Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10USOSCE55
2010-02-19 06:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE OSCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL OSCE PINR KZ 
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DE RUEHVEN #0055/01 0500658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190658Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6911
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000055 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2030
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE PINR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE OSCE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000055

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2030
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE PINR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE OSCE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Representing the Chair in Office (CiO) at the OSCE,
Kazakhstan's Vienna representatives have begun to show their
mettle in dealing with conflict and their intentions for the
coming year. Led by seasoned diplomat Kairat Abdrakhmanov,
the Kazakhstani delegation is off to a shaky start in Vienna,
appearing to have only a superficial understanding of the
OSCE and frequently bumbling while hoping - above all - never
to lose face. Abdrakhmanov is often disengaged, reluctant to
make decisions, reliant on underlings and, despite generally
projecting a congenial, cosmopolitan image, occasionally
revealing a steely intransigence.


2. (C) (Summary continued) It is still early days to assess
whether Kazakhstan seeks to have a meaningful impact on the
development or direction of the OSCE but early indications
are that more than anything, it hopes to hold a high profile
summit and make it through the year without any major
embarrassments. The Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has
committed substantial resources - in both funding and
personnel - to this endeavor. On the other side of the coin,
however, it has already instituted some unwelcome changes to
long-standing OSCE traditions and customs. How much of this
can be attributed to cultural differences between an
authoritarian country and the long-standing democratic
traditions of the west and how much to political intention is
not yet clear. Multi-vector Kazakhstan has an opportunity to
be an honest broker with the West while retaining Moscow's
trust, but so far, at least in Vienna, the overriding goal is
to burnish the GOK's international image through the holding
of a Summit. At the same time, we will need to counter
Kazakhstan's declared intention to provide "balance" of
greater emphasis on hard security and less on the human
dimension. As we seek to work with Kazakhstan at OSCE, this
message is provided to offer initial insights into the
Kazakhstani actors in Vienna. End summary.

ABDRAKHMANOV LEADS, WITH DIFFIDENCE -- OR INTRANSIGENCE

-------------- --------------

3. (C) The Permanent Representative of the Republic of
Kazakhstan to the OSCE is Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov: a
seasoned diplomat who has previously held top-level
positions, including Ambassador to Israel (2003-2006),Deputy
Foreign Minister (1999-2001 and 2006-2007) and bilateral
Ambassador to Austria (2007)- which he ceded for the
undoubtedly career enhancing possibility of representing
Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE. With over a year to
get prepared for the Chairmanship, Abdrakhmanov has ably
fashioned a figurative role of a visiting orchestral
conductor - waving his hands over the orchestra, while not
paying much attention to the preparatory work behind the
stage. He appears to rely inordinately on those beneath him
expecting all will go smoothly. This has contributed to him
and his team getting off to a shaky start in Vienna,
frequently bumbling and appearing to have (and not to be
bothered about having) no more than a superficial
understanding of the OSCE or its institutions, while striving
- above all - to deliver the promised summit decreed by
Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev without ever losing face.


4. (C) Abdrakhmanov's behavior is in some ways reminiscent of
Soviet models. He is authoritarian yet disengaged. He is
often unable to make decisions and fears being called to
account by his superiors. Director of the OSCE Conflict
Prevention Center German Ambassador Herbert Salber told
USOSCE CDA that Abdrakhmanov was visibly reluctant to remain
in the car with FM Saudabayev during the minister's January
2010 visit to Vienna. His inability to make decisions is
very frustrating to OSCE delegations. For example, the
Austrian Ambassador to the OSCE repeatedly asked Abdrakhmanov
for information about the 2010 Ambassadors' Retreat - an
event traditionally paid for by the Austrian government.
After each request, she received no response. In
exasperation, she finally announced publicly that due to the
lack of consultation Austria could not cover the costs of the
event. Even the OSCE Secretary General (SYG) Marc Perrin De
Brichambaut told USOSCE CDA that it is nearly impossible to
get a decision out of Abdrakhmanov - even on simple
logistical issues like the date and venue for the retreat.
The event finally took place February 12-13 and was paid for
lavishly by the CiO.


5. (C) Abdrakhmanov relies inordinately on underlings and
cultivates the image of himself as a congenial, debonair
socialite. He delights in showing off the riches of his
country at social events. However, when confronted with
unpleasantness or disagreements, Abdrakhmanov drops that

USOSCE 00000055 002 OF 004


facade to reveal an intransigent streak. While his English
is good, he can also be difficult to understand sometimes
because he mumbles and speaks very softly or in a convoluted
style. Abdrakhmanov has also perfected the ability to talk
at great length while saying very little of substance. In
weekly meetings with USOSCE, he will often speak in general
terms for nearly all the meeting until pushed to get down to
specifics of the week's agenda.


