Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10USNATO7
2010-01-08 14:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
ALLIES STRESS CAUTION AND SOLIDARITY ON KFOR
how-toVZCZCXRO3595 PP RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0007/01 0081440 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081440Z JAN 10 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3764 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0035 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0285 RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 3327 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0879 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0218 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 3510 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0092 RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000007
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: ALLIES STRESS CAUTION AND SOLIDARITY ON KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000007
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: ALLIES STRESS CAUTION AND SOLIDARITY ON KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 6,the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) agreed on the need to ensure KFOR maintains adequate
troop levels and force mobility during the drawdown. The
U.S. and a large number of Allies stressed that the KFOR move
to deterrent presence must be a conditions-based process
without timelines. The U.S., Germany, Italy, Czech Republic,
Greece, and Bulgaria called Allies to respect the
"in-together, out-together" principle. Deputy Assistant
Secretary General (DASG) for Operations Rossin said Serbian
Ambassador Milinkovic had recently informed him that Belgrade
intends to send a delegation to NATO in March with formal
proposals for changing the Kumanovo Military Technical
Agreement (MTA). DASG Rossin said KFOR had prepared for
transferring responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan
Monument to the Kosovo Police, a move that was currently
being considered by the Military Committee for endorsement to
the NAC. At the close of the meeting, Allies agreed to hold
the Defense Ministerial Afghanistan meeting in ISAF format
and are debating the pros and cons of holding a KFOR format
meeting. END SUMMARY
--------------
NATO Engagement in Kosovo Critical
--------------
2. (C) Deputy Secretary General (DSYG) Bisogniero said
continued NATO engagement in Kosovo was critical because
although Kosovo was stable, tensions persist, especially in
the north. The German PermRep cautioned that we remained on
thin ice in Kosovo and needed to ensure we maintained
adequate troop levels and force mobility. The Greek PermRep
said the situation was better but not ideal, and warned of
the need to closely monitor political developments.
3. (C) DASG Rossin assessed that post-election political
turmoil was normal for Kosovo's level of development and did
not threaten a safe and secure environment. The Bulgarian
PermRep said the elections were a positive sign but the lack
of Kosovo Serb participation in the north was troubling.
Slovenia added that steps were needed to ensure better
integration of Kosovo Serbs in the north. Italy and Slovenia
warned that the ongoing case challenging Kosovo's
independence in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
could have a negative effect on stability, and Romania said
NATO would need to fine-tune its approach after the ICJ
decision.
--------------
KFOR Drawdown Must Be Conditions-Based
--------------
4. (C) The U.S. stressed that the KFOR move to deterrent
presence must be a conditions-based process without
timelines. The majority of Allies explicitly echoed this
theme. NATO International Military Staff Assistant Director
for Operations, Major General Li Gobbi, said NATO Military
Authorities (NMAs) understood that the KFOR drawdown was an
events-driven, not time-driven process, and were conducting
planning accordingly.
5. (C) MG Li Gobbi said the first phase of the KFOR drawdown
was on schedule for completion by January 31, at which time
KFOR will have 10,200 troops (Gate 1). MG Li Gobbi said
shortfalls, especially in intelligence, rotary wing, and
maneuver forces, remained that would be a concern for moving
to Gate 2 (5,500 troops). He noted, however, that KFOR would
be able to stand up the joint logistics unit by the end of
the month.
6. (C) Germany, supported by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania,
said the move to Gate 2 must remain strictly conditions-based
and would require precise analysis. Italy concurred, but
USNATO 00000007 002 OF 003
expressed optimism that the appropriate conditions could be
met in the short-term. Romania emphasized that political
criteria must be considered in addition to security
conditions, and Bulgaria added that regional factors were
also important.
--------------
In-Together, Out-Together
--------------
7. (C) The U.S., Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, Greece, and
Bulgaria stressed that the KFOR drawdown must proceed in
accordance with the principle of "in-together, out-together."
MG Li Gobbi said setting unilateral national deadlines for
withdrawing from KFOR threatened the conditions-based
approach. To ensure adequate inclusion of non-NATO troop
contributors, Italy and the Czech Republic called for their
inclusion at the Kosovo discussion by Defense Ministers in
February. Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia stressed their
intentions to maintain their contributions.
--------------
Belgrade to Present MTA Proposals in March
--------------
8. (C) The Czech PermRep said NATO should be open to revising
the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and should
encourage Belgrade to convey its ideas to NATO. The UK
advised caution on the MTA. USNATO reported that the U.S.
had urged Serbia to come forward with specific proposals
during bilateral contacts, noting the ball was in Belgrade's
court. DASG Rossin said Serbian Ambassador Milinkovic had
recently informed him that Belgrade intends to send a
delegation to NATO in March with formal proposals for
adjusting the agreement.
--------------
Patrimonial Sites Must Be Treated Carefully
--------------
9. (C) MG Li Gobbi said the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) was
sensitive to the risks of turning over the nine
KFOR-protected patrimonial sites to the Kosovo Police (KP)
and was developing comprehensive plans for unfixing these
sites in consultation with relevant actors. He reported that
the first request to unfix a site, Gazimestan Monument, was
with the Military Committee and said the KP had shown their
readiness to assume responsibility during joint exercises.
