NPT REVCON: EGYPT UNMOVED BY ISRAELI OVERTURE ON

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000016

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, VCI/NA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: AORC PARM IAEA KTBT IS EG SY

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: EGYPT UNMOVED BY ISRAELI OVERTURE ON
MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

REF: A) TEL AVIV 11 B) 09 UNVIE 0547

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (S) Summary: According to a January 21 readout from
Israeli Ambassador Azoulay, an Israeli-Egyptian bilat on NPT
Revcon and related IAEA General Conference Middle East issues
registered no substantive progress. Azoulay said he repeated
Israeli National Security Advisor Arad's late December appeal
to FM Gheit as to common regional security interests on Iran
(ref a) but Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi hewed to standard
Egyptian insistence on signaling out Israel's non-NPT status
at the Revcon. In a separate meeting with DCM, visiting
Israeli Atomic Energy Director Danieli expressed low
expectations for the Revcon and said Israel is already
strategizing about overturning the close vote on the Israeli
Nuclear Capabilities Resolution at the IAEA GC. In other
news, Israel reaffirmed its flexibility on Palestinian
Observership at the CTBT Prepcom (ref b) and proposed
resumption of bilateral US-Israeli consultations on CTBT/OSI
that had been suspended during the Bush Administration. DCM
used a follow on meeting with Azoulay January 22 to suggest
closer U.S.-Israel tactical coordination of IAEA briefings,
so we can better support the intention of new Director
General Amano to take a more factually based approach to IAEA
reports on Iran and Syria. End summary.

NPT Revcon/ IAEA GC
--------------


2. (S) Israeli Ambassador Azoulay reported to Ambassador
Davies January 21 that Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi was friendly
but not forthcoming in response to Israel's overtures on
setting aside differences on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (NWFZ) in the NPT Revcon and IAEA fora. The
Fawzi-Azoulay meeting was a follow up to Egyptian FM Abu
Gheit's late December discussion with Israeli National
Security Advisor Arad (ref a). Azoulay recapped the
arguments Arad had made in Cairo that Egyptian sniping at
Israel's non-NPT status was counterproductive and detracted
focus from the real and common threat to regional security
coming from Iran. Israel's non-NPT status was never a threat
to Egypt, he noted to Fawzi, and aside from the NWFZ issue,
Israel and Egypt were now at a peak in their relations, with
more in common than divided them. Azoulay argued further
that it would be futile to try to impose a NWFZ on Israel,
that this could only be achieved through regional
cooperation. Unmoved, Fawzi insisted that Israel's non-NPT
status and nuclear ambiguity are a threat to Egypt's national
security regardless of Iran and that Egypt has every right to
insist on implementation of the 1995 Revcon resolution on the
Middle East. In short, the Vienna meeting revealed no
evolution in the Egyptian position.


3. (S) Comment: While Fawzi and Azoulay agreed to keep in
touch, there is little if any prospect for a solution to the
Revcon Middle East conundrum coming out of the Vienna
channel. (Note: Indeed, in a follow-on January 22 discussion
with DCM, Azoulay confirmed he had no instructions or plans
to further engage Fawzi on the NPT Revcon. His focus/mandate
is the IAEA General Conference. End Note.) Asked what more
the U.S. could do, in light of high-level interventions in
Cairo to date, Azoulay saw the Egyptian MFA as a dead end and
suggested a direct approach to President Mubarak on the
margins of the April Nuclear Security Summit.


4. (C) In a separate meeting with DCM January 19, visiting
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Deputy Director
Danieli had low expectations for the Revcon, assessing that
Egypt would not mind if it collapsed. Azoulay was more
magnanimous than others in Tel Aviv, Danieli said, in seeing
Egypt as motivated more by fear of Iran than disinterest in
the NPT. He reported that Israel had not decided whether to
participate as an Observer at the Revcon. In the meantime,
Israel is already strategizing about the IAEA General
Conference and FM Lieberman had sent a letter to a select
list of 19 countries that voted in favor of the Israeli
Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution (text at para 9) (Note:
Danieli did not share the full list but it included
Singapore, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Russia and others that
might be subject to persuasion. End note.) In this
connection, in their January 20 conversation Azoulay
acknowledged Ambassador Davies' point, however, as to
sequencing with respect to the Revcon from the U.S.
perspective, i.e. first things first. Ambassador Davies
agreed that lobbying in NAM/G-77 capitals--after the

Revcon--is the right approach in seeking to defeat the INC in
the IAEA GC.

Iran/ Syria
--------------


5. (S) Danieli also reported that IAEC Director General
Chorev would come to meet IAEA DG Amano in February, and
Israel welcomed and expected toughening of the IAEA stance on
Iran and Syria. Danieli expressed concern as to slow-motion
legitimation of Qom and asked about working the Secretariat
to press for the release of the PMD "annex," which DCM
advised against. On Syria, interestingly, Danieli explicitly
refuted the French suggestion that Tel Aviv would like to
soft pedal the Syria file, arguing to the contrary that
pressure on Syria could be helpful in driving a wedge between
Damascus and Tehran. In his meeting with Azoulay, Ambassador
Davies cautioned that Amano cannot overreach and will be
deliberative in his approach on Iran and Syria. Azoulay
understood this and had moderated GOI expectations
accordingly.


