Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10STATE15563
2010-02-20 01:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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UNCLAS STATE 015563 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS, THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 23-26, 2010)

REFS:
A) 2010 State 005807(Guidance for Consultations and
Meetings on Issues Related to CW Destruction and the
2012 Deadline)
B) 2009 State 105819 (Guidelines for the 58th Session of
the OPCW Executive Council)
C) 2008 State 126586 (Supplemental Guidance for the 13th
Conference of the States Parties, December 2-5, 2008)
D) 2010 State 007952 (Guidelines for Consultations on
Situations Not Foreseen by the Convention)
E) 2010 The Hague 000039 (Experts' Meeting on the Iraqi
Al Muthanna Bunkers)

-----------------
Summary/Overview
-----------------

UNCLAS STATE 015563

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS, THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 23-26, 2010)

REFS:
A) 2010 State 005807(Guidance for Consultations and
Meetings on Issues Related to CW Destruction and the
2012 Deadline)
B) 2009 State 105819 (Guidelines for the 58th Session of
the OPCW Executive Council)
C) 2008 State 126586 (Supplemental Guidance for the 13th
Conference of the States Parties, December 2-5, 2008)
D) 2010 State 007952 (Guidelines for Consultations on
Situations Not Foreseen by the Convention)
E) 2010 The Hague 000039 (Experts' Meeting on the Iraqi
Al Muthanna Bunkers)

--------------
Summary/Overview
--------------


1. (U) The fifty-ninth session of the Executive Council
(EC-59) will involve much routine Council business.
Several politically loaded issues, both on and off the
agenda, are likely to receive significant attention on
the Council floor and on the margins. The issue of "how
and when" to initiate discussions on the 2012 final
extended chemical weapon (CW)destruction deadline has
not received much attention during the intersessional
period, but the opportunity for mischief remains. And,
of course, the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction progress
reports will provide Iran ample opportunity for
political theater. The issuance of a Note by the
Director-General (DG) on the composition of the
Technical Secretariat (TS) may be used by the South
African ambassador to pressure the DG on the need for
increased geographical representation in the hiring of
TS staff members from the developing world - especially
from the African Group.


2. (U) One issue which is politically loaded and may
consume time on the margins is Michael Hurley's
(Ireland) facilitation on "Situations Not Covered" by
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This was
intended to be a limited effort to address chemical
weapons (CW) recovered in a non-state party during armed
conflict. Some, however, are attempting to take the
issue in a direction (e.g., expanded scope, legally
binding, and application of treaty provisions for
declarations, inspections, and destruction) that is
inimical to U.S. interests. Following several rounds of
consultations and severe criticism of the facilitator's

draft text by several delegations, Hurley recently
circulated a paper containing five elements that that he
hopes could offer a way ahead. The United States, UK
and perhaps other delegations still have significant
problems with Hurley's five elements. In addition, the
Russian delegation is also likely to be anxious to speak
to the U.S. delegation (Del) on the continued
verification measures at converted chemical weapons
production facilities (CWPFs).


3. (SBU) Del objectives for EC-59:
--ensure that the facilitator for Situations Not
Covered, the TS, and key delegations are well aware that
the United States will not accept any decision that is
of expanded scope or legally binding. Work to ensure
that any additional draft that may be tabled is heading
in a direction that the United States can work with;
--ensure that the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction
progress reports are simply noted and work to ensure
that Iran - to the extent possible - becomes isolated
should it decide to use the United States reports to
grandstand on the U.S. projected inability to meet the
extended 2012 CWC destruction deadline; and
--ensure that any discussions or consultations that may
be held on "how and when" to initiate discussions on the
2012 final extended CW destruction deadline remain
focused on the process elements of "how and when."