DASG Rossin endorsed COMKFOR's approach and said KFOR had
well and thoroughly prepared for unfixing Gazimestan.
10. (C) Italy, supported by Hungary, stressed that KFOR must
maintain the capability to protect the nine sites even after
unfixing. The Czech PermRep said he hoped the careful
approach to Gazimestan would be a model for all the sites,
and Greece said this task must be handled with extreme
sensitivity. Croatia said coordination was needed with
Belgrade, and DASG Rossin noted that Serbian Ambassador
Milinkovic had told him recently that Belgrade's major
concern was with the protected sites of Decani and Pec rather
than Gazimestan.
--------------
Allies Want More Attention to Kosovo
--------------
11. (C) Albania said the Council should be reviewing the
situation in Kosovo more intensively. Albania, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey called for more
frequent Kosovo discussions in the NAC. Albania, supported
by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, said the NAC
should visit Kosovo soon. Spain said it could support a
visit to KFOR rather than Kosovo. The UK added that it would
welcome a briefing in the NAC by Joint Forces Command Naples
Commander Admiral Fitzgerald.
USNATO 00000007 003 OF 003
12. (C) Albania, supported by France, UK, Croatia, Romania,
and Slovenia, called for a NAC discussion with EU Law and
Justice Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) chief de Kermabon.
Slovenia asked that EU Special Representative Feith also be
invited. The Turkish Deputy PermRep said he would pass on
this suggestion to Ankara for guidance. Spain offered to
facilitate a discussion as current holder of the EU
Presidency.
--------------
KSF Shortfalls Remain
--------------
13. (C) MG Li Gobbi said two recruitment campaigns in 2010
and two in 2011 are planned to fill out the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF) structure, with a particular emphasis on
attracting Kosovo Serbs. He said it would be critical to
resolve the 9 million euro shortfall in the KSF trust fund.
Slovenia said it had just contributed 1.8 million euros in
equipment, and Albania said it would soon contribute 500,000
dollars.
14. (C) DASG Rossin said manning shortfalls in the Military
Civil Advisory Division for training the KSF and the NATO
Advisory Team (NAT) for the Ministry of the KSF would stall
achievement of full operating capability if not addressed.
Slovenia noted that it had just sent one volunteer to serve
in the NAT and would contribute two more.
-------------- --
AOB: Defense Ministerial Meeting in ISAF Format
-------------- --
15. (C) Under Any Other Business, the DSYG sought Council
approval to include non-NATO ISAF contributors in the
Afghanistan session at the February Defense Ministerial. The
Turkish Deputy PermRep said he foresaw no problem but needed
to seek Ankara's approval. All other Allies approved the
proposal.
HEFFERN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: ALLIES STRESS CAUTION AND SOLIDARITY ON KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 6,the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) agreed on the need to ensure KFOR maintains adequate
troop levels and force mobility during the drawdown. The
U.S. and a large number of Allies stressed that the KFOR move
to deterrent presence must be a conditions-based process
without timelines. The U.S., Germany, Italy, Czech Republic,
Greece, and Bulgaria called Allies to respect the
"in-together, out-together" principle. Deputy Assistant
Secretary General (DASG) for Operations Rossin said Serbian
Ambassador Milinkovic had recently informed him that Belgrade
intends to send a delegation to NATO in March with formal
proposals for changing the Kumanovo Military Technical
Agreement (MTA). DASG Rossin said KFOR had prepared for
transferring responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan
Monument to the Kosovo Police, a move that was currently
being considered by the Military Committee for endorsement to
the NAC. At the close of the meeting, Allies agreed to hold
the Defense Ministerial Afghanistan meeting in ISAF format
and are debating the pros and cons of holding a KFOR format
meeting. END SUMMARY
--------------
NATO Engagement in Kosovo Critical
--------------
2. (C) Deputy Secretary General (DSYG) Bisogniero said
continued NATO engagement in Kosovo was critical because
although Kosovo was stable, tensions persist, especially in
the north. The German PermRep cautioned that we remained on
thin ice in Kosovo and needed to ensure we maintained
adequate troop levels and force mobility. The Greek PermRep
said the situation was better but not ideal, and warned of
the need to closely monitor political developments.
3. (C) DASG Rossin assessed that post-election political
turmoil was normal for Kosovo's level of development and did
not threaten a safe and secure environment. The Bulgarian
PermRep said the elections were a positive sign but the lack
of Kosovo Serb participation in the north was troubling.
Slovenia added that steps were needed to ensure better
integration of Kosovo Serbs in the north. Italy and Slovenia
warned that the ongoing case challenging Kosovo's
independence in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
could have a negative effect on stability, and Romania said
NATO would need to fine-tune its approach after the ICJ
decision.
--------------
KFOR Drawdown Must Be Conditions-Based
--------------
4. (C) The U.S. stressed that the KFOR move to deterrent
presence must be a conditions-based process without
timelines. The majority of Allies explicitly echoed this
theme. NATO International Military Staff Assistant Director
for Operations, Major General Li Gobbi, said NATO Military
Authorities (NMAs) understood that the KFOR drawdown was an
events-driven, not time-driven process, and were conducting
planning accordingly.
