Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10STATE8267
2010-01-27 17:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CFE/HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 28, 2010 HLTF

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE NATO 
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VZCZCXRO9628
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #8267/01 0271739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271731Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7037
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 7152
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// PRIORITY
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 008267 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/15
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE NATO
SUBJECT: CFE/HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 28, 2010 HLTF
AND RELATED MEETINGS

REF: (A) USNATO 522: NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING, (B) USNATO
595: NATO-RUSSIA: SYG'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, (C)
09MOSCOW3139: EUR/RPM DIRECTOR TURNER DEC 16-18 MOSCOW
VISIT, (D) STATE 127435: GUIDANCE ON RUSSIA'S DRAFT
TREATY GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
MEMBER STATES

Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Director, for
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 008267

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/15
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE NATO
SUBJECT: CFE/HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 28, 2010 HLTF
AND RELATED MEETINGS

REF: (A) USNATO 522: NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING, (B) USNATO
595: NATO-RUSSIA: SYG'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, (C)
09MOSCOW3139: EUR/RPM DIRECTOR TURNER DEC 16-18 MOSCOW
VISIT, (D) STATE 127435: GUIDANCE ON RUSSIA'S DRAFT
TREATY GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
MEMBER STATES

Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Director, for
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (C) Allies reaffirmed in the December 2009 NATO
Ministerial Statement their commitment to CFE as stated
in the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, confirmed a
readiness to intensify efforts in 2010 to find a way
forward on CFE, and noted it could be difficult to
continue providing CFE information to Russia in the
future if Russia's "suspension" continues. Discussion
at the January 28 High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting
will center on the need to intensify engagement with
Russia on CFE, especially in the context of Russia's
recently tabled proposals on a European Security Treaty
and NATO-Russia Treaty. Allies will look to the U.S.
for ideas on how to move beyond the CFE impasse as we
develop a unified approach on the broader Russian
proposals in preparing for a NATO Summit, a possible
NATO-Russia Summit and possibly an OSCE Summit
anticipated in late 2010.


2. (C) U.S. goals for the January 28, 2010 HLTF and
associated meetings are as follows:

- Stress that our focus in 2010 as we intensify efforts
to find a way forward on CFE is to change the current
dynamic with Russia without compromising NATO unity. We
do not want to enable Russia to exploit differences.

- Emphasize the need to consider the way forward on CFE
in light of other elements of the European security
dynamic, including Russia's proposals for European
Security and NATO-Russia Treaties, and the facts on the
ground; seek Allied thinking on how these issues
intersect and what a useful fruitful path forward might
be.

- Seek Allied views on next steps on resolving the CFE
impasse while reinforcing the need for unity based on
close consultations and aimed at moving toward a
comprehensive solution.


- Express support for continuing with the NATO CFE
inspection plan and raising Russia's refusals in the
Joint Consultative Group (JCG) stressing the negative
impact of Russia's actions on the CFE regime and
European security as a whole.

- - - - - -
Background
- - - - - -


3. (C) Since the last HLTF in November, Allies have
continued to indicate strong interest in intensifying
efforts to find a solution to the impasse on CFE.
Allies share our dissatisfaction with the lack of
progress on finding a solution on CFE to date, but some
are concerned that any hasty shifts in the Alliance
approach or new CFE initiatives could compromise NATO's
principled positions and divide the Alliance. Some
Allies are not prepared to show additional flexibility
to reach a CFE deal until Russia shows some willingness
to compromise. At the same time, there are some -
Germany stands out - interested in seeing movement
toward a solution in the near term. It is unlikely
Germany will press for action at this HLTF, although the
German rep may lean further forward during pre-HLTF quad
discussions.

STATE 00008267 002 OF 005




4. (SBU) Engagement with Russia on CFE has been limited
in recent months. The NATO Secretary General's mid-
December trip to Moscow (ref B) included discussion of
Russia's proposal to define "substantial combat forces"
in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as well as some
discussion on CFE. FM Lavrov noted Russia has long
sought to define "substantial combat forces" and
expressed Russia's readiness to renew CFE negotiations
on the package approach while stressing Russia was not
considering resuming implementation of CFE at present.
The International Staff intends to raise SYG Rasmussen's
trip report for discussion in the HLTF and note the
possibility that Russia's push to define "substantial
combat forces" in the NRC is a concrete proposal that
signals Russian interest in forward movement on CFE and
deserves serious attention.