-------------- --------------
---
Agenda Item/Issue
Paragraphs
-------------- --------------
---

Status of implementation of the Convention (Item 5):
a. Detailed plans for verification of chemical weapons
destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4-5
b. Facility agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6-7
c. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .8-12
d. Progress made in meeting revised deadlines for the
destruction of chemical weapons and related issues. .
13-23
e. Timely submission of declarations under Article VI of
the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
f. Status of implementation of Article X . . . . . . . .
25
g. Status of implementation of Article XI . . . . . . .
26
h. Industry-Cluster issues, including enhancement of
OCPF declarations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.27-30
i. Procedure for off-site sample analysis and adherence
to OPCW Confidentiality Regime requirements. . . . . .
. . .31
j. Implementing the regime for handling confidential
information in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.32
OPCW's Central Analytical Database (Item 6):. . . . .
33-35
Report on the implementation in 2009 of the
recommendations of the External Auditor (Item 7): . . .
. . . . . . . . .36
Administrative and Financial Matters (Item 8):
a. Implementation of the Verification Information
System.37
b. OPCW income and expenditures for FY 2009 . . . . . .
.38
c. Transfer of funds in 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.39
d. Report on implementation of the tenure policy. . . .
.40
e. Composition of the Technical Secretariat . . . . . .
.41
f. Implementation of International Public Sector
Accounting Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .42
g. Adjustments to the Director-General's gross salary .
.43
h. Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02 . . . . . . . . . . .
.44
Report on the Scientific Advisory Board(Item 9):. . . .
.45
OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism effort
(Item 10): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
Any other business (Item 11):
a. Credentials of Executive Council representatives. . .
47
b. Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008
Verification Implementation Report . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .48
c. Key terms used in Executive Council reports. . . . .
.49
d. Enhanced transparency on OPCW procedures . . . . .
50-54
e. Consultations with Iraqi delegation. . . . . . . . .
.55
f. Consultations with the Indian delegation . . . . . .
.56
g. Consultations with the Libyan delegation . . . . . .
.57
-------------- --------------
Item 5: Status of implementation of the Convention
-------------- --------------

--5(a): Detailed plans for verification of the
destruction of chemical weapons--


4. (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve
amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification
of the destruction of chemical weapons at the Leonidovka
chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF),Russian
Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.1, dated November 16, 2009).
The detailed plans for verification and facility
agreements for both the Leonidovka and Maradykovsky
CWDFs are being modified to reflect the specific
chemical weapons to be destroyed and the operational
specifics for the respective second destruction trains.
Del may join consensus in approving the amendments to
the detailed plans for verification for Leonidovka.


5. (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve
amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification
of the destruction of chemical weapons at the
Maradykovsky CWDF, Russian Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.2,
dated November 16, 2009). Del may join consensus for
approval.

--Subitem 5(b): Facility agreements--


6. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian
Federation for the Leonidovka CWDF (EC-59/DG.1, dated
November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on
the Note.


7. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian
Federation for the Maradykovsky CWDF (EC-59/DG.2, dated
November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on
the Note.

--Subitem 5(c): Conversion of chemical weapons
production facilities--


8. (U) The Council is again requested to consider and
note a Note by the TS on a proposal for general
guidelines on the nature of continued verification
measures at converted CWPFs ten years after the DG's
certification of their conversion (EC-56/S/3(asterisk),
dated April 14, 2009),and to approve a draft decision
on the matter (EC-57/DEC/CRP.1, dated June 3, 2009.

(9). (U) Del should work to have both documents
deferred. The issue remains under consideration in
several capitals and Washington is still conducting its
own internal review. Del is encouraged to hold
consultations on the margins of the EC with the UK,
Germans and other interested delegations. Del should
gather as much information as possible on the positions
of other delegations.


10. (U) Del should indicate that the United States
believes that converted facilities need to be assessed
on an individual basis irrespective of the country in
which they are located. Such an assessment should
include current activities of the facility and take into
account the overall configuration of the plant site,
which can be quite large in certain situations, as well
as the activities that are underway there and in
adjacent or adjoining facilities. Converted facilities
that are co-located on a plant site where other chemical
production or processing activities are underway may
pose special risks and therefore require special
verification arrangements to ensure confidence. The
United States is still in the process of assessing all
converted facilities that are subject to continued
verification measures.


