MISH'AL IN RIYADH, BUT IRAN IS THE REAL FOCUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000037

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY SA
SUBJECT: MISH'AL IN RIYADH, BUT IRAN IS THE REAL FOCUS

REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1683

B. 09 RIYADH 841 (NODIS)

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Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY:
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1. (C) Egyptian President Mubarak, Palestinian Authority
President Abbas, the Turkish Foreign Minister and Hamas
Political Bureau Chief Khalid Mish'al visited Riyadh in the
past two weeks, reflecting a renewed Saudi push on
Palestinian and intra-Arab reconciliation, aimed ultimately
at blunting Iranian influence in the region. The
consultations do not appear to have resulted in concrete
gains --yet-- but Mish'al's visit signaled an end to the
Saudi cold shoulder that followed the collapse of the
Saudi-brokered Palestinian reconciliation (the so-called
Mecca Accords) in 2007. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud
Al-Faisal staged a joint press conference with Mish'al,
explaining to reporters that the visit was "necessary to
remove any doubt concerning Hamas cooperation with Iran in
supporting rebels in Yemen." Mish'al declared that Hamas
"stood with the Kingdom in maintaining the peace and security
of its borders." He added that Palestinian factions were
close to agreement on an Egyptian proposal for
reconciliation, stressing that any deal would be sealed only
in Cairo. End summary.

SAUDI DIPLOMATIC PUSH
--------------


2. (C) In the last two weeks, a parade of key Middle East
Peace (MEP) stakeholders paid calls in Riyadh, reflecting a
renewed Saudi diplomatic push in support of Palestinian and
intra-Arab reconciliation. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
visited Riyadh on December 22-23, followed by Palestinian
National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on December 29
(ref a). Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made his
first official visit to Riyadh on January 2 and the next day
Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khalid Mish'al arrived, to meet
with Saudi FM Saud. On October 4, FM Saud flew to Kuwait to
begin briefing GCC leaders on developments; he will
reportedly continue to Damascus on January 5. (NOTE: A
concurrent visit by Afghan Second Vice President Abdulkarim
Khalili, suggesting developments on the Afghan front, will be
reported septel. End note.)

MISH'AL COMES TO MAKE AMENDS BY...
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3. (C) This was Mish'al's first official visit since 2007
(though he did come for Umrah during Ramadan),the last time
King Abdullah tried his hand at Palestinian mediation, with
the failed "Mecca Accords." Since then the Saudis had made
clear their exasperation with the movement's leaders and had
broken ranks with other Arabs to condemn the Hamas takeover
of Gaza, and even blamed Hamas intransigence at the outset of
the Israeli offensive against Gaza in January 2009. Popular
outrage against the offensive caused a shift in SAG rhetoric,
however, and King Abdullah publicly castigated all
Palestinian factions for their disunity at the Arab League
summit in Kuwait the following month. Senior Saudi officials
emphasized, however that they were not prepared to go beyond
rhetorical exhortations and would leave the mediating to the
Egyptians. Observers were therefore surprised by the sight
of FM Saud holding a joint press conference with Mish'al on
January 3 only days following the visit of Mahmoud Abbas.

...DENYING SUPPORT FOR THE HOUTHIS?
--------------


4. (U) Whereas Abbas was accorded full head of state honors,
and met with the King, Crown Prince and other senior royals,
the Saudis were at pains to show that the Mish'al visit was
more limited, at least in public. Mish'al met only with the
Foreign Minister, and the SAG staged a press conference to
publicly explain Mish'al's purpose: Saud told reporters that
the visit was "necessary to remove any doubt concerning the
movement's cooperation with Iran in supporting rebels in
Yemen." Mish'al added his own categorical denial that Hamas
had assisted the Houthis, saying, "we could not side with

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anyone targeting Arab security whether in the Kingdom or
Yemen." Responding to a question from Okaz, Mish'al declared
that Hamas "stood with the Kingdom in maintaining the peace
and security of its borders."

