Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10RIYADH79
2010-01-13 16:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

AFCENT COMMANDER DISCUSSES AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Tags:  MASS MOPS PREL SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHRH #0079/01 0131604
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131604Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2310
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RUETIJS/CSG JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T RIYADH 000079 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA
SUBJECT: AFCENT COMMANDER DISCUSSES AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
WITH SAUDI AIR DEFENSE AND NAVY COMMANDERS

REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1687

B. RIYADH 33

Classified By: A/DCM Lisa M. Carle for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T RIYADH 000079

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA
SUBJECT: AFCENT COMMANDER DISCUSSES AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
WITH SAUDI AIR DEFENSE AND NAVY COMMANDERS

REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1687

B. RIYADH 33

Classified By: A/DCM Lisa M. Carle for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY. In January 5 meetings with Royal Saudi Air
Defense Forces (RSADF) Commander LTG Abdulaziz Mohamed
Al-Hussein and Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF) Commander VADM
Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud, U.S. Air Forces
Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage broached
CENTCOM,s desire to pursue Regional Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (RIAMD) together with all the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Both service chiefs
were receptive to partnering and exercising under RIAMD, and
to learning more about it. Lt Gen Hostage invited LTG
Hussein to visit his operations center in Qatar to enhance
interoperability. Both Hussein and Fahd described the
ongoing battle against Houthi infiltrators on the Saudi
border, with both lamenting that U.S. delays in releasing
needed weapons technologies were hindering the Saudi effort
to defend its territory. (Lt Gen Hostage's meeting with RSAF
Commander Prince Faisal reported septel.) END SUMMARY.

RELEASABILITY PROBLEMS AND THE HOUTHI FIGHT
--------------


2. (S) RSADF Commander LTG Hussein and U.S. Air Forces
Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage and U.S.
Military Training Mission (USMTM) Chief Maj Gen Paul Van
Sickle discussed Yemen, agreeing on the need for President
Saleh to deal effectively with the Houthi rebellion and
establish stability. Asked how the Saudi military's efforts
were progressing to expel the Houthis from the Saudi border,
LTG Hussein replied that the fight would be going better if
the Saudi defense forces "could get the stuff we need on
time" from the U.S. He complained in particular about the
U.S. delay or inability to release encrypted cell phones to
the KSA military. He noted that such cell phones were
available on the open market, but the Saudi government still
preferred to turn to the U.S. for equipment. (Comment )
phones are not available for sale in KSA ) the company
(General Dynamics) needs an export license. RSADF wrote an
official LOR that was received 3 January and turned over to
the Embassy with a country team assessment so that DOS

embassy can grant an export license. The RSADF commander was
under the impression that this could be done with a phone
call ) these are encrypted SIPR/NIPR/CAC enabled phones that
may not be releasable and the RSADF is looking for this to be
a direct commercial sale.) "There are good guys" in
Washington, LTG Hussein said, but they don't have the full
picture of the battleground from so far away, he lamented.

PARTNERING ON RIAMD: &IT WOULD BE INTERESTING8
-------------- -


3. (S) LTG Hussein expressed confidence that his Air Defense
Forces could "shoot down anything that flies over" Saudi
airspace. (NOTE: This confidence stems from recent Patriot
as a Target (PAAT) LFX where they shot down 7/9 targets.) Lt
Gen Hostage used this opening to explain his role as the
support commander in CENTCOM for Regional Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (RIAMD),explaining that his network of
satellites, radars, and Aegis cruisers could detect missile
launches anywhere in the AOR as they left the ground, such as
a Shahab-3 from Iran. This would enable the U.S. to give GCC
countries earlier notification than they could detect
themselves with only their Patriot batteries, and he urged
Hussein to work together with him as he developed bilateral
networks with GCC countries to share such information. LTG
Hussein said the RSADF would benefit from sharing such
information and capabilities and would like to exercise such
scenarios. Acknowledging that the RSADF was the most capable
air defense force in the region, Lt Gen Hostage invited him
to visit his Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar
to see for himself whether there would be cause to partner
with the U.S. in RIAMD. LTG Hussein welcomed exchange
visits, stating that he would like to expand the relationship
with AFCENT, and it would be of interest to him "to see how
things fit together" in the CAOC. Lt Gen Hostage related
that he expected to see a Theater High Altitude Air Defense
(THAAD) system deployed to the AOR within the next year,
along with an AN/TPY-2 radar soon.