11. (U) Washington understands that Russia is
considering the destruction of some of its formerly
converted CWPFs, but has not provided any specific
information. Del should seek the names and locations of
the converted CWPFs that Russia is considering for
destruction. Russia is also interested in learning more
about the process that the United States utilized for
the destruction of the former Marquardt CWPF (part of
the binary program). In November 2000, the U.S.
notified the TS that the Marquardt buildings had been
demolished and in 2001 the TS inspected Marquardt and
closed out the CWPF as destroyed; it no longer falls
under treaty requirements for a converted CWPF. Del
should inform Russia that TS inspections verified the
conversion of the Marquardt facility in 1997 and 1998.
In 2000, the Marquardt facility was sold to another
company who demolished the facility; standard demolition
techniques were used and the destruction requirement was
satisfied, notified and confirmed by the TS in 2001.


12. (U) A State Party: Del should seek a bilateral
meeting with this delegation and inform them of the
points in paragraph (10) above and indicate that the
United States believes that the converted facility may
need to be subject to continuing verification measures.
Del should inform A State Party that the United States
is still developing its position on the type of
verification measures that should apply, and that the
two countries will need to cooperate closely on this
issue. Washington understands from the previous
consultation that A State Party is opposed to new (or
continued) verification measures.

--Subitem 5(d): Progress made in meeting revised
deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons--


13. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
two national papers by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the
status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.1, dated
October 22, 2009, and EC-59/NAT.5, dated January 18,
2010). No substantive action is required on the two
Notes.


14. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
two national papers by the United States of America on
the status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.2,
dated October 20, 2009 and EC-59/NAT.6, dated January
12, 2010). No substantive action is required on the two
Notes.


15. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
two national papers by the Russian Federation on the
status of its destruction activities (EC-59/P/NAT.1,
dated October 19, 2009; and EC-59/P/NAT.2, dated
February 17, 2010). No substantive action is required in
the two Notes.


16. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
two national papers by China entitled "Report on the
Status of the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in
China" (EC-59/NAT.3( asterisk),dated October 14, 2009;
and EC-59/NAT.7, dated January 19, 2010),and two
national papers by Japan entitled "The Report on the
Current Status of the ACW Projects in China" (EC-
59/NAT.4, dated October 15, 2009; and EC_59/NAT.8,
dated January 20, 2010). No substantive action is
required on these four Notes.


17. (U) At EC-58 the Council requested the Chairperson
to engage in informal consultations with interested
delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by
the Council on issues related to meeting the final
extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical
weapons, and to keep the Council informed of these
consultations. The Chair will report to the Council on
informal consultations held in accordance with this
request.


18. (U) Chairman Lomonaco is expected to report on the
positive and generally constructive tone of the first
consultation, and may restate his concept that the
consultations should provide a forum for discussion that
parallels the formal sessions of the Council. As
appropriate, Del should complement the Chairman and
fellow delegations on the productive beginning,
emphasize the U.S. intent for continued, active
participation, and support a reasonable schedule for
addressing the completion of CW destruction by the 2012
deadline. Del should push back if Iran attempts to
reintroduce the concept of an ad-hoc working group, and
deploy previous guidance (Ref. A) should Iran attempt to
open discussion of the U.S. destruction schedule.


19. (U) At EC-58 the Council decided to establish a
facilitation to develop guidelines for the security and
destruction of CW that comes into the possession and/or
control of a State Party in situations unforeseen by the
Convention. The facilitator (Michael Hurley) will report
to the Council on the consultations held.