AND NO MEDIATION
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5. (U) Regarding a Saudi role in mediating between
Palestinian factions, FM Saud insisted that, while the
Kingdom "was at the forefront of Arab states working for the
Palestinian cause," there was no connection between the
visits of Abbas and Mish'al. The Prince urged Palestinian
factions to respond quickly to the latest Egyptian initiative
"to give hope back to the Palestinians."

THOUGH A DEAL MAY BE CLOSE
--------------


6. (U) For his part, Mish'al claimed that Fatah and Hamas
were "close to an agreement," though Hamas still had
reservations about the Egyptian proposal. "We want this
document to conform to what we have agreed with our brothers
in Fatah and the other Palestinian organizations, Mish'al
said. "We will then be ready to sign it in Cairo, with the
others."

IT'S ALL REALLY ABOUT IRAN
--------------


7. (S/NF) In a readout on Mish'al's visit for A/DCM on
January 4, MFA Western Affairs Director Dr. Ra'ed Krimly
denied that the SAG was back in the Palestinian mediation
business. "We are willing to talk to Hamas, but if we talk
it is to encourage them to go along with the Egyptian plan."
Instead, Krimly explained, Mish'al's visit should be
understood in the context of the regional diplomatic
initiative launched by King Abdullah at the 2009 Arab League
Summit in Kuwait, aimed at repairing regional relations,
promoting Palestinian unity following the Gaza conflict, and
strengthening Arab unity. With Saudi-Syrian rapprochement
solidified, Krimly explained, regional players were now
focused on repairing the rift between Cairo and Damascus, to
restore the traditional Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus axis and
strengthen Arab unity. Palestinian reconciliation was only
one benefit that could come from repairing ties with Syria.
(Comment: Deputy FM Dr. Prince Torki argued similarly last
June that the road to Palestinian unity went through Damascus
- ref b. End comment). "Iran will continue to attempt to
sabotage all efforts," Krimly asserted, "and this is why it
is important to reach a full rapprochement with Syria."
Probing for USG views on Palestinian reconciliation, Krimly
recalled that a recent USG visitor had suggested that the US
opposed a reconciliation agreement at a time when "Abbas was
weak." A/DCM responded by stressing the need to continue to
support the PA, noting ongoing Saudi financial assistance and
urging additional resources. Krimly was non-commital.

AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?
--------------


8. (C) Krimly told A/DCM that the SAG remained in listening
mode as far as Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were
concerned. As Prince Saud had reiterated many times,
negotiations required a U.S. articulation of the elements of
a final settlement - "which are known to all." Krimly
volunteered that President Mubarak had detected some new
"flexibility" in his recent discussions with Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu, but in the Saudi opinion, this did not
amount to much in view of the continued construction in
Jerusalem. U.S. assurances were necessary precisely to
counter such actions -- the Palestinians needed "political
cover" to be able to begin negotiations in the absence of a
total freeze on settlements. Such a strategy might enable
discussions regarding borders, Krimly speculated, noting that
the Saudis would support whatever was agreed upon by both
sides on every issue except Jerusalem. On this issue, he
underscored, the Saudis had a stake, and would only accept a
solution that included Jerusalem as the capital of a
Palestinian state.

COMMENT: THE GOAL IS IRAN, THE STRATEGY IS ARAB UNITY
-------------- --------------

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9. (C) Given the Saudis painful --and unsuccessful-- history
in trying to mediate among the Palestinians, their claims
that the successive Abbas and Mish'al visits were not part of
a new Saudi initiative are plausible. Since the 2009 Kuwait
Arab League summit, King Abdullah has been systematically
working to shore up Arab unity as a means to reduce Iranian
influence in the region. Khalid Mish'al's "assurances" that
Hamas did not provide assistance to the Houthis -- also
plausible -- and his support for "Arab security" were
important in that regard. The joint press conference was
likely intended as a rebuff to Iran and a message on Arab
unity. We expect that the Saudis will continue to leave
mediating between Fatah and Hamas to the Egyptians, while
they focus their attention on what they see as a more
important regional strategy: forging stronger ties between
Damascus, Cairo and Riyadh to check Iranian power, with (the
preferred option) or without (the feared option) Arab-Israeli
peace.
SMITH