Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10TUNIS81
2010-02-02 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

TUNISIA: WE NEED TO PROCEED WITH THE APRIL 27-29

Tags:  MARR PREL TS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0081/01 0331524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021524Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7225
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000081 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

OSD-ISA FOR ASD VERSHBOW AND DASD HUDDLESTON,
NEA FOR PDAS SCHLICHER, DAS SANDERSON, NEA/MAG, AND NEA/RA
PM FOR PDAS COUNTRYMAN
NSC STAFF FOR NORTH AFRICA DIRECTOR AGUIRRE
AFRICOM FOR AMBASSADOR HOLMES AND MG SHERLOCK
JOINT STAFF J5 FOR COL SALCEDO
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: MARR PREL TS
SUBJECT: TUNISIA: WE NEED TO PROCEED WITH THE APRIL 27-29
JOINT MILTIARY COMMISSION AS PLANNED

REF: A. TUNIS 34 (NOTAL)

B. TUNIS 26 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

--------------------------
Summary and Action Request
--------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000081

NOFORN
SIPDIS

OSD-ISA FOR ASD VERSHBOW AND DASD HUDDLESTON,
NEA FOR PDAS SCHLICHER, DAS SANDERSON, NEA/MAG, AND NEA/RA
PM FOR PDAS COUNTRYMAN
NSC STAFF FOR NORTH AFRICA DIRECTOR AGUIRRE
AFRICOM FOR AMBASSADOR HOLMES AND MG SHERLOCK
JOINT STAFF J5 FOR COL SALCEDO
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: MARR PREL TS
SUBJECT: TUNISIA: WE NEED TO PROCEED WITH THE APRIL 27-29
JOINT MILTIARY COMMISSION AS PLANNED

REF: A. TUNIS 34 (NOTAL)

B. TUNIS 26 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

--------------
Summary and Action Request
--------------


1. (C) OSD should proceed with its initial plan to host the
25th Annual Joint Military Commission (JMC) with Tunisia
April 27-29 in Washington, D.C. The alternative - cancelling
or 'postponing' the JMC - is likely to damage relations with
the Government of Tunisia at a time it has signaled it wants
to turn a new page in bilateral relations. I am meeting with
the Defense Minister on February 8 and would like to present
him with a formal invitation letter to the JMC at that time.
End summary and action request.

--------------
Tunisians Aware of Original Invitation
--------------


2. (SBU) The Tunisians were informed about the dates for
the JMC on January 13 when the Senior Defense Official
(SDO) received the signed invitation from OSD-ISA for
then-Minister of Defense Kamel Morjane. However, it was
not delivered because on January 14 the GOT announced a
cabinet change which moved Morjane to the Foreign Ministry
and Ridha Grira into the MOD position. We then requested
an updated letter from OSD-ISA for the new minister. The
MOD is now waiting for the invitation and a continued delay
will be seen as an affront to the new minister. Furthermore,
after OSD agreed to hold the JMC in April, the Governor of
Wyoming agreed to invite Grira for a visit on April 30 as
part of the State Partnership Program (SPP) Wyoming has with
Tunisia. This would be the most senior visit by either side
since the SPP began in 2004.

--------------
Improving Relations
--------------


3. (C) After a low point beginning in the summer of 2008 and
lasting until after the elections last fall, recent
developments have provided signs that the GOT is acting to

improve bilateral atmospherics with the U.S., suggesting an
opportunity exists to move relations forward with the GOT.
As discussed reftels, the January 14 cabinet shuffle,
particularly the move of the pro-West Morjane to the MFA,
likely reflects the GOT's desire to improve its image and
relations with the U.S. and other Western powers.


4. (C/NF) Military cooperation is on the upswing.
After months of requests, beginning in December the GOT
agreed to a series of visits; enthusiastically participated
in a U.S.-Tunisian Intelligence Analyst Seminar and Exchange
focused on regional terrorism; agreed to AFRICOM's request
to move the Annual Planning Conference (the second most
important bilateral event after the JMC) to March from its
previous July dates; indicated its intention to participate
in the Directors of Military Intelligence Conference as well
as a counterpart visit hosted by the AFRICOM Director of
Intelligence and Knowledge Development; recently expressed
appreciation for U.S. support and programs in Mali, Niger,
and Mauritania focused on combating AQIM; indicated its
desire
for greater U.S. assistance and cooperation in border
security
and intelligence sharing; and have generally begun responding
positively and in a timely manner to requests on matters
dealing with bilateral exercises, seminars, exchanges and
execution of military-to-military events. We need to
capitalize on this momentum by proceeding with the JMC as
originally scheduled.

