Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10USUNNEWYORK88
2010-02-16 21:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

AMB RICE'S MEETING WITH BRAZILIAN PERMREP

Tags:  PREL UNSC IAEA BR IR HA SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0088/01 0472119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 162119Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8189
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000088 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PREL UNSC IAEA BR IR HA SU
SUBJECT: AMB RICE'S MEETING WITH BRAZILIAN PERMREP

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000088

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PREL UNSC IAEA BR IR HA SU
SUBJECT: AMB RICE'S MEETING WITH BRAZILIAN PERMREP

Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. Summary: During a February 8 lunch hosted by Ambassador
Rice for Brazilian PermRep Viotti, the U.S. and Brazil were
in agreement on priorities for and approaches to dealing with
Haiti. On Sudan, Viotti said she believes there is "a
measure of convergence" in the SC on what needs to be done
there, but the details are hard and the possibility for UN
action is limited. However, she agreed that it might be
useful to think about new ways for the Security Council to
approach the issue. Viotti said that on the Middle East
issue, Brazil sees potential for greater contribution by the
Security Council and the international community to the peace
process, including doing more to encourage both parties to
return to negotiations. She urged additional efforts at
quiet diplomacy with the Iranians, noting that in Davos the
Iranians did not seem to be rejecting the basic concept of
the proposal; they simply wanted more time to discuss the
details. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Rice began the discussion at a February 8
lunch she hosted for Brazilian PermRep Viotti by outlining
the U.S. view of the situation in Haiti and priorities over
the coming weeks and months. Viotti agreed with the U.S.
assessment, concurring that it is important to keep Haitians
themselves in the lead on all efforts, and stressing that the
international community must already begin thinking about
reconstruction and rebuilding. She said that Brazil has been
very much engaged in Haiti since 2004 and wants to reinforce
regional efforts to assist Haiti. Viotti said she believed
that Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH had encouraged
greater participation by other Latin American countries in
addressing Haiti's needs. She also highlighted enhanced
cooperation efforts among Latin American countries in order
to deconflict bilateral aid to Haiti. She agreed that
CARICOM countries have "taken a more distant position" with
regard to Haiti, but in light of the current crisis they are
offering support and assistance, and she suggested that this
might be the beginning of more effective long-term engagement
on the part of the Caribbean countries.



3. (C) Viotti noted that maintaining calm in Haiti will
depend on effective distribution of food, water, medicine,
and other basics. Cash distributions to Haitians are a vital
part of assistance, she added, as they allow people to
re-open businesses and take other actions that give them back
some control over their lives. Brazil will probably donate
money for the cash distribution program, separate from the
$15 million it has already given to the Flash Appeal for
Haiti. She said that the MINUSTAH mandate seems to be
sufficient to cover everything that needs to be done right
now, but it might need to be reviewed when it comes up for
renewal in October.


4. (C) Viotti said that while Haiti is an immediate priority,
Brazil's other priorities include Africa, peacekeeping,
peacebuilding, protection of civilians, and Timor-Leste. She
commented that Brazil has been very active in Timor-Leste
since the start of UN involvement there. Brazil is the chair
of the Security Council's DRC sanctions committee, and Viotti
said they are setting up a new expert group for the committee
and she looks forward to working closely with them to improve
monitoring of the sanctions regime. On Sudan, Viotti said
she believes there is "a measure of convergence" in the SC on
what needs to be done there, such as implementing the CPA and
planning for after the election, but the details are hard and
the possibility for UN action on these issues is limited.
Rice responded that while the SC should not prejudge or
influence the outcome of the election or the referendum, it
is pretty clear to everyone what the outcome of a free and
fair referendum would be, and we need to begin planning now,
in a creative and sustained way. Viotti suggested that it
might be possible for the Council to approach this through
setting up some type of informal group or committee to
examine possibilities, and both ambassadors agreed it will be
important to work closely with U/SYG Menkerios on this.


5. (C) The Middle East is also an issue of interest for
Brazil, Viotti said, particularly since Brazil has a large
Arab community and a "strong and powerful" Jewish community.
Rice outlined the U.S. position on the Middle East, stressing
that the SC's monthly meetings are not necessarily helpful to
efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table,
and that the Council must be careful that its meetings and
pronouncements are constructive and supportive of the larger
goal of getting the parties to a two-state solution. Viotti
said that Brazil takes a somewhat different view of the
potential contribution of the SC and the international
community to the peace process, and suggested that perhaps
the SC can do more to encourage both parties to return to
negotiations. Maybe they need encouragement from the broader
international community in order to move the process forward,
she suggested.



6. (C) When the discussion turned to Iran, Viotti repeated
Brazil's position that all countries have the right to
peaceful use of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.
Brazil has told Iran that the offers on the table from the
P5 1 are an opportunity not to be missed, she said, and
judging from Brazil's contacts with the Iranians last year,
it seemed that by the end of the year Iran, including
President Ahmadenijad, saw the value of engaging, but
domestic problems prevented the GOI from doing so, since such
engagement provided an opening to criticize the government.
She urged additional efforts at quiet diplomacy with the
Iranians, noting that in Davos the Iranians did not seem to
be rejecting the basic concept of the proposal; they simply
wanted more time to discuss the details. Rice responded that
there has been a clear deal from the IAEA on the table - send
all 1200 kilograms of their LEU to Russia and then France to
be processed - but the Iranians have been unable to come to
grips with it in all this ti
me. The deal's utility as a confidence-building measure is
diminishing every day, as Iran makes more LEU. Viotti said
the question for Brazil is whether sanctions will be
effective, since they have not been so with Iran in the past.
Crippling sanctions could close the door to further
diplomatic efforts. Rice replied that the U.S. sees
sanctions as having exactly the opposite effect: they are a
way to keep the diplomatic option alive and reduce the risk
of a military conflict, since their purpose is to encourage
Iran to move in the right direction.


RICE