Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10USOSCE22
2010-01-29 07:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

PERSPECTIVES ON KAZAKHSTAN,S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP IS

Tags:  OSCE PREL KZ KG TI TX UZ AF 
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DE RUEHVEN #0022/01 0290736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290736Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6838
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0153
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000022 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: OSCE PREL KZ KG TI TX UZ AF
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES ON KAZAKHSTAN,S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP IS
FOCUS OF DCM SPRATLEN,S VISIT TO VIENNA

Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000022

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: OSCE PREL KZ KG TI TX UZ AF
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES ON KAZAKHSTAN,S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP IS
FOCUS OF DCM SPRATLEN,S VISIT TO VIENNA

Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The visit of Embassy Astana DCM Pamela
Spratlen to Vienna January 20-22 helped promote useful
exchanges of views on Kazakhstan's Chairmanship, facilitated
discussion of OSCE engagement in Afghanistan, and provided an
opportunity to promote further interaction among Central
Asian PermReps. NATO Caucus PermReps agreed that Kazakhstan
is focusing more on process than content and that supporters
of the Corfu Process will need to work hard to ensure good
substantive results. Central Asian PermReps affirmed their
support for Kazakhstan's Chairmanship and the work of OSCE
field missions but cautioned that the OSCE was "no magic
wand" for advancing change in their countries. OSCE
Secretary General de Brichambaut urged continued engagement
with Kazakhstan at all levels, noted the United States would
have to play a leading role in shaping the Chairmanship's
agenda, and cast doubt on some participating States' belief
that an OSCE Summit in 2010 is inevitable. Kazakhstani
PermRep Abdrakhmanov reiterat
ed the Chairmanship's willingness to work with the United
States, particularly on Afghanistan. The director of the
Conflict Prevention Center shared insights on the delicate
relationship between Abdrakhmanov and Kazakhstani Foreign
Minister Saudabayev, as well as between Abdrakhmanov and the
Kazakhstani ambassador to Austria and the UN Vienna. End
summary.

--------------
NATO CAUCUS
--------------


2. (SBU) At the January 20 meeting of the NATO Caucus,
PermReps discussed the priorities of the Kazakhstani
Chairmanship, including the proposed Summit and Afghanistan.
All lamented that the draft agenda for the Corfu Process is
very "event-driven," focusing on process, lacking political
direction, and aiming primarily at a Summit, while leaving
the substance up to the participating States (pS). The
Polish PermRep pointed out a paradox: those who were against
the idea of a Summit are now in the paradoxical position of
supporting the Corfu Process, which will provide some of the

substance. Hungary wondered if the Chairmanship could really
"deliver" Russian approval for OSCE involvement inside
Afghanistan. All called for closer coordination among NATO
allies to focus on our priorities in all three dimensions and
ensure there is substance for the interim report in June.


3. (SBU) The Estonian Chair of the NATO Caucus then invited
DCM Spratlen to provide insight on how the Chairmanship is
seen by the diplomatic community in Astana and on how
Kazakhstan relates to Russia. DCM Spratlen began by
stressing how important the OSCE Chairmanship is to
Kazakhstan. Everyone in Kazakhstan now knows about the OSCE
and expects the Chairmanship to bring honor and prestige to
the country; any OSCE events within the country will
"resonate" with the population and have an impact. DCP
Spratlen urged NATO allies to help shape the substance of the
Kazakhstani agenda, seeking opportunities to influence the
way Kazakhstan approaches its work, through cooperation,
coordination, and dialogue. Kazakhstan has enormous
self-confidence and therefore does not always "hear" us --
the 56 pS will need appropriate repetition of key messages we
want Kazakhstan to hear. She noted that Kazakhstan pursues a
balanced foreign policy, and although most in the government
still see Russia as Kazakhstan's most imp
ortant partner, they treasure their sovereignty and pursue
independent priorities. NATO allies have an opportunity to
help shape the year for Kazakhstan, to help it as a state and
to help make the OSCE a success.

--------------
OSCE IS POSITIVE, BUT IT'S NO MAGIC WAND
--------------


4. (SBU) Central Asian PermReps on January 21 welcomed the
new focus on Central Asia that has accompanied Kazakhstan's
Chairmanship and praised the work of OSCE field missions.
Most of them also voiced their support for Kazakhstan's
announced priorities as Chair. Turkmen PermRep Aydogdyev
said his government was interested in seeking common ground

with Central Asian neighbors. He praised the OSCE Center in
Ashgabat but indicated there was a limit to what the OSCE
could do, arguing, for example, that there was "no need" for
OSCE involvement in law enforcement activities, as Central
Asian states already enjoyed good cooperation on such
matters. Several questioned the OSCE's emphasis on human
dimension issues, contending that it duplicated the work of
the UN's Human Rights Council. The Turkem PermRep, seconded
by others, cautioned that their cultures need to change
slowly, and pushing too hard, too fast is counterproductive.
The Tajik and Turkmen PermReps and the Uzbek Charge
complained that they are small
missions and have difficulty following all of the issues,
and USOSCE Charge pledged that USOSCE would try to stay in
closer touch with them.