--------------
Grira's Influence
--------------



5. (C/NF) While the Tunisian decision-making process can be
murky, we believe that Grira's previous position as Minister
of State Properties and Real Estate indicates that he has
President Ben Ali's full confidence. In his previous
capacity,
Grira would have had access to sensitive information about
the
finances and holdings of both Ben Ali's and the First Lady's
families, who have benefitted from acquisitions of government
and other lands. Such information is closely guarded, and
Grira's appointment as Defense Minister suggests he remains
influential and in favor with the highest levels of the GOT.
Holding the JMC as scheduled, followed by the State
Partnership
visit to Wyoming, provides the U.S. the opportunity to
influence
the new Defense Minister's objectives and perceptions of the
value of the U.S.-Tunisian relationship at the beginning of
his
tenure.

--------------
Tunisian Objectives
--------------


6. (C) The GOT will not officially begin preparing for the
JMC
until it receives an invitation from the Department of
Defense.
At the colonel level, Tunisian officials have told us that
Grira will reiterate Tunisia's commitment to relations with
the
United States, as evidenced by the fact that this is the only
one of its 12 bilateral discussions attended personally by
the
Defense Minister, and explain that the GOT has opted to focus
its limited resources on developing its social programs,
which
it believes is the best way to combat extremism. Grira will
discuss Tunisia's perspectives on regional issues, such as
the
threat from the Trans-Sahel region. During our joint
preparation
for the JMC, we will ask that both sides present a strategic
brief that addresses the regional challenges and the best way
to
address these challenges, with a focus on building on the
recent
momentum the Tunisians have shown vis--vis bilateral
military
cooperation.

--------------
U.S. Objectives
--------------


7. (C/NF) The JMC, held at the end of April as originally
scheduled, will give the U.S. its best opportunity to develop
a strong and productive relationship with the new Defense
Minister from the outset of his tenure. We will want to
emphasize to Grira that while we value our relationship
with Tunisia, shrinking resources will be prioritized for
those countries that are willing to work with the U.S.,
particularly in regional security efforts such as the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP) and NATO's
Operation Active Endeavor. Tunisia's Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) will drop from $15 million in FY-2010 to $4.9
million in FY-2011. I fully support this reduction, and it
is important that the GOT - and Grira in particular - clearly
understand what has led to reduced FMF levels. At the same
time, by pointing to the large IMET budget and the robust
mil-mil program, which will be discussed during the March
17-18
Annual Planning Conference (APC),we will clearly express
our desire to continue working with the Tunisian military,
the sole apolitical security force in Tunisia. We will also
be able to point to potentially increased military
intelligence
cooperation, to include training in the desert regions of

Tunisia
focused on integration of intelligence collection assets
provided
under the 1206 and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) programs, as
a security multiplier.

--------------
Funding
--------------


8. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense has said that while it would
appreciate any financial assistance the U.S. could provide
for its participation in the JMC, it is willing to fully
fund its own participation. However, our counterparts in
the MOD have emphasized that they cannot request funding
until an official invitation to attend this event is received.

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


9. (C) While reading the true intention of the GOT is always
difficult, recent indicators such as the Cabinet shuffle,
the lack of a strong reaction to the Secretary of State's
recent criticism of Tunisia's record on Internet freedom,
and agreements to hold meetings which had been on hold for
months indicate a desire by the GOT to renew and improve
ties with the U.S. Retracting the invitation to the April
27-29 JMC will be seen by the new Minister as both a personal
and political affront, will reverse our efforts to repair
this
relationship, and will likely set back progress for years.
The
JMC is a golden opportunity to make a positive impression on
the Defense Minister and take advantage of the current
environment to improve relations and strengthen not just our
mil-mil relations with Tunisia, but also our broader
bilateral
relationship.


10. (C) I therefore request that OSD proceed with the JMC as
originally planned, and request (by COB Friday, February 5) a
formal invitation letter to deliver to the Minister of
Defense
on Monday morning, February 8.


GRAY
GRAY