IRAN:MOUSAVI MESSAGE SPLITS PRINCIPLISTS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RPO DUBAI 000001

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/03
TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN:MOUSAVI MESSAGE SPLITS PRINCIPLISTS?

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 1 Green Path Opposition (GPO) leader Mir
Hossein Mousavi issued his 17th declaration, titled "The Events of
Ashura and the Following Days." Decrying Ashura-day regime
brutality and describing as futile government efforts to end the
current crisis via mass arrests and suppression, he proposed a five
point solution, to include creating a fair and transparent election
law, freeing all political prisoners, instituting press freedom and
recognizing the peoples' right to gather and to form political
associations and parties. Noticeably, he did not call for the
abrogation of the June election and said that the Majlis and
Judiciary should deal with the Ahmadinejad administration within
the framework of the Constitution. Some moderate Principlists such
as Mohsen Rezai expressed support for Mousavi's letter, while
Principlists associated with President Ahmadinejad denounced both
Mousavi, and Rezai for supporting him. As one prominent Iranian
political analyst expressed to IRPO, this latest Mousavi letter
seems designed primarily to foster division within Iran's ruling
factions and to allow whatever moderates there are left more
ammunition in supporting Mousavi and working against Ahmadinejad.
END SUMMARY.




2. (U) On Friday, January 1 Green Path Opposition (GPO) leader Mir
Hossein Mousavi issued his 17th Declaration, on "The Events of
Ashura and the Following Days." Decrying Ashura-day regime
brutality and describing as futile government efforts to end the
current crisis via mass arrests and suppression, he proposed a five
point solution, adding that movement towards fulfilling any one of
these points could help considerably in fostering unity. The five
proposals were:



- (1) 'ANNOUNCING THE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
IN RELATION TO THE NATION, THE MAJLIS,AND THE JUDICIARY...'such
that it is not given unusual support in the face of its weaknesses
and shortcomings, and it is directly accountable for the problems
it is creating for the nation. If the Administration is effective
and deserving it will be able to answer the people and the Majlis
and if it is inefficient and insufficient, the Majlis and the
Judiciary can deal with it within the Constitutional framework."



- (2) CREATING A TRANSPARENT AND CONFIDENCE-CREATING ELECTION LAW



- (3) FREEING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RESTORING THEIR
REPUTATIONS



- (4) FREEDOM OF PRESS/MEDIA AND ALLOWING PRINTING OF NEWSPAPERS
THAT HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN



- (5) OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS FOR LEGAL
GATHERINGS, FORMATION OF PARTIES AND OTHER GROUPS, AND OBSERVANCE
OF ARTICLE 27 OF THE CONSTITUTION [NOTE: Article 27 [Freedom of
Assembly]: 'Public gatherings and marches may be freely held,
provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to
the fundamental principles of Islam.']




3. (U) Other highlights of Mousavi's statement included:



- ADMINISTRATION'S CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC INABILITY: Mousavi
condemned corruption 'arising from bad policies and lack of
planning... We are ready to show...that today the rights and
interests of the oppressed and workers and laborers and other
classes of the nation are being drowned in one great
corruption...the Twenty Year National Plan, approved by all parts
of the System, today has become a worthless scrap of paper.'

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- ATTACK ON 'IRGC INC:' Mousavi called for the IRGC to withdraw
from its economic activities: '...if a great and powerful
institution like the Sepah-e Pasdaran is calculating the rising and
falling of stock shares every day, it cannot defend the nation and
the nation's interests. It itself becomes corrupt and also draws
the country into corruption.'



ASHURA VIOLENCE/EXCESSES: Mousavi condemned the indiscriminate
violence of regime security forces on Ashura, saying that whatever
excesses and 'desecrations' there were on the part of some
protestors, they were in reaction to regime brutality, which was
'the worst type of desecration.'



- FUTILITY OF REPRESSION AND DECAPITATING OPPOSITION: Mousavi said
that while arrests, violence and suppression might bring temporary
quiet, it won't solve the root causes of the crisis. Similarly, 'an
order to execute, kill or imprison Karrubi, Mousavi or our like
won't solve anything.'



- GPO'S ISLAMIC/NATIONALIST ROOTS: Mousavi denied foreign control
or influence on the GPO: 'I stress the Islamic and nationalistic
identity of the GPO, our fealty to the Constitution, and our
opposition to the dominance of foreigners [aka the West].... We are
not American or British [i.e. pro-American, pro-British]. We have
not send cards of congratulations to the leaders of the great
powers [NOTE: a dig at Ahmadinejad and his congratulatory letter to
President Obama], nor do we have hopes of their help.'



