RSAF LTG FAISAL COMPLAINS TO AFCENT COMMANDER

S E C R E T RIYADH 000080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA
SUBJECT: RSAF LTG FAISAL COMPLAINS TO AFCENT COMMANDER
ABOUT LACK OF U.S. WEAPONS RELEASABILITY TO SAUDI FORCES

REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1687

B. RIYADH 33

Classified By: A/DCM Lisa M. Carle for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY. In a January 6 meeting with U.S. Air Forces
Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage, Royal Saudi
Air Force (RSAF) Commander Prince (Lt Gen) Abd-al-Rahman
bin Fahd Al-Faisal Al-Saud laid out an extensive laundry list
of releasability problems the RSAF was enduring in trying to
obtain U.S. weapons technologies. In both his private
meeting with Lt Gen Hostage and a series of briefings, Lt Gen
Faisal described in great detail the shortages of urgently
needed munitions and other equipment to prosecute the battle
against the Houthi rebels. He first likened the situation to
one where a neighbor's house is on fire and the closest
neighbor refuses to help, citing policy reasons. He later
said when the U.S. sold its weaponry, it was like a car
dealer selling five cars, but with only eight tires. Lt Gen
Faisal also asserted that he had conclusive proof of Iranian
involvement in the Houthi insurgency: the RSAF had bombed a
mountaintop site, killing some Iranians whose bodies were
later shipped to Bandar Abbas. END SUMMARY.

RELEASABILITY PROBLEMS AND THE HOUTHI FIGHT
--------------


2. (S) Before presenting a series of briefings, RSAF
Commander Lt Gen Faisal held a one-on-two meeting with U.S.
Air Forces Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage and
U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) Chief Maj Gen Paul Van
Sickle. Lt Gen Faisal and Lt Gen Hostage both stressed the
importance of maintaining a strong, close friendship and an
even keel despite whatever political circumstances they might
face. (NOTE: At the last minute, both Prince Khalid bin
Sultan, the MODA Assistant Minister for Military Affairs, and
General Salih bin Ali Al-Muhayya, MODA Chief of the General
Staff, refused to see Lt Gen Hostage. It may have been a
message of unhappiness about the lack of U.S. technology
releases to KSA, and/or unhappiness about proposed new TSA
airport screening procedures for Saudi citizens (Refs A and
B). Lt Gen Hostage asked Lt Gen Faisal to give both of them
his best regards. End Note.)

IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE HOUTHI REBELLION?
--------------


3. (S) Lt Gen Faisal made two interesting comments about the
Houthi effort: he indicated the Saudi military had moved many
villagers from their villages and had sterilized a 5 km swath
along the border, turning it into a free-fire zone. Clearly,
they are using this crisis to strengthen border security.
Additionally, he said they had proof that Iran was involved.
They had attacked a mountain-top site, reputed to be a
transmitter site and Kaytusha rocket assembly site. He said
the Saudi Air Force bombed it and killed many. He said his
intelligence reported that 30 bodies were removed and sent
to Eritrea, where Jordanian bodies were then shipped to
Jordan and Iranian bodies were shipped to Bandar Abbas. He
assured Lt Gen Hostage his intelligence information was
definitive.


OUR HOUSE IS ON FIRE AND THE U.S. WON'T HELP
--------------


4. (S) Lt Gen Faisal spent the rest of the private office
call laying out a series of technology releasability problems
facing the RSAF that were preventing it from prosecuting the
battle against the Houthi border infiltrators effectively,
focusing in particular on slow munitions releases. Lt Gen
Faisal likened the situation to one where a neighbor's house
bursts into flame, and the closest neighbor says he will
cross the fence soon to help, but then doesn't, citing policy
as preventing him, but hoping he will still be considered a
very good friend. Meanwhile, others who are not close
friends are helping. Lt Gen Hostage said he was not directly
involved in weapons export control policy, but he would send
a message back to his leadership. It was apparent that Lt
Gen Faisal was told by his own leadership to convey this
releasability message.

RELEASABILITY: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH NATIONS
-------------- --------------



5. (C) Lt Gen Faisal opened the briefings by inviting Lt Gen
Hostage on his next visit to travel to RSAF bases across
Saudi Arabia. He highlighted the RSAF's long and positive
relationship with AFCENT. Jumping quickly to the main issue,
Lt Gen Faisal said "compatibility and interoperability come
through releasability." He appealed to Lt Gen Hostage to
"fight together" to get the necessary weapons systems
released to Saudi Arabia because it was in the best interests
of both nations. He expressed appreciation for joint
exercises with AFCENT, and for major exercises such as Red
Flag, adding that the RSAF also participated yearly at the
Air Warfare Center exercises in UAE because it wanted to gain
from U.S. experience. Lt Gen Hostage echoed Lt Gen Faisal's
comments about the long, steady friendship between RSAF and
AFCENT.

THE LAUNDRY LISTS OF RSAF NEEDS
--------------


6. (C) Col Khalid Shablaan, RSAF Directorate of Operations
and Plans, presented the RSAF,s initial briefing, describing
its history, and leading up to the present day need to for
the KSA to build its own military industrial base in order to
increase employment for young Saudi men. He added that the
RSAF would also rely more greatly on local depot maintenance
for the same reason. (NOTE: Maintenance and Logistics are
not RSAF strong suits.)


