SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SRAP WITH SAUDI INTEL: WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE TALIBAN?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000101

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PK, AF, SA
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SRAP WITH SAUDI INTEL: WHAT TO
DO ABOUT THE TALIBAN?

REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1639
B. RIYADH 8

RIYADH 00000101 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY:
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1. (C) During a meeting with General Masudi, General Director
of Internal Affairs for the General Intelligence Presidency
(GIP),Barnett R. Rubin, the Special Advisor to the Special
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, sought Masudi,s
views regarding the Taliban, Saudi plans to deal with them
politically, and the objectives of Pakistan. Masudi
discussed the GIP view of the Taliban and mentioned concerns
about keeping Pakistan a part of the process. He also
discussed the growing Iranian role in Pakistan's instability,
Taliban financing in Saudi Arabia and a possible positive
outcome for Afghans being held in Saudi Arabia. End Summary.

2. (S//NF) Barnett R. Rubin, the Special Advisor to the
Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Chief
GRPO met with General Masudi, the General Director of
Internal Affairs for the GIP, on January 11 to discuss policy
regarding the Taliban and the potential for cooperation with
the SAG in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

THE SAG VIEW OF THE MATTER
--------------

3. (C) Masudi gave an overview of SAG thinking about the
Afghan Taliban. The SAG viewed the Afghan Taliban as largely
under the control of Pakistan, Masudi said. Many members of
the Taliban were born in Pakistan as refugees, had lived
there and had family there. However, there were some members
of the Afghan Taliban who were opposed to such a strong
Pakistani influence. They wished to pursue their own
objectives without outside influence. Unfortunately, this
group was weak. These members of the Afghan Taliban needed
support to be able to become more independent of Pakistan.


AFGHAN FIGHTERS EXPLOITED BY IRAN AND PAKISTAN
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4. (C) Most of the Afghan Taliban were Afghan citizens,
Masudi continued, but they did not have a clear vision of
what they wanted for Afghanistan. The vast majority of the
Afghan fighters were being exploited by outside powers and
simply used as "fuel for the battle." Outside powers, like
Iran and Pakistan, had influenced the uneducated Afghans to
believe that the U.S. and the SAG were working against the
Afghan people. We have to convey the truth to this group,
Masudi urged, because they were ignorant and simply didn't
know.


DON'T FORGET PAKISTAN
--------------

5. (C) In order for any of this to work, Masudi cautioned,
it was vital to consider Pakistan's concerns regarding
Afghanistan. Pakistan was very concerned about losing
influence in Afghanistan to India and Iran. It was important
that the SAG and the U.S. reassure Pakistan that any
activities conducted wouldn't harm its interests, otherwise
there might be a backlash. Furthermore, the Pakistani
government insisted that it played a big part in the defeat
of the Soviets. Islamabad lost much in the war, and had to
take in millions of Afghan refugees. The Pakistanis felt
that they deserved to have a big part in Afghanistan, Masudi
said. They wanted to be "the closest friend" and were
offended when they thought Iran or India were taking this
role.

6. (C) The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was also a
major concern to Pakistan, Masudi said, even if the
Pakistanis didn't say it. This single issue was a very
important factor in the 1980's when Pakistan was deciding
which mujahidin groups to support. (Note: At that time
Masudi worked on Afghanistan for GIP chief Prince Turki
al-Faisal. End note.) Pakistan would support only those
leaders who promised to recognize the Durand Line as an

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international border. This was why Pakistan did not support
Ahmad Shah Massoud.


THE TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN; A WHOLE DIFFERENT MATTER
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Masudi made a big distinction between the Taliban in
Afghanistan and in Pakistan. In Pakistan, he said, Al Qaeda
had much more of an influence over the Taliban. Negotiating
with the Taliban in Pakistan wouldn't work because they
didn't have a political cause to negotiate.


IRAN AND AL QAEDA
--------------

8. (C) Masudi said that the GIP had information that
demonstrated new links between Iran and Al Qaeda. Some Al
Qaeda prisoners that were held in Iran had been released and
gone to fight in Waziristan. Masudi gave the example of
Yasin Bargush, a Syrian member of Al Qaeda's leadership who
was arrested and detained in Iran. Masudi said that Bargush
was released by Iran to strengthen the link between Al Qaeda
and Iran.


TALIBAN FINANCING
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9. (C) Rubin outlined the USG's concern about members of the
Taliban fundraising in the KSA. Even if Taliban leaders
traveled to the KSA for talks, he explained, it was key that
they were not allowed to raise funds while they were in the
Kingdom. Masudi agreed and assured Rubin that guests of the
GIP in Saudi Arabia were not raising money. Masudi suggested
that his office meet with the MOI and give them an overview
of these discussions so that they could coordinate some of
their efforts. "We need to be clear with all of the
government that raising money is not permitted."


AFGHANS ARRESTED IN KSA COULD BE HELPFUL
--------------

10. (C) Masudi also mentioned that the SAG held a number of
Afghans in prison on charges of fundraising for the Taliban.
Perhaps these prisoners could be used as bargaining chips in
political talks, Masudi speculated. This could strengthen
the hand of those engaged in political discussions and
demonstrate to members of the Taliban that such efforts could
produce positive results. Masudi suggested that this was
another area where the GIP could coordinate with the MOI.


ALL THE REST
--------------

11. (C) Summarizing his views on the Haqqani Network and
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Masudi said they all wanted power
but they would join the political process eventually. "When
they are convinced that a military solution won't work, they
will join to have a piece of the cake."

12. (U) Special Advisor to the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Barnett R. Rubin, has cleared this
message.
SMITH