CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: HOST COUNTRY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 009964

SIPDIS
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: CBW KTIA PARM PREL UK OPCW CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: HOST COUNTRY
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM ON CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS (SBU)

REF: STATE 060625

Classified By: ISN/CB Office Director Robert Mikulak.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Action Request in Paragraph 8.

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OBJECTIVE
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2. (C-REL U.K.) Department requests Embassy to pursue the
following objective:

-- Work with the Government of the United Kingdom to finalize
an exchange of letters to clarify differing interpretations
of our 1997 Host Country Agreement (HCA) Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) challenge inspections.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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3. (U) Embassy should report results of discussions with
British officials by cable to ISN/CB ) Eugene Klimson by 12
February, 2010 or at (202) 647-5165 or via email with any
questions or for any further background information.

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BACKGROUND
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4. (C-REL U.K.) The United States and the United Kingdom
concluded a CWC Host Country Agreement (HCA) in 1997.
Following U.S. participation in a U.K. challenge inspection
exercise, the United States and United Kingdom initiated a
dialog regarding the differing interpretations of the HCA,
and agreed to negotiate an exchange of letters (reftel).


5. (C-REL U.K.) Several exchanges regarding the differing
views took place, and in December 2008, Clive Rowland, of the
U.K.'s Office of Counterproliferation and Arms Control within
the Ministry of Defense, provided a letter, dated November
25, 2008, to Dr. Deborah Ozga of the U.S. Joint Staff
containing comments on the U.S. draft letter of February

2008. The USG has reviewed the letter, held subsequent
discussions on the margins of the CWC Executive Council
meetings in 2009, and drafted a formal response below.


6. (C-REL U.K.) During the discussions, the United States
suggested that in view of the difficulties concerning the
sampling issue, the two sides continue to work that issue,
but go forward on the exchange of letters since all other
outstanding issues have been resolved. The United States
also proposed that contact information be exchanged for
making initial notifications that a challenge inspection is
called involving the other Participant,s assets. The United
Kingdom agreed to the U.S. proposal.


7. (C-REL U.K.) Washington is eager to finalize the exchange
of letters if the U.K. accepts the current U.S. proposal.
Washington seeks post to deliver the cover letter and current
U.S. proposed text attached below. (The new U.S. proposed
text is in brackets.)

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Action Request
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8. (C-REL U.K.) Post is requested to contact appropriate
U.K. officials to deliver the talking points in paragraph 9
and the letter and draft annex in paragraphs 10 and 11.

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Talking Points
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9. (C-REL U.K.) Talking points for the Government of the
United Kingdom:

(Begin talking points.)

- The United States appreciates U.K. efforts to resolve
outstanding issues related to the implementation of our 1997
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the conduct of Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections involving our
two countries.

- Based on the letter, dated November 25, 2008, provided by
Mr. Clive Rowland to Dr. Deborah Ozga of the Joint Staff in
December 2008 and subsequent discussions between the U.S. and
U.K. representatives on the margins of the CWC Conference of
the States Parties Meeting in The Hague, we have prepared
comments to the U.K. proposals contained in the December 2008
letter.

- As discussed in The Hague, we have added text for the
continuation of sampling discussions upon formalization of
this exchange of letters.

- Also per our discussions, we have added text concerning
exchanging initial Point of Contact information to be used if
a Challenge Inspection is called involving both of our
assets. Changes to the original text are noted by brackets.

- We believe the time is ripe to formalize the understandings
that have been achieved over the past few years of
discussions and look forward to finalizing our letters of
exchange.

(End talking points.)


10. (C-REL U.K.) U.S. response to U.K. letter for delivery:

(Begin draft text of letter.)

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): Implementation of
Challenge Inspections under the 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU): U.S. response to U.K. Letter dated
November 25, 2008.

Introduction:

The United States appreciates the United Kingdom's efforts to
negotiate an exchange of letters to clarify differing
interpretations of our 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Challenge Inspection Host Country Agreement (HCA),and its
recent written response, dated November 25, 2008 to Dr.
Deborah Ozga of the Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense.
The numbering of our response corresponds to the numbering in
your letter, and we have added an additional Item (Item 8)
listing points of contact.

We believe the attached Annex ) with the few exceptions
listed below ) represents the understandings we have
achieved during our discussions over the past several years.
If the United Kingdom agrees, including to the few new
changes proposed by the United States, we believe that this
Annex (once the United Kingdom furnishes the Point of Contact
information requested in new Item 8) could form the basis for
the exchange of letters both sides have sought.

