Iran Pursues Cultural Evolution, Not Revolution

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000037

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/15
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SCUL IR
SUBJECT: Iran Pursues Cultural Evolution, Not Revolution

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In August 2009, Supreme Leader Khamenei condemned
the teaching of Western social sciences and humanities and called
for a second cultural revolution. With authorities concerned by
the re-opening of universities providing new opportunities to
protest the presidential election, Khamenei's speech suggested the
IRIG would take a long-term view toward the eliminating the toxic
Western influences as the root cause of student discontent.
Months later, hundreds of students have been arrested or expelled
from universities and several professors fired, but Khamenei's
sweeping second cultural revolution has not yet materialized.
Rather, IRPO contacts have described the threatened changes at the
university level as part of a broader effort to roll back academic
and artistic freedom and Western influence since Ahmadinejad was
elected in to his first term. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In an August 2009 speech to several dozen university
professors and Basij students, Supreme Leader Khamenei called for
revision in the teaching of humanities and social sciences,
suggesting that they had a corrupting influence that taught
students to disdain Islam, and implicitly contribute to opposition
to the regime. Throughout the fall, other government officials
announced plans to segregate classrooms by sex, to increase the
Basij presence in university classrooms and to place clerics in
schools across country, as well as rewrite textbooks to bring them
into line with the values of the Islamic Republic. Several months
on, authorities have acted to contain demonstrations on university
campuses and students' involvement in mass protests through an
increased law enforcement presence on campus, arrests of suspected
student leaders, disciplinary action against others accused of
participating in protests, and using Basijis to attack and
intimidate students. There have been reports of firing of some
lecturers and professors sympathetic to the opposition. On
January, 12 professors from Allameh Tabatabaei University were
forced to retire for writing a letter to the university's president
in support of a colleague and students who had been arrested.
(NOTE: The Cultural Revolution took place from 1980-1987 and led to
the closure of universities for three years and the purging of
university faculties. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Our contacts have told us, however, that the IRIG has yet to
institute the wholesale, sweeping changes intent on removing
"un-Islamic influences" Khamenei and others have promised. A
US-based Iranian-American professor with contacts in the humanities
faculties at several Iranian universities said that professors have
lowered their profile, including declining invitations to
conferences in the US, but have continued to teach without
problems. She speculated that the authorities have held off on more
severe measures to avoid further inflaming university campuses.
Another Iranian academic we met in Dubai said that there had been
no sign of a coming cultural revolution at his university.
Authorities had made it clear to him and his colleagues, however,
that contacts with foreign universities and organizations,
particularly American ones, were to be avoided.


4. (C) Rather than a revolution, our contacts in academia, the arts
and in the press have said Khamenei's statement should be
considered as part of a broader process to tighten control over
education and the arts that began with Ahmadinjad's election in

2005. Like the cultural revolution, however, this process has had
the same goal of minimizing Western influences and, more recently,
defending Iran in the perceived "soft war" with America. It has
led to increased censorship, the ouster of moderate officials in
various ministries, and increased scrutiny by the security services
of any activity considered detrimental to the Islamic Republic.


5. (C) The government has given special attention to the domestic
and foreign media in trying to control information and limit
criticism. An Iranian journalist contact told us that in addition
to increased pressure on reformist newspapers, journalism faculties
at various universities are being reduced, while prospective
journalism students are being required to interview with
authorities to assess their ideological conformity before they are
accepted. State-run news outlets are also being directed to hire
graduates from IRGC-affiliated Imam Hossein and Imam Ali
universities. The press section of the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance (Ershad) has lost any pretense of independent
decision making, and it has been totally subordinated to the
security services, according to Western journalists. Ershad
officials who in the past would advocate on behalf of accrediting
Western journalists have been replaced, as the IRIG has restricted
foreign media presence in Iran.

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6. (C) Other examples we have heard are as follows: Artists have
told us that Ershad's cultural division is now staffed by
conservatives who take a negative view of any art that is not
religious. Consequently, many exhibitions have gone underground
and some galleries closed. Filmmakers are required to get Ershad
approval to begin shooting a film and another permit to show it,
and our contacts have said that Ershad has become more rigid in its
approvals, pushing filmmakers toward films that are nationalistic
or mindless entertainment. These bans have forced many Iranian
films to be screened at foreign film festivals because they are
banned at home. Ironically, semi-official and state run news
agencies are quick to hail their success when they are awarded
prizes in trumpeting the artistry of Iranian film. Security
officers banned actress Fatemeh Motamed Arya and documentary
filmmaker Mojtaba Mirtahmasb from traveling to Hollywood as part of
an Iranian delegation invited by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts
and Sciences because of their visible support for Mir Hossein
Mousavi. State broadcaster IRIB, which has been heavily criticized
for its bias during the campaigns and its slanted reporting of
unrest afterward but remains the leading source of information for
most Iranians, in December announced that is was going to increase
the amount of religious programming and that women appearing on air
would no longer be allowed to wear makeup.


7. (C) Authorities have also recognized, however, that they cannot
eliminate all foreign cultural influences and that they need to
offer some alternative. Satellite dishes continue to proliferate
in Iran, with an estimated 80 percent of Iranian public having
access to satellite programming, according to contacts familiar
with research data. Access to most other foreign broadcasts,
particularly entertainment channels, is not blocked. Facing a
boycott of the annual Fajr Film Festival, Iran's largest filmfest
and part of the 10 Days of Dawn celebrating the anniversary of the
Islamic Revolution, authorities allowed the screening of a few
Iranian films that had been banned. And IRIB, in the face of
competition from foreign satellite channels like Farsi 1 and MBC
Persian and boycotts of its programming, has also been trying to
develop game shows and big-budget miniseries to maintain its
audience. Although this may suggest easing of restrictions on
arts and entertainment, observers have said that they are tactical
pauses brought on by the post-election unrest not a change in
direction.


8. (C) COMMENT: The Supreme Leader's call for a second cultural
revolution follows what has been the incremental tightening of
government control on freedom of expression since Ahmadinejad took
office in 2005. The postelection demonstrations and subsequent
calls among demonstrators to end the Islamic Republic have given
these efforts a new impetus. Although the IRIG has always limited
criticism and "un-Islamic" expression, Khamenei's August speech
portends a long-term effort to try again to suppress the ideas and
influences -- what he has termed "cultural aggression" -- that
present a threat to the regime and form the basis of the what
authorities perceive as the "soft war" against Iran.
EYRE