LATVIA: MORE CHARGES LIKELY AS POLICE CONTINUE PASSPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000051

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/VO BILL BEARDSLEE, LAURA STEIN, AND BRENDA GREWE
DEPT ALSO FOR CA/FPP SETH BILLINGS
FRANKFURT FOR RCO KERRY BROUGHAM AND CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
DHS HEADQUARTERS FOR EMILY HYMOWITZ
MOSCOW FOR FPM ERIN EUSSEN AND NIV CHIEF PHIL SKOTTE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CIS PGOV PREL ASEC KFRD KCOR KCRM LG

SUBJECT: LATVIA: MORE CHARGES LIKELY AS POLICE CONTINUE PASSPORT
FRAUD INVESTIGATION

REF: 08 RIGA 23

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On January 21 we met with the Latvian Security
Police to discuss a two-year passport fraud investigation.
Officials confirmed that 10 suspects have been charged, and more
indictments are expected. The Government of Latvia (GOL) confirmed
that 144 false identities were created and shared the actual
biographical information of foreign nationals who fraudulently
obtained the Latvian passports. Previously, it appeared that
Latvian authorities were only targeting corrupt officials for
prosecution and planned to merely recover and cancel the fraudulent
documents, but it is now clear that all who obtained these passports
could face prosecution in Latvia that would also meet the threshold
for U.S. visa ineligibilities. Latvian officials understand the
importance of document security with regard to LatviaQs
participation in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). This far-reaching
investigation and willingness to share data underscores that the GOL
continues to take this matter seriously. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On January 12, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the
consular section with information about four new criminal cases
filed between September and November 2009 pertaining to a
high-profile passport fraud scheme that was uncovered in late 2007,
shortly before Latvia was admitted into the VWP (reftel). The
Regional Security Office separately received an updated list of the
fraudulent passports which authorities have identified. On January
21 we met with senior Latvian Security Police officials, including
the lead investigator, to discuss the status of the case. Police
officials confirmed that, in addition to the four recently filed
criminal cases, six other individuals have been charged in separate
cases in connection with fraudulently obtaining genuine Latvian
passports. The police officials confirmed that the investigation is
continuing and that evidence is being analyzed on a case-by-case
basis, often involving the assistance of handwriting experts or
other forensic specialists. Thus, while it is difficult to
determine how many individuals will ultimately face criminal
charges, the police indicated that anyone who was involved in the
selling or the purchase of the fraudulent identities is fair game.



3. (SBU) The Security Police confirmed that a total of 144 false
identities were created in the Population Register of Latvia between
2002 and 2006 before the fraud scheme was uncovered, and passports
were issued in all of these identities. The number of identities
does not exactly line up with the number of passports issued because
some travelers were issued multiple passports (for example, if they
subsequently registered a marriage and obtained a new passport in
the married name or if they filled the pages from travel). Latvian
authorities shared the most updated list showing the names of the
false identities and, for 66 of the passports, the corresponding
real biographic information for those who purchased the passports
and may face criminal charges. (Note: There were some
discrepancies in separate lists received from the GOL over the past
two years, and the Security Police pledged to provide post with a
further updated list for use in consolidating information and
creating substantive visa lookout entries. End note.)


4. (SBU) The police officials also provided assurances that,
although a total of 108 passport books have not been physically
recovered, all fraudulent passports have been invalidated via the
Interpol and Schengen reporting systems. The corresponding real
names have not yet been identified for 78 fraudulently issued
passports, but authorities have determined the real identities for
the remainder. According to the law enforcement officials, the
majority of the passports were obtained by affluent Russian citizens
who wanted an EU passport for travel purposes, although the police
reported that citizens of Belarus, Ukraine, Israel, and Lithuania
were also involved in the fraud scheme. The police confirmed that
large bribes were paid to secure the fraudulent passports, and
emboffs heard anecdotal reports of payments of up to USD 100,000 for

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the passports. The high price these genuine documents commanded
underscores the affluence of the suspects in this investigation.
The Security Police noted that charges thus far have focused on
fraud and forgery, but suggested that additional charges could be
filed against the passport recipients for the bribery associated
with obtaining the travel documents.