5. (C) Alliance unity on CFE remains a priority for the
United States. We want to have an open discussion with
Allies in seeking ideas on how to change the dynamic on
CFE with Russia while maintaining unity and achieving a
comprehensive solution that addresses the security
interests of all CFE States Parties. As we start
exploring ideas and finding common ground on a way
forward, the U.S. should try to temper any sense of
urgency to respond to Russia's proposals without well-
considered positions that lead us toward a solution, and
continue to emphasize the need for a unified approach on
CFE issues. Allies may have heard about the
appointment of a senior U.S. official dedicated to the
CFE issue and will be very interested in any details, as
well as any updates on START follow on negotiations.

- - - - - - - -
Talking points:
- - - - - - - -


6. (SBU) U.S. Del should draw from the following points
in discussions on the way forward on CFE:

-- As we consider the way forward on CFE we believe we
need to view next steps in light of our overall European
security agenda this year, culminating in the Lisbon
summit in November. Secretary Clinton intends to give a
major speech on European security tomorrow in Paris to
frame U.S. thinking on work this year, and the enduring
principles and goals we share.

--Clearly, we need to do some thinking on how we move
ahead on CFE, but we cannot sacrifice our unity or the
underlying principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, host nation consent and transparency. At the
same time, we need an approach that takes into account
other elements of the European security dynamic,
including Russia's proposals for European Security and
NATO-Russia Treaties, and the facts on the ground. The
constructive engagement of Russia will facilitate
greater European security. We must calibrate our way
forward on CFE and our response to Russia's EST and
NATO-Russia Treaty proposals to encourage Russia to be a
responsible stakeholder in European stability and
security rather than a destructive outsider.

- (If asked whether the U.S. is abandoning the
Parallel Actions Package supported by all Allies):
The Parallel Actions Package addresses all the key
issues on the table, and reflects key principles
which we are not abandoning. The question is what
we can do to get from where we are to a more
constructive place.


- As a practical matter there are some aspects of the
European security picture that have not changed for the
better in the last several years. And as NATO develops
its new strategic concept, we will need to take account
of how the Alliance can respond effectively to
challenges that are far more complex than any we have
faced before.


STATE 00008267 003 OF 005


- It is also the case that traditional measures of
security have not changed for the better: partly as a
consequence of Russia's suspension of CFE, we have less
military transparency in Europe than we had five years
ago. Transparency in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian
regions of Georgia is lacking. There are more gray
areas in Europe today than there were a decade ago.
Moreover, there is a need for greater transparency in
all three dimensions of security, not just the pol-
military area that is the focus of the HLTF's work.

- There is no reason to suppose that the Russian
position on CFE issues has changed. But we know that
Moscow has expressed continuing interest in discussions
with NATO on the meaning of the NATO-Russia Founding Act
language on stationing of "substantial combat forces,"
and other issues. A key question for us is where CFE
fits into this complicated picture, and how we translate
"intensified efforts" to move forward on CFE into
concrete results that solve the current impasse.

-- Alliance unity remains important as we look to
intensify our efforts and explore options to change the
current dynamic with Russia to achieve progress on a
comprehensive CFE solution.

-- The U.S. is committed to working hard with you this
year to find a solution that resolves CFE concerns and
preserves the benefits of the CFE regime, as we also
ensure that the solution meets current and forseeable
security needs. [If asked whether a senior official has
been dedicated to the CFE issue: as I said, we are
thinking creatively about how to invigorate our
diplomacy but we're not ready to make any specific
announcements.]

-- At the December NATO and OSCE Ministerials, we made
clear that Allies remain firmly committed to the CFE
Treaty and still seek a solution with Russia while we
signaled to Russia that it is past time to move forward.

-- Although we are keen for progress and open to ideas,
we cannot lose sight of the fact that any solution must
address the security concerns of all 30 CFE States
Parties. We should continue to stress to Moscow that
Russia needs to match the flexibility already shown by
others and join us in implementing CFE.

- - - - - - - -
Russia's European Security and NATO-Russia Treaty
Proposals
- - - - - - - -


7. (C/REL NATO) Discussions on a way ahead for CFE will
take place in parallel with the OSCE's Corfu Process as
well as discussions on Russia's recent draft treaty
proposals. The NRC proposal includes a proposed
definition of "substantial combat forces" which has CFE
implications per ref D. Moreover, the IS has suggested
Russia's interest in defining this term could be read as
an indicator of its interest in progress on CFE,
although there is also the possibility that it is
intended to replace CFE. U.S. rep should seek Allied
views and, as appropriate, note:

-- We believe that the OSCE, with its inclusive
membership and multi-dimensional approach to security,
is an essential venue for discussions about European
security that concern all OSCE participating States.
Consistent with the Presidents' statements, we also
intend to discuss elements of Russia's European security
proposals in the NATO-Russia Council as appropriate.

