Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10USNATO48
2010-02-02 16:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR
how-toVZCZCXRO4453 PP RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0048/01 0331655 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021655Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3826 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 3330 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0038 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 3513 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0221 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0288 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0882 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0095 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0431 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1136 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000048
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000048
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 29, the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) and non-NATO KFOR contributors discussed with EU
representatives the situation in Kosovo and NATO's way ahead
on the KFOR drawdown after reaching Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of
deterrent presence. Stressing the importance of integrating
the north into the rest of Kosovo, International Civil
Representative/EU Special Representative (ICR/EUSR) Feith
asked NATO not to draw down forces precipitously while the
Northern Strategy was being addressed. Ambassador Daalder
supported Feith's request, saying the Alliance needed to keep
sufficient forces in place while key political issues were
being tackled in the north. The UK challenged Feith's
request and said NATO should continue with the drawdown.
This issue will come up at the Istanbul Defense Ministerial.
END SUMMARY
--------------
Northern Kosovo is Stagnant and Unsustainable
--------------
2. (C) ICR/EUSR Feith told the North Atlantic Council and
non-NATO KFOR contributors on January 29 that the situation
was stable and improving in southern Kosovo but stagnant and
unsustainable in the north. Feith said Belgrade's takeover
of electricity distribution and reinforcement of parallel
institutions in the north were clear violations of UNSCR 1244
and possible steps toward functional partition. Against this
backdrop, he assessed that the upcoming ICJ ruling and KFOR's
drawdown would critically affect the possibility for
strategic change.
3. (C) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de
Kermabon said EULEX was reaching the limits of its technical
mandate in the north and was dependent on key stakeholders
addressing political problems in order to do more. He
protested Belgrade's appointment of parallel judges and
reinforcement of parallel institutions and asked Allies to
convey to Belgrade the imperative of standing down on the
judiciary issue in Mitrovica. He said the electricity issue
had escalated from a commercial to a political problem that
was not in EULEX's mandate but needed attention. Switzerland
responded that EULEX must continue to show resolve and
advance its work in the north.
--------------
Taking the Northern Strategy Forward
--------------
4. (C) Feith said the International Civil Office (ICO)
Strategy for the North aimed to deal with issues that had
been left unaddressed for 10 years. He said the strategy was
not intended to destabilize the region but to provide better
public services and improve the quality of life. He said he
would consult with Belgrade but not give it a veto. The four
key strands would be extending the rule of law in the north,
promoting decentralization beginning with municipal elections
in Mitrovica around September, improving social and economic
conditions, and maintaining security. Feith said he was
looking to move forward in the coming weeks and planned to
tackle easier problems first before moving on to more
difficult issues. He asked NATO to consider the situation in
the north as it looked to drawdown KFOR, with an eye to
maintaining sufficient forces in the country.
5. (C) Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. agreed that the
situation in the north was stagnant and unsustainable and,
along with the German PermRep, pledged full support for the
ICO Northern Strategy. Ambassador Daalder said the U.S.
understood implementation would take time. The German
PermRep said the Mitrovica courthouse would be a key test of
USNATO 00000048 002 OF 003
EULEX readiness. Albania advised that the prospect of EU
integration should be used to induce Belgrade's cooperation.
The Italian PermRep said the international community could
not allow 10 years of work in Kosovo to fail -- it needed to
move Kosovo from "fragile stability" to "stable stability."
6. (C) EU Civilian Operations Commander Klompenhouwer said
these problems could be solved only by dialogue and not by
force. The Greek PermRep stressed Athens' view that the
northern strategy was not an EU document. He said that while
Belgrade did not have a veto in the north, it had an
important role to play. He called for Pristina to do a
better job of facilitating refugee returns. The Czech
PermRep expressed concern that the northern strategy had
already elicited a threat of force by Belgrade and said steps
needed to be taken to de-escalate the rhetoric.
--------------
Factor Northern Strategy into KFOR Drawdown
--------------
7. (C) Feith said that these critical issues in the north
needed to be addressed before KFOR completed its drawdown
(Gate 3 - 2,500 troops) and requested that NATO factor this
into its deliberations regarding the move to Gate 2 (5,500
troops). He said the KFOR move to deterrent presence was a
positive development for Kosovo but asked that KFOR retain
the ability to act with strategic effect. Klompenhouwer
added that EULEX expects resistance as it works to extend the
rule of law and would need KFOR back-up.
8. (C) Ambassador Daalder and the German PermRep supported
Feith's request. Amb. Daalder stressed that while it was not
KFOR's role to implement the northern strategy, KFOR needed
to maintain sufficient forces on hand as political issues
were tackled. He warned that the international community
needed to address the north now or there would be no safe and
secure environment in the future. Albania, Croatia, and
Norway also advocated caution.