Comment:
--------------


5. (SBU) Up until now, it was postQs understanding that Latvian
authorities were only targeting the Latvian bureaucrats and
ringleaders who issued the fraudulent passports for prosecution and
that police were content to merely recover and cancel the
ill-begotten passports. It is now clear that criminal charges are
possible for many or all of the people who paid large sums for these
fraudulent travel documents, and the recently filed charges over the
past few months demonstrate that the two-year long investigation
indeed continues and is yielding results. The participation of the
Chief and Deputy Chief of the responsible Latvian Security Police
unit in this meeting with emboffs and their willingness to share
data with post also demonstrates that Latvia is taking document
security issues seriously, and officials are mindful that it is an
important element of the countryQs participation in the Visa Waiver
Program. Most of the passport holders reside abroad, but even if
suspects agree to pay a fine as part of a guilty plea if they are
charged, there could be a substantial number of affluent and
possibly influential persons facing future criminal eligibilities
for U.S. visas.

Visa Lookout Entries:
--------------


6. (SBU) When post obtained the first lists of fraudulent identities
from the GOL in early 2008, consular staff promptly entered P6C
misrepresentation lookouts into the CLASS system. However, when
some of the holders of the fraudulent passports subsequently applied
for U.S. visas, it was noted that there was no basis for a hard 6C
ineligibility as the passports were never used to obtain a U.S.
immigration benefit. The P6C lookouts were also based on the
fraudulent identities and were not linked to the real identities of
those who obtained the passports, which in many instances still
remains unknown. Since Latvian authorities have invalidated the
passports electronically and the criteria for 6C misrepresentation
as established in the Immigration and Nationality Act is not met,
post will seek to remove the P6C lookouts via CLOK in coordination
with the Visa Office. However, QLQ lookouts will be entered for all
fake identities involving passports which have not been physically
recovered, which will ensure that adjudicating consular officers are
alerted in the event one of these passports is presented in
conjunction with a visa application.


7. (SBU) Post will follow up with the Department of Homeland
Security Customs and Border Protection to ensure that the Latvian
efforts to invalidate the documents were sufficient to alert U.S.
port of entry inspectors should any of the unrecovered fraudulent
passports be presented for admission to the U.S. via the Visa Waiver
Program. On January 26 the consular section searched the Consular
Consolidated Database (CCD) and confirmed that no visas have been
issued for any of the known fraudulent identities. There were
several new fraudulent names on the most recent list which had not
previously been provided by Latvian law enforcement and therefore
had no CLASS lookouts, so conoff checked the DHS Arrival Departure
Information System (ADIS) to confirm that none of these fraudulent
identities had been used to enter the United States. New QL
lookouts will be added for these identities as well. We are also
expecting Latvian authorities to provide information on
approximately 20 additional fraudulent identities (of the 144
reported) that we have not received thus far.


8. (SBU) Since there is a reasonable basis to believe that criminal
charges may eventually be filed against all known subjects who

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obtained fraudulent Latvian passports, post will enter possible P2A1
ineligibilities for moral turpitude in the CLASS system for the 66
real identities that have been revealed to date. These entries
would alert consular officers to possible pending criminal cases in
Latvia should the same subjects apply for U.S. visas at any embassy
or consulate. Those charged in the four criminal cases shared by
the MFA have already been entered, but the Security Police agreed to
provide information about the other six confirmed indictments filed
thus far. Post will upgrade these lookouts to hard category one
hits for moral turpitude as information about convictions becomes
available since all applicable statutes in the Latvian criminal code
carry possible prison sentences of one year or more in prison and
meet the criteria for a visa ineligibility.

GARBER