POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

S E C R E T RIYADH 000061

NOFORN
SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN
STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS: ECON, PREL, EFIN, KTFN, SA
SUBJECT: POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR

Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and
Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials
to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in
Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO
officials shared with Mabahith detailed information on the
financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist
groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mabahith pointed
to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP),Saudi Arabia's
overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban
matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith
pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in
the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban
leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith
asked GRPO and Treasury to provide additional detailed and
actionable information to assist in its investigations.

2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence
exchange session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through
the previously shared intelligence, which suggested that
Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi Arabia
in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the
information provided, to work through intelligence channels
to share information and results, and submit additional
requests for information. END SUMMARY.

(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network

3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the
Saudi government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and
highlighted the importance the USG places on combating
Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives
significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion,
but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives
significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious
threat and stated that Saudi authorities can more easily
target al-Qaida financing since the group's members are
frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses and
phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however,
usually enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and
may use fabricated travel documents, according to Mabahith.
Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj represents an
opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same officials
further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between
Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering
sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.

5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials
travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but
said they also conduct fundraising activities while in the
Kingdom. Mabahith initially responded that Taliban
reconciliation issues were handled by the GIP and stated that
the Mabahith has very little insight or coordination with the
GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa said that
even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the
auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest
anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.

6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on Tayyeb
Agha, Mullah Jalil, and Khalil Haqqani, three senior Taliban
officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to Saudi
Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence. (NOTE: Information
available to the USG and shared for this exchange included
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information
for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.)
Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to
follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and
Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and
phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates
known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.

7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names
of suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith
recognized Shaykh Abdullah bin Ubayd, a prominent Saudi who

reportedly gave Mullah Jalil $30,000 in September 2008.
Mabahith had no information regarding Ubayd's financial
contributions to the Taliban, but speculated that the money
could have come from a trust or a charity that was associated
with Ubayd, rather than from Ubayd himself. Mabahith pledged
to investigate Ubayd and stated that it would not hesitate to
"press him" regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn
emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize
Taliban fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked
hard to delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving
money to the group.

8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG's new fingerprinting
system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be
more effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel
through official points of entry, than it will be against
al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters, who enter the country
illegally. Mabahith also stated that this system should
reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents used at
official points of entry. They pointed out the country's
large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they
expect to encounter.

(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about
Pakistan-based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa
al-Sunna (JDQ) and its involvement in attacks against
coalition forces in Afghanistan. GRPO and Treasury passed
names and other identifying information of suspected Saudi
Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith pledged to
investigate the names and follow up through intelligence
channels.

(U) Al-Haramain Foundation

10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful
operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support
activities of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation
(AHF),and pledged USG support for their investigation.
Mabahith confirmed that more than 40 AHF-affiliated
individuals had been arrested as a result and that Mabahith
had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil.
Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were
embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil,
since they had previously arrested and released him based on
an earlier lack of evidence.
SMITH