CWC: IRAQI AMBASSADOR WARNS COMMITMENT TO CHEMICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000010

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: IRAQI AMBASSADOR WARNS COMMITMENT TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION SHIFTING IN IRAQ

REF: A. MIKULAK-BANAA LETTER OF 4 JANUARY 2010 WITH
REPORT ON RECOVERED AND DESTROYED
CHEMICAL WEASPONS LOCATED IN THE
REPBULIC OF IRAQ

B. 09 THE HAGUE 768

C. 09 THE HAGUE 738

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-1-10.


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Iraqi Ambassador to the Netherlands
Siamand Banaa requested Delrep to convey his concerns "to the
highest level" of the U.S. government that commitment by his
government to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is
declining and could "shift" with the upcoming elections. He
believes strong U.S. and international support for an agreed
plan and timetable for the destruction of remaining chemical
weapons in Iraq is essential to keep Iraq from reversing
course. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Delrep met with Ambassador Siamand Banaa after his
return to The Hague on January 8 to deliver the report on
Recovered and Destroyed Chemical Weapons Located in the
Republic of Iraq (February - August 2009) (Ref A) and to
discuss the upcoming meetings of visiting Iraqi and U.S.
experts with the Technical Secretariat (TS) of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
(Refs B and C).


3. (C) Banaa opened the meeting by asking when the U.S. would
have a new Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the OPCW.
When Delrep replied that no nomination has yet been made,
Banaa asked if she would then convey an important
confidential message to the "highest policy levels" of the
U.S. government. He, like all other Iraqi ambassadors, is
about to be re-assigned and will likely return to Baghdad.
He did not know who might be replacing him in The Hague but
is very concerned that the progress made to date in Iraq's
accession and implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention might be stalled or reversed. He described the
mood in Baghdad as "hardening" against the CWC and the
current government's commitment to destroy the remnants of
Saddam Hussein's CW program. He noted that 450 Egyptian
engineers that were involved in that program have
"disappeared." A new government following the elections in
March might walk away from the commitment Iraq made a year
ago to join the Convention and complete CW destruction.


4. (C) Banaa's solution to hold back such a possibility is
to have in place an agreed plan with concrete interim goals
and a timetable for the destruction of the remaining chemical
weapons and former facilities in Iraq. Essential to such a
plan, in his view, is U.S. and other international support,
both politically and financially, for chemical weapons
destruction. He warned that some in his government would be
quite willing to blame the U.S. and others for historical
responsibility for the CW program rather than accepting, as
the current Iraqi government has done, Iraq's responsibility
for its own past. He hinted that some other governments
would be very sympathetic to such a view.


5. (C) On the recovered weapons report (Ref A),Banaa stated
that he would seek instructions from his government on making
Qthat he would seek instructions from his government on making
the required report to the OPCW. He asked if the report had
been delivered yet in Baghdad and to whom. Delrep said she
had not seen confirmation of delivery in Baghdad, but noted
that the visiting U.S. delegation the following week would be
able to answer questions on the report and to meet
bilaterally, if necessary.


6. (C) On the possibility of the initial visit by the OPCW
Technical Secretariat (TS) to Iraq, Banaa felt a visit would
not be possible until after the March elections. Delrep
noted that the TS views the trilateral meetings January 12-13
as an opportunity for progress in planning to report to the
Executive Council in February (Ref B),in lieu of the TS

visit to Baghdad. Banaa agreed that the upcoming meetings
are important but said that the expected Iraqi delegation is
too "junior" and uninformed to make any decisions.
Everything will have to be sent back to Baghdad, he said.


7. (C) Banaa then launched into a litany of complaints about
Dr. Al Sharaa, head of the Iraqi National Monitoring
Authority, describing him as not being "serious" about the
upcoming meetings because he is sending new people who "don't
even speak English" and have not been involved in OPCW
issues, rather than coming himself. Al Sharaa, he said, has
wanted exclusive control of not just the chemical account but
the nuclear one as well and has not delegated real
responsibility to anyone else. This is why, Banaa opined,
"Nothing gets done." Banaa has tried to identify key actors
in each relevant office to coordinate CWC action and to
provide continuity from one international meeting to the
next, "but they keep sending new people." Al Sharaa, he
believes, has an eye on the spotlight and would like to
become a minister in the post-election government.


8. (C) DEL COMMENT. While the frictions between Banaa and Al
Sharaa, and the lack of coordination in the Iraqi government
on OPCW matters, have been more than evident here in The
Hague, Del has no means of evaluating Banaa's comments on the
political waters in Baghdad and the future prospects in Iraq
for the CWC. We pass his warning on for what it is worth.


9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Banaa's point about the narrow
window for action on a destruction plan for Iraq, however, is
worth highlighting. OPCW, too, faces a large turnover in
expertise during 2010, starting with a new Director-General
in July and most likely a new Director for Verification, a
key position for CW destruction planning. A new Iraqi
ambassador and new ministers in Baghdad will inevitably face
a learning curve on CWC issues, even without political
shifts. Moving forward as briskly as possible on a plan for
destruction, and lining up appropriate international
assistance, as well as political support among Executive
Council member states, will be critical in the months ahead.


10. (U) BEIK SENDS.
MANN