Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10RIYADH154
2010-02-03 14:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
DEMARCHE RESPONSE: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE
how-toVZCZCXRO5324 OO RUEHBC RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHRH #0154 0341416 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031416Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2434 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0477 RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0588
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000154
SIPDIS
NEA/FO FOR ELISA CATALANO, ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW,
NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC SA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE
IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 09124
B. RIYADH 118
C. RIYADH 123
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000154
SIPDIS
NEA/FO FOR ELISA CATALANO, ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW,
NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC SA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE
IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 09124
B. RIYADH 118
C. RIYADH 123
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) DCM met with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister for
Bilateral Relations, Dr. Khalid Al-Jindan, on February 3 to
solicit Saudi support for the U.S. strategy to mobilize
pressure to persuade Iran's engagement on its nuclear program
per reftel A.
2. (C) Al-Jindan noted that he had attended the London
Conference on Afghanistan together with FM Prince Saud
Al-Faisal, where they had the opportunity to discuss Iran and
other topics with Secretary Clinton on the margins of the
meeting. As he understood it, the time had come to "tighten
the screws," and consider further sanctions. The Saudis were
on board, he continued, if the international community as a
whole had determined that Iran had failed to live up to its
obligations or respond positively to diplomatic gestures.
3. (C) It was important for the international
community--especially the P5--to be in complete agreement as
to the next steps, Jindan stressed. Without a consensus, it
would be impossible to achieve our goals. At this point, P5
member Russia was better, but China "was not really
cooperating," although recently China did appear to be moving
in the right direction. When the Saudis raised the issue of
sanctions with Chinese FM Yang (ref B,C) they found him "more
cooperative than we had thought." We needed to do more to
bring China over to our side, added Al-Jindan. Fortunately,
Iran's refusal to respond to repeated international gestures
was strengthening our case.
4. (C) Al-Jindan stressed the importance of pursuing
"everything short of military action" to prevent a nuclear
Iran. Military action was a "non-option," that could have no
positive results. The problem had to be dealt with in a way
that would not throw the region into a state of turmoil and
negatively impact the economy. Al-Jindan added that as
Iran's neighbor, Saudi Arabia faced a "clear and present
danger" of an attack by a nuclear Iran.
SMITH
SIPDIS
NEA/FO FOR ELISA CATALANO, ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW,
NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC SA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE
IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 09124
B. RIYADH 118
C. RIYADH 123
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) DCM met with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister for
Bilateral Relations, Dr. Khalid Al-Jindan, on February 3 to
solicit Saudi support for the U.S. strategy to mobilize
pressure to persuade Iran's engagement on its nuclear program
per reftel A.
2. (C) Al-Jindan noted that he had attended the London
Conference on Afghanistan together with FM Prince Saud
Al-Faisal, where they had the opportunity to discuss Iran and
other topics with Secretary Clinton on the margins of the
meeting. As he understood it, the time had come to "tighten
the screws," and consider further sanctions. The Saudis were
on board, he continued, if the international community as a
whole had determined that Iran had failed to live up to its
obligations or respond positively to diplomatic gestures.
3. (C) It was important for the international
community--especially the P5--to be in complete agreement as
to the next steps, Jindan stressed. Without a consensus, it
would be impossible to achieve our goals. At this point, P5
member Russia was better, but China "was not really
cooperating," although recently China did appear to be moving
in the right direction. When the Saudis raised the issue of
sanctions with Chinese FM Yang (ref B,C) they found him "more
cooperative than we had thought." We needed to do more to
bring China over to our side, added Al-Jindan. Fortunately,
Iran's refusal to respond to repeated international gestures
was strengthening our case.
4. (C) Al-Jindan stressed the importance of pursuing
"everything short of military action" to prevent a nuclear
Iran. Military action was a "non-option," that could have no
positive results. The problem had to be dealt with in a way
that would not throw the region into a state of turmoil and
negatively impact the economy. Al-Jindan added that as
Iran's neighbor, Saudi Arabia faced a "clear and present
danger" of an attack by a nuclear Iran.
SMITH