Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10TBILISI146
2010-02-02 14:42:00
SECRET
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MOPS KG KZ TI TX UZ GG 
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VZCZCXRO4232
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHSI #0146 0331442
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021442Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2804
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T TBILISI 000146 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS KG KZ TI TX UZ GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, C-RE9-02185

REF: A. 09 STATE 123007

B. 09 TBILISI 2239

Classified By: DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T TBILISI 000146

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS KG KZ TI TX UZ GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, C-RE9-02185

REF: A. 09 STATE 123007

B. 09 TBILISI 2239

Classified By: DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) In response to ref A the following is further
information regarding the Northern Distribution Network in
Georgia.


A. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE THE HOST COUNTRY LEADER VIEWS ON THE
US MILITARY LOCAL PURCHASE PLAN'S PROGRESS AND ANY BENEFIT TO
THE HOST COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. HOW SATISFIED ARE HOST COUNTRIES
WITH THIS PROGRAM?

There is no U.S. Military local purchase plan in Georgia.
DLA has reviewed outlets to purchase goods in Georgia and
Georgian companies ar interested in pursuing opportunities
to sell goods to the U.S. military.


B. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY INSTANCES OF HOST COUNTRY GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION IN THE US LOCAL PURCHASE PLAN, INCLUDING ANY
INDICATIONS THAT HOST COUNTRY SENIOR LEADERSHIP IS INVOLVED.
WHO IN THE HOST COUNTRY -- LEADERS, MINISTRIES, CLANS --
BENEFITS THE MOST?

There are no known instances of host country graft, as there
is no purchase plan.


C. (C) HOW DO HOST COUNTRIES LEADERS VIEW EXPANDING THE NDN
TO INCLUDE TRANSITING MILITARY SUPPLIES CONSIDERED "LETHAL"?

The GOG is eager to expand their transport of military
supplies and has put no restrictions on cargo.


D. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY EXTERNAL POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC
PRESSURE FROM RUSSIA, CHINA, ETC., TO ALTER OR TERMINATE
PARTICIPATION IN THE NDN.

Given the tense relations with Russia and Russia's own supply
transit role, the Russians would be pleased for Georgia to
cease participating in the Northern Distribution Network.
However, Post is unaware of Russian pressure on Georgia on
this particular issue. Russia and Georgia broke diplomatic
relations after the August 2008 war.


E. (C) WHAT PLANS DO HOST COUNTRIES HAVE IN PLACE FOR
RESPONDING TO ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION SUPPLY LINES? HOW
WOULD TERRORIST ATTACKS OR OTHER SABOTAGE INCIDENTS AGAINST
SUPPLY LINES INFLUENCE THE HOST COUNTRY'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE
PARTICIPATING IN THE NDN?

There are no specific plans in place to repair supply lines,
but the GOG would act quickly to repair any kind of damaged
infrastructure (for example, rail lines) in the case of
damage. They have demonstrated their willingness and ability
to do this as recently as the war in August of 2008, and we
would expect the same in case of a terrorist attack.


F. (C) WHAT ARE THE MOST VULNERABLE POINTS -- POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, OR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE -- IN THE HOST
COUNTRY THAT, IF CHALLENGED, WOULD AFFECT ITS WILLINGNESS TO
CONTINUE NDN COOPERATION WITH THE US?

None of the aforementioned potential vulnerabilities affect
Georgia's willingness to participate in the Network. Georgia
is eager to demonstrate its continued willingness to
contribute to the Allied effort in Afghanistan, including by
committing a battalion (approximately 750) of troops to serve
alongside the U.S. Marines in Afghanistan with no caveats
(ref B),so we would not expect any of the factors listed to
deter Georgia from participating.
BASS