9. (C) The UK disputed Feith's comments, saying that a steady
KFOR drawdown would send a positive message, there was no
reason to attach specific conditions to specific gates, and
perceptions of risks should not interfere with the drawdown.
The UK called for NATO to take a more strategic view, saying
the Alliance faced global issues, not just Kosovo, and should
also consider NATO's severe resource constraints. The
Italian PermRep said NATO did need to take a strategic view,
but the drawdown must remain conditions-based. He stressed
that conditions on the ground must be right before moving to
Gate 2.
--------------
Unfix with Caution
--------------
10. (C) Feith said he fully supported KFOR transfer of
responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan monument -- one
of nine KFOR-guarded sensitive patrimonial sites -- to the
Kosovo Police (KP). He said the KP was ready and cautioned
Allies not to be unnerved by protests or other propaganda
efforts. De Kermabon said EULEX was working closely with the
KP on Gazimestan and was confident of success. De Kermabon
said EULEX was giving the unfixing process its utmost
attention and would continue to participate in joint meetings
and planning with KFOR and the KP.
11. (C) Germany, Czech Republic, Albania, and Norway
cautioned that unfixing the other eight patrimonial sites
would be more difficult. Spain and Greece stressed the need
to address Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) concerns. Greece
said NATO must remember that the patrimonial sites would
USNATO 00000048 003 OF 003
continue to need protection even after unfixing. Feith and
de Kermabon advocated a gradual approach, active consultation
with the SOC, and a proactive media campaign to build
confidence. De Kermabon recommended unfixing Pec and Decani
last and said he was pushing the KP in Decani to deepen
relations with the SOC leaders there.
12. (C) De Kermabon said turning over border monitoring
duties from KFOR to the KP would also be a sensitive process.
He noted that the KP was increasing the number of officers
in the border police but said these officers needed training.
He said EULEX would collaborate with KFOR to ensure a good
turnover.
--------------
NATO-EU Cooperation Working in Kosovo
--------------
13. (C) Feith and de Kermabon expressed appreciation for
excellent cooperation with KFOR. Feith said the ICO, EULEX,
and KFOR shared a common vision. De Kermabon added that the
KP, EULEX, and KFOR have a common understanding of their
respective first, second, and third responder roles. Turkey
noted that it was taking a constructive approach to
KFOR-EULEX coordination in theater, but this did not change
its main lines with regards to NATO-EU relations.
14. (C) Klompenhouwer praised EULEX-KFOR cooperation as well
as NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. Klompenhouwer,
supported by Croatia, said NATO and the EU should increase
cooperation at the operational level and pursue more informal
contacts given the two organizations' common challenges.
DAALDER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR
DRAWDOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 29, the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) and non-NATO KFOR contributors discussed with EU
representatives the situation in Kosovo and NATO's way ahead
on the KFOR drawdown after reaching Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of
deterrent presence. Stressing the importance of integrating
the north into the rest of Kosovo, International Civil
Representative/EU Special Representative (ICR/EUSR) Feith
asked NATO not to draw down forces precipitously while the
Northern Strategy was being addressed. Ambassador Daalder
supported Feith's request, saying the Alliance needed to keep
sufficient forces in place while key political issues were
being tackled in the north. The UK challenged Feith's
request and said NATO should continue with the drawdown.
This issue will come up at the Istanbul Defense Ministerial.
END SUMMARY
--------------
Northern Kosovo is Stagnant and Unsustainable
--------------
2. (C) ICR/EUSR Feith told the North Atlantic Council and
non-NATO KFOR contributors on January 29 that the situation
was stable and improving in southern Kosovo but stagnant and
unsustainable in the north. Feith said Belgrade's takeover
of electricity distribution and reinforcement of parallel
institutions in the north were clear violations of UNSCR 1244
and possible steps toward functional partition. Against this
backdrop, he assessed that the upcoming ICJ ruling and KFOR's
drawdown would critically affect the possibility for
strategic change.
3. (C) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de
Kermabon said EULEX was reaching the limits of its technical
mandate in the north and was dependent on key stakeholders
addressing political problems in order to do more. He
protested Belgrade's appointment of parallel judges and
reinforcement of parallel institutions and asked Allies to
convey to Belgrade the imperative of standing down on the
judiciary issue in Mitrovica. He said the electricity issue
had escalated from a commercial to a political problem that
was not in EULEX's mandate but needed attention. Switzerland
responded that EULEX must continue to show resolve and
advance its work in the north.
--------------
Taking the Northern Strategy Forward
--------------
4. (C) Feith said the International Civil Office (ICO)
Strategy for the North aimed to deal with issues that had
been left unaddressed for 10 years. He said the strategy was
not intended to destabilize the region but to provide better
public services and improve the quality of life. He said he
would consult with Belgrade but not give it a veto. The four
key strands would be extending the rule of law in the north,
promoting decentralization beginning with municipal elections
in Mitrovica around September, improving social and economic
conditions, and maintaining security. Feith said he was
looking to move forward in the coming weeks and planned to
tackle easier problems first before moving on to more
difficult issues. He asked NATO to consider the situation in
the north as it looked to drawdown KFOR, with an eye to
maintaining sufficient forces in the country.