20. (U) Del should use the margins and informal meetings
with Hurley and other delegations to argue for a draft
decision that is political in nature (e.g., not legally
binding) and focused exclusively on the recovery of CW
in non-state parties during future armed conflicts,
events that were not envisaged by the CWC. A legally
binding draft decision that is of broad and potentially
unlimited scope is not acceptable to the United States.
Any draft decision should also not be declarative in
nature and avoid the use of "shall, must, will" in favor
of "should, may, etc."


21. (U) Del should exchange legal views with the TS
Legal Advisor and work constructively with him, South
Africa and others to focus on the elements presented by
Hurley that may offer common ground. For instance, the
need for an "acceptable level of transparency and timely
reporting" (element 3 of the five elements defined by
Hurley),having a role for the policy-making organs
(element 4),and reporting to the Council (element 5)
contain useful and constructive concepts. Concerning
element 5, Del must avoid use of such terms as "full
facts before the Executive Council for review." The EC
is not a tribunal. The recovering State Party should
provide to the EC information on what was recovered, how
it was handled, secured, or destroyed, and any potential
impact on the safety of the local population and the
environment. This information should be provided in a
manner and at a time that is consistent with
contemporaneous security conditions.


22. (U) Element 1 (threshold for triggering the use of
the guidelines) and Element 2 (verification in
accordance with the Verification Annex and CWC) as
drafted, are problematic. The basic problem is that
there should be no "threshold for triggering the
guidelines" and " application of the CWC" because the
recovery of CW in a non-state party during periods of
armed conflict was not foreseen by the drafters of the
CWC. Therefore, elements 1 and 2 are not acceptable. A
possible way ahead may be to put general treaty
references in the preambular section of a draft decision
with the admonition that recovering States Parties
should be mindful of these CWC provisions and should
attempt to guide their actions in that spirit.
Operative sections of the text could focus on the
limited scope of the draft decision, the non-binding
nature of the political agreement, along with elements
on transparency that would be desirable but not
mandatory, and recommended guidelines for reporting to
the EC with due accommodations for safety and security
considerations, as assessed by the recovering State
Party.


23. (U) Del should oppose any efforts by some
delegations to make this a separate and regular EC
agenda item. This is not necessary. The issue
currently falls under Status of Implementation and that
is where it should be handled until the interested
States Parties believe enough progress has been made to
warrant discussion by the Council.

--Subitem 5(e): Timely submission of declarations under
Article VI of the Convention--


24. (U) The Council is requested to note the Note by
the DG on the timely submission by States Parties of
declarations under Article VI of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (EC-59/DG.8, dated January 29, 2010). No
substantive action is required on the Note.

--Subitem 5(f): Status of implementation of Article X--


25. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a
report by the DG on the status of implementation of
Article X of the Convention as at 31 December 2009 (EC-
59/DG.12,dated February 9, 2010). No substantive action
is required on the Note.

--Subitem 5(g): Status of implementation of Article XI -
-


26. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a
report by the DG on the status of implementation of
Article XI of the Convention as at December 31, 2009
(EC-59/DG.13, dated February 11, 2010). No substantive
action is required on the Note.

--Subitem 5(h): Industry-Cluster issues, including
enhancement of OCPF declaration--


27. (U) The Council has considered a Note by the TS on
enhancing information on the characteristics of plant
sites in other chemical production facility (OCPF)
declarations (EC-53/S/5, dated June 17, 2008) and a Note
by the DG concerning information on the enhancement of
OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11, dated June 17, 2008) at
previous sessions, and is requested to consider the
Notes further.


28. (U) No action is required on these two Notes. There
has been no progress through consultations on these two
Notes since EC-57. Previous Del guidance on the two
Notes still applies (Ref. B). As appropriate, Del should
restate the need for the TS to provide assessments that
clearly demonstrate the beneficial impact that would
result from implementing the actions proposed in TS and
in the DG Notes. Del may support the TS continuing its
efforts to better focus OCPF inspections by working with
States Parties in considering alternative approaches to
those contained in the two Notes.


