Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10RIYADH153
2010-02-02 13:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL ON AFGHANISTAN,
how-toVZCZCXRO4284 PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHRH #0153/01 0331347 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021347Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2432 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4827 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0321 RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0475 RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0586 RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0198
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000153
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF PK
SUBJECT: PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL ON AFGHANISTAN,
COUNTERTERRORISM
RIYADH 00000153 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000153
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF PK
SUBJECT: PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL ON AFGHANISTAN,
COUNTERTERRORISM
RIYADH 00000153 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting on January 30, Ambassador Smith and
Prince Turki Al-Faisal--former GIP Head and Ambassador to the
U.S., and current Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal
Center-- discussed ways to further strengthen the U.S.- Saudi
bilateral relationship; Saudi Arabia's Afghanistan lessons
learned, and how the U.S. might use these to achieve our
current goals; the Saudis' counterterrorism strategy; and why
Islamic extremism surprised the Saudis. Originally scheduled
as a brief courtesy call, the meeting lasted over an hour as
the Prince candidly shared his insider's view on these and
other topics of U.S.-Saudi interest. His daughter, Princess
Mashael, joined her father and the Ambassador for part of the
meeting. END SUMMARY.
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIPS ARE KEY
--------------
2. (U) Thanking the Ambassador for his visit, Prince Turki
noted that the Saudi-American relationship had always been
driven by warm personal relationships at the highest levels.
While these relationships continued, lower-level,
people-to-people exchanges were now of growing importance.
During his time in the U.S., first as a student and later as
the Saudi Ambassador, he had made a concerted effort to
travel widely and engage Americans outside of the nation's
capital. He hoped Ambassador Smith would be able to do the
same in Saudi Arabia.
TRUST BREEDS COOPERATION...
--------------
3. (C) Ambassador asked for Prince Turki's thoughts
regarding the current U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship,
focusing on ways we might be able to intensify our
cooperation on issues of common interest, such as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East Peace. Turki observed
that Saudi-U.S. cooperation and collaboration reached an
unusual peak during the 80's and 90's, when he worked as GIP
Head, but that the relationship remained very close. The
consultations between the King and President Obama were a
reflection of this closeness, he said, adding that the
leaders "had a level of trust in one another" that inspired
cooperation.
...EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------
4. (C) Focusing on Afghanistan, Turki shared some Saudi
lessons learned. Afghanistan was a "puzzle," with a
"peculiarly Afghan" organizational structure that the Saudis
had difficulty making sense of. In his view, establishing
trust with Afghan leaders had been the key to the Saudis'
success at the time, as was recognizing the links between
Pakistan and the Taliban. All financial aid to the Taliban
government was conditional, with the Saudis unwilling to hand
anything over until the fighting had stopped. The same thing
was needed in Afghanistan today-- benchmarks for the
leadership must be set, and aid must be withheld until these
are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation
had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short." Karzai
had asked for Saudi help, but let them down when he began
readying for elections instead of following through with the
mediation process.
PUT THE FOCUS BACK ON BIN LADEN
--------------
5. (C) The Taliban leadership was now fractured, Turki
continued. The media labeled anyone fighting against NATO or
the U.S. as "Taliban," but many were simply crooks, drug
dealers, gangsters or terrorists that profited from the
country's instability. The U.S. and NATO needed to target
these criminal elements more vociferously. Further, we
needed to re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden
and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. The people harboring them were not
doing so for ideological or even financial reasons, Turki
insisted, but simply because there was no longer any real
RIYADH 00000153 002.2 OF 002
cost to doing so. "Since 2003, Bin Laden has been
comfortable...he has had time to plan operations" such as the
Christmas bombing attempt. He suggested Saudi Arabia, the
U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join
forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden
and Al-Zawahiri. This would break the terrorists' "aura of
invincibility" and allow the U.S. to "declare victory" and
move on.
PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE
--------------
6. (C) All things considered, the U.S. response to 9/11 was
relatively measured, said Turki. If the same thing had
occurred anywhere else, the world would have expected to see
far more violent reprisals. The Saudis had learned from the
American response to 9/11, and "resisted the trap" of
retaliating in a way that would only generate more hatred.
He credited Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohamed bin
Nayif for developing the Kingdom's innovative
counterterrorism program, and winning support for it from his
father, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz, the
Crown Prince, and the King. The strategy required patience,
but the King was willing to wait.
IN RETROSPECT, WRITING WAS ON THE WALL
--------------
7. (C) Turki then discussed the 1979 siege of the Great
Mosque in Mecca, observing that he--and the rest of the Saudi
leadership--had a blind spot when it came to believing
someone could do something so violent in the name of Islam.
In retrospect, the signs that a problem had been brewing were
clear. He took issue with the thesis that the event marked
the birth of Al-Qaeda, claiming the siege and Al-Qaeda were
different phenomena. Juhayman was driven by a misreading of
theology that Bin Laden considered apostasy, while Bin Laden
suffered from megalomania.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador's meeting with Prince Turki,
originally scheduled as a short courtesy call, lasted more
than an hour as the Prince spoke candidly about lessons
learned during his years as a pillar of the Saudi foreign
policy establishment. While he insisted that he had been out
of government for two and a half years, and was thus speaking
from his outsider's perch, Turki appeared well-briefed on the
official Saudi position and eager to share his opinions with
the Ambassador and other USG officials. END COMMENT.
