THE GULF WAR: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR EXPANSION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 3988

FOR MANAMA POLITICAL OFFICERS' MEETING
NEW DELHI FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY
LONDON FOR RAPHEL
PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS PREL IZ IR XF
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR EXPANSION

REF: STATE 323960



1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


2. SUMMARY: THE GULF WAR WILL LIKELY BUT NOT NECESSARILY REMAIN
STALEMATED. IRAQ DOMINATES IN EVERY MAJOR WEAPONS CATEGORY AND
HAS CONSTRUCTED FORMIDABLE DEFENSES. YET, ALL IS NOT WELL. THE
IRANIANS CONTINUE TO MAKE INROADS EVEN WHILE PAYING DEARLY FOR
THEM. OVER TIME THE WILL OF IRAQI FORCES TO RESIST COULD BECOME
INCREASINGLY BRITTLE. THE STAKES INVOLVED FOR WESTERN INTERESTS
ARE TOO VITAL TO PERMIT COMPLACENCY. AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD
REDRAW THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE GEOGRAPHIC MAP. THE DANGER
IS NOT THAT IRAQ'S ACTIONS WILL SPARK A WIDER WAR BUT THAT IT
WILL OVERESTIMATE ITS ABILITIES TO SUSTAIN A DETERMINED DEFENSE.
IN ANY CASE, IRAN WILL NOT NOW ATTEMPT A FRONTAL ASSAULT ON
OTHER GULF ARAB STATES BUT WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE POLICIES
DESIGNED TO DESTABILIZE THEIR RULING REGIMES OR AT MINIMUM
INTIMIDATE THEM INTO STRICT NEUTRALITY. FINALLY, FEARS THAT THE
SOVIETS WILL GAIN ADVANTAGES IN IRAN AT OUR EXPENSE ARE GROSSLY
EXAGGERATED GIVEN THE DIVERGENT POLICIES OF THE TWO STATES AND
THVIR ANTITHETICAL INTERESTS. END SUMMARY.


3. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN A BLOODY STALEMATE FOR
THE LAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS WITH IRANIAN SOLDIERS PAYING
A TERRIBLE PRICE TO ACHIEVE MINOR TACTICAL GAINS. GIVEN IRAN'S
GROSS INFERIORITY IN THE FULL RANGE OF MODERN WEAPONRY AND IRAQ'S
FORMIDABLE, IF LARGELY STATIC, DEFENSIVE LINES, THE STALEMATE
SHOULD CONTINUE. HOWEVER, WARS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE.
INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION AND UNIT ESPIRIT STILL COUNT FOR A GREAT
DEAL. IN THESE CATEGORIES, IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND RAG-
TAG BASIJ CLEARLY HOLD SWAY. MOREOVER, THE IRAQI POLITICAL LEADER-
SHIP'S DETERMINATION TO MINIMIZE CASUALTIES AND TO USE ITS VAST
AIR SUPERIORITY SPARINGLY LEAVE THE INITIATIVE TO IRAN'S FORCES
-- A SITUATION THAT CERTAINLY MUST DEMORALIZE AT LEAST SOME OF
THE MORE PROFESSIONAL OFFICEERS AND NON-COMS IN IRAQ'S ARMY.
EVEN MORE PUZZLING IS THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES' APPARENT WILLING-
NESS TO ALLOW THEIR ADVERSARIES TO BUILD CAUSEWAYS AND PONTOON
BRIDGES THROUGHOUT THE VAST HUWAYZAH MARSHES WITH ONLY SPORADIC
HARRASSMENT FROM H&I FIRE OR AIR STRIKES. MILITARY ATTACHES AND
ADVISERS IN BAGHDAD ARE AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN IRAQ'S PASSIVITY AND
VIOLATION OF SOME BASIC RULES OF WARFARE.


4. NEVERTHELESS, THOSE WHO MEET WITH IRAQI COMMANDERS AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS FIND THEM EXUDING CONFIDENCE. AND, PERHAPS,
NOT WITHOUT REASON. MASSIVE IRANIAN OFFENSIVES HAVE BEEN BROKEN
TIME AND TIME AGAIN. WHERE IRAQI LINES HAVE BEEN BREACHED, THE
IRANIANS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO EXPLOIT IT BECAUSE OF INADEQUACIES
IN PLANNING, MOBILITY, AIR, ARMOR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND
LOGISTICS. INDEED, THESE FACTORS RATHER THAN IRAQI PROWESS MAKE
A CONTINUED STALEMATE LIKELY.