29. (U) Del should raise the United States' concern with
the lack of progress in addressing longstanding
industry-related issues, in particular in expanding the
OCPF selection methodology to implement fully the
provisions of Paragraph 11 of Part IX of the
Verification Annex to include proposals by States
Parties, and the need for the Council to identify
qualified facilitators so that key issue can be
addressed.


30. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
the report by the DG on the performance of the modified
methodology for the selection of OCPFs for inspection
(EC-59/DG.5, dated January 18, 2010). No action is
required on this report. The report provides an update
of the report noted during EC-58 (first year (2008)
report) and covers the first two years of
implementation. The results are consistent with 2008
report except that in 2009 there were fewer sites
selected of high relevance to the CWC (high A14 scores)
and the maximum limit (20) on numbers of Schedule 3 plus
OCPF inspections was reached by China and the United
States, resulting in higher than statistically
predictable OCPF selections in other States Parties -
Iran complained about this issue in EC-57 and EC-58. The
initial inspection of a large number of Schedule 3 plant
sites in China likewise appears to have resulted in
higher than statistically predicted OCPF selections in
the United States. The future impact of this development
will need to be discussed within the interagency. Del
guidance on comments still applies (Ref. B).

--Subitem 5(i): Technical arrangement between the TS and
designated laboratories concerning the procedures for
off-site analysis of samples and for adherence to the
requirements of the OPCW Confidentiality Regime--


31. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a
Note by the DG entitled the "Technical Arrangement
between the TS and Designated Laboratories Concerning
the Procedures for Off-site Analysis of Samples and for
Adherence to the Requirements of the OPCW
Confidentiality Regime" (EC-57/DG.5, dated June 3,
2009). No substantive action is required on the Note.
However, Del should request clarification from the
German and French delegations on their concerns with the
Note.

--Subitem 5(j): Implementation of the regime governing
the handling of confidential information by the TS in
2009--


32. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a
report by the DG on the implementation of the regime
governing the handling of confidential information by
the Secretariat in 2009 (EC-59/DG.6 C-15/DG.1, dated
January 27, 2010). No substantive action is required on
the Note.

--------------
Item 6: OPCW Central Analytical Database
--------------


33. (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the
Secretariat on continued inclusion in the OPCW Central
Analytical Database (OCAD) of analytical data for
analytical derivatives of scheduled chemicals (EC-
57/S/1, dated June 11, 2009). No substantive action is
required on the Note.


34. (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by
the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by
the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-58/DG.4, dated
September 4, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on
the inclusion (EC-58/DEC/CRP.1, dated September 10,
2009). Del may agree to approve the decision.


35. (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by
the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by
the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-59/DG.3, dated
December 16, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on
the inclusion (EC-59/DEC/CRP.4, dated January 21, 2010).
Del may agree to approve the decision.

-------------- --------------
Item 7: Report on the implementation in 2009 of the
recommendations of the External Auditor
-------------- --------------


36. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a
Note by the Secretariat on the status of implementation
of the recommendations of the External Auditor (EC-
59/S/1, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action
is required on the Note.

-------------- -
Item 8: Administrative and financial matters
-------------- -

--Subitem 8(a): Current status of implementation of the
Verification Information System--


37. (U) The Council is requested to take note of the
status report on the Verification Information System
(EC-59/S/3, dated February 1, 2010). No substantive
action is required on the Note.

-- 8(b): OPCW income and expenditure for the financial
year to 31 December 2009--


38. (U) The Council is requested to note a report by
the DG on OPCW income and expenditure for the financial
year to 31 December 31, 2009 (EC-59/DG.9, dated February
4, 2010. No substantive action is required on the Note.

--Subitem 8(c): Transfers of funds in 2009--


39. (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the
DG on transfers of funds during 2009 (EC-59/DG.7 C-
15/DG.2, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action
is required on the Note.

--Subitem 8(d): Report on the implementation of the
policy on tenure--


40. (U) The Council is requested to note a DG report on
implementation of the tenure policy in 2008 (EC-57/DG.4,
dated 3 June 2009),and an addendum dated February 8,
2010). No substantive action is required on the Note.