SHARING CRITICAL ASSET LISTS

--------------


4. (S) Noting that he had his own Critical Assets List (CAL)
of key Saudi critical infrastructure sites, Lt Gen Hostage
said it would be worthwhile to compare lists with the RSADF.
LTG Hussein agreed, commenting that there could never be
enough defense of critical infrastructure. (NOTE: Lt Gen
Hostage and the U.S. Office of Program Management/Facilities
Security Forces (OPM/FSF) Chief BG Catalanotti also agreed to
share their lists.) Lt Gen Hostage pointed out that this was
another reason to become RIAMD partners. Deconflicting who
would shoot at which incoming missiles or aircraft was
another important element of RIAMD cooperation. "The more an
adversary sees that we are difficult to attack, the less
likely he will be to attack," Hostage concluded.

IRANIAN MISSILES AND PROPAGANDA
--------------


5. (S) Lt Gen Hostage asked for LTG Hussein,s views of
Iran,s Shahab-2 and -3 missiles. By showing their missiles
in public, Hussein responded, the Iranians mixed their
weaponry with propaganda. He said he had seen their Hawk air
defense missiles, but he wasn't sure all the Iranian systems
actually worked. Still, he stated, their missile systems
have to be taken seriously, and "we are very concerned,"
which was why Shared Early Warning (SEW) was so important.
Lt Gen Hostage noted that that was what he could offer with
his satellites. In addition, Maj Gen Van Sickle related that
a U.S. team would be in place by the end of January to finish
setting up Saudi Arabia's new SEW system. LTG Hussein
remarked that the RSADF had waited too long for the SEW
system.


6. (S) Maj Gen Van Sickle mentioned that Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) head Lt Gen O'Reilly would visit KSA in February
and Van Sickle hoped that Gen O'Reilly could make a joint
presentation to MODA (Ministry of Defense and Aviation)
commanders. Lt Gen Hostage said he worked closely with MDA,
which had provided him a linked architecture for a recent
integrated missile defense exercise between the CAOC, U.S.
Patriot batteries and Aegis cruisers. As the U.S. side
became well integrated, the next step was to regionalize
integrated air and missile defense with GCC partners, he
elaborated. LTG Hussein said a Command Post exercise was
needed to have all the partners see the same picture. Lt Gen
Hostage explained that that was indeed his goal: to exercise
and synchronize efforts. He said a Missile Defense Center of
Excellence (COE) was being established in the region for
training purposes that would enable countries to train
without having to disrupt their operating national defense
systems. He hoped that Saudi Arabia would join the COE once
it was opened. LTG Hussein said he hoped so, too, commenting
that Patriots systems without early warning were pointless.
Lt Gen Hostage observed that the role of Link-16
communications architecture was to knit the Patriots as well
as other systems with each other. He said the U.S. Air
Force, Navy and Army were learning to work with each other on
missile defense, to which LTG Hussein responded that the
Saudi military liked to work together with its U.S.
counterparts, and Lt Gen Hostage concurred. He invited LTG
Hussein to observe a U.S. MD exercise in late March.

RSNF TAKE ON RIAMD COOPERATION ) AND RELEASABILITY
-------------- --------------


7. (S) In a subsequent meeting with RSNF Commander VADM
Fahd, Lt Gen Hostage described again his goals for RIAMD,
noting he could link in RSNF capabilities for littoral
defense as all regional systems began to be tied together.
VADM Fahd replied that he would be willing to cooperate with
the U.S. in any capacity in order to help the RSADF. He also
pointed to requests from the U.S. Navy for similar
cooperation. Lt Gen Hostage explained that he worked very
closely with USNAVCENT (Naval Forces Central),and both
AFCENT and NAVCENT could work with the RSNF on RIAMD,
pointing out that U.S. capabilities could help protect Saudi
critical assets. But there would be a need to train together
against ballistic missile, cruise missile and aircraft
threats, and he outlined the goals of the COE.