5. TO CONTEMPLATE AN IRANIAN VICTORY REQUIRES THE SUPPOSITION
THAT IRAQI FORCES AFTER SUFFERING A MAJOR, BUT INDECISIVE,
BATTLEFIELD REVERSE, PANIC AND A GENERAL ROUT BEGINS SOMEWHAT
ON THE ORDER OF WHAT HAPPENED TO ARVN TROOPS IN 1975. ALTHOUGH
THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WITH GOOD INTERIOR LINES OF DEFENSE COULD
BE EXPECTED TO RUSH IN FRESH TROOPS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE, THE
FACT IS THAT FEW FOREIGNERS HAVE ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE OF HOW IRAQI
TROOPS WOULD HANDLE SUCH A REVERSE. WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE A
COLLAPSE CANNOT BE RULED OUT, IT REMAINS IMPROBABLE FOR THE NEAR-
TERM.


6. YET, THE STAKES IN THIS WAR ARE SUCH THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES
SHOULD GUARD AGAINST COMPLACENCY. EVEN IF ONE ASSIGNS THE
IRANIANS ONLY A 10-15 PERCENT POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY, THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD CERTAINLY BE CATESTROPHIC.


7. FEW DOUBT THAT KHOMEINI WANTS HIS INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM TO
PREVAIL THROUGHOUT THE REGION OR THAT HE WOULD BE SATISFIED TO
DOMINATE IRAQ. EVEN NOW THE IRANIANS ARE SEEKING TO UNDERMINE
SEVERAL GULF REGIMES, MOST NOTABLY IN BAHRAIN AND KUWAIT. THE
SAUDI RULING FAMILY IS THE OBJECT OF SCORN IN TEHRAN AND THEIR
RIGHT TO ACT AS SOLE GUARDIANS OF THE HOLY PLACES HAS BEEN CALLED
INTO QUESTION. IRANIAN FEELINGS TOWARD KING HUSSEIN AS A CRONY OF
THE SHAH AND MORE RECENTLY AS AN ALLY OF IRAQ HARDLY NEED
MENTIONING. DESPITE REPORTED ISRAELI AID FOR IRAN EARLIER IN THE
WAR AND THEIR MUTUAL ANTIPATHY FOR IRAQ, ISRAEL AND ITS RULE OVER
JERUSALEM SERVE AS POWERFUL SYMBOLS THROUGH WHICH IRANIAN
PROPAGANDA TRIES TO ROUSE ARAB AND NON-ARAB MUSLIMS ALIKE. THE
ACTIONS OF IRANIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS IN LEBANON SUCH AS
HIZBALLAH AND ISLAMIC AMAL WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT IRANIAN
VITUPERATION DIRECTED AT ISRAEL IS MORE THAN RHETORICAL.


8. EVEN A VICTORIOUS IRAN WITH LESSER AMBITIONS AT MINIMUM COULD
EXPECT TO DOMINATE OIL POLICY IN THE REGION AND FORCE A CHOICE
AMONG GULF RULERS BETWEEN DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THE U.S. OR
EMBRACING US A NEVER BEFORE. BOTH SCENARIOS ARE INHERENTLY
DANGEROUS AND UNSTABLE.


9. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS VALID, THEN IRAQ NEEDS BOLSTERING AND
FEARS THAT ITS ACTIONS AGAINST KHARG OR IRAN'S INTERIOR WOULD
SPREAD THE WAR, WHILE UNDERSTANDABLE, SHOULD BE SUBORDINATED TO
REDUCING FURTHER THE ODDS THAT IT MIGHT LOSE. IN TRUTH IRAQ
WAS TOO BOLD IN STARTING THIS WAR AND IS TOO TIMID IN
PROSECUTING IT.


10. THE LONGER THE WAR DRAGS ON, THE MORE LIKELY AN IRAQI
COLLAPSE BECOMES. A KHOMEINI-LED IRAN WILL NOT WIND DOWN OR END
THE WAR UNLESS NO OTHER VIABLE OPTION EXISTS. THIS REQUIRES IRAN
BE DENIED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE INCOME AND ARMS. THE IRANIANS
ARE NOT GOING TO SPREAD THE WAR BY MAKING A SUSTAINED FRONTAL
ASSAULT AGAINST THE GULF STATES, REALIZING ALL TOO WELL WHAT THE
CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. RATHER, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE
TO SEEK SUBVERSIVE ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE GULF REGION WHILE
PROBING PRESSURE POINTS AND PRACTICING GENERAL INTIMIDATION.


11. FINALLY, FEARS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE INROADS INTO IRAN
WOULD SEEM GROSSLY EXAGGERATED. THE SOVIET UNION, NOT THE U.S.,
IS IRAQ'S PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER; THE ENEMY OF THE MUJAHIDIN
IN AFGHANISTAN; THE BACKER OF THE TUDEH PARTY; AND THE RULERS
OF 40 MILLION MUSLIMS INSIDE ITS OWN BORDERS. THE SOVIETS HAVE
HARDLY RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO RECENT IRANIAN OVERTURES LARGELY
BECAUSE THE IDEOLOGY OF IRAN'S RULING CLERICS PREVENTS THEM FROM
MAKING THE SOVIETS A SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE OFFER TO SWITCH
SIDES.-/


NEWTON