5. (C) Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. agreed that the
situation in the north was stagnant and unsustainable and,
along with the German PermRep, pledged full support for the
ICO Northern Strategy. Ambassador Daalder said the U.S.
understood implementation would take time. The German
PermRep said the Mitrovica courthouse would be a key test of
USNATO 00000048 002 OF 003
EULEX readiness. Albania advised that the prospect of EU
integration should be used to induce Belgrade's cooperation.
The Italian PermRep said the international community could
not allow 10 years of work in Kosovo to fail -- it needed to
move Kosovo from "fragile stability" to "stable stability."
6. (C) EU Civilian Operations Commander Klompenhouwer said
these problems could be solved only by dialogue and not by
force. The Greek PermRep stressed Athens' view that the
northern strategy was not an EU document. He said that while
Belgrade did not have a veto in the north, it had an
important role to play. He called for Pristina to do a
better job of facilitating refugee returns. The Czech
PermRep expressed concern that the northern strategy had
already elicited a threat of force by Belgrade and said steps
needed to be taken to de-escalate the rhetoric.
--------------
Factor Northern Strategy into KFOR Drawdown
--------------
7. (C) Feith said that these critical issues in the north
needed to be addressed before KFOR completed its drawdown
(Gate 3 - 2,500 troops) and requested that NATO factor this
into its deliberations regarding the move to Gate 2 (5,500
troops). He said the KFOR move to deterrent presence was a
positive development for Kosovo but asked that KFOR retain
the ability to act with strategic effect. Klompenhouwer
added that EULEX expects resistance as it works to extend the
rule of law and would need KFOR back-up.
8. (C) Ambassador Daalder and the German PermRep supported
Feith's request. Amb. Daalder stressed that while it was not
KFOR's role to implement the northern strategy, KFOR needed
to maintain sufficient forces on hand as political issues
were tackled. He warned that the international community
needed to address the north now or there would be no safe and
secure environment in the future. Albania, Croatia, and
Norway also advocated caution.
9. (C) The UK disputed Feith's comments, saying that a steady
KFOR drawdown would send a positive message, there was no
reason to attach specific conditions to specific gates, and
perceptions of risks should not interfere with the drawdown.
The UK called for NATO to take a more strategic view, saying
the Alliance faced global issues, not just Kosovo, and should
also consider NATO's severe resource constraints. The
Italian PermRep said NATO did need to take a strategic view,
but the drawdown must remain conditions-based. He stressed
that conditions on the ground must be right before moving to
Gate 2.
--------------
Unfix with Caution
--------------
10. (C) Feith said he fully supported KFOR transfer of
responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan monument -- one
of nine KFOR-guarded sensitive patrimonial sites -- to the
Kosovo Police (KP). He said the KP was ready and cautioned
Allies not to be unnerved by protests or other propaganda
efforts. De Kermabon said EULEX was working closely with the
KP on Gazimestan and was confident of success. De Kermabon
said EULEX was giving the unfixing process its utmost
attention and would continue to participate in joint meetings
and planning with KFOR and the KP.
11. (C) Germany, Czech Republic, Albania, and Norway
cautioned that unfixing the other eight patrimonial sites
would be more difficult. Spain and Greece stressed the need
to address Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) concerns. Greece
said NATO must remember that the patrimonial sites would
USNATO 00000048 003 OF 003
continue to need protection even after unfixing. Feith and
de Kermabon advocated a gradual approach, active consultation
with the SOC, and a proactive media campaign to build
confidence. De Kermabon recommended unfixing Pec and Decani
last and said he was pushing the KP in Decani to deepen
relations with the SOC leaders there.
12. (C) De Kermabon said turning over border monitoring
duties from KFOR to the KP would also be a sensitive process.
He noted that the KP was increasing the number of officers
in the border police but said these officers needed training.
He said EULEX would collaborate with KFOR to ensure a good
turnover.
--------------
NATO-EU Cooperation Working in Kosovo
--------------
13. (C) Feith and de Kermabon expressed appreciation for
excellent cooperation with KFOR. Feith said the ICO, EULEX,
and KFOR shared a common vision. De Kermabon added that the
KP, EULEX, and KFOR have a common understanding of their
respective first, second, and third responder roles. Turkey
noted that it was taking a constructive approach to
KFOR-EULEX coordination in theater, but this did not change
its main lines with regards to NATO-EU relations.
14. (C) Klompenhouwer praised EULEX-KFOR cooperation as well
as NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. Klompenhouwer,
supported by Croatia, said NATO and the EU should increase
cooperation at the operational level and pursue more informal
contacts given the two organizations' common challenges.
DAALDER