MODERATE OSULIS: MAYBE

--------------




4. (U) Reaction to Mousavi's statement among Iran's ruling
"Principlist" ('Osulgarayan') faction seemed split largely among
the fault line between the Ahmadinejad wing and the so-called
moderate wing (aligned with Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezai and Tehran
Mayor Mohammad Qalibaf). Initial signs indicated that the 'moderate
Osulgarayan wing' seemed either quiet or somewhat supportive of the
Mousavi initiative. One of the main websites associated with this
faction, Ayandeh news, posted Mousavi's letter without any negative
editorializing. Anti-Ahmadinejad former Majlis conservative Emad
Afruq wrote that it was a 'positive sign' in that Mousavi
explicitly expressed his abhorrence for foreign powers such as the
US or the UK and for 'sinister currents' such as the MEK; stressed
the nationalist-Islamic nature of his efforts; and made explicit
his commitment to work within the Constitution. Other public
comments by both conservatives and others similarly noted
Mousavi's 'compromises' in this statement.



REZAI BACKS MOUSAVI STATEMENT

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5. (U) More significantly, that same day (June 1) Expediency
Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai made public his letter to the
Supreme Leader in which he supported Mousavi's statement. Rezai
wrote that 'Mousavi's retreat from denying [the legitimacy of]
Ahmadinejad's administration and his constructive suggestion that
the Majlis and Judiciary act according to their legal duties in
terms of making the Administration accountable, although late, can
serve as a movement unifying the protestors with others.' As such,
he suggested Khamenei send a message or guidance [presumably in
reaction to Mousavi's statement], which 'could be a new movement
for unity, brotherhood, forgiveness and common sacrifice in
society.' Rezai letter to the Supreme Leader Khamenei also made
much of the December 30 pro-government demonstrations, which he

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wrote 'nullified the enemy's plans' and could 'serve as the start
of a new initiative to move the country forward and end the
confusions and ambiguities of the last few months.'



AHMADINEJAD OSULIS: NO

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6. (U) Pro-Ahmadinejad conservatives were having none of it,
expressing disapproval both for Mousavi's letter and more so for
Rezai's endorsement of it. Kayhan's January 3 main headline read
'Mousavi's New Statement Copied from CIA, Mossad.' Prominent
pro-Ahmadinejad Majlis representative Hamid Rasai lashed out at
Rezai for asking Supreme Leader Khamenei to implement the wishes of
'the seditionist leaders,' while representative Hojjatoleslam
Musavi Qorbani called Rezai's letter 'simplistic' and showing his
'lack of understanding of the current situation.' Tthe website of
the IRGC's political office 'Basirat' wrote a piece on the 'wave of
criticism' by Iranian political activists in relation to Rezai's
letter, and another one showing the similarities between Mousavi's
statement and comments by President Obama. Pro-Ahmadinejad Majlis
Representative Ruhollah Hosseinian also criticized Rezai's letter,
saying that seeking unity with seditionists is treason.'



MOUSAVI'S GOAL: DIVIDE OSULIS?

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7. (C) A prominent US-based Iranian analyst made the following
points to IRPO about Mousavi's letter [paraphrase follows]:



- Unlike many of Mousavi's pronouncements, this one was 'carefully
worded' and didn't seek Ahmadinejad's removal over the election.
It placed the responsibility of removing Ahmadinejad on Majles and
the Judiciary 'if and when... the incompetence of the government
becomes evident.'



- Mousavi sought to 'keep Khamenei out of the equation' by
accepting his role constitutionally and yet giving him a way out of
the crisis, which allowed Rezai to issue his statement;



- Obviously Mousavi knows that the hardliners and probably Khamenei
will not accept his proposals but this statement was not written
for them. It was intended to give Rafsanjani more room to maneuver
from within (again Rezai's statement is significant here) and to
find more allies within the regime. It was also intended to unarm
the hardliners or at least give them less ammunition for attack, by
affirming his commitment to Iran's constitution and by showing that
Mousavi isn't seeking to bring down Khamenei and the system. In
this manner the statement sought to increase the rift within the
conservative faction. It is of course not clear it is going to
work but it is an attempt to start a process of negotiation based
on the argument that what has been done so far has proven
disastrous to the Islamic Republic.



THROWING AHMADINEJAD

UNDER THE BUS?

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8. (C) COMMENT: The paragraph seven analysis immediately above
seems on the money, in that this latest Mousavi statement seems

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primarily a stratagem to divide the ruling Osulgarayan faction,
provide more ammunition to Rafsanjani in his attempts to woo the as
yet uncommitted elite, and to encourage the Supreme Leader if not
to 'throw Ahmadinejad under the bus,' to allow the Majlis and other
political players to continue to weaken his position. However,
Mousavi's attack on IRGC economic interests in this latest
statement seems to ensure that at least one large and important
segment of those seeking to neutralize the GPO will remain
unconvinced of the need for compromise. END COMMENT.
EYRE