SMITH
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF PK
SUBJECT: PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL ON AFGHANISTAN,
COUNTERTERRORISM
RIYADH 00000153 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting on January 30, Ambassador Smith and
Prince Turki Al-Faisal--former GIP Head and Ambassador to the
U.S., and current Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal
Center-- discussed ways to further strengthen the U.S.- Saudi
bilateral relationship; Saudi Arabia's Afghanistan lessons
learned, and how the U.S. might use these to achieve our
current goals; the Saudis' counterterrorism strategy; and why
Islamic extremism surprised the Saudis. Originally scheduled
as a brief courtesy call, the meeting lasted over an hour as
the Prince candidly shared his insider's view on these and
other topics of U.S.-Saudi interest. His daughter, Princess
Mashael, joined her father and the Ambassador for part of the
meeting. END SUMMARY.
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIPS ARE KEY
--------------
2. (U) Thanking the Ambassador for his visit, Prince Turki
noted that the Saudi-American relationship had always been
driven by warm personal relationships at the highest levels.
While these relationships continued, lower-level,
people-to-people exchanges were now of growing importance.
During his time in the U.S., first as a student and later as
the Saudi Ambassador, he had made a concerted effort to
travel widely and engage Americans outside of the nation's
capital. He hoped Ambassador Smith would be able to do the
same in Saudi Arabia.
TRUST BREEDS COOPERATION...
--------------
3. (C) Ambassador asked for Prince Turki's thoughts
regarding the current U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship,
focusing on ways we might be able to intensify our
cooperation on issues of common interest, such as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East Peace. Turki observed
that Saudi-U.S. cooperation and collaboration reached an
unusual peak during the 80's and 90's, when he worked as GIP
Head, but that the relationship remained very close. The
consultations between the King and President Obama were a
reflection of this closeness, he said, adding that the
leaders "had a level of trust in one another" that inspired
cooperation.
...EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------
4. (C) Focusing on Afghanistan, Turki shared some Saudi
lessons learned. Afghanistan was a "puzzle," with a
"peculiarly Afghan" organizational structure that the Saudis
had difficulty making sense of. In his view, establishing
trust with Afghan leaders had been the key to the Saudis'
success at the time, as was recognizing the links between
Pakistan and the Taliban. All financial aid to the Taliban
government was conditional, with the Saudis unwilling to hand
anything over until the fighting had stopped. The same thing
was needed in Afghanistan today-- benchmarks for the
leadership must be set, and aid must be withheld until these
are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation
had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short." Karzai
had asked for Saudi help, but let them down when he began
readying for elections instead of following through with the
mediation process.
PUT THE FOCUS BACK ON BIN LADEN
--------------
5. (C) The Taliban leadership was now fractured, Turki
continued. The media labeled anyone fighting against NATO or
the U.S. as "Taliban," but many were simply crooks, drug
dealers, gangsters or terrorists that profited from the
country's instability. The U.S. and NATO needed to target
these criminal elements more vociferously. Further, we
needed to re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden
and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. The people harboring them were not
doing so for ideological or even financial reasons, Turki
insisted, but simply because there was no longer any real
RIYADH 00000153 002.2 OF 002
cost to doing so. "Since 2003, Bin Laden has been
comfortable...he has had time to plan operations" such as the
Christmas bombing attempt. He suggested Saudi Arabia, the
U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join
forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden
and Al-Zawahiri. This would break the terrorists' "aura of
invincibility" and allow the U.S. to "declare victory" and
move on.
PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE
--------------
6. (C) All things considered, the U.S. response to 9/11 was
relatively measured, said Turki. If the same thing had
occurred anywhere else, the world would have expected to see
far more violent reprisals. The Saudis had learned from the
American response to 9/11, and "resisted the trap" of
retaliating in a way that would only generate more hatred.
He credited Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohamed bin
Nayif for developing the Kingdom's innovative
counterterrorism program, and winning support for it from his
father, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz, the
Crown Prince, and the King. The strategy required patience,
but the King was willing to wait.
IN RETROSPECT, WRITING WAS ON THE WALL
--------------
7. (C) Turki then discussed the 1979 siege of the Great
Mosque in Mecca, observing that he--and the rest of the Saudi
leadership--had a blind spot when it came to believing
someone could do something so violent in the name of Islam.
In retrospect, the signs that a problem had been brewing were
clear. He took issue with the thesis that the event marked
the birth of Al-Qaeda, claiming the siege and Al-Qaeda were
different phenomena. Juhayman was driven by a misreading of
theology that Bin Laden considered apostasy, while Bin Laden
suffered from megalomania.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador's meeting with Prince Turki,
originally scheduled as a short courtesy call, lasted more
than an hour as the Prince spoke candidly about lessons
learned during his years as a pillar of the Saudi foreign
policy establishment. While he insisted that he had been out
of government for two and a half years, and was thus speaking
from his outsider's perch, Turki appeared well-briefed on the
official Saudi position and eager to share his opinions with
the Ambassador and other USG officials. END COMMENT.
SMITH