GEORGIA: THREE MONTHS BEFORE LOCAL ELECTIONS -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000222

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: THREE MONTHS BEFORE LOCAL ELECTIONS -
OPPOSITION IN DISARRAY, UNM STRONG

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BASS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Recent internal United National Movement
(UNM) polling shows officially-undeclared mayoral candidate
Gigi Ugulava with a commanding lead over opposition rivals.
The trend lines indicate that Ugulava's active grassroots
outreach has paid significant dividends while opposition
inaction, notably by chief rival Irakli Alasania
(Alliance/Our Georgia - Free Democrats),has eroded their
support and widened the gap in the UNM's favor. Former PM
Zurab Noghaideli's decision to court Moscow has further split
the non-parliamentary opposition and reinforced its focus on
fruitless backroom dealings and internal squabbling rather
than campaigning. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment: Diligent, focused efforts by the UNM
appear likely to pay electoral dividends while the
non-parliamentary opposition is turning what should have been
a solid electoral opportunity into a likely failure.
Long-simmering fissures among the non-parliamentary
opposition have grown into public disagreements.
Noghaideli's controversial move to embrace Russia has split
the non-parliamentary opposition on ideological grounds, but
personality and financial incentives still play the dominant
role behind the scenes. On the other hand, the
disorganization/reorganization among the non-parliamentary
opposition only strengthens UNM's dominant electoral
position. Sadly but perhaps predictably, the
non-parliamentary opposition once again appears unable to
learn from past failures. Meanwhile, UNM has coalesced
around Ugulava who is energized, and ironically, showing his
rivals that one does not need to spend vast sums of money to
make a discernible impact. End Comment.

UNM Strong, Facing Unlikely Opposition Problem


3. (C) The UNM's American pollster (please protect) shared
with the Ambassador polling for the UNM that shows currently
undeclared UNM candidate Gigi Ugulava with a commanding lead.
Ugulava's raw numbers put his support at near 50 percent;
with allocations of undecideds, Ugulava is likely to grab 60
percent of the vote. Alasania runs a distant second, winning
just over 10 percent of the vote. The rest of the vote is
scattered among many marginal candidates. Ugulava's numbers
have been trending dramatically upwards in the last six
months, while Alasania's numbers trended downwards. Polling
and focus groups indicate the numbers reflect Ugulava's
engagement versus Alasania's inaction. Alasania has done
little visible campaigning in Tbilisi since announcing his
candidacy months ago and spent much of December and January
traveling abroad in Europe and the U.S.. Ugulava continues
to work hard; he told the Ambassador he spends a chunk of
each day meetings with 3-4 groups of citizens in their
neighborhoods, fielding complaints and requests. The current
numbers have created a dilemma the UNM did not expect -- how
to prepare to handle what is shaping up to be a resounding
victory, yet still ensure widespread public confidence in the
results. The Pollster noted that, ironically, what the UNM
needed was a semi-coherent opposition, but there was little
indication that the non-parliamentary opposition could
coalesce around any one leader.

Noghaideli Flirts with Moscow - Other "Democrats" Follow


4. (C) Although there have always been obvious fissures in
the non-parliamentary opposition, former Prime Minister
Noghaideli's embrace of a pro-Russian strategy appears to be
QNoghaideli's embrace of a pro-Russian strategy appears to be
the straw that broke the camel's back. Privately, the
general view of the UNM, CDM, Alliance and other more
moderate political actors is that Noghaideli is a "feckless
idiot", a "useful idiot for UNM", a "shameless clown" and so
on. An increasingly moderate Salome Zourabichvili (Georgia's
Way) told the Ambassador that Noghaideli was so unpopular and
such a perfect foil, she almost believed that he was acting
on behalf of the UNM. Alasania told the Ambassador that he
has heard that Noghaideli has discussed nothing of any
importance with Russian authorities and was "selected" simply
because he was in Moscow when Putin thought it would be
useful to openly interfere in Georgian domestic politics.
Noghaideli told the DCM that he was pursuing a logical course
by speaking to Russian officials noting that Saakashvili's
decision to ignore Russia was a failed policy. Noghaideli
said he was surprised at the high level at which he had been
received in Moscow, and noted that he only had signed a
framework agreement with United Russia and not discussed
thorny bilateral issues. Noghaideli maintained that he was
simply trying to foster communication with Russian
authorities (and in time South Ossetian and Abkhaz) to try to
find workable solutions to re-incorporate South Ossetia and
Abkhazia into Georgia.

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5. (C) Whatever Noghaideli's motives, at present he stands
to capture only a small portion of the Georgian electorate
which is potentially open to closer relations with the
Kremlin. IRI and NDI polling on Georgian views as to who is
to blame for the 2008 August War; whether or not Russian
aggression continues; and whether or not Russia is a partner
or enemy suggest that only 5-10 percent of the electorate
would be receptive to a pro-Russian policy. Noghaideli
dismissed the argument saying that polls show generally that
Georgians have anti-Russia feelings, but the reality was
Georgian views were more complex and the public generally
supported his initiatives because Georgians realized that
"somebody had to speak to Moscow." Despite Noghaideli's
optimism, it appears unlikely that Noghaideli has any chance
to leverage his northern turn into electoral support
especially considering that former "pro-Western democrats"
such as Zviad Dzidziguri (Conservatives),Koba Davitashvili
(People's Party) and even former Speaker Nino Burjanadze
(Democratic Movement - United Georgia) have also thrown their
hats into the "support for dialogue with Russia" ring.

