Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10TUNIS69
2010-01-28 13:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS VISITS

Tags:  PHUM PTER PGOV PREL TS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTU #0069/01 0281308
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281308Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7212
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000069 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS VISITS
TUNISIA

Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000069

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS VISITS
TUNISIA

Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while
Countering Terrorism, visited Tunisia January 22-26, the
first such visit since 1999. At the conclusion of his visit,
he told the Ambassador and other foreign diplomats that he
had received generally satisfactory cooperation from the GOT,
including meetings with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Justice, and was able to gain access to detention facilities
and see prisoners in their cells. Sheinin's greatest concern
was the potential for mistreatment of terror suspects in the
initial stages of their detention, when they are held
incommunicado in secret facilities. He recommended several
concrete steps Tunisia could take to improve its practices,
including guaranteeing detainees' access to lawyers from the
outset of their detention, and amendments to existing laws.
Tunisia's pro-government media misrepresented Sheinin's brief

press release as a glowing seal of approval for Tunisia's
human rights record. End summary.


2. (SBU) Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering
Terrorism, briefed members of the foreign diplomatic corps at
the conclusion of his January 22-26 visit to Tunisia. The
event, hosted by the Ambassador of Spain, was attended the
Chiefs of Mission of the EU, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, and
the U.S. (notably absent was the Ambasador of France - who
sent his deputy chief of mission.).


3. (C) Scheinin underlined the importance of human rights in
Tunisia's external relationships, particularly in the context
of Tunisia's request for "advanced status" in its EU
Association Agreement talks. Scheinin described his visit as
a "break-through" in that he was the first Special Rapporteur
to visit Tunisia since 1999. The GOT's acceptance of his
visit was linked both to Tunisia's interest in "advanced
status" and its turn under the Universal Periodic Review
process by the UN Human Rights Commission, Scheinin believed.


4. (C) Scheinin said he had received satisfactory cooperation

from the Tunisian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice,
and less from the Ministry of the Interior. Although
cooperation from the head of Tunisia's penitentiary system
was "slow at best," he had managed to gain access to
detainees, in their cells. Schenin twice saw the two
detainees returned to Tunisia from U.S. custody in
Guantanamo, but they declined to speak with Schenin, likely
due to their own bitterness and/or due to their distrust of
western officials, he speculated.


5. (C) Sheinin pointed to the lack of transparency in the
custodial process for detainees facing terror charges, and
questions about judicial police methods for questioning
detainees and building cases against them, as the most
serious problems he encountered during his visit. Terror
suspects are typically held incommunicado by the judicial
police soon after their arrest, in still unidentified
facilities, and it is at this point that they are at highest
risk for mistreatment.


6. (C) Terror suspects are generally processed through the
Bachoucha detention facility, which Shenin was not able to
access, in which they are held in "garde a vue" (preliminary
detention) status in which they are held incommunicado for
renewable six day periods. Schenin was not certain whether
the ICRC, which is permitted to inspect detention facilities,
had had access to Bachoucha.


7. (C) Scheinin reported that the GOT had previously
maintained that it is holding 250-300 suspects in custody
under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Tunisian NGOs believed
the number was significantly higher, Schenin noted, but he
did not specify any counter statistics. The Ministry of
Justice told Schenin that 1,253 Tunisians had been either
tried or sentenced under the terrorism law, a figure which he
said was closer to NGO estimates and could be accurate based
on his observations.


8. (C) Tunisian judges who met with Schenin noted that the
provision in the 2003 anti-terror law outlawing membership in
unrecognized organizations was typically the simplest route
to prosecute terror suspects. Terror suspects are often
charged with offenses under the penal code when evidence of
terror links is insufficent, he added.


9. (C) Despite his catalogue of concerns, Scheinin said he
nonetheless saw some positive aspects of Tunisia's approach.
The 2003 anti-terrorism law was ammended in 2009 to remove
incitement, which had been too vaguely defined and
misapplied, he implied. He commended the GOT's efforts to

attack root causes of extremism, including efforts to
alleviate poverty and improve education.


10. (C) Sheinin concluded his briefing by offering two
recommendations: First, all law enforcement personnel should
be required to wear name tags, to counter impunity for human
rights offenders, and second, he recommended the installation
of video cameras, which can not be turned off, at all
detention facilities, to provide a record of occurances and
comings and goings of detainees.


11. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador for more recommendations,
Sheinin suggested the strengthening of Tunisian laws against
torture, ensuring detainees' access to lawyers from the
outset of their arrest rather than at the end of their "garde
a vue" detention, and modifying the legal definition of
terrorism. Sheinin also urged Tunisia to ratify the optional
protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture.


12. (C) Sheinin said he had already issued a brief,
diplomatically-worded press release, and added that he would
likely issue an interim report of his findings in March.
Under the terms of the Universal Periodic Review, the GOT
would have the option to respond to an Arabic copy of the
report. Sheinin allowed that, with the incorporation of the
GOT's response, the inal report might not be published until
Decembe 2010. Commenting on the presentation, the EU
Abassador pointed to the significance of Sheinin's ccesss
to the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Afairs, who, while
apparently not thrilled by the rocess, had pledged continued
cooperation.

13 (C) During a January 25 dinner, lawyer Mokhtar Trifi, who
met with Sheinin in his capacity as President of the Tunisian
League for Human Rights, told Pol-Econ Counselor he was
concerned the GOT would misrepresent the objectives and
findings of Sheinin's visit to score public relations
"points" without regard to the dismal realities.
Subsequently, Tunisia's pro-government media did indeed
present Sheinin's brief publc comments as an unqualified
endorsement for Tunsia's success in balancing human rights
and the ight against terror.


14. (C) Comment: While thepress's disingenuous spin was
typical and predicable, the GOT's acceptance of Sheinin, and
its tngible, if unenthusiastic, cooperation with him,represent a step for
ward on a long road toward impoved human
rights practices in Tunisia. End commnt.

GRAY