FATA SECURITY UPDATE; PAKISTANI/RC-EAST COORDINATION ON

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000010


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS PK AF
SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE; PAKISTANI/RC-EAST COORDINATION ON
BAJAUR

CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Consul General, Peshawar, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (C) Summary. During a January 23 briefing for RC-East MG
Scapparotti, 11th Corps Chief of Staff BG Aamer provided an
overview of the security situation in FATA and Malakand
Division, Northwest Frontier Province. It would take at least
a year, predicted Aamer, to finish military operations and
create the conditions for civilian development that is required
to stabilize the area. The imminent operation in Bajaur (for
which MG Scaparrotti met the same day with Frontier Corps MG
Tariq Khan to plan coordinated operations) was designed to: (a)
prevent militants who had re-infiltrated into Bajaur from again
threatening the neighboring settled areas of Malakand Division;
and (b) finish operations in northern FATA so that they could
redeploy and increase forces in the south (i.e., North
Waziristan) by May-June. 11th Corps Commander LTG Masood made
it clear that the Army had decided to change tactics and would
no longer displace local populations ahead of combat because the
post-conflict consequences of this in Bajaur and Malakand had
been too disruptive. The Army and the Frontier Corps again
complained about militant support from the Governor of Kunar
Province and noted the importance of reconstruction and
restoring civilian governance to their ability to reverse
militancy. This is a joint CG Peshawar SOC-FWD Pakistan
message. End Summary.


South/North Waziristan (SWA/NWA)


2. (C) According to Aamer, the Army is continuing
"synchronized, calibrated" operations around Ladha in central
SWA where militants are trying to regroup because they
increasingly are being denied support in NWA. The Wazir tribe
is "completely on board," and discussions with the dominant
Mehsud tribe (reftel) continue. Many within the Mehsud tribe
are now openly advocating support to the Government of Pakistan
which is considered to be against their cultural norms. The
Army is expanding its "social space" of areas in which the local
population supports anti-militant operations with both
intelligence and the denial of sanctuary.


3. (C) IEDs remain the weapon of choice within SWA and all
indications are the TTP leadership has fled the Agency to NWA
and left behind mid-level leadership and foot soldiers behind to
continue harassment operations. Gul Bhadar continues to support
these resistance activities. Both Aamer and Masood highlighted
the $55 million USAID has provided for SWA.


4. (C) In North Waziristan (NWA),"the environment is being
shaped (through roadblocks and snap operations) to deal
effectively with the situation by the middle of the year." The
Army will be rotating forces in May/June, with the "quiet"
result of an added infantry battalion and additional Special
Service Group (Special Forces) troops. The relief in place of
these infantry formations is designed to bring fresh troops into
the environment as the current formations have been engaged in
combat operations for nearly two continuous years.


5. (C) The January 21-22 operations in NWA included an attack
that killed ten militants along the border near Machi Khel and
an airstrike on a militant compound outside Miram Shah where
known Arab, Uzbek, and Afghan fighters were living. Aamer said
that the areas around Mir Ali, Miram Shah, Datta Khel and the
Tochi Valley remained problematic. Extremists were being
supported by Gul Bahadar, foreign fighters and Punjabi militants
(Note: no mention of the Haqqani network but an interesting
admission on the presence of Punjabi militants). The problem
was that these areas were heavily populated (Aamer claimed the
population of NWA was now about 800,000); LTG Masood said
several times that the Army had abandoned its previous strategy
of depopulating areas before military operations. "There will
be no new displacements," as this punishes the tribes and
creates too many post-conflict challenges. Aamer and Masood
voiced the hope that the NWA population has taken a lesson from
what happened in SWA and will cooperate with the government to
preclude a similar fate for themselves.


Orakzai/Mohmand/Kurram/Khyber


6. (C) Most of the access points to Orakzai Agency have been
blocked but further action is planned after the Bajaur operation
is completed. The plan is to encircle Mangal Bagh's militants
in the Tirah Valley (a central point in the Kurram, Khyber and
Orakzai Agencies). This is the area that al-Qaida wants to keep
in reserve as a sanctuary if they lose the Waziristans,
according to Aamer. The Thall-Parachinar road in Kurram, which
was blocked by militants for over a year, is now open; the major
concern in Kurram now is habitual Sunni-Shi'a conflict. Pockets
of resistance along the border remain in Mohmand Agency, which
serves as a conduit between Bajaur and Khyber/Orakzai. The
Frontier Corps will continue sporadic operations in Khyber
Agency, which controls Af-Pak trade and Coalition Forces' supply
routes and protects Peshawar.


