT SOUTHERN
SUBURBS AND IN SIDON. IN ANY EVENT, SYRIA IS
CERTAINLY WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS HERE CLOSELY AND IS
APPARENTLY NOT UNHAPPY WITH THE COURSE THEY HAVE
TAKEN SO FAR.


14. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT (REFTEL B.),
PRIME MINISTER KARAMI EXPRESSED DEEP DESPAIR OVER
THE VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. HE OBLIQUELY BUT
CLEARLY BLAMED SYRIA FOR THE "GRAVE AND SERIOUS"
EVENTS AND CALLED ON IT TO HELP SORT OUT THE
CRISIS. ON APRIL 18, KARAMI DEPARTED FOR DAMASCUS
TO MEET WITH SARG LEADERS.

--------------
REPLACING THE PRIME MINISTER
--------------

15. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS LATEST
BATTLE IN WEST BEIRUT WAS TO FORCE THE RESIGNATION
OF PRIME MINISTER KARAMI WHO, CONFRONTED WITH
BARRI'S SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON SUNNI INTERESTS, HAD
NO CHOICE BUT TO RESIGN. THE SELECTION OF A NEW
SUNNI PRIME MINISTER IS SUBJECT TO A NUMBER OF
RESTRAINTS. FOREMOST IS THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF ANY
SUNNI NOTABLE AGREEING TO REPLACE THE DESPAIRING
KARAMI UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS. KARAMI
CLEARLY FELT HUMILIATED BY THE EVENTS OF APRIL
16-17; NO SELF-RESPECTING SUNNI WOULD OVERTLY
ATTEMPT TO PROFIT BY THE "EFFENDI'S" DISCOMFITURE.
SECONDLY, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE A SUNNI
LEADER TO PRESIDE OVER A CABINET WITH AN
UNREPENTANT BARRI AND JUMBLATT PRESENT. FINALLY,
SYRIA'S APPROVAL OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER WILL BE
REQUIRED. NOT KNOWING SYRIA'S EXACT ROLE AND
INTENTIONS IN THE EVENTS IN THE WEST, THE
PROSPECTIVE SUNNI CANDIDATES WILL BE WARY.


16. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CAN FORESEE ONE
FORM WHICH A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE. FOR
EXAMPLE, A MEETING OF SUNNI RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL
NOTABLES AT THE DAR AL-FATWA, THE SEAT OF THE GRAND
MUFTI, MIGHT ISSUE A SET OF CONDITIONS THAT WOULD
HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE A SUNNI COULD ACCEPT THE
PREMIERSHIP. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE NEW PRIME
MINISTER TO CLAIM THE BACKING OF THE SUNNI
COMMUNITY FOR NEW TERMS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION, THUS
MORE OR LESS TURNING THE PAGE ON KARAMI'S
RESIGNATION. WE CANNOT PRECLUDE THAT, UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, KARAMI HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BE
REINCARNATED.


17. POSSIBLE PRECONDITIONS (APART FROM
CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS AND GESTURES FROM AMAL AND
THE PSP) INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT THAT BARRI AND
JUMBLATT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CABINET MEETINGS, AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY PLAN
FOR THE SUNNI HEARTLANDS OF WEST BEIRUT, SIDON, AND
POSSIBLY TRIPOLI. ANY OF THE ABOVE CONCESSIONS
WOULD BE HARD TO EXTRACT FROM THE SHIA, WHO ARE
RIDING HIGH AT PRESENT. THUS THE CABINET CRISIS
MIGHT BECOME A DRAWN-OUT AFFAIR.

--------------
FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT
--------------

18. AS FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, WE
SEE TWO PRIMARY OPTIONS. THE FIRST, A SMALL
CABINET MUCH LIKE THE OUTGOING "NATIONAL UNITY
GOVERNMENT," APPEARS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE UNDER
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BASICALLY THE SAME
PERSONALITIES WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND THE SAME
ANIMOSITIES WOULD REAPPEAR. IN SUM, THE
DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE KARAMI GOVERNMENT ARE
PROBABLY TOO DEEP TO BE SIMPLY PAPERED OVER,
ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE RISE OF SHIA POWER VIS-A-VIS
THEIR SUNNI CORELIGIONISTS. THE SECOND, AN
ENLARGED GOVERNMENT, RUMORS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN
CIRCULATING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, MIGHT PROVE A MORE
FEASIBLE OPTION. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD POINT OUT
THE REPUTATION OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAKIADDIN
SOLH AS A CONCILIATOR PRESIDING OVER LARGE
GOVERNMENTS (THOUGH AGAIN, WE RECALL KARAMI'S
PHOENIX-LIKE QUALITIES).

BARTHOLOMEW