5. (C) MG Li Gobbi said the first phase of the KFOR drawdown
was on schedule for completion by January 31, at which time
KFOR will have 10,200 troops (Gate 1). MG Li Gobbi said
shortfalls, especially in intelligence, rotary wing, and
maneuver forces, remained that would be a concern for moving
to Gate 2 (5,500 troops). He noted, however, that KFOR would
be able to stand up the joint logistics unit by the end of
the month.
6. (C) Germany, supported by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania,
said the move to Gate 2 must remain strictly conditions-based
and would require precise analysis. Italy concurred, but
USNATO 00000007 002 OF 003
expressed optimism that the appropriate conditions could be
met in the short-term. Romania emphasized that political
criteria must be considered in addition to security
conditions, and Bulgaria added that regional factors were
also important.
--------------
In-Together, Out-Together
--------------
7. (C) The U.S., Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, Greece, and
Bulgaria stressed that the KFOR drawdown must proceed in
accordance with the principle of "in-together, out-together."
MG Li Gobbi said setting unilateral national deadlines for
withdrawing from KFOR threatened the conditions-based
approach. To ensure adequate inclusion of non-NATO troop
contributors, Italy and the Czech Republic called for their
inclusion at the Kosovo discussion by Defense Ministers in
February. Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia stressed their
intentions to maintain their contributions.
--------------
Belgrade to Present MTA Proposals in March
--------------
8. (C) The Czech PermRep said NATO should be open to revising
the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and should
encourage Belgrade to convey its ideas to NATO. The UK
advised caution on the MTA. USNATO reported that the U.S.
had urged Serbia to come forward with specific proposals
during bilateral contacts, noting the ball was in Belgrade's
court. DASG Rossin said Serbian Ambassador Milinkovic had
recently informed him that Belgrade intends to send a
delegation to NATO in March with formal proposals for
adjusting the agreement.
--------------
Patrimonial Sites Must Be Treated Carefully
--------------
9. (C) MG Li Gobbi said the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) was
sensitive to the risks of turning over the nine
KFOR-protected patrimonial sites to the Kosovo Police (KP)
and was developing comprehensive plans for unfixing these
sites in consultation with relevant actors. He reported that
the first request to unfix a site, Gazimestan Monument, was
with the Military Committee and said the KP had shown their
readiness to assume responsibility during joint exercises.
DASG Rossin endorsed COMKFOR's approach and said KFOR had
well and thoroughly prepared for unfixing Gazimestan.
10. (C) Italy, supported by Hungary, stressed that KFOR must
maintain the capability to protect the nine sites even after
unfixing. The Czech PermRep said he hoped the careful
approach to Gazimestan would be a model for all the sites,
and Greece said this task must be handled with extreme
sensitivity. Croatia said coordination was needed with
Belgrade, and DASG Rossin noted that Serbian Ambassador
Milinkovic had told him recently that Belgrade's major
concern was with the protected sites of Decani and Pec rather
than Gazimestan.
--------------
Allies Want More Attention to Kosovo
--------------
11. (C) Albania said the Council should be reviewing the
situation in Kosovo more intensively. Albania, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey called for more
frequent Kosovo discussions in the NAC. Albania, supported
by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, said the NAC
should visit Kosovo soon. Spain said it could support a
visit to KFOR rather than Kosovo. The UK added that it would
welcome a briefing in the NAC by Joint Forces Command Naples
Commander Admiral Fitzgerald.
USNATO 00000007 003 OF 003
12. (C) Albania, supported by France, UK, Croatia, Romania,
and Slovenia, called for a NAC discussion with EU Law and
Justice Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) chief de Kermabon.
Slovenia asked that EU Special Representative Feith also be
invited. The Turkish Deputy PermRep said he would pass on
this suggestion to Ankara for guidance. Spain offered to
facilitate a discussion as current holder of the EU
Presidency.
--------------
KSF Shortfalls Remain
--------------
13. (C) MG Li Gobbi said two recruitment campaigns in 2010
and two in 2011 are planned to fill out the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF) structure, with a particular emphasis on
attracting Kosovo Serbs. He said it would be critical to
resolve the 9 million euro shortfall in the KSF trust fund.
Slovenia said it had just contributed 1.8 million euros in
equipment, and Albania said it would soon contribute 500,000
dollars.
14. (C) DASG Rossin said manning shortfalls in the Military
Civil Advisory Division for training the KSF and the NATO
Advisory Team (NAT) for the Ministry of the KSF would stall
achievement of full operating capability if not addressed.
Slovenia noted that it had just sent one volunteer to serve
in the NAT and would contribute two more.
-------------- --
AOB: Defense Ministerial Meeting in ISAF Format
-------------- --
15. (C) Under Any Other Business, the DSYG sought Council
approval to include non-NATO ISAF contributors in the
Afghanistan session at the February Defense Ministerial. The
Turkish Deputy PermRep said he foresaw no problem but needed
to seek Ankara's approval. All other Allies approved the
proposal.
HEFFERN