7. (C) The Director of Operations and Plans, Maj Gen Al
Garni, provided the following list of urgently needed
weapons to which the U.S. had yet to respond:
JSOW (currently not released to KSA by OSD);
SLAM-ER (currently not released to KSA by OSD);
AGM-88E HARM/HDAM (currently under USG review for FMS, CTA
for KSA has been approved);
JASSM (currently not released to KSA by OSD);
AIM-120D (not released for FMS by OSD, no Export version
available);
Small Diameter Bomb (GBU-39) (currently not released to KSA
by OSD);
NCTR (Non-Cooperative Target Recognition) (currently under
USG review for FMS);
ECCE Pod integration with 274 mb/sec data transfer rate.
(Released to KSA but at a slower transfer rate of
approximately 137mbs)

The Ops Director asked for a more precise response to the
RSAF,s request to participate again in Green Flag and Blue
Flag exercises, hopefully by 2012. (USMTM AFD advisors have
been told the RSAF would not be invited to a GF unless they
were a member of the coalition. The RSAF was briefed about
GF while attending a RED FLAG exercise at Nellis. Currently
there are no BF exercises scheduled due to continued &real
world8 efforts by CAOC personnel, AFD advisors have worked
with AFCENT to invite the RSAF when the next BF is scheduled.)

Maj Gen Al Garni highlighted a new request for intelligence
sharing on COIN operations TTPs (tactics, techniques and
procedures) for conducting asymmetric warfare, along with
COIN lessons learned. Lt Gen Hostage offered to bring a team
to discuss COIN operations.


8. (C) The Operations Director outlined the need for
releasability of U.S. secure communications for air platforms
from Britain and France: Typhoons, MRTT Airbus refuelers,
Cougars and Tornados. He specifically noted that the Saudi
Air Force was aware that the Australians had been approved
for U.S. secure comms on their Airbuses, and the French had
told them they would either have to delay delivery or &do
something else.8


9. (C) Lt Gen Faisal said the problem with the Saturn
Radios on the British Typhoons was that the U.S. Have
Quick-II technology was embedded in them and the U.S. said
its technology was not releasable. Did the U.S. have an
alternative recommendation? He made a special plea for
resolution of this issue. For the MRTT Airbus refuelers,
Cougar helicopters and Tornado jets, the need was for
expedited release of MIDS/SY-100/SAASM communications
technology.


10. (C) The Director of Arms and Ammunition, Brig Gen Al
Ghamdi, explained the RSAF,s need for LANTIRN targeting pod

spare repair parts. (NOTE: The USAF has accelerated the
shipment of the first 14 Sniper pods and a contract for an
additional 21 is expected to be signed by April 2010.) Brig
Gen Al Ghamdi stressed that the contract for the additional
21 should be accelerated. He also stressed the immediate
need for GBU-10, -12, -24 and -31/38 (JDAMS) munitions.
(Note: the GBU-10's are due in country in mid-January; the
GBU-12's in March, the JDAMS in September 2010; but the RSAF
wants them all as soon as possible.) The RSAF also did not
want to wait two years for the GBU-24/WGU-43, but asked for
immediate release and delivery of WGU-39's instead.

GBU-10 MK-84 FAILURE RATE AGAINST HOUTHI POSITIONS
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Lt Gen Faisal said he did not know the total number
of GBU-10 laser guided bombs that have been dropped so far
against Houthi targets on the Yemeni border, but there were
30 ) 40 that were duds. Citing aerial photos as evidence,
Lt Gen Faisal stated the bombs had hit their targets but
failed to explode. He thought the problem might be nose-well
cracks with the Mk-84 (bomb body component of the GBU-10)
that were produced by General Dynamics, but not those
produced by Raytheon. He asked about the USAF failure rate
in Afghanistan. Lt Gen Hostage explained that his failure
rate was .01% per thousand bombs dropped. He described the
USAF's &cradle to grave8 testing and maintenance on its
bombs. He offered USMTM and other experts, help to
investigate, which Lt Gen Faisal indicated he would accept.


FIVE CARS WITH ONLY EIGHT TIRES
--------------


12. (C) Summing up the delays and the lack of releasable
systems, Lt Gen Faisal said the situation was like a car
dealer who sold five cars, but with a total of only eight
tires. Lt Gen Hostage said he would add his voice to those
of other military officers to see if there was any way to
expedite specific urgent cases, but he outlined the arms
export legalities that must be observed. Maj Gen Van Sickle
assured Lt Gen Faisal that USMTM was tracking all of the
weapons cases closely and moving each case forward as quickly
as possible. Lt Gen Hostage invited Lt Gen Faisal to visit
his Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar to see for
himself whether there would be cause to partner with the U.S.
in Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense. They hoped
to see each other at the upcoming Bahrain Air Show. Lt Gen
Faisal related that the RSAF was thinking seriously about
buying two C-17 aircraft. Discussions were underway with
USMTM and the manufacturer (Boeing). (NOTE: A capabilities
briefing is scheduled in Kingdom later this month.)

COMMENT: MODA ISN'T HAPPY
--------------


13. (C) It was clear that Lt Gen Faisal was instructed to
press Lt Gen Hostage on RSAF releasability problems. He
raised the same issues in both the private office call and
briefings. He made no mention of Saudi interest ) or not )
in purchasing the F-15 SA aircraft on offer, and he offered
little chance to address other business.
SMITH