FM SHARES MOROCCAN ANGST ON WESTERN SAHARA WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000114

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA AND IO/PSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS KPKO MO WI
SUBJECT: FM SHARES MOROCCAN ANGST ON WESTERN SAHARA WITH
DAS SANDERSON

REF: RABAT 0028 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Samuel Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri
offered DAS Sanderson a decidedly downbeat assessment both of
Moroccan-Algerian relations and of recent developments
surrounding the Western Sahara. He stated Morocco's
willingness to participate in an informal round of
UN-sponsored talks in February, but predicted that Algerian
non-participation and intransigence would undermine their
usefulness. He rebuked Algeria repeatedly for blocking
progress on the Sahara, Maghreb integration and regional
counterterrorism cooperation, and accused Algerian
intelligence agents of manipulating Sahrawi independence
activists. On a more positive note, Fassi Fihri emphasized
King Mohammed VI's "strong desire" to further strengthen
U.S.-Morocco relations and the GOM's willingness to work with
to promote security in Africa. Fassi Fihri's remarks
reflected continued, deep Moroccan frustration with what the
GOM perceives as a lack of clear U.S. support for their
Western Sahara strategy. End Summary.


2. (U) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Janet Sanderson
met January 22 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi
Fihri as part of her January 21-23 visit to Morocco.
Ambassador Kaplan and PolCouns (notetaker) accompanied the
DAS; Chief of Staff Nasser Bourita, Director of the Americas
Division Fouad Yazourh and U.S. Desk Director Abderrahmin
Rahhaly joined Fassi Fihri.

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Making a Strong Relationship Stronger
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3. (C) The Foreign Minister, who had just returned from
France and had hurried to the meeting directly from the
airport, opened on a positive note by praising the
U.S.-Morocco relationship and our history of cooperation.
King Mohammed VI respects the leadership of President Obama
and deeply appreciates his friendship with the Secretary,
Fassi Fihri said. "And I want to confirm to you how strong
the desire of His Majesty is to strengthen our two countries'
relationship." The FM suggested that the U.S. and Morocco
create a "strategic dialogue" to formalize further their
cooperation on Africa, the Middle East, counterterrorism and
counter-radicalization, and what he termed a dialogue between
Islam and the West. Regarding the latter, Fassi Fihri noted
that "without government encouragement, such dialogue will
not occur spontaneously," and he offered the GOM's continued
good offices -- in partnership with Washington -- to advance
the process. Finally, he asked for U.S. and international
support for Maghreb integration, noting that "all the
countries of the region -- not just Algeria -- need to become
more serious" about working together.

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Deep Frustration with the UN Process
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4. (C) Fassi Fihri then quickly turned the conversation to
the Western Sahara and bluntly accused Algeria of
exacerbating and prolonging the conflict. Morocco welcomes
resuming informal negotiations February 9-11, as UNSG
Personal Envoy Christopher Ross has suggested, he said.
However, GOM does not hold out much hope for the talks'
bearing fruit, given Algeria's refusal to join Morocco and
the Polisario around the table. The Algerians are a party to
this conflict, Fassi Fihri insisted, and they cannot be
permitted to manipulate Polisario negotiators and undermine
the talks from behind the scenes, as they did during past
negotiations. And in addition to undermining the
Ross-sponsored talks, he continued, the GOA has stepped up
its obstructive activities in the territory. Algerian
intelligence operatives have increased efforts to incite
Sahrawi activists to engage in "expression that is free but
not peaceful," he alleged. Yet when the GOM takes action to
ensure peace, the international community accuses it of human
rights violations, and Algeria uses it as an excuse not to
join the UN talks. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
case of Aminatou Haider, whom the FM described as a pawn of
Algiers and not, as many in the U.S. or Europe would have it,
a real human rights defender. "If this continues," Fassi
Fihri concluded, "it could kill the political process."


5. (C) More widely, Fassi Fihri accused Algiers of blocking
Maghreb integration; of undermining regional counterterrorism
cooperation and economic development; and of preventing UNHCR
from conducting a census of the refugees at Tindouf. He
reminded us that the UN had given Ross a two-fold mandate --

i.e., to broker talks aimed at resolving the Sahara conflict
AND to find ways to improve relations between Algeria and
Morocco -- and he asked that the U.S. press both Ross and
Algiers, particularly on the latter. DAS Sanderson promised
to explore how the U.S. could support that part of Ross's
mandate.

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Only Autonomy is &Credible and Serious"
--------------


6. (C) Finally the FM reiterated Morocco's deep desire for
more robust Washington support for Morocco's autonomy plan.
In 2007, Washington and Rabat presented the plan together.
The Bush Administration had asked the GOM to soften some
language and be more flexible, Fassi Fihri recounted, and it
accepted that advice. He acknowledged that there were other
options for resolving the Sahara conflict, but insisted that
only Morocco's is "credible and serious." The other sides
have offered nothing new, and the Polisario knows that a
referendum is simply not possible, Fassi Fihri concluded.


7. (C) DAS Sanderson responded to Fassi Fihri's lengthy
presentation by stating that Secretary Clinton has instructed
the Department to place more focus on the Maghreb. In that
regard, the key to progress in all areas centers on resolving
the Sahara conflict, and the U.S. has become very concerned
about the long delays in the UN process. "We do worry that
the longer this goes on, the more it will continue to poison
Algerian-Moroccan relations." As for the autonomy plan,
Sanderson noted that the U.S. does support the autonomy plan
as one solution among many, but that it was important for
Washington not to pre-judge the work of the UNSG Personal
Envoy. Looking forward, she also noted that there was much
work to do in preparation for the renewal of MINURSO's
mandate in April (septels),and that the U.S. and Morocco
needed to work together to find a strategy for managing that
process.

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Comment
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8. (C) Fassi Fihri's pessimistic analysis of the UN process
and his 25-minute tirade against Algeria reflect the GOM's
deep, but understandable, frustration with what it perceives
as a lack of clear U.S. support for Morocco's autonomy play.
More difficult for us to understand -- and therefore more
difficult to respond to -- are the GOM's vehement allegations
regarding the role of Algerian intelligence in Western Sahara
and its continued bewilderment over our negative reaction to
the Haidar case (reftel). End Comment.


9. (U) DAS Sanderson has cleared this message.


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KAPLAN