--Subitem 8(e): Composition of the Technical
Secretariat--


41. (U) Following deliberations at CSP-14, the Council
is requested to discuss and take a decision on the
structure and content of a yearly report on the
composition of the TS. The Council is requested to
consider a Note by the DG on this subject (EC-59/DG.10,
dated February 8, 2010). This yearly reporting was
instigated by the South African ambassador, who is
seeking more transparency on TS hiring practices and
continues to push for greater hiring of African
candidates. This item is likely to be deferred, as it
is difficult for the Council to take a decision on a
document that has not been circulated only two weeks
before the session. Del may support deferral of the
document.

--Subitem 8(f): Implementation of the International
Public Sector Accounting Standards--


42. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
the Note by the Secretariat on the status of
implementation of the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards (EC-59/S/4, dated February 12,
2010). No substantive action is required on the Note.

--Subitem 8(g): Adjustment to the Director-General's
gross salary--


43. (U) A decision of the Conference at its First
Special Session (C-SS-1/DEC.4, dated 25 July 2002)
stipulated that the terms of appointment of the DG shall
be subject to adjustments by the Council to keep the
terms in line with those of other executive heads within
the United Nations system. The Council is requested to
adopt a decision adjusting the Director-General's gross
salary (EC-59/DEC/CRP.3, dated January 21, 2010). Del
can join consensus on a decision that will adjust the
DG's gross salary in line with other executive heads
within the United Nations system.

--Subitem 8(h): Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02--


44. (U) The Council is requested to consider the
amendment to Staff Rule 9.4.02 (this document is not yet
available to delegations),and to recommend the
amendment to the Conference at its Fifteenth Session
(this document is not yet available to delegations). If
not raised by others, Del should request that
consideration of these documents be deferred until EC-60
due to their late distribution.

-------------- --------------
Item 9: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board
-------------- --------------


45. (U) The Council is requested to note the report of
the Fourteenth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board
(SAB) (SAB-14/1, dated November 11, 2009) and the Note
by the DG in response to the report of the Fourteenth
Session of the SAB (EC-59/DG.4, dated January 14, 2010).
No substantive action is required on the Note.

-------------- --------------
---
Item 10: The OPCW's contribution to global anti-
terrorism efforts
-------------- --------------
---


46. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
the Note by the DG on the status of the OPCW's
contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts (EC-
59/DG.11, Dated February 8, 2010). No substantive action
is required on the Note. Del should, as appropriate,
take the floor and thank the DG and associated staff for
producing this very comprehensive report. The TS should
be encouraged to provide regular updates. Per Ref. C,
Del should explain, as necessary, U.S. "redlines" on
chemical safety and security. Specifically, Del should
point out that the OPCW is not organized or staffed as a
chemical terrorism organization and that the OPCW should
not develop requirements or guidance documents for
States Parties or industry that provide direction on
chemical safety and security.

--------------
Item 11: Any other business
--------------

--Credentials of representatives to the Executive
Council--


47. (U) The Council is requested to consider and
approve an addendum to the report by the DG on the
credentials of representatives of members of the
Council. Del should review this document when available
and may agree to approve the document.

--Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 Verification
Implementation Report--


48. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
the corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008
Verification Implementation Report (VIR) (EC-
58/HP/DG.1/Corr.1, dated December 29, 2009). No
substantive action is required on the Note.

--Key terms regularly used in Executive Council reports-
-


49. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note
the Note by the Secretariat on key terms used in the
reports of the Council (EC-59/S/2, dated January 29,
2010). No substantive action is required on the Note.

--Enhanced transparency in the procedure of the policy-
making organs of the OPCW--


50. (U)The Note by the Chairperson entitled "Enhancing
Transparency in the Procedures of the Policy-Making
Organs of the OPCW" (EC-59/2, dated 4 February 2010) has
been circulated to members of the Council. As
Washington understands it, the Council is not being
asked to approve or note this document; it is a proposal
of basic guidelines on transparency measures for when
informal groups meet under the policy-making organs in
effort to resolve a deadlocked issue.


