DAS SANDERSON MEETS SENIOR MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000127

SIPDIS

FOR NEA AND IO/PHO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM PREF MO WI
SUBJECT: DAS SANDERSON MEETS SENIOR MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE
AND MFA OFFICIALS

REF: A. RABAT 114

B. RABAT 34

Classified By: Political Counselor Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: DAS Janet Sanderson held separate
meetings in Rabat January 21 with Director-General for
Studies and Documentation (DGED) Mansouri and MFA Chief
of Staff Bourita. Mansouri indicated that Morocco
intends to remain deeply involved in assisting Guinea's
transition. On counterterrorism, he highlighted
Moroccan fears regarding possible AQIM attacks in sub-
Saharan Africa, and alleged links between AQIM and the
Polisario (but did not elaborate). Both interlocutors
welcomed UNSG Personal Envoy Ross's invitation to resume
informal Western Sahara talks Feb. 9-11 and said Morocco
would participate; however, they held out little hope
for progress if the Personal Envoy (and the U.S.) failed
to convince Algeria to participate officially and to
play a less obstructive role. At the MFA, Bourita
further argued that Ross's mandate is two fold: to
reinvigorate the talks, but also to find ways to improve
relations between Morocco and Algeria. He also
unleashed a spirited case against enlarging MINURSO's
mandate to include human rights, when it comes up for
renewal in April. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson
visited Morocco January 20-23. In addition to meeting
Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri (Reftel A),she met
separately in Rabat with DGED (Morocco's Director of
National Intelligence and National Security Advisor
equivalent) Mohammed Yassine Mansouri and with
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, MFA Director-General for
Multilateral Cooperation and Chief of Staff to the
Foreign Minister.

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Model Cooperation on Guinea
--------------


3. (C) In each meeting, Bourita and Mansouri highlighted
the French-U.S.-Moroccan cooperation in response to the
Guinea crisis (Reftel B),saying that our shared efforts
to convince junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara not to
return to Conakry should serve as a "model" for dealing
trilaterally with future crises in Africa. Guinea
remains fragile, "and King Mohammed VI has asked me --
not as national intelligence director, but personally --
to remain involved in the transition," Mansouri said.
For that transition to succeed, Camara cannot go back to
Conakry, but he also cannot come back to Rabat, he
added. Sanderson responded by commending Morocco's
efforts, and thanked the GOM for "creating the space"
for the U.S. to work with its partners to resolve the
crisis.

--------------
The Terror Threat in Africa
--------------


4. (C) On counterterrorism, Mansouri highlighted
Moroccan fears regarding possible AQIM attacks in sub-
Saharan Africa. He emphasized that, in combating the
AQIM threat, the Magreb cannot be disassociated from
Africa, and that Morocco sees the potential for AQIM
attacks in Nigeria, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. AQIM has
begun to develop two separate cells in southern Algeria
-- one of which, Mansouri alleged, may have links to the
Polisario -- but he offered no further detail. In
responses to Sanderson's question, Mansouri admitted
that Moroccan/Algerian counterterrorism cooperation and
intelligence sharing is non-existent. He described
various unofficial triangulation schemes, whereby
information is shared through third parties, but
admitted that over the course of the past year direct
communication has ceased.

--------------
Algeria Undermining Sahara Negotiations
--------------


5. (C) Highlighting a theme Sanderson heard throughout
her visit, Mansouri welcomed UNSG Personal Envoy
Christopher Ross's invitation to resume informal Western
Sahara talks Feb. 9-11 and said Morocco would
participate. However, he expressed frustration with

Algeria's apparent refusal to participate officially in
informal discussions, stating that the GOM needs Algeria
to become "an interlocutor of good faith." Mansouri
also laid a small portion of the blame for Algerian
intransigence at the feet of the U.S., saying that
Algiers has misinterpreted the Obama administration's
less outspoken support for Morocco's autonomy play as "a
change in position on the issue," and is using this as
an excuse not to participate. From a security
perspective, the DG also alleged that Morocco has
evidence that small numbers of "individuals with
narcotics and terrorist connections" are moving from the
Tindouf camps into Moroccan-controlled Sahara at
Algeria's behest, potentially to create unrest. At the
last round of informals in Austria, Mansouri recounted,
Minister Delegate and Algerian Western Sahara negotiator
Abdelkader Messahel even stated to Ross, "We are capable
of creating unrest in the Western Sahara."


6. (C) Sanderson responded that the USG shared some of
Morocco's concerns about the Algerians' reluctance to
play a formal role in the negotiations and said she
would urge them to play an active role at the meeting.
However, she noted that the USG wants the talks to move
away from formalities and toward substance -- something
all sides needed to work to achieve. She reassured
Mansouri that the USG's position regarding Morocco's
autonomy plan as one viable option for resolving the
dispute has not changed.


7. (C) At the MFA, Bourita echoed many of the same
themes as Mansouri regarding Morocco's willingness to
participate in the next round of informal talks. That
said, he acknowledged the poor relations between Morocco
and Algeria, and noted that the UNSC had given Personal
Envoy Ross two missions: to get the GOM-Polisario talks
back on track, and to seek ways to improve Moroccan-
Algerian relations. "We are doing OK on the first, but
failing on the second," he admitted. On a positive
note, Bourita added that there has been no better hope
in recent years for progress in resolving the Sahara
crisis, given that both Morocco and Algeria are in a
position to negotiate from a position of strength; that
there is international political consensus in favor of a
negotiated solution; and that "we have the best mediator
since (former UNSG Personal Envoy James) Baker."

-------------- --------------
GOM Strongly Opposes Human Rights Mandate for MINURSO
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Bourita also gave a spirited defense of
Morocco's longstanding opposition to adding a human
rights component to the UN Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara's (MINURSO) mandate, which comes up for
its annual renewal in April. First, he argued,
MINURSO's implementation of such a mandate would be easy
on the Morocco side, because Morocco has willingly
become party to all the relevant UN human rights
conventions; however, the Polisario -- to whom Algeria
has "abdicated its sovereignty" -- is party to none of
them, and would never agree to permit MINURSO to carry
out its human rights role. Second, a human right
mandate would introduce a political component into a
ceasefire agreement that is purely technical --
potentially creating "unnecessary tension between
Morocco and MINURSO." Third, Bourita said, Algeria and
the Polisario would politicize any MINURSO human rights
activities and distort them as a means to "give
separatists more freedom to operate." Finally, adding
the human rights mandate would be simply unnecessary,
given that Morocco has already opened its doors to UN
and European Union human rights monitors, international
NGOs and U.S. diplomats who freely travel to and
examine the human rights issues in the territory.


9. (C) Sanderson emphasized that the USG has made no
decisions yet regarding how it will react in New York in
April to the question of enlarging MINURSO's mandate;
however, she cautioned, some UNSC members intended to
press the issue and the GOM needed to be prepared and
consider how best to manage this. Bourita urged the
USG to inform the GOM early in the process if its
position changes and to "explain to us how it is in U.S.
interests."


10. (U) DAS Sanderson has cleared this cable.



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