AWOLasania


6. (C) According to recent IRI and NDI polling, Alasania's
personal numbers remain high. However, he is a distant
second to current Tbilisi mayor Gigi Ugulava when viewed
through the prism of the mayoral election. Alasania's
downward trend lines appear to be a troubling sign for his
candidacy. Internal UNM polling now shows Alasania winning
only a shade above 10 percent for the Tbilisi mayoral race,
nearly half of the support he enjoyed two months ago.
Alasania faces two difficult political tasks: to turn his
personal approval ratings into solid political support; and
to pivot from detached, foreign-policy focused diplomat into
a credible mayoral candidate who is able to articulate a
coherent plan as to how he would run the city. So far,
Alasania has been unable to do either. Notwithstanding a
difficult broadcast media environment and significant
financial disadvantage, Alasania has not focused on the
low-cost activities he could use to generate support. He
spends a large share of his time outside of Georgia. When in
Tbilisi, Alasania rarely if ever spends time among the public
or does any sort of retail level campaigning. In contrast,
Ugulava is found in all corners of the city, meeting
residents, listening to their concerns and explaining his
plans for improving the city and their lives. Alasania has
pushed back the re-launch of his campaign a number of times,
and has effectively ceded three months of unopposed campaign
time to Ugulava. Unfortunately for Alasania, his absence has
left the public with little understanding of his platform or
why he is running. Alasania has hired the American firm
Aristotle consultants as advisors and plans to begin his
campaign in earnest shortly. Alasania's advisors maintain
that he has plenty of time to take on Ugulava successfully.

Levan and the Money Trail


7. (C) Levan Gachechiladze (Protect Georgia Movement) has
apparently not made up his mind as to what he intends to do
regarding the May 2010 elections. MP Paata Davitaia (We
Ourselves),with whom Gachechiladze had a good relationship,
told us that Gachechiladze also thought that a pro-Russia
policy swing could potentially be a good idea for the
non-parliamentary opposition. Davitaia expressed his disgust
Qnon-parliamentary opposition. Davitaia expressed his disgust
with Gachechiladze's willingness to embrace Noghaideli's
position. Davitaia said that others willing to join
Noghaideli (Conservatives - People's Party) were doing so for
the modest sum of about USD 50,000. According to Davitaia
and other sources, Gachechiladze has been mulling a run for
mayor as the candidate of the United Opposition.
Gachechiladze's entry into the race would certainly
complicate Alasania's floundering bid. Privately, Alasania's
team has repeatedly told Poloff that Gachechiladze has
assured them that he supports Alasania, but would only
announce his support publicly at a "key moment".
Nevertheless, Alasania insiders question Gachechiladze's
commitment, noting that he could be "purchased" at any
moment, and the Alliance simply does not have the funds nor
inclination to meet what could be a substantial asking price.


Christian Democrat's Candidate Underwhelms


8. (C) Former President of the Georgian International Oil
Corporation (which oversaw the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
project in Georgia) Gia Chanturia was officially announced as
the CDM candidate for mayor on February 12. Chanturia left
Georgia amid controversy and allegations of corruption after
being dismissed from his post by President Saakashvili in

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September 2004. Since that time Chanturia has lived in Baku,
and advised the Azeri government and SOCAR on oil and gas
projects. He continues to have good ties with government
officials in Azerbaijan. Chanturia's initial speech as the
CDM mayoral candidate was lackluster, and he left the party's
anniversary party mid-way through the event. Chanturia
admitted to an Embassy contact that he had no real interest
in running for mayor, but had been encouraged by the GoG to
run. If he ran, Chanturia was reportedly told that the GoG
would support an energy project he hopes to develop on the
Black Sea that involves refining and transit of CNG/LNG.
(Embassy Note: Press is already speculating about the "real"
reasons for Chanturia's return to politics. End Note.)


9. (C) Christian Democratic Leader, Giorgi Targamadze told
Poloff that Chanturia's technocratic background and his
ability to fund his own campaign were both appealing to CDM.
By backing Chanturia, who is running as an independent,
Targamadze opens himself up to criticism of being a GoG
stooge. However, as Targamadze told Poloff, CDM has little
to no chance of winning the Tbilisi mayoral race and was
committed to playing to its strengths by focusing on local
council (Sakrebulo) elections nationwide. Chanturia appears
to provide the best of limited options; a self-funded
candidate who will keep CDM relevant in Tbilisi but whose
loss would do little to harm Targamadze personally or CDM's
brand. By backing Chanturia, CDM can focus on down ticket
races; maintain its support (roughly 10 percent) in Tbilisi;
and give its organization a good electoral test run.
Whatever Chanturia's merits, Targamadze clearly views the
electoral utility of running Chanturia as worth the risk.
BASS