6. (C) While every Chairmanship brings its own unique style
to the OSCE's helm, Kazakhstan has sometimes disturbed
delegations by changes to OSCE traditions. In a departure
from established practice, Abdrakhmanov refused to permit
Georgia - the country under discussion at a Permanent Council
meeting - to be the final speaker as is both custom and
courtesy. In that instance, in what appeared to all to be a
slap in the Georgian ambassador's face, Abdrakhmanov
permitted the Russians to speak last. Abdrakhmanov has
abandoned another OSCE tradition to let all participating
States make Permanent Council remarks before any partner
state does so. Other cultural differences appear as well.
Female OSCE support staff have complained to U.S. delegates
that the "non-European Kazakhstanis treat women as if they
are good for only two things: getting coffee and the oldest
profession in the world."


7. (C) Abdrakhmanov is disorganized, or deliberately lax
about, sharing information in a timely manner. Announcements
of meetings, schedule changes or invitations to
representational events often arrive late. Although it is
possible that the CiO is just going through normal "growing
pains," the impression given is clear: when the Chair issues
a document or an invitation, all delegations are expected to
be immediately attentive and responsive. OSCE SYG De
Brichambaut told CDA that the cycle of consultations and the
pressure of building consensus likely would start to wear on
the Kazakhstani delegation relatively quickly and recommended
interlocutors be "discreet" and avoid surprises, particularly
given Abdrakhmanov's preoccupation with "face" and image. De
Brichambaut said he expected an "authoritarian streak" to
show itself in Abdrakhmanov (noting that Chairmanships often
suffered from a "master of the universe" syndrome).


8. (C) This tendency was particularly pronounced in early and
mid-February as USOSCE worked with the Kazakhstani delegation
and others to shape a workable agenda for the Human Dimension
in 2010. As CiO, Kazakhstan bears the responsibility for
developing a Human Dimension agenda by setting forth topics
for the seven Human Dimension events to take place throughout
the year. However, the Kazakh proposal lacked almost any of
the priorities the U.S., the EU, Canada, Norway, and other
like-minded missions presented to them earlier. Instead, the
proposal was heavy on non-controversial tolerance and
nondiscrimination topics (Russian and Central Asian
favorites) and bereft of fundamental freedoms or basic human
rights. The Kazakhstani delegation initially presented their
package of ideas as being sacrosanct, warning delegations not
to "open the package." Under pressure to broker a
compromise, they held repeated formal and informal meetings,
but negotiations fell apart on February 17. USOSCE learned
that the delegation had just received instructions from
Astana to reaffirm the CiO's initial draft and refuse to
negotiate any changes, insisting that it is a take it or
leave it deal. In an interchange with the Charge and Senator
Ben Cardin of the Helsinki Commission at the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly February 18, Abdrakhmanov insisted
that freedom of religion is a fundamental freedom and that
that should be good enough for us. Senator Cardin assured
him again that including fundamental freedoms is a priority
for the U.S.

OTHER PLAYERS
--------------

9. (C) Kazakhstan dramatically increased the size of its
Mission to the OSCE after receiving the chairmanship at the
Madrid Ministerial Council in 2007. It now has three Deputy
Permanent Representatives (DCMs),approximately 15 other
accredited diplomats and six support staff. The primus inter
pares among the three DCMs is widely seen as Yerkin
Akhinzhanov. An information sheet provided by the
Kazakhstani delegation lists his portfolio as encompassing a
wide range of responsibilities, including general
coordination, the OSCE Summit, the Corfu Process, the
Preparatory Committee and the Political Military Dimension.
Akhinzhanov, an extrovert, is seen as a capable and
gregarious interlocutor who speaks good English. He shares a
great variety of information (maybe even more than a more
seasoned diplomat would do). While he is largely seen as
being good at what he does, it is frequently evident that he
is operating above his level of experience or comfort. He
has made painstaking, but sometimes inept, efforts to

USOSCE 00000055 003 OF 004


coordinate the timing for the OSCE's largest security-related
events on the Corfu Process, constantly revising the timing
to suit this or that concern voiced by various delegations.
This stands in sharp contrast to Abdrakhmanov's more
authoritarian approach, but it also contributes to
undermining the Chair's effectiveness in an organization
where gaining a balance between progress and universal
acceptance is more of an art than a science.