Comments on the Annex are as follows:

Item 1: Determining Acceptable Inspectors

The United States regrets that the phrase &subject to
the changes below8 caused confusion when placed under Item

1. Our intent was to note that the document had been through
several rounds of discussions, both formal and informal, and
that all of the changes (throughout the document, not just in
Item 1) were applicable. However, our placement of that
language under Item 1 could lead to the conclusion that
&subject to the changes below8 applies only to Item 1. We
believe that all of the changes proposed and acceptable by
both sides are now reflected in the annex ) accordingly,
&subject to the changes below8 is not necessary.

Item 2: Requesting State Observer (RSO)

The United States welcomes the U.K. proposal to hold an
informal dialogue on the handling of the Requesting State
Observer in order to share lessons learned, understand each
others, procedures and identify likely problem areas. We
suggest that such dialogue occur on the margins of the
&close allies8 meeting scheduled to take place during
summer 2010 in Washington.

Item 3: Managing Inspection Preparation Time

Issue 2: 108 Hours

The United States can accept the U.K. amendments with the
additional change to read as follows:

"The participants will consult to determine a suitable
handling and presentation strategy that addresses public and
media relations and that reflects the national positions and
interests and priorities of both the United States and United
Kingdom. This will focus on the need to demonstrate
compliance with the CWC expeditiously (begin bracketed text)
while allowing both participants to exercise their rights as
necessary to safeguard their national security (end bracketed
text)."

Item 6: Public Affairs

The phrase &to develop a joint8 was inserted in the first
sentence for clarity.

Item 7: Laboratory Analysis Samples

The United States believes that more discussion will be
required to reach consensus on this issue and proposes that
the current understandings on all other items be finalized
with the understanding that further discussions will continue
to resolve this matter.

Additional Item: Item 8: Point of Contact

The United States recommends that initial Points of Contact
should be exchanged to enable expedient exchange of critical
data during a challenge inspection. Therefore, the United
States has added the following text:

For the purpose of implementing paragraph III.B.1 of the MOU,
the United Kingdom should as an initial point of contact
inform the United States of a challenge inspection at the
United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone 1
202-647-9166, fax 1-202-647-4892) and the United States
European Theater Command Center ( 49-711-680-5064, fax
49-711-680-5064). The United States should inform the
United Kingdom at (tel., fax to be filled in by the United
Kingdom).

(End of Text.)


11. Draft Letter of Exchange for delivery.

(Begin Text.)

Annex

Understanding between the Governments of the United States of
America and the United Kingdom Regarding the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Conduct of
Certain Challenge Inspections Pursuant to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, dated
December 5, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the "MOU."

The United States and the United Kingdom hereinafter referred
to as "the participants," have reached the following
understandings regarding implementation of the MOU:

Item 1: Determining Acceptable Inspectors

With respect to Part III, A.1. of the MOU, the participants,
in all applicable situations, will inform the inspection team
during the pre-inspection briefing if U.S. assets are within
the inspectable area and, as a result, will inform the team
that U.S. considerations must be applied in determining
access to those assets.

The participants expect the Technical Secretariat to ensure,
consistent with paragraph 2 of Part II of the Verification
Annex that no inspector that is unacceptable to the United
States will participate in inspection activities of an asset
(begin added text) of the United States (end added text) or
(begin added text) a (end added text) facility under U.S.
control. Failing this, consistent with the managed access
provisions in Part X of the Verification Annex, particularly
paragraphs 41 and 48, the United States will only allow
individual inspectors that have been accepted by the United
States, or sub-teams consisting only of accepted inspectors,
access to U.S. assets (begin added text) and facilities (end
added text).

In those situations where it can be reasonably established
from the inspection request that U.S. assets are likely to be
within the requested perimeter, the participants will jointly
remind the Technical Secretariat regarding U.S. sensitivities
in this regard prior to the arrival of the inspection team at
the Point of Entry (POE) (begin deleted text) unaware of the
presence of U.S. assets within the requested perimeter (end
deleted text).

Item 2: Requesting State Observer (RSO).

With respect to Part III, A.2. of the MOU, the participants
will consult on whether or not to accept the RSO and, as far
as possible, (begin added text) agree (end added text) (begin
deleted text) decide (end deleted text) on an (begin deleted
text) agreed (end deleted text) approach to managing the RSO
during the challenge inspection. If the RSO is unacceptable
to one of the participants, options such as designation of an
observer from a third country or acceptance of the RSO by one
participant and use of managed access (begin added text) with
regard to (end added text) (begin deleted text) around (end
deleted text) the (begin deleted text) other's (end deleted
text) assets (begin added text) of the other participant (end
added text) should be explored.

Item 3: Managing Inspection Preparation Time.

Issue 1: Equipment and POE Activities.

