PREVIEWING THE MARCH 2010 COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000009

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS: AF SNAR UNCND IR
SUBJECT: PREVIEWING THE MARCH 2010 COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC
DRUGS

REF: A. UNVIE 570

B. UNVIE 172

C. UNVIE 005

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for
reasons 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 2010 Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(CND) provides the United States with an excellent
opportunity
to highlight the Obama Administration's forthcoming National
Drug Control Strategy and its top priorities in the
international drug policy arena. As this March is the
Administration's first substantive foray into the CND, other
member states will be watching to see how our language
departs
from the previous administration, what issues we advance, and
whether we continue to be a leader in international drug
control efforts. The dynamics of this year's CND, will be
influenced by an activist Iranian Chair, ongoing ideological
difference over how best to address the world drug problem,
and the ever-deepening financial and administrative
difficulties of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
Director Kerlikowske's participation will provide vivid
evidence of the Administration's commitment to international
cooperation on counter drug issues, but we need to be ready
for the compromises and half steps that multilateral
diplomacy
demands. The CND Chair, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh,
clearly
desires a successful Commission meeting that reflects well on
both Iran and him personally, especially after disputes in
the
Iranian leadership undercut the success he believed he had
made in October during the Tehran Research Reactor
negotiations. Nevertheless, the stakes in greater bilateral
relationship with the U.S. and debate within the Iranian
leadership on engagement could cause Tehran to intercede and
make it more difficult for the U.S. to achieve its goals at
the CND. Keeping any engagement with Soltanieh limited to
CND
business and low-key will improve chances for success.
Meanwhile, the Afghan delegation, with yet to be decided
leadership, will be looking for U.S. help to ensure that
Kabul
is not singled out for its leading role in the international
drug trade. END SUMMARY

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Chance for Obama Administration
To Put Best Face Forward
--------------


2. (U) Last year, after months of intense and sometimes
bitter negotiations, member states adopted a political
declaration reviewing the past ten years of drug control and
formulating an action plan for the next decade. While the
documents were ultimately agreed to by consensus, intractable
issues like "harm reduction," human rights, and the false
dichotomy between eradication and alternative development
(among others) were not resolved. Ten months later, some
delegations (mostly in the EU) still express frustration over
the 2009 outcome documents and complain that while the world
drug situation has changed, thinking in many parts of the
world (including in the U.S.) has not sufficiently evolved.


3. (U) As this will be the Obama Administration's and ONDCP
Director Kerlikowske's first substantive foray into the CND,
many national delegations are eager to see what face we put
forward-especially in light of last year's negotiations over
"harm reduction". In this regard, the CND provides a
fantastic opportunity to roll-out the new National Drug
Control Strategy, and send the message that the United States
is eager to partner with other countries in tackling this
threat. Most importantly, a demonstration of our serious
commitment to raising the profile of international
counternarcotic efforts will reassure other delegations that
the U.S. continues to be a serious leader in developing and
advancing pragmatic and proven policies to counter the
supply,
trafficking and abuse of drugs. In order to build this
alliance, we should reach out soon both here in Vienna and in
key capitals to float U.S. ideas and priorities. Key targets,
include many delegations in the G77 (and especially Argentina
and Algeria, current and likely future G77 President),the EU
(Madrid and Brussels),Mexico and Canada, among others.

UNVIE VIEN 00000009 002 OF 003



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Critical that U.S. Keeps CND,
UNODC Mandate Focused
--------------


4. (U) The last year has seen intense negotiations on the
financial and administrative situation of the UNODC (the UN
Office which gets its guidance from the CND and Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). Via CND
resolutions, member states have tasked UNODC with growing
number of mandates, even as its funding situation continues
to worsen (Ref A). We have consistently called upon CND
member states to refrain from unduly expanding UNODC's
mandate
(especially without simultaneously dedicating voluntary
resources to fulfill these new directives),and to instead
focus any new mandates (via resolution or otherwise) around
UNODC's increasingly thematically and regionally organized
work, as well as the drug conventions. It will be important
that the U.S. continue to lead by example in this regard, and
discourage other delegations from using the CND as a
"Christmas tree" where we hang nationally specific issues
that
are not of international priority nor squarely relevant to
the
drug conventions. We also must work with other partners to
ensure that any new mandates coming out of the CND are
sufficiently funded. This will require early and frequent
consultations with allies in the EU, Canada, Japan and
Australia delegations that all have proven records of fiscal
discipline.

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Iran Chair Keen to Succeed
--------------


5. (S) The CND Chair plays an important substantive role in
the outcome of the meeting, and a special complicating factor
this year is the chairmanship of Iranian Ambassador Ali
Asghar
Soltanieh. Soltanieh is a nuclear physicist who relishes the
role of champion for the "downtrodden". Promising
delegations
that he would spare no effort and would be at the service of
all delegations, Soltanieh has indicated plans to play a
prominent role in this year's meeting.


6. (C) He clearly desires a successful CND that will
reflect
positively on Iranian leadership and perhaps even more so, on
him personally, especially given the high profile failure of
his work on the Tehran Research Reactor negotiations to pass
muster in Tehran. Iran's interactions with the UNODC and
support of regional initiatives, the country's serious
domestic
drug problem and its interest in advancing the general
objectives of the UNODC in controlling the flow of narcotics
out of Afghanistan. Iran wishes to be seen as a regional
leader in counternarcotics efforts (Ref B). As the U.S. is a
traditionally major player in the CND, and since we (almost
alone) cannot work through the collectivity of a regional
group, Soltanieh needs to cultivate a constructive, if not
collegial, relationship with the U.S. At the same time, Iran
could use the opportunity of the CND to criticize or confront
the U.S. on any resolutions pursued or on the lack of support
for flexible funding for regional efforts, especially given
the high cost in lives and dollars Iran has paid for its
counternarcotics efforts, which it repeatedly argues benefit
the whole world. Soltanieh's work as Vice Chair of the 2009
CND and within UNODC fora leads us to believe that he would
want to resist such efforts to tarnish the perception of him
as a fair arbiter, but he is likely not strong enough to
press
back against the Iranian leadership in Tehran, which he has
admitted in other venues has conditioned his flexibility (Ref
C). Keeping any engagement with Soltanieh low key and
related
only to the key business of the CND would probably serve both
his and our interests and prevent individuals in Tehran from
feeling the need to publicly undercut our interactions. At
the same time, limited engagement could start to build modest
bridges in an area of common interest and help to achieve
U.S.
goals at the CND, including the passage of multiple
resolutions where Soltanieh could be either a help or a

UNVIE VIEN 00000009 003 OF 003


hindrance.

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Comment
--------------


7. (U) Another U.S. priority for this CND relates to
Afghanistan.
The Afghan Ambassador tell us he does not yet know who will
represent his government in Vienna, but he is aware of
previous instances where Russia or Pakistan have sought to
introduce resolution language that shines a spotlight on
Afghanistan's role in the international drug trade. Without
whitewashing Afghanistan's huge drug problem, we will want to
ensure that the CND does not detract from the effort to
maintain a positive, multilateral-focus for our Afghan
counterdrug
effort. Early articulation of agreed U.S. goals for the
CND including a positive message of international
partnership,
will help us to deliver a successful CND. With an
international
audience eager to hear from the Obama Administration, the
U.S.
is primed to deliver outcomes worthy of our place as leader
in
international drug control efforts. The challenge will be to
harness that message to the unpredictable political dynamics
of Vienna and the legacy of unresolved differences from last
year's
CND. END COMMENT
DAVIES