8. (S) VADM Fahd said all the RSNF had was CIWS (close-in
weapons system) point defense for its ships. He had been
trying to explain to higher authorities the need for better

naval air defense assets ) "if we get the right stuff, and
not less capable systems," he added, obliquely referring to
U.S. unwillingness to release its most capable weapons
systems to KSA. The Admiral stated that the two sides would
have to examine whether Saudi systems would be able to
contribute, "so that if your ships are away, ours can cover
the area." He said he had considered the two U.S. ships in
competition for a new RSNF contract, and he did not think
that either would meet 100% of the RSNF's requirements
without significant design changes. He said the RSNF worked
closely with the RSADF and the U.S. Navy. The key issue, he
stressed, was to have SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) MD systems
"up there looking."


9. (C) VADM Fahd posited that the RSAF (Royal Saudi Air
Force) got whatever it wanted, unlike the RSNF. He suggested
that U.S. interlocutors should press Prince Khalid bin
Sultan, MODA Assistant Minister for Military Affairs, and
others up to King Abdullah about the RSNF,s need for better
weapons systems to be able to defend itself. He half-joked
that the RSNF would like to be better at air defense than the
RSADF.

FAHD: IRANIANS INVOLVED WITH HOUTHIS
--------------


10. (C) Lt Gen Hostage asked for VADM Fahd's take on how the
fight against the Houthi infiltrators was progressing. Fahd
said the Houthis got the message that they were not welcome
in the Kingdom and that the KSA had the right to defend
itself. He said the RSAF in particular was doing a good job
and its efforts needed to be supported (by the U.S.). He was
sure "the Houthis are not doing what they are doing because
they want to." Rather, they were working according to
"someone else's" agenda. "This is not speculation, but
fact," VADM Fahd asserted, pointing out that when one looked
at the Iranian official spokesman's and Foreign Minister's
comments, one could see evidence of Iran,s involvement. He
believed that Iran was trying to build a Hezbollah-like
terrorist group in the Houthi area of Yemen. He thought it
would be wiser to bring development to that region than to
leave it undeveloped and under the influence of outside
actors.


11. (C) VADM Fahd stated that President Saleh should be
listening to the opposition leaders in the South, and he
should be doing more to develop infrastructure in his
country, but he needed help. Fahd said he didn't want Yemen
to become a failed state like Somalia, and he tied Al Qaeda
in Yemen to Al Qaeda in Somalia, commenting that all the poor
tribesmen in both countries managed to carry sophisticated
weapons -- "who is the outside actor?"

COUNTER-PIRACY EFFORTS NOT EFFECTIVE
--------------


12. (C) Piracy was another problem that should have been
solved early on, VADM Fahd remarked. "From Somalia to
Afghanistan, it is not a healthy situation for us for Muslims
to act this way," he observed. "There has to be a solution."
Lt Gen Hostage said participation in the counter-piracy
Combined Task Force was a good step, but Fahd pointed out
that 10 ships had been pirated lately, and no one had stopped
the pirates. "If a thief knows he can enter your house and
take what he wants, why wouldn't he?" VADM Fahd exclaimed.
"Why have a navy there ) it's like a cop not stopping a drug
dealer. What good is it?" he wondered. VADM Fahd concluded
that the military and the civilian side formed two hands, and
"you can't work one-handed," calling for more aid to the
Somali people.


13. (S) COMMENT: Both LTG Hussein and VADM Fahd welcomed Lt
Gen Hostage's invitation to partner in RIAMD, although Fahd
was a little more cautious. He seemed taken aback at first
to be meeting with a U.S. Air Force counterpart, but he
quickly warmed to the discussion. As VADM Fahd observed,
RSNF has no significant air or missile defense capability
until acquisition of Saudi Naval Expansion Program II (SNEP
II)/Eastern Fleet Modernization Program (EFMP),at which time
RSNF is proposed to acquire the Surface Combatant Ship (SCS)
equipped with the AEGIS SPY-1F combat system. The SM-2 Block
IIIA missile is currently approved for sale to Saudi Arabia,
which does not have an anti-ballistic missile capability.
However, as noted above VADM Fahd is interested in acquiring

SM-3, which does have an anti-ballistic missile capability.
SNEP II/EFMP is awaiting approval from King Abdullah. AFCENT
will press RSADF Commander Hussein ) and RSAF Commander
Prince Faisal ) to visit the CAOC at the earliest
opportunity to see firsthand the opportunities that could be
on offer in partnering in regional integrated air and missile
defense.
SMITH