Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10PARIS84
2010-01-26 18:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

MINURCAT: FRENCH WANT TO PRESERVE UN PRESENCE IN

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR KPKO UN CD CT FR 
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P 261823Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8137
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000084 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR KPKO UN CD CT FR
SUBJECT: MINURCAT: FRENCH WANT TO PRESERVE UN PRESENCE IN
CHAD AND C.A.R.

REF: A. N'DJAMENA 43

B. N'DJAMENA 48

C. N'DJAMENA 49

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000084

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR KPKO UN CD CT FR
SUBJECT: MINURCAT: FRENCH WANT TO PRESERVE UN PRESENCE IN
CHAD AND C.A.R.

REF: A. N'DJAMENA 43

B. N'DJAMENA 48

C. N'DJAMENA 49

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Maintaining a UN presence in Chad and
C.A.R. remains a French priority but obtaining an extension
of MINURCAT will require effort to overcome Chad President
Deby's opposition, MFA Chad/C.A.R. desk officer Vincent
Alexandre said on January 21. Such a presence is necessary
because there is no other mechanism available to carry out
MINURCAT's mission of protecting refugee camps and
humanitarian workers. One problem, in France's view, is that
MINURCAT has been poorly supported and has not fulfilled its
potential, bolstering Deby's argument against an extension.
MINURCAT should be extended for another year but if not one
year, than at least until the latter part of 2010. The
French hope that an extended MINURCAT mission in Chad would
eventually be able to hand over its functions to a more
capable and motivated Chadian entity, based on the existing
DIS component. MINURCAT's small element in C.A.R., however,
would be difficult to replace; failure to replace would leave
a vulnerable void in a volatile region. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Vincent Alexandre, MFA desk officer for Chad and
C.A.R., shared his views on MINURCAT on January 22 and
problems associated with the end of its mandate (reftels).
Alexandre, who is a French Army Lieutenant Colonel seconded
to the MFA, was blunt in his assessment. He offered his
analysis of why Chad President Deby does not want MINURCAT
extended. First, Deby was playing the sovereignty card,
arguing that Chad did not need a foreign presence to take
care of its problems. Second, Deby was exploiting the fact
that MINURCAT has been a weak and ineffective force, a point
with which Alexandre agreed (see further below). Third, Deby
was emboldened by DRC President Kabila's willingness to
oppose the MONUC operation in the DRC. Fourth, Deby claimed
that MINURCAT was causing inflation because MINURCAT members
had the means to pay more for items purchased locally, thus

driving up prices for everyone. (Alexandre said this was a
specious, disingenuous argument, since it did not take into
account the money MINURCAT was injecting into the system, but
that Deby and others were nonetheless making this claim.)
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, Deby was pointing to the
recent significant improvements in Chad-Sudan relations in
order to claim that tensions across the region were
diminishing and that therefore MINURCAT was no longer
necessary.


3. (C) Alexandre said that Deby was not inaccurate in
criticizing MINURCAT's performance. Alexandre said that the
mission had never been adequately supported by the UN and
that the UN had not been comfortable with inheriting a
mission from the EU, which had itself been cajoled into
developing a mission by France, the result of France's desire
to prevent Sudan's problems spilling westward and southward
into Chad and C.A.R.. Near the end of its one-year mandate,
MINURCAT was still only 50 percent staffed, Alexandre said,
with only about 2,600 forces. That number was deceptive --
only about 600 of these forces were actually deployable, with
the other 2,000 performing rear-area support functions. Many
of the units were ill-equipped, lacking vehicles and even
ammunition, which made it difficult to perform even the most
basic tasks out in the field.


4. (C) That said, MINURCAT in its present state was better
than nothing, and in Chad and C.A.R., anything better than
nothing was worthwhile, Vincent stressed. Although operating
at far less than an optimal level, MINURCAT performed a
deterrent function, served as a potential trip-wire that the
international community monitored, and was a
confidence-builder among the NGO and humanitarian assistance
communities. Vincent predicted that significant numbers of
NGOs and their personnel might consider leaving Chad if
MINURCAT disappeared. Vincent also said that a MINURCAT
presence would surely create a more promising environment
during presently scheduled elections in the region.


5. (C) Alexandre said that France favored a one-year
extension for MINURCAT but, if this were not possible, at
least an extension that would carry into the latter part of
2010 (i.e., for six-eight months). In the meantime, Vincent
said that France and others should redouble efforts to train
DIS personnel, who were gradually becoming more competent,
who were beginning to enjoy the NGO community's trust, and

PARIS 00000084 002 OF 002


who were the natural element to carry out MINURCAT's missions
should MINURCAT leave and its protective functions devolve
onto the Chadian government.


6. (C) Alexandre suggested that we try to convince Deby
that it would be in his interest to allow MINURCAT to
continue. Its presence would allow Chad to avoid taking on
responsibilities vis-a-vis the refugees and NGOs that the
international community would strongly and rightfully expect
Chad to undertake if Chad refused to allow MINURCAT to
continue. Even if less than effective than it could be,
MINURCAT helped ease tensions and deterred all manner of
potential violence (criminal as well as political) in its
zones of operations. Did Deby really want to take on those
responsibilities? Alexandre suggested that Deby be reminded
that if he caused MINURCAT to pack up and leave, the
international community would not likely be quick to send
another force if things turned sour in Chad again and Deby
asked for outside assistance. The overall situation may have
improved recently but Chad has seen things turn bad quickly
before.

C.A.R.
--------------

7. (C) Alexandre said that the Togolese component of
MINURCAT deployed in eastern C.A.R. was doing a good job and
was quite capable compared to most of MINURCAT's other units.
Alexandre said that the part of MINURCAT in C.A.R. played an
important role merely by its presence in eastern C.A.R. and
that region's proximity to Sudan and Chad. Alexandre said
firmly that any renewal of MINURCAT had to include the
portion in C.A.R., since the forces in C.A.R. were filling
what could otherwise easily become an vacuum easy to exploit
by the region's many hostile rebel and militia groups or by
criminals seeking to raid or kidnap vulnerable parties
operating in that area.


8. (C) COMMENT: Alexandre was quite firm in describing the
importance France places on a renewal of MINURCAT and at the
same time also under no illusions about MINURCAT's
shortcomings. The challenge would be to make Deby agree to
an extension, which Alexandre thought could be accomplished
through old-fashioned diplomatic persuasion and by painting
for Deby a bleak scenario post-MINURCAT, with Chad fully
expected by the outside world to do what MINURCAT has been
doing. END COMMENT.
RIVKIN