Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ULAANBAATAR53
2010-02-23 08:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Cable title:  

PARTISAN FUNDRAISING NETWORKS

Tags:  PGOV KCOR SOCI MG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHUM #0053/01 0540810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230810Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3428
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0305
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6629
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2885
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4089
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3717
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ULAANBAATAR 000053 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, DRL;
TREASURY FOR MICHAEL HIRSON;
COMMERCE FOR ZHEN GONG-CROSS;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV KCOR SOCI MG
SUBJECT: PARTISAN FUNDRAISING NETWORKS

REF: 08 UB 0355

Classified By: Political Officer Dan Rakove for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ULAANBAATAR 000053

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, DRL;
TREASURY FOR MICHAEL HIRSON;
COMMERCE FOR ZHEN GONG-CROSS;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV KCOR SOCI MG
SUBJECT: PARTISAN FUNDRAISING NETWORKS

REF: 08 UB 0355

Classified By: Political Officer Dan Rakove for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The General Election Commission's (GEC)
documentation of political contributions for the 2008
parliamentary election offers insight into the commercial
sector and the types of individuals who support each
political party. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
(MPRP) appears to draw a large proportion of funding from
undocumented and consequently illegal sources. The
Democratic Party (DP) appears transparent in comparison, and
draws from a much broader base comprised largely of
individuals. The distinct absence of mining interests in the
public contribution records suggests that this sector is
providing funds to politicians in secret, and primarily to
the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). END
SUMMARY

--------------
Background
--------------


2. (C) Although a descendent of the pre-1990 Communist Party,
the MPRP,s policies differ little from those of the more
recently emerged DP. Furthermore, with both parties taking
part in a coalition/unity government in Parliament, it is
often unclear where the fissure lies between them. One way
to distinguish the parties is to examine their respective
funding sources. Using company descriptions provided by the
General Authority of State Registration, GEC contribution
records for the 2008 Parliamentary election offer insight
into the networks of individuals and corporate supporters
behind each organization.


3. (U) The GEC requires that all personal donations of
200,000 Tugrik (MNT) (170 USD) or more and corporate
donations of 500,000 MNT (430 USD) or more be reported by the
recipient parties. For the purpose of this cable, these are
classified as large donations. Small donors who do not meet
this threshold are not reported by name, although their
contributions are recorded. The maximum allowed
contributions are 1,000,000 MNT (860 USD) for individuals and
3,000,000 MNT for corporations (2,600 USD). Foreigners,
minors, debtors, NGOs, religious organizations and trade
unions are all prohibited from making political contributions.


--------------
MPRP Contributions
--------------


4. (SBU) The MPRP reported approximately one billion MNT
(800,000 USD) in donations to support 74 parliamentary
candidates for the 2008 election. Twenty percent of publicly
documented donations were from large donors. Of these
sizable contributions, 70 percent came from individuals and
30 percent from 23 companies. Many of these businesses
engage simultaneously in a number of industries, including
most prominently food and beverage sales (nine),as well as
tourism (three). The largest single source was the
pharmaceutical and cosmetics producer Munukh, which provided
9,000,000 MNT (8,000 USD). It appears to have circumvented
the maximum contribution limit by packaging this into
separate contributions from three of its subsidiaries.


5. (SBU) The frequency of donations from food and beverage
retailers, according to some observers, arises from the
common impulse to avoid fines for selling liquor in the midst
of periodic prohibitions. Similarly many politicians are
engaged in corporations which sell and distribute sales.
Ten of the entities contributing to the MPRP sell alcohol
products at bars, snooker parlors, night clubs, or stores.
As widespread alcohol abuse is blamed for violence, traffic
accidents and other social ills, authorities forbid its sale
after midnight as well as on certain days. The law also bans
advertisements for alcoholic products.


6. (C) Nonetheless, as this is one of the most profitable
trades, alcohol distributors are known to bribe police
officials in return for impunity. It appears that they also
seek to influence the legislative process through

ULAANBAATA 00000053 002 OF 002


contributions to the MPRP. Nyamdavaa, General Secretary of
Coordination for the Committee on Crime Prevention at the
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, who has looked into
alcohol abuse in his tenure, confirmed that alcohol interests
have significant political sway. Wholesalers are the other
set of large contributors, reflecting corporate interest in
customs policy.


7. (C) The MPRP reported one billion MNT (USD 800,000) in
contributions for the 2008 election cycle. This is five
billion MNT short of the DP's coincident fundraising for a
comparable number of candidates. More telling, post,s
sources estimated that the minimum cost per MPRP member to
run in 2008 was at least USD 150,000. With 76 seats up for
grabs, minimum election costs for the MPRP may have easily
reached USD 11.4 million, suggesting at least a USD 10
million shortfall in reported funds. There is strong reason
to believe that the MPRP is relatively more reliant upon
unregistered contributions than the DP. Under the table
lobbying from mining interests may explain this gap.
Although this sector accounts for more than 20 percent of
GDP, no contribution from them is documented to any party.
Additionally, those wishing to donate more than the maximum
legal amounts, or entities prohibited by law from influencing
elections may play a role. As these unregistered
contributions are likely to be larger in denomination, the
estimated 20 percent reliance of the MPRP upon large
contributors is a low number. The Party's dependence upon
unregistered, large contributors makes it institutionally
unlikely to support election transparency and perhaps money
laundering reforms.


8. (C) Another factor may be that many MRPR candidates (and
some DP ones, too) financed their own campaigns. For
example, as reported reftel, the two MPRP candidates, both
with business ties, paid for all expenses associated with
their respective campaigns. There costs were estimated to be
about USD 150,000 per candidate.

--------------
Profile of DP Contributions
--------------


9. (U) The DP reported approximately 6 billion MNT (USD 5
million) in donations to support 76 candidates for the 2008
election. Three percent were from large donors. Of these
sizable contributions, 93 percent came from individuals, and
seven percent came from five companies engaged in wholesale
(three),grain production (one) and auto repair (one).


10. (SBU) The prevalence of individual contributors among
large donors implies the Democratic Party has broader
grassroots support. The fact that an estimated 97 percent of
recorded donations came from small donors supports this.
Although the extent of DP contribution underreporting is
unclear, the implied average funding from the documented
donations of 80 million MNT (USD 70,000) per candidate
appears realistic, particularly in relation to the comparable
MPRP figure of 13 million MNT (USD 11,000) per Parliamentary
hopeful.
HILL