5. (SBU) The Kyrgyz and Tajik PermReps praised the OSCE's
overall role but joined their colleagues in highlighting the
difficulty of cooperating on certain issues, including
Afghanistan. All said it frequently was difficult to obtain
visas for Afghan officials, and several identified logistical
hurdles as key obstacles to including Afghans in OSCE
training in their countries. There was no reaction when the
Kazakh DCM announced that they had designated as the
Chairmanship's liaison for OSCE coordination a senior
official in the Kazakhstani embassy in Kabul.

--------------
SG URGES CONTINUED, COORDINATED ENGAGEMENT
--------------


6. (SBU) Noting that his priority was to defend the
"integrity and respectability" of the OSCE, Secretary General
de Brichambaut emphasized January 22 that continued
engagement with Kazakhstan in Vienna and capitals was
critical to ensuring the OSCE continued to work "in the right
way" during the Kazakhstani Chairmanship. De Brichambaut
urged the United States and the EU to coordinate their
expectations of the Corfu Process, identify "decent outcomes"
(particularly for the June interim report),and deliver a
unified message at all levels. Lamenting the EU's "lack of
direction," de Brichambaut said the United States would have
to lead the Corfu Process -- and potentially could be left as
the only pS to try to impose conditions on Kazakhstan's
desire for a Summit. De Brichambaut suggested that a Summit
might not be inevitable, but that Vienna might be a desirable
location for such a meeting, particularly if it turned out to
be little more than a "jubilee exercise" -- a phrase
introduced by the Russian PermRe
p during the last Corfu Process meeting.


7. (SBU) Turning to day-to-day management issues, de
Brichambaut said he spoke "three times a day" to Kazakhstani
PermRep Abdrakhmanov, frequently on purely logistical
matters, and added that he expected an "authoritarian streak"
to show itself (he noted that Chairmanships often suffer from
a "master of the universe" syndrome). De Brichambaut further
observed that the cycle of consultations and the pressure of
building consensus likely would start to wear relatively
quickly on the Kazakhstani delegation and recommended that
interlocutors be "discreet" and avoid surprises, particularly
given Abdrakhmanov's preoccupation with "face" and image. On
one final note, de Brichambaut said the Chairmanship was
reluctant to reconsider its draft human dimension agenda,
despite significant pressure from the United States and the
EU, as Abdrakhmanov believed doing so would open a "Pandora's
box" of conflicting demands. De Brichambaut declined the
Chairmanship's request to get involved, saying he had "no
mandate" for su
ch issues.

--------------
KAZAKHSTAN'S ROLE ON AFGHANISTAN
--------------


8. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting January 22, Kazakhstani
PermRep Abdrakhmanov answered a question about Russian
PermRep Azimov's hints of a possible change in Russia's
long-standing opposition to OSCE activities inside
Afghanistan by saying his government was unaware of any such
change. Abdrakhmanov said that while the Chairmanship wanted

to find a niche for the OSCE vis-a-vis Afghanistan, it
remained concerned about the security situation and
participating States' continuing reservations about work
inside the country. He added that Kazakhstan was "not too
influential" in this matter and suggested that much would
depend on the January 28 London conference and on ongoing
U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia dialogues. Abdrakhmanov did
confirm, however, that the Chairmanship had identified Second
Secretary Dauren Tishtykbayev at Kazakhstan's embassy in
Kabul as a liaison officer for OSCE issues.

--------------
LIFE IS NOT EASY FOR THE KAZAKHSTANI PERM REP
--------------


9. (C) Asked about his perceptions of the Kazakhstani
Chairmanship, OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Director
Herbert Salber (Germany) observed that there is no high
expectation of Abdrakhmanov's ability to manage OSCE issues.
In fact, he asserted, the GOK had considered replacing
Abdrakhmanov prior to assuming the Chairmanship, and
bilateral Ambassador Yerzhan Kazyhanov (who also serves as
PermRep for the UN) might be to a certain extent keeping an
eye on his compatriot. (Note: Salber is privy to some direct
information due to the secondment of a German national,
Dieter Boden, as policy adviser to the GOK in Astana.)
Kazyhanov had been a personal aid to the president, was once
head of international relations for the GOK, and remains
close to Saudabayev. In contrast, Abdrakhmanov tries to stay
out of Saudabayev's proximity and even refused to take the
seat next to him in the car when he arrived in Vienna for the
inaugural festivities held January 14. Salber also recounted
"dueling events" January 13. Sho
rtly after Abdrakhmanov issued invitations for a gala concert
at 6:30, Kazyhanov issued an invitation to a presentation of
President Nazarbayev's book "The Kazakhstan Way": same time,
same place; the concert had to be delayed.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Interlocutors' recommendations for dealing with the
Kazakhstanis -- from "discreetly" delivering messages to
providing ways for the Kazakhstani delegation to "save face"
when making difficult decisions -- suggest we have a range of
tools at our disposal for shaping the Chairmanship.
Coordination among NATO allies, both in Vienna and Brussels,
is essential for helping counterbalance Russian pressure on
Kazakhstan and ensuring our messages are heard. Our
continued cooperation with Embassy Astana and with other
Missions in Central Asia will be key, particularly as we seek
to expand OSCE engagement with Afghanistan and promote
further interaction among Central Asian states. DCM
Spratlen's visit proved valuable from many perspectives and
showed that occasional visits by U.S. officials to Vienna can
help promote our objectives. USOSCE urges Washington and
Brussels officials to make similar visits, especially during
the Corfu Process discussions that will contribute to the
June interim report.
FULLER