YEMENI-HOUTHI CEASEFIRE: WILL IT LAST?

S E C R E T RIYADH 000193

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2019
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: YEMENI-HOUTHI CEASEFIRE: WILL IT LAST?

REF: A. 09 SANAA 2117

B. 09 SANAA 2279

C. RIYADH 1621

D. RIYADH 1633

E. SANAA 275

Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (A),(B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary: On Thursday, February 11, the Yemeni
Government announced a ceasefire in its conflict with the
Houthis to take effect as of midnight on February 12th.
While violations and political setbacks are likely in the
days and weeks ahead, the ceasefire ought to hold for the
near term. The Houthis fighters have been weakened by
significant losses and appear to be choosing to put down
their guns while they are still standing rather than risk
being further ground down by Saudi and Yemeni forces.
Importantly, Saudi Arabia has acheived its military
objectives of driving the Houthis away from the border area.
The ceasefire also reflects that the Yemeni government, with
Saudi encouragement, understands the urgency to redirect the
focus of its security forces to the fight against Al-Qaida.
One key unresolved matter is the promised return of five
Saudi soldiers held by the Houthis. If these captives are
not returned to Saudi Arabia in the days immediately ahead,
the Saudi military will likely seek to compel their release
with a resumption of attacks on Houthi targets. End Summary.


2. (U) As reported in reftel (e),the ceasefire went into
effect at midnight on Friday, February 12, 2010 after the
Houthis agreed to six ceasefire terms laid out by the Yemeni
Government. The local press has carried various descriptions
of the six conditions of the ceasefire, which are summarized
below, The Houthis must:

-- end attacks against Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia
forces;

-- release civilian and military prisoners taken during the
conflict, including the five Saudi captives;

-- withdraw from government buildings and military posts
occupied during the fighting;

-- remove checkpoints so that roads can be reopened;

-- return looted items, including arms taken from the Yemeni
and Saudi military; and

-- withdraw from the Saudi/Yemen border area; and


3. (C) Prince Khalid bin Sultan informed Ambassador Smith on
February 7 that a ceasefire was in the works, and his
prediction that something would happen "within a week" has
proven accurate. Prince Khalid also informed the Ambassador
that, as requested by Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Government troops
would be deployed along the Yemeni side of the Saudi/Yemeni
border once the Houthi fighters have fully withdrawn from the
area. Additionally, Prince Khalid said that he would
advocate not permitting the many evacuated villages on the
Saudi side of the border to be re-populated. He prefers that
a 10-kilometer strip on the Saudi side of the border be
retained as an unoccupied military zone.



4. (C) On February 13, Prince Khalid appeared on Saudi
television to declare Saudi support for the Yemeni-Houthi
ceasefire. Prince Khalid noted that the Saudi military would
remain in place along the Saudi border to reinforce the Saudi
Border Guard. He also noted that one important condition of
the ceasefire had not yet been met, which is the return of
the five Saudi soldiers captured by the Houthis. Prince
Khalid said that he expects the return of these captives
"within 48 hours." If the Houthis do not return the Saudi
soldiers in the days immediately ahead, this Saudi military
would likely resume air and artillery operations against
Houthi targets in an effort to compel their release. This
eventuality could put the ceasefire in jeopardy.


5. (S) Embassy Comment: The ceasefire, which brings to a
close nearly five years of on-again, off-again battles with
the Houthis, has the potential to last for some time. Both
sides appear tired of fighting each other. The Houthis have
been beaten, but not vanquished, leaving them able to quit
the fight while drawing pride and accomplishment from their
defiance of the central government. With a ceasefire in
place, the Saudi government can return to its practice of
buying tribal loyalties, and is prepared to do so by funding
substantial development projects in northern Yemen to help
induce Houthi cooperation with the Yemeni government, and in
the words of the Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior
Mohammed bin Nayef "to give the people something to lose."


6. (S) After three months of military operations, the Saudi
military has achieved its primary goal of driving the Houthis
from the border area, teaching them a lesson, and emerging
from the campaign with substantially stronger border controls
in place. The primary Saudi concern at this point is gaining
the release of the soldiers held by the Houthis; our
assumption is that the transfer will happen very soon. The
Yemeni Government has been feeling pressure from both the
U.S. and the Saudis to turn its attention to Al-Qaida, and
now will be better positioned to do so. While ceasefire
violations and protests of bad faith from both sides are
likely over the coming weeks, particularly as the Yemeni
government seeks to reassert its control over Saada,
nonetheless the conditions outlined above suggest that the
agreement to end hostilities should prove durable. End
comment.
SMITH