6. (S) DCM used a follow up meeting with Azoulay January 22
to propose that the U.S. and Israel should consider
reinitiating closer consultation regarding intelligence
information we share with the IAEA, noting that such
coordination had been common practice in the past. DCM said
this would facilitate a better and more organized approach to
our respective efforts to share information with the IAEA on
countries of common concern. Azoulay replied that Israel
already shares the information it briefs to the IAEA with
counterparts through intelligence channels, and said he
believed such pre-consultations already take place between
our governments. DepCouns corrected Azoulay's impression in
this regard, noting that he could attest to the fact that the
depth and timeliness of U.S.-Israeli consultations on
info-sharing with the IAEA had significantly reduced in
recent years. Azoulay pledged to relay the suggestion for
renewed consultations to capital.

CTBT
--------------


7. (SBU) Azoulay and Danieli raised CTBT issues as well,
confirming a shift in Israeli policy on Palestinian
Observership at CTBTO, as Azoulay had suggested on the
margins of the CTBT Preparatory Commission meeting last
November (ref b). Azoulay indicated that Israel could "live
with" a G-77 proposal to amend the rules of procedure in such
a way as to allow Palestine to observe, but without
mentioning Palestine by name. As reported in reftel, Israel
also proposed two amendments, the first relating to
nominations from geographical groups and the second dealing
with procedures should an issue come to a vote in the
Preparatory Commission. Danieli was clear that Israel would
not insist on its amendments and did not want to complicate
the efforts of the Australian Chair to resolve the PA issue
in a satisfactory manner.


8. (SBU) Azoulay also relayed an Israeli request for
resumption of Clinton-era U.S.-Israeli Bilateral
Consultations on CTBT/OSI that had been suspended by the Bush
Administration. The Israeli nonpaper (passed to Department)
proposes that U.S. and Israeli dels to the February 15- March
5 Working Group B session meet to discuss details, agenda and
logistics of future bilateral consultations.



9. (U) Text of FM Lieberman's letter to INC supporters:

Excellency,

I am writing to you to bring to your attention that the 53rd
General Conference (GC) of the IAEA (14-18 September 2009)
has witnessed yet another deterioration in the politicization
of the professional body as it pertains to the situation in
the Middle East and the treatment of Israel. By their
uncompromising attitude and anti-Israeli move, the Arab
sponsors of the GC's "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the
Middle East" resolution and the so-called "Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities" resolution sought to divert attention away from
the blatant cases of non-compliance with NPT obligations by
several Middle Eastern states.

It should be noted that prior to and during the GC, Israel
exerted every effort in order to regain consensus on the

"Middle East Package" whereby the "Application" resolution is
submitted containing agreed language and the "Capabilities"
resolution is not acted upon in lieu of an agreed
Presidential statement. Israel conducted negotiations on
this subject matter with Egypt, under the auspices of Sweden
(as the Presidency of the EU) and the United States. These
negotiations reflected a candid, forthcoming and flexible
attitude on Israel's part. Unfortunately, this approach was
not met with corresponding attitudes by member states of the
Arab group who were aiming solely at singling out Israel.

It is our belief that the results of the IAEA's GC impairs
the GC's ability to address constructively the issues of the
Middle East. Furthermore, these results run counter to the
professional characteristics of this esteemed body.

As the international community has recognized with regard to
other regions, the establishment of a nuclear weapons free
zone (MWEZ) can only emanate from within the region, stemming
from direct negotiations. Israel strongly believes that only
through an inclusive process, which takes into account the
positions of all relevant states in the region and which is
firmly based on consensus, can the vision of a nuclear
weapons free zone in the Middle East be promoted.

Those who wish to superimpose on the Middle East resolutions
or initiatives regarding the NWFZ which do not enjoy the
support of all regional states will not contribute to the
realization of this goal. Nor will they succeed in bringing
about regional dialogue and a spirit of cooperation and trust
which are essential in order to advance this matter further.

In our view, progress towards realizing the vision of a
Middle East free of nuclear weapons cannot be made without a
fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a
significant transformation in the attitude of states in the
region towards Israel.

It should be noted that Israel attaches great importance to
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has made great
efforts over the past years to bring itself closer whenever
possible. Despite the worsening of the geo-political
environment in the Middle East, it has been Israel's long
standing policy to support, and whenever possible, to join
arms control and other international treaties that do not
detract from its uniquely narrow security margins.

In light of the above, I kindly request that the Government
of the Russian Federation reconsider its position toward s
the "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" resolution if brought up
during the 54th GC of the IAEA to be held in September 2010.

Moreover, I would appreciate the Government of (the Russian
Federation) sending a clear message, in the different form
and initiatives addressing relevant issues, that it expects
the Arab group to pursue consensus rather than divisive
attitudes.

Israel remains, as always, ready to engage in dialogue on
these issues.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration.

End Israeli Text.
DAVIES