-- Regarding Russia's NRC proposal, there are some
elements that could be useful to integrate into NRC
work, but we remain concerned by many of the other ideas
and look forward to continued discussions.

-- It is not clear to us that Russia's push to define
"substantial combat forces" is a sign of interest in
achieving a CFE deal. Moscow may well see that as a

STATE 00008267 004 OF 005


substitute for working this in the CFE context, rather
than as a complement to it.

-- The Russian Federation proposal aims to define
explicitly the meaning of the term "substantial combat
forces" as it is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act by
proposing both structural and numerical definitions.
While the structural parameters suggested are familiar
(e.g., 'brigade'),the numerical parameters for
equipment are extremely restrictive. Moreover, this is
the first time we can recall the Russian Federation
proposing that such a definition be made legally
binding.

-- While we welcome Russian proposals, we must consider
carefully how to proceed with this aspect of it in the
context of CFE discussions. Our goal is to achieve
agreement on an overall CFE solution before addressing
specific elements, as appropriate, in the NRC and
elsewhere. Defining "substantial combat forces" is an
element of the package approach and addressing it
separately in the context of the NRC may not advance our
efforts. On the other hand, willingness to define
"substantial combat forces" may eliminate the ambiguity
surrounding NATO enlargement and stationing of troops in
the Baltic States that Russia has long sought as a way
to maintain stragegic predictability, providing a
possible breakthrough for the CFE impasse.

- - - - - - - - -
Contacts and Bilaterals
- - - - - - - - -


8. (C/REL NATO) U.S.-Russia Bilateral Meetings:

-- On December 7, U/S Tauscher met with Russian D/FM
Ryabkov to discuss non-proliferation and missile defense
cooperation. Although there was not a specific
discussion on CFE, both sides agreed it was an area in
which we needed to make progress as it contributes to
European stability.

-- In addition, EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner visited
Moscow December 16-18 to discuss a range of European
security and NATO-Russia issues, including CFE. Turner
met with MFA Department of Security Affairs and
Disarmament (DVBR) conventional arms control director
Anton Mazur who reiterated familiar positions on key
issues and noted Russia's interest in finding a solution
to the CFE impasse on the basis of the Parallel Actions
Package approach. Mazur suggested States Parties should
seek to make some updates to the adapted CFE Treaty now,
specifying that the flank issue cannot be put off. He
noted it would be better to build from the existing
treaty through iterative adaptations rather than
negotiate a completely new treaty.

? During General Jones' January 21 meeting with
Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev, he
affirmed that the United States was ready to engage
with Russia on President Medvedev's European
Security proposals, including in the NATO-Russia
Council.


- - - - - -
As Needed
- - - - - -


9. (C) Russia's proposal for a review of Vienna Document
1999: Per State 4427, we expect Russia to engage in
the Forum for Security Cooperation early this year on
the 2009 Ministerial agreement (MC.DEC/16/09),which,
inter alia, calls on participating States (pS) to
"explore ways in which to strengthen the OSCE's
political-military toolbox, with particular attention to
strengthening current arms control and CSBM instruments,
including strengthening the Vienna Document 1999."
Russia is likely to interpret this as a mandate to
revive the Russian-Belarusian-Kazakh proposal to "re-
open" VD99. Washington currently is reviewing its

STATE 00008267 005 OF 005


approach to VD99 and proposed CSBMs in the context of
broader European security discussions.

-- If raised, U.S. del may note our interest in thorough
discussions (either in Brussels or Vienna, or both)
about the potential benefit(s) to NATO before Allies
pursue specific CSBMs or changes to VD99 in the FSC.

-- If raised, Washington is interested to know if
delivery of Russia's draft treaty proposals has impacted
Allies' willingness to review current instruments.


10. (SBU) U.S.-Russia START negotiations: Allies
appreciate that current efforts underway to finalize
START negotiations are a priority effort and have noted
that a successful outcome could serve as impetus for
progress on CFE. If raised, U.S. del should utilize
press guidance points below to provide any updates on
the status and expected outcome of START negotiations.
Delegation should steer away from commentary on the
negotiations.

-- Senior U.S. and Russian officials met last week in
Moscow to continue discussions on a New START agreement
as well as address a number of other important issues on
the bilateral agenda.

-- The U.S. and Russian delegations are working in
Geneva to reach agreement. We will not make any
predictions about when we will finish negotiations.
What is important is to arrive at a quality agreement
that meets the needs and interests of both sides.

- - - - - -
Next Meeting
- - - - - -


11. (SBU) It is likely the next HLTF will be scheduled
for sometime in March, prior to the April NATO Informal
Minsterial. HLTF rep should support such a meeting
timeline.
CLINTON