10. (C) Next in authority is Usen Suleimenov who is
responsible for, inter alia, the Human Dimension, the OSCE
Troika, the Office of the Secretary General, field missions
in Central Asia, Asian Partners for Cooperation and protocol.
Suleimenov is considered the toughest negotiator of the
top-tier Kazakhstani team. His negotiating style can
frequently shift (even in a single meeting) from bullying, to
pleading, to pretending to have been offended or insulted, to
serious negotiator. He quickly personalizes issues and
depicts even minor setbacks as impassable disagreements which
will sink the Chairmanship and inevitably lead to the
ruination of his diplomatic career.


11. (C) Suleimenov is not above blatant efforts to
horse-trade unrelated issues. In an effort to get USG
agreement to his preferred language in a draft decision at
the December 2009 Athens Ministerial, prior to the Kazakh
Chairmanship, Suleimenov essentially offered a bribe:
Kazakhstan would create a personal representative of the CiO
for gender issues and staff it with an American if we would
withdraw our objections. We did not, and Kazakhstan is again
seeking to fill the post with an amcit - this time, without a
bribe. Suleimenov is also occasionally boorish, and has been
overheard by U.S. delegates making sexist remarks to female
delegates.


12. (C) Third in line is Akan Rahkmetullin who is responsible
for the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED),the
External Cooperation Department, and field missions in South
Eastern Europe, among other things. Akan is seen by some as
an intellectual lightweight who is more interested in making
friends and being liked than taking hard-line positions or
forging difficult compromises. In a recent conversation with
Poloff, he mentioned he has been in the MFA since 1992, but
it is not uncommon for those meeting him for the first time
to assume him to be younger or less experienced than this
would indicate. In his work on the EED, Akan so far has not
taken the lead on providing proposals or substance,
preferring to rely, instead, on other delegations to provide
extensive written input first. A number of pS have expressed
privately to USOSCE (and somewhat openly in a recent
committee meeting) frustration that the Kazakhstani handling
of energy security, expected to be a salient part of the EED
agenda for 2010, has been passive and slow-moving. On the
Balkans, Akan admits readily that he does not have a deep
knowledge of the region (a region where Kazakhstan is without
diplomatic representation) and in two recent meetings with
USDEL and visiting USG officials to discuss Balkans issues he
has been almost entirely in listening mode.

LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AWAITS
--------------

13. (C) A coincidental irony for Kazakhstan is that it
assumed the Chairmanship just as the OSCE moved into higher
gear on a comprehensive review of European security and
ongoing threats to it. Geographically and historically
removed from the issue, Kazakhstan has an opportunity to be
an honest broker while retaining Moscow's trust. Or, as
seems increasingly likely as time goes by, Ambassador
Abdrakhmanov can step back and orchestrate the process from a
comfortable distance, seeking only to obtain some sort of
initial step worthy of presenting to a Summit. By tapping
ten other Ambassadors as "Corfu Coordinators" to follow
specific issues and work with the Chair, Abdrakhmanov has
skillfully spread out the work (and the responsibility) for
the success or failure of the project. Since eight of these
are EU ambassadors, this bodes well for keeping the process
on track with the spirit of the Corfu process. Nevertheless,
as with other components, the hard work of butting heads and
forging compromises - the responsibility of the OSCE CiO -
lies ahead, and Abdrakhmanov cannot afford to continue as a
passive player.

COMMENT
--------------

14. (C) It is apparent that Kazakhstan's prime interest is to
burnish its international credentials, notably with the
crowning achievement of a first-in-a-decade OSCE Summit - no
matter the topic or outcome - rather than leaving a lasting
imprint on the organization. To achieve that, the Kazakhstan
Delegation seems keen to avoid major embarrassments and
political turmoil. At the same time, there is still a

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possibility that their actions may reflect political
intention. Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev and Foreign
Minister Saudabayev have both stated on numerous occasions
that Kazakhstan wants to see 'balance' restored to the OSCE -
words echoed by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in his
February 6 address at the Munich Security Conference. This
is largely code for reducing focus on the Human Dimension and
reemphasizing traditional, hard security or first dimension
issues. We will continue to state our clear priorities to
the Kazakhstani representatives in Vienna as we proceed with
this year's OSCE agenda. We believe it is important, more
than with past Chairmanships, that our messages be carefully
synchronized between Vienna, Washington and Astana, and that
we stay in close contact with our EU and NATO allies.
FULLER