GEORGIA APPROVES STATE STRATEGY ON OCCUPIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000125

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA APPROVES STATE STRATEGY ON OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES

REF: A. 09 TBILISI 2204

B. BASS-KAIDANOW EMAILS 12/21/09

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The Government of Georgia approved the
"State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through
Collaboration" on January 27. The strategy presents the
government's vision for engaging the disputed territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and preventing their isolation.
State Minister of Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili
coordinated his efforts on the strategy with international
partners, including the United States, who provided
suggestions at several stages during the drafting of the
document. The government now plans to focus on the
development of an Action Plan for implementation of the
strategy, which the Georgians expect to take approximately
six months. End summary.


2. (C) Comment. The final version of the strategy does
incorporate a number of the Quad's suggestions and is a
considerable improvement over earlier drafts (reftels). It
begins with a positive vision for Georgia's future and
emphasizes Georgia's commitment to the non-use of force to
reintegrate the territories up front in the preamble. The
strategy also acknowledges past mistakes made by all parties
and the resulting suffering of the civilian population on all
sides. While contentious phrases still remain in the
document, the language overall reflects the most
forward-leaning step toward the separatist regions that we
have seen from this government.


3. (C) Several concerns remain, however. While the current
status review section, which details Georgia's version of the
history of the conflict, was shortened and revised to present
more factual circumstances, the very existence of such a
section may be viewed as provocative and may shift discussion
of the strategy aay from the future and back to the past.
In addition, in a section on human rights, the ethnic
cleansing of ethnic Georgians is singled out as a focus of
special concern, undermining the claim made in the document
of equal treatment. The final version also includes a
glossary, not seen in earlier drafts, which uses
controversial and non-neutral language, clearly intended to
appease some government hardliners. End comment.

GOVERNMENT APPROVES AND PRESENTS STRATEGY


4. (C) On January 27, the Government of Georgia announced its
approval of the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories:
Engagement Through Collaboration." In statements to the
press, Yakobashvili said the strategy outlines peaceful
measures for the de-occupation of the separatist regions, IDP
return and safety and the restoration of territorial
integrity. He added that "we are saying no to the isolation
of the populations in the breakaway regions...We will ensure
conditions for their education, healthcare, cultural and
economic development....A neutral status working group will
be formed and headed by an international organization to
coordinate the strategy." According to the government, the
strategy will be presented to the international community,
first to the Council of Europe, as well as to OSCE, the UN
and the EU. Yakobashvili told the Ambassador that now that
the strategy is in place, we can begin to plan projects, even
without an Action Plan. The document is available publicly
on www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SRM-Strategy-en.p df.
Qon www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SRM-Strategy-en.p df.

YAKOBASHVILI TRIES TO DEFLECT HARD-LINERS


5. (C) Yakobashvili told the Ambassador that during
discussions with the government, he was surprised at some of
the wild suggestions he received from hard-liner colleagues,
such as that the text should refer to the de facto
authorities as "puppet regimes." The addition of a glossary,
which incorporates some of the suggestions the Ministry
received from the government, was included as a way to pacify
these colleagues while avoiding the use of potentially
controversial language in the text of the strategy itself.

COORDINATION WITH THE ABKHAZ?


6. (C) Yakobashvili speculated that, although Abkhaz de facto
"minister of foreign affairs" Sergey Shamba may feel
constrained in his public comments about the strategy at
first -- especially right now when he is seeking the de facto
"prime minister" position -- Shamba can nevertheless accept
much of the strategy in the long term. Yakobashvili
indicated that he has been in close contact with the Abkhaz

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de facto authorities, primarily Shamba, during the
preparation of the strategy, who have reacted positively in
particular to some of the concrete proposals in the strategy.

THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION


7. (C) According to Yakobashvili, a major challenge now will
be organizing implementing mechanisms. The Ministry will
form working groups to address different elements of the Plan
and Ministry officials plan to travel extensively during the
next several months to gather suggestions from around the
world. Yakobashvili is currently leaning toward UNDP as an
umbrella organization for implementation; while they would
not necessarily implement projects, they could provide
transportation and other logistical suggestions. The Abkhaz
de facto authorities proposed a "Commission for Humanitarian
Programs" under the Geneva process to oversee activities.
While the Georgians do not necessarily object to such a
formulation, they do not like the idea of putting this under
Geneva, which would inject the Russians into the process.
BASS