With respect to Part III, B.3. and 4., and Part III, C.3. and

4. of the MOU, the participants will ensure that if the
assets of one participant are involved in an inspection where
the other participant is the inspected State Party, the other
participant will be allowed to conduct its own inspection of
the inspection team's equipment and the participants will
(begin added text) jointly ensure that (end added text)
(begin deleted text) make clear (end deleted text) this
requirement for review by both participants to the inspection
team.

In addition, if different methodologies regarding POE
activities create a situation in which the inspected State
Party believes that it is necessary to commence the
inspection, the inspected State Party will ensure that the
other participant's assets are not inspected or monitored
until such time as (begin added text) assets of (end added
text) the other participant (begin deleted text) 's assets
(end deleted text) have been prepared for inspection within
the period permitted in the Convention.

In the event of a delay in agreeing to the final perimeter,
the participants will consult to determine the best way to
conduct exit monitoring (begin added text) so that (end added
text) (begin deleted text) of (end deleted text) all
inspectable vehicles (begin added text) will exit (end added
text) (begin deleted text) exiting (end deleted text) the
requested perimeter as soon as possible and not later than 12
hours after the inspection team,s arrival at the POE.

Issue 2: 108 Hours.

With respect to Part V, B.1. of the MOU, both participants
will be allowed up to 108 hours, if necessary, to prepare
their assets for the inspection, pursuant to Part V, B.1. of
the MOU. If the inspected State Party determines that its
assets are prepared prior to those of the other participant,
the inspected State Party may make its assets available to
the inspection team for inspection so long as the (begin
added text) assets of the (end added text) other participant
(begin deleted text) 's assets (end deleted text) are not
affected in any way.

The participants will consult to determine a suitable
handling and presentation strategy that addresses public and
media relations and that reflects the national positions and
interests and priorities of both the United States and United
Kingdom. This will focus on the need to demonstrate
compliance with the CWC expeditiously (begin bracketed text)
while allowing both participants to exercise their rights as
necessary to safeguard their national security (end bracketed
text).

Item 4: Managing Access

Issue 1: Perimeter Negotiations

With respect to Part IV, A., B., and C. of the MOU, the
participants will consult on a joint approach to perimeter
negotiations. Both participants (begin added text) will (end
added text) (begin deleted text) should (end deleted text) be
involved in these negotiations if assets of both countries
are included or adjacent to the requested perimeter, or if,
pursuant to Part IV, B.1., it cannot be determined whether an
asset of the United States is included within the inspectable
area.

Issue 2: Ships and Aircraft

The participants will consult promptly in the event of a
challenge inspection to determine whether any U.S. sovereign
warships or aircraft are in the affected area. If this is
the case, the participants would jointly inform the Director
General of the OPCW that the United States would need to be
designated as the inspected State Party for such vessels or
aircraft. If this request is denied, the participants should
consult on methods to demonstrate compliance.

U.S. military and other state ships and aircraft, including
some vessels and aircraft that are operated and used at the
time exclusively for government noncommercial service, enjoy
sovereign immunity. Aircraft, vessels, or land vehicles for
which the United States is not asserting sovereign immunity
are defined as inspectable assets.

Issue 3: Overflights. The participants will consult on the
provision of aerial photographs to the inspection team as
well as the offering of any aerial overflight of the
inspected site, where US assets are included, or where such
provision may impact or compromise preparations to receive
the challenge inspection.

Item 5: Intellectual Property (IP) and Documentation

The participants understand that the definition of asset in
Part I, paragraph 2 of the MOU does not extend to
documentation or intangible technology and that existing
procedures already in place will be used to ensure
appropriate protection of documentation and intangible
technology.

Item 6: Public Affairs

Pursuant to Part VII of the MOU, the participants will
consult (begin bracketed text) to develop a joint (end
bracketed text) public affairs and media handling strategy
for the conduct of the challenge inspection. This (begin
added text) will include (end added text) (begin deleted
text) would cover (end deleted text) public statements, joint
or independent, identification of contact points on site and
in capitals, dealing with media requests for interviews or
television footage etc. and how best to handle any areas
where our respective national positions differ.

Item 7: Sampling and Analysis

The United States and United Kingdom will continue to (begin
added text) seek (end added text) (begin deleted text) work
on toward finding (end deleted text) a common understanding
on procedures for handling the analysis of samples taken
during a challenge inspection.

Item: 8: Points of Contact

For the purpose of implementing paragraph III.B.1 of the MOU,
the United Kingdom should as an initial point of contact
inform the United States of a challenge inspection at the
United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone 1
202-647-9166, fax 1-202-647-4892) and the United States
European Theater Command Center ( 49-711-680-5064, fax
49-711-680-5064). The United States should inform the
United Kingdom at (tel., fax to be filled in by the United
Kingdom).

(End of Text.)
CLINTON