Bajaur


7. (C) Aamer noted that militants from Swat and Dir (Malakand
Division, NWFP) as well as from the Khyber and Orakzai Agencies
in FATA and Afghanistan had been steadily moving into the Bajaur
area in recent months. These included Maulana Fazlullah, Qari
Hussain, Jan Wali, Qazi Zia ur Rehman, and Salih Mohammad. The
focus of militant activity remains the Mahmond tehsil along the
border with Kunar Province in Afghanistan, but Aamer admitted
they do not yet have full control of the restive Charmang
Valley. The Frontier Corps has established concentric rings, an
inner one around Mahmond tehsil and another around Khar to block
militant exits. Since the militants are aware of planned
operations, however, Aamer said the leaders already were
slipping away to Afghanistan. The focus on the upcoming
operation will be against mid-level forces; the plan is to
regain control of Mohmand and station troops there for at least
six months to stabilize the agency.


8. (S/REL PAK) Aamer and Masood were adamant the Governor of
Kunar was providing logistical and refuge support to TNSM
Commander Faqir Mohmand and remained concerned the upcoming
Bajaur operation would merely displace him and his key leaders
to Afghanistan.


9. (S/REL PAK) Masood noted the importance of securing Bajaur
that he identified as key to securing the northern portion of
Pakistan. Preventing movement through Bajaur into Lower Dir,
combined with efforts in Afghanistan in preventing movement
through Nuristan, would secure the Malakand Division. Security
within the settled areas will allow the Pakistan military to
shift some of the nearly three divisions' worth of troops
currently acting as a hold force there to support the efforts in
SWA and NWA. Aamer inserted into this discussion the importance
of developmental and reconstructive aid into this region, and
specifically asked for donor representation in Khar, Bajaur.


U.S. Operations in Afghanistan


10. (C) Noting that RC-East covered the major population
centers important to improving governance and controlling Kabul,
LTG Masood asked why the U.S. was concentrating the troop surge
in RC-South. Scaparrotti replied that we needed to control a
Taliban resurgence but noted that his major focus was governance
and the number of civilian experts in RC-East had increased from
30-174 during his command.


Bio Note


11. (C) LTG Masood's only son was killed in the December 4
attack on a mosque in Rawalpindi. Since then, he has been
reporting to the 11th Corps headquarters in Peshawar only
infrequently. Before his son's death, he was due to retire but
was extended for the SWA operation. Mission sources report that
COAS General Kayani has agreed that Masood will be given the
option of remaining in Peshawar but for how long remains
unclear. In the meetings today, he was particularly unfocused
and BG Aamer, who has effectively been running 11th Corps,
interrupted and corrected his commander on several occasions.


Operational Planning With the Frontier Corps


12. (C) In a follow-on meeting, FC MG Tariq provided a
detailed historical overview of the FATA/NWFP covering the last
several years. He particularly explained how the GoP agreed to
a series of deals with various militant factors and tribes
because of political necessity. As the deals were broken by the
various factions, the GoP used this as justification to conduct
operations against them.


13. (C) Bajaur was the first major operation conducted but was
unable to conclude due to unrest within Malakand and eventually
SWA. Currently the militants were attempting to reconsolidate
their position in the northern portions of Bajaur believing the
difficult terrain and Faqir Muhammad's grip on the region
prevented effective FC interdiction. Tariq claimed the local
tribes want them removed from the area.


14. (S/REL PAK) The current plan is to conduct a three phased
operation against the remaining contested regions with Bajaur.
The first two are directed at pushing the militants up through
Mohmand tehsil towards Afghanistan with an expectation RC-E
would conduct disrupting operations as a blocking force. The
third phase is directed towards Hashim Valley, along the
southern portion of Bajaur. Shaping operations were due to
begin January 24 with the initiation of air strikes against
pre-planned targets followed by a ground assault beginning on
January 26. The actual start will be dependent on the weather.
An Agency-wide curfew will be issued 24hrs prior to the ground
assault in order to isolate the militant and safeguard the
population. Tariq did not expect any major population
disruptions.


15. (S/REL PAK) The Frontier Corps operations will target the
following militant groups:

- Faqir Muhammad (Strength: 180-200)

- Ibn-e-Amin/Fateh (Strength: 150-200)

- Jan Wali Alisa Sheena Gp (Strength: 70-80)

- Maulv I Umar Group (Strength: 25-30)

- Qari Zia Ur Rheman Group (Strength: 40-50)

Each of the elements are known supporters of Faqir Muhammad, who
is the dominant threat personality in Bajaur. Faqir Muhammad is
currently broadcasting through FM thaQe is ready to support
the GoP, but Tariq believes he is using these statements to buy
time prior to the launch of the offensive. This is not the
first time Faqir Muhammad has used this tactic.


16. (S/REL PAK) Like 11th Corps, the Frontier Corps iterated
to RC-East their belief, based on intelligence analysis, that
the Governor of Kunar is providing logistical and refuge support
to the militants. The preferred tactic was to cross into
Afghanistan for about a kilometer, cache their equipment, and
blend into the local population to evade capture.


16. (S/REL PAK) RC-East, Frontier Corps, 11th Corps, and
SOC(FWD)-PAK will use the Intel Fusion Cells as the
deconfliction point and the conduit to pass intelligence back
and forth.


PUTNAM