51. (U) Washington is aware of the perceived lack of
transparency regarding the meeting of informal
gatherings to try and resolve deadlocked issues in a
small group setting. The absence of transparency and
inclusiveness can undermine the perceived legitimacy of
the outcome or even prevent agreement. This is an on-
going problem that should be addressed in some capacity.
The Note by the Chairperson is too restrictive though.
For instance, convening informal groups as "a last
resort" (paragraph 6a) could mean in reality that such a
group never convenes. Also, the informal gathering
should not be "a step prior to the convening of open-
ended facilitation" - such a process would likely undue
any agreement reached in the informal gathering.
Regional consultations (paragraph 8) should not be
allowed to hold-up progress within the informal group or
to prevent the Chairperson from giving regular progress
reports. It is also not appropriate (paragraph 9) that
the conclusions of the informal group be presented to
the facilitation group before the outcomes are tabled in
plenary. A facilitation is not a ratifying or approving
body and such a mechanism adds an unnecessary layer and
would likely result in prolonged consultations and a
breakdown of agreement.


52. (U) Del should approach Lomonaco early and seek
clarify on his intentions. Are his intentions to have
the discussion paper noted, or to convene a consultative
process? Del can support the aims of the paper (e.g.,
increased transparency) but should lay down a marker
that the paper as drafted is too restrictive. The
overall responsibility of the Chairperson is to achieve
results. Restrictive requirements or prescriptive
guidelines for small-group work (a standard component of
multilateral negotiations) can interfere with the
Chairperson's ability to make progress and resolve
roadblocks.


53. (U) Del should work with Lomonaco on the elements
of his Note that may offer a way ahead. For instance,
having representation from each regional group attending
small-group gatherings will help facilitate
transparency. The facilitator of the facilitation and
the Chairperson should be invited to all small group
gatherings. The Chairperson should also be encouraged
to present regular progress updates to the Council from
the informal groups. The Chairperson may also encourage
other interested delegations to attend small group
gatherings.


54. U) Del should also seek out the views of other key
delegations. While the Council is not taking action on
this Note, Del should make it clear to the EC Chair and
other delegations, that the basic guidelines as
presented do not constitute any operating guidance for
the policy-making organs. The guidelines are simply a
suggestion and Del should work to steer them in a
direction as outlined above. If the guidelines are
presented in a manner that conforms with above guidance,
del may agree to note the note - if necessary.

--Consultations with the Iraqi delegation--


55. (SBU) Six participants from Baghdad are expected to
join their CWC delegation during EC-59 for bilateral
meeting on the margins. The U.S.-GOI agenda should
include continued discussion of specifics on GOI
reporting of recovered CW; status of GOI decisions on
making corrections via amendment to the CWC declaration
and a proposal to use encapsulation for the Al Muthanna
bunkers, as suggested by the TS during recent GOI-U.S.-
TS experts' meeting (Ref. E); and GOI preparations for
presentations on the proposed amendment and its general
plan for CW destruction to be presented during EC-60 in
April. Del will focus on addressing any open questions
from the experts meeting, eliciting Iraq's decisions and
timeline for deploying its general plan and planning for
USG assistance to GOI preparations for EC-60.

--Consultations with the Indian delegation on industry
issues-


56. (U) Consultations may be held with the Indian
delegation on industry issues including preparations to
host inspections, host team procedures during
inspections and evaluation of the effectiveness of
inspections as a follow-up to discussions held on the
margins of CSP-14.

--Consultations with the Libyan delegation on CW
destruction -


57. (U) The United States should continue consultations
with the Libyan delegation on the status of its CW
destruction and conversion efforts. Del should seek out
the UK and Italian delegations to determine whether a
joint meeting among the